PUSHPALATA versus VIJAY KUMAR (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ORS. on 5 September 2022

1. With the consent of the parties, this matter is heard finally. Thepresent appeal challenges a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court H

PUSHPALATA v. VIJAY KUMAR (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ORS.[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

at Jabalpur, dismissing the petitioners’ second appeal[1] and affirming theorder and decree passed by the trial court[2].

Facts and contentions:

2. The original first plaintiff – Laxmi Prasad, was the karta of aHindu Undivided Family (HUF) consisting of his wife, Janki Bai (secondplaintiff), two daughters - Sarita and Pushpalata (second and thirdplaintiffs), and two sons – Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar (the firsttwo defendants). The parties are hereafter referred by name, or as‘plaintiffs’ and ‘defendants’.

3. Laxmi Prasad purchased a property measuring 1.6 acres atKhasra No. 44/2 (in Bandobast No. 102, Patwari Halka No. 65 in LalipurWard) by agreement dated 15.02.1960 (hereafter “first property”). Thisfirst property was purchased in the name of Vijay Kumar (i.e., his sonand first defendant). Another piece of property measuring 2332 sq. ft(Plot No. 1/1 in Nazul Street No. 22B; hereafter “second property”)was purchased by Laxmi Prasad on 21/2.05.1966 in the names of histwo sons - Vijay Kumar and Rajendra Kumar. It was alleged that LaxmiPrasad later constructed a two-storied building, with his earnings. Similarly,Laxmi Prasad purchased two more properties admeasuring 150 sq. ft.on 18.12.1972 and 453 sq. ft. on 25.05.1973, again in the names of VijayKumar and Rajendra Kumar. According to Laxmi Prasad, these propertieswere bought by him for the proper maintenance and education of hischildren; he was involved in the construction business.

4. On 03.05.1994, Vijay Kumar sold 0.047 hectares out of theland admeasuring 1.6 acres at Khasra No. 44/2 (first property) – whichforms the subject of this suit (hereafter “suit property”) – to the thirddefendant (hereafter “purchaser”). He allegedly further sold 0.019hectares on 21.06.1995 and 0.049 hectares on 27.08.1996 in favour ofthe third defendant (despite an interim injunction).

5. Laxmi Prasad filed a suit on behalf of himself, his wife (whopassed away in 1996) and two daughters, on 30.09.1994, against his twosons (first and second defendants) and the purchasers of the property(third and fourth defendants) seeking setting aside of the sale deed dated 1 Second Appeal No. 1738/2005, judgment dated 04.04.2013 passed by the MadhyaPradesh High Court at Jabalpur.

2 Civil Suit No. 47A/94, judgment dated 29.09.2004 passed by the Second Civil Judge,Class-I, Mandla (MP).

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A03.05.1994 and the relief of declaration of title. The plaintiffs urged thatthey and the first and second defendants, were members of a HUF, andthat original first defendant (Vijay Kumar) was a benami owner whocould not have alienated the suit property. It was alleged that the propertieswere paid for or purchased by the first plaintiff- Laxmi Prasad and thatthe first two defendants, minors, had no source of income. RajendraBKumar filed written statement dated 16.02.1995, and Vijay Kumar andthe third defendant (subsequent purchaser) filed their respective writtenstatements on 07.12.1999. In the meanwhile, in 1996, the trial court hadrestrained the defendants from alienating the suit properties, and later in2002 from constructing over the suit property.C6. The trial court framed 14 issues; but was predominantly facedwith the issue of whether the first plaintiff was the sole owner, inpossession of the properties purchased, and consequently, whether thefirst defendant was not entitled to sell the disputed land. The trial courtby judgment dated 29.09.2004 dismissed the suit on the ground that theDoriginal plaintiff had failed to prove by cogent evidence that the suitproperty was purchased for the welfare of the co-parceners of the HUFand declared that the first defendant had the right to sell the disputedproperties in his name.

7. The appellate court declined the plaintiffs’ appeal[3] holding thatEthe first plaintiff himself intended for the first defendant to be the absoluteowner, and it was not a benami transaction. It was further held thateven in arguendo, if he was a benami owner (given that the first plaintiffhad paid for the property), that the suit was not maintainable, in view ofthe provisions of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988(hereafter ‘Act’), since the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the propertyFwas purchased for the benefit of it the coparceners. The High Court byimpugned judgment dated 04.04.2013 dismissed the second appeal, withcosts. The High Court reiterated that the plaintiffs had failed to provethat the property was purchased for the benefit of the coparceners, andhence the suit was rightly rejected as not maintainable. Aggrieved, theGplaintiffs sought special leave.

8. For the sake of completeness, it may be noted that MamataBai (third defendant, a subsequent purchaser) filed a contempt petitionwhich was disposed by this court[4], as unmerited. Further, during the3 By order dated 26.04.2005 passed by the District Judge, Mandla (MP) in Civil SuitNo. 19-A/2004.H4 Order dated 16.05.2018 in Contempt Petition (C) No. 509/2015.

proceedings, Laxmi Prasad was deleted[5] from the list of petitioners, andadditionally, legal representatives substituted[6] the original first defendant-Vijay Kumar. The original third plaintiff - Smt. Sarita (Laxmi Prasad’sfirst daughter), died during pendency of appeal before High Court andno legal representatives were brought on record. Therefore, the partiesas they now stand are: the sole petitioner - Ms. Pushpalata (d/o LaxmiPrasad); Respondent Nos. 1.1-1.5 (legal representatives of Vijay Kumar,deceased s/o Laxmi Prasad), Respondent No. 2 – Rajendra Kumar (s/o Laxmi Prasad and original second defendant), Respondent No. 3 and4 (subsequent buyers), among other contesting respondents.

9. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended thatthe defendants, i.e., the two sons, were minors with no independentsource of income. They neither had the capacity to purchase the saidproperties, nor alienate them. It was urged that the plaintiffs were jointowners of the property, and being coparceners, out of love and affection,the properties were registered in the names of the defendant sons.Instances in the written statements filed by the defendants, were pointedout in support of these averments – that the defendants were minors atthe time, by their own admission. Furthermore, the second defendant-Rajendra Kumar had in fact, admitted the petitioner’s claim in the civilsuit.

10. The petitioner-plaintiffs urged that the facts of this case, andthe pleadings, established that the property was purchased long ago, bythe father, i.e., the late Laxmi Prasad for the benefit of the HUF couldnot be treated as that of the sons. Reliance was placed on Section 4 (3)(a) of the Act in this regard, to say that the ostensible owner could not,under the Act, be treated as the owner, because the ownership was onbehalf of the HUF. Reliance was placed on this court’s judgment inValliammal v. Subramaniam[7] to urge that it is not only the documentaryevidence, but the surrounding circumstances, such as who funded thetransaction, relationship of the parties, nature of possession after thesale, etc., that had to be considered. It was urged that the material onrecord, such as the pleadings and evidence, established the plaintiffs’claim. Counsel stressed on the fact that the first plaintiff’s deposition 5 Order dated 27.08.2018, IA No. 91588/2018 allowed.

6 Order dated 11.05.2022, IA No. 85600/2021 allowed.

7 2004 Supp (1) SCR 966

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Aabout having paid for the property, and that the first two defendantswere his sons, went unrebutted. Furthermore, the first defendant did notproduce any material to support that he had the funds, or the means oflivelihood to purchase the properties. Likewise, the second defendantsupported the plaintiffs, and admitted to the suit averments; he alsodeposed in favour of the plaintiffs. Counsel urged that in theseBcircumstances, the findings of the two courts below were contrary toevidence. The High Court, in declining to hold that the questions of lawwere to be answered in favour of the plaintiffs, erred in law.

11. Counsel on behalf of the respondents defended the impugnedjudgment and insisted that the High Court had correctly appreciated theCmatter by dismissing the suit as being barred by Section 4 (1) of the Act.It was further urged that the first appellate court was virtually the lastarbiter on facts and evidence, and that it ought not to be interfered with,given the absence of any substantial question of law.

12. It was further submitted that this court rarely – if ever interferesDwith concurrent findings. Absent any manifest error of law, orunreasonable findings of fact, the discretion under Article 136 of theConstitution, should not be invoked to upset findings of the courts below.

Analysis and conclusions

E13. In light of the contentions raised, it is necessary to considerthe relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2 defines ‘benami transaction’as as any transaction in which property is transferred to one person,for consideration paid or provided by another person. Section 3[8],prohibits entering such transactions, barring for the benefit of wife orunmarried daughter. Section 4 reads as follows:F

“4. Prohibition of the right to recover property heldbenami- 8 “3. Prohibition of benami transactions-

(1) No person shall enter into any benami transaction.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to the purchase of property by anyGperson in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter and it shall be presumed, unlessthe contrary is proved, that the said property had been purchased for the benefit of thewife of the unmarried daughter.

(3) Whoever enters into any benami transaction shall be punishable withimprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,H1973, an offence under this section shall be non-cognizable and bailable.”

(1) No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respectof any property held benami against the person in whosename the property is held or against any other person shalllie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the realowner of such property.

(2) No defence based on any right in respect of any propertyheld benami, whether against the person in whose namethe property is held or against any other person, shall beallowed in any suit, claim or action by or on behalf of aperson claiming to be the real owner of such property.

(3) Nothing in this section shall apply, — (a) where theperson in whose name the property is held is a coparcenerin a Hindu undivided family and the property is held forthe benefit of the coparceners in the family; or (b) wherethe person in whose name the property is held is a trusteeor other person standing in a fiduciary capacity, and theproperty is held for the benefit of another person for whomhe is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity”

The courts, by concurrent finding, have concluded that the suit isbarred by Section 4(1) of the Act, whereas the petitioner-plaintiffs urgethat the exception in Section 4(3), applies to the present case.

14. The written statement filed by the first defendant - Vijay Kumar(now deceased), contains an explicit admission that the suit propertywas purchased when he was a minor. He does not however, mentionhow he purchased the same. It is simply claimed that the numerousproperties in question, were bought by him, in his name, and his youngerbrother’s name.

15. However, Vijay’s younger brother - Rajendra Kumar (seconddefendant) in his written statement filed in the suit proceedings,categorically states in relation to the suit property that “the defendantNo. 1 knowing this fact very well that the plaintiff no. 1 had purchasedaforementioned property for the welfare of his family, which is jointproperty, has sold the land deliberately by deriving undue advantageof this land being benami, whereas the actual owner of the propertyis plaintiff No. 1”. In other words, he corroborated his father’s positionin the proceedings, as well as that of the sisters and admitted the plaintaverments. In his examination-in-chief, he reiterated that the properties A

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Awere purchased from their father’s personal income for the welfare,education, maintenance, and necessary arrangements for his children.

16. Laxmi Prasad, in his examination-in-chief, deposed that thesuit property had been purchased in 1960 for the benefit of the HUF, inthe name of his first son - Vijay Kumar who was 13-14 years old at theBtime. Similarly, with regards to the second property it was contendedthat Vijay Kumar was 17-18 years old, and Rajendra Kumar was 6-7years old. Though facially inconsistent (with respect to the ages of thetwo sons, given that the two transactions are 6 years apart), the factremained that clearly both the sons were minors, at the stage when theproperties were purchased. It is put to Laxmi Prasad in the cross-Cexamination, whether his in-laws (i.e., maternal grandparents of VijayKumar) had lent Vijay the money to purchase the property – which hedenied. It is pertinent to note however, that no such plea (of funding byhis grandparents), was averred to in Vijay Kumar’s own written pleadings.

17. As far as the defendants are concerned, clearly the secondDdefendant, i.e., Rajendra Kumar, admitted to the claim, in the writtenstatement, unambiguously stating that the plaintiff was the owner of theproperty, and the first defendant was seeking to derive undue advantageof his being named as the ostensible owner of the property.

18. There is nothing on the record, to support the plea of firstEdefendant (Vijay Kumar) that he was the real and true owner of theproperty. The trial and first appellate court have not relied on any materialto show that Vijay Kumar had any source of income, or was living awayfrom his father, or was not dependant on him. The faint suggestion thatVijay’s maternal grandparents had lent the money, was denied by theFplaintiff; no defence witness in support of that suggestion appears tohave been examined.

19. With this factual background, the petitioner’s reliance on Section4(3)(a) of the Act and the exception it offers to the prohibition of benamitransactions under the Act, requires reconsideration.G20. The High Court’s consideration of the matter in second appeal, G20. The High Court’s consideration of the matter in second appeal,is limited to substantial questions of law, as per Section 100 of the CivilProcedure Code. That the High Court cannot reappreciate evidence ormatters of fact, has been reiterated in numerous decisions of this court.The High Court identified two substantial questions of law – firstly,whether the lower appellate court had erred in confirming the trial court’sH

Analysis

findings and decree; and secondly, whether there was an error of lawin holding that the suit filed by the plaintiffs, is barred under Section 4 ofthe Act. Relying on this court’s decision in Rajgopal Reddy v. PadminiChandrashekhar[9] the High Court held that the suit was barred by Section4 of the Act because it applied the provisions of the Act to the factsconfirmed by the first appellate court – i.e., that the suit property wasnot purchased for the benefit of the members of HUF.

21. The court’s approach in cases, where the claim is that aproperty or set of properties, are benami, was outlined, after consideringprevious precedents, in Binapani Paul v. Pratima Ghosh[10], where thiscourt cited with approval extracts from Valliammal v. Subramaniam(supra):

“47. Burden of proof as regards the benami nature oftransaction was also on the respondent. This aspect of thematter has been considered by this Court in Valliammal(D) By LRS. v. Subramaniam and Others [(2004) 7 SCC233] wherein a Division Bench of this Court held:

“13. This Court in a number of judgments has held that itis well established that burden of proving that a particularsale is benami lies on the person who alleges thetransaction to be a benami. The essence of a benamitransaction is the intention of the party or partiesconcerned and often, such intention is shrouded in a thickveil which cannot be easily pierced through. But suchdifficulties do not relieve the person asserting thetransaction to be benami of any part of the serious onusthat rests on him, nor justify the acceptance of mereconjectures or surmises, as a substitute for proof. Ref toRefer to Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra [(1974) 1 SCC 3], Krishnanand Agnihotri v. State of M.P. [(1977) 1 SCC816 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 190] , Thakur Bhim Singh v. ThakurKan Singh [(1980) 3 SCC 72] , Pratap Singh v. SarojiniDevi [1994 Supp (1) SCC 734] and Heirs of Vrajlal J.Ganatra v. Heirs of Parshottam S. Shah [(1996) 4 SCC490]. It has been held in the judgments referred to above 9 (1995) 2 SCC 630

10 (2007) 6 SCC 100

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that the question whether a particular sale is a benami ornot, is largely one of fact, and for determining the questionno absolute formulas or acid test, uniformly applicable inall situations can be laid. After saying so, this Court speltout the following six circumstances which can be taken asa guide to determine the nature of the transaction:

(1) the source from which the purchase money came;

(2) the nature and possession of the property, after thepurchase;

(3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a benamicolour;

(4) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any,between the claimant and the alleged benamidar;

(5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale; and

(6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing withthe property after the sale. (Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra[(1974) 1 SCC 3] , SCC p. 7, para 6)

14. The above indicia are not exhaustive and their efficacyvaries according to the facts of each case. Nevertheless,the source from where the purchase money came and themotive why the property was purchased benami are by farthe most important tests for determining whether the salestanding in the name of one person, is in reality for thebenefit of another. We would examine the presenttransaction on the touchstone of the above two indicia.

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18. It is well settled that intention of the parties is theessence of the benami transaction and the money must havebeen provided by the party invoking the doctrine of benami.The evidence shows clearly that the original plaintiff didnot have any justification for purchasing the property inthe name of Ramayee Ammal. The reason given by him isnot at all acceptable. The source of money is not at alltraceable to the plaintiff. No person named in the plaintor anyone else was examined as a witness. The failure of PUSHPALATA v. VIJAY KUMAR (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ORS.[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

the plaintiff to examine the relevant witnesses completelydemolishes his case.””

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22. As a matter of law, the principle that one who alleges that aproperty is benami and is held, nominally, on behalf of the real owner -in cases which form the exception, under Section 4 (3) – has to displacethe initial burden of proving that fact. Such proof can be through evidence,or cumulatively through circumstances. This fact was brought home, bythis court, in Marcel Martins v. M. Printer[11]. In that case, the issuewas whether the transfer of rights in favour of one of the siblings, in theabsence of a will, by the person having interest (as a tenant in theproperty), after her death, operated to exclude the other heirs. The courtheld that the transfer was made to fulfil a municipality’s requirement,and the property was held by the one in whose name it was mutated, ina fiduciary capacity, under Section 4(3)(a) of the Act, on behalf of thesiblings:

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“22. It is manifest that while the expression “fiduciaryDcapacity” may not be capable of a precise definition, itimplies a relationship that is analogous to the relationshipbetween a trustee and the beneficiaries of the trust. Theexpression is in fact wider in its import for it extends to allsuch situations as place the parties in positions that arefounded on confidence and trust on the one part and goodEfaith on the other.

23. In determining whether a relationship is based on trustor confidence, relevant to determining whether they standin a fiduciary capacity, the Court shall have to take intoconsideration the factual context in which the questionarises for it is only in the factual backdrop that the existenceor otherwise of a fiduciary relationship can be deduced ina given case. Having said that, let us turn to the facts ofthe present case once more to determine whether theappellant stood in a fiduciary capacity vis-à-vis theplaintiffs-respondents.

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24. The first and foremost of the circumstance relevant tothe question at hand is the fact that the property in questionwas tenanted by Smt. Stella Martins-mother of the parties A

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before us. It is common ground that at the time of her demiseshe had not left behind any Will nor is there any othermaterial to suggest that she intended that the tenancy rightheld by her in the suit property should be transferred tothe appellant to the exclusion of her husband, C.F. Martinsor her daughters, respondents in this appeal, or both. Inthe ordinary course, upon the demise of the tenant, thetenancy rights should have as a matter of course devolvedupon her legal heirs that would include the husband ofthe deceased and her children (parties to this appeal). Evenso, the reason why the property was transferred in the nameof the appellant was the fact that the Corporation desiredsuch transfer to be made in the name of one individualrather than several individuals who may have succeededto the tenancy rights. A specific averment to that effectwas made by plaintiffs-respondents in para 7 of the plaintwhich was not disputed by the appellant in the writtenstatement filed by him. It is, therefore, reasonable to assumethat transfer of rights in favour of the appellant was notbecause the others had abandoned their rights but becausethe Corporation required the transfer to be in favour ofindividual presumably to avoid procedural complicationsin enforcing rights and duties qua in property at a laterstage. It is on that touchstone equally reasonable to assumethat the other legal representatives of the deceased-tenantneither gave up their tenancy rights in the property nordid they give up the benefits that would flow to them aslegal heirs of the deceased tenant consequent upon thedecision of the Corporation to sell the property to theoccupants. That conclusion gets strengthened by the factthat the parties had made contributions towards the saleconsideration paid for the acquisition of the suit propertywhich they would not have done if the intention was toconcede the property in favour of the appellant.Superadded to the above is the fact that the parties wereclosely related to each other which too lends considerablesupport to the case of the plaintiffs that the defendant-appellant held the tenancy rights and the ostensible titleto the suit property in a fiduciary capacity vis-à-vis his siblings who had by reason of their contribution and thecontribution made by their father continued to evinceinterest in the property and its ownership. Reposingconfidence and faith in the appellant was in the facts andcircumstances of the case not unusual or unnaturalespecially when possession over the suit property continuedto be enjoyed by the plaintiffs who would in law and on aparity of reasoning be deemed to be holding the same forthe benefit of the appellant as much as the appellant washolding the title to the property for the benefit of theplaintiffs.

25. The cumulative effect of the above circumstances whenseen in the light of the substantial amount paid by lateShri C.F. Martins, the father of the parties, thus puts theappellant in a fiduciary capacity vis-à-vis the said fourpersons. Such being the case the transaction is completelysaved from the mischief of Section 4 of the Act by reasonof the same falling under Sub-section 3(b) of Section 4.The suit filed by the respondents was not, therefore, barredby the Act as contended by the learned counsel for theappellant.”

23. In the present case, the analysis of evidence and pleadings, onthe record would show that the first plaintiff, Laxmi Prasad, had averredthat the properties were purchased for the maintenance and educationof his children; that he had constructed a two storied building at a costof 7,00,000/- from his earnings as a contractor, and that he was in`possession of the property. He also positively averred that the two sons(i.e., ostensible owners) were minors, with no source of income at thetime of purchase. The first defendant (Vijay Kumar) no doubt generallydenied these allegations. However, he did not deny that he was a minorat the time of purchase of the properties; he set up no additional plea ofany source of income, or that someone had lent the money to fund thepurchase of the property. The second defendant (Rajendra Kumar),admitted to plaint allegations, and even deposed in favour of his father.He alleged that the first defendant was unemployed and had assaultedhis father.

24. The plaintiff Laxman Prasad examined himself and deposedto having bought the property in the name of his sons, and that he remained AB

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Ain possession throughout. He also said that the suit property was let outby him - which was supported by an independent witness, who remainedunshaken during cross- examination, and said that he took the propertyon rent of 40 per month, in 1972 and that the rent was paid to Laxman`Prasad.

B25. The first defendant, and those claiming through him, assubsequent purchasers, did not lead any evidence to show that the firstdefendant had the means or any source of income, to purchase theproperty, quite apart from the fact that he was a dependent of LaxmiPrasad, and minor at the time of acquisition of the properties.Furthermore, the first defendant also made inconsistent pleas- apart fromCasserting that he was owner of the property he alleged to have perfectedtitle, through adverse possession, a plea which he did not support duringthe evidence. This was fatal to his case: further, the written statementwas bereft of any details as regards the date from when he claimedhostile possession, against his father.D

26. In the light of these factors, and the law declared by this courtwhich has elaborated the circumstances under which a claim against abenami owner can be said to be proved, under Section 4(3)(a) of theAct, the conclusions drawn by the trial court and first appellate court,are plainly erroneous, given the evidence on record. The High Court, inEthe opinion of this court, fell into error in not noticing the correct positionin law.

27. As far as the discretionary nature of this court’s jurisdiction,under Article 136 goes, the respondents are correct in highlighting thatthe court would rarely interfere with concurrent findings. However, theFjurisdiction, it has been reiterated is wide, and in exceptional cases,interference is called for. In Collector Singh v. L.M.L. Ltd[12] it was heldthat:

“9. Jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution isextraordinary and interference with the concurrent findingsGof fact recorded by the courts below is permissible only inexceptional cases and not as a matter of course. Wherethe appreciation of evidence is found to be whollyunsatisfactory or the conclusion drawn from the same isperverse in nature, in exercise of the jurisdiction under 12 (2015) 2 SCC 410H

Article 136 of the Constitution, this Court may interferewith the concurrent findings for doing complete justice inthe case. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in ourview, it is a fit case to exercise the jurisdiction under Article136 of the Constitution to interfere with the conclusion ofthe Labour Court upholding the punishment of dismissalas affirmed by the High Court.”

28. Likewise, in Nizam v. State of Rajasthan[13] the court held that:

“20. Normally, this Court will not interfere in the exerciseof its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of Indiawith the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below.But where material aspects have not been taken intoconsideration and where the findings of the Court areunsupportable from the evidence on record resulting inmiscarriage of justice, this Court will certainly interfere.”

29. In the opinion of this court, the High Court fell into error, inignoring that the circumstances of this case, where the first plaintiff hadproved that the properties had been purchased, with his funds, and thesons were minors, with no source of income. The second defendant’sposition- throughout all the proceedings, was that the properties werethat of the first plaintiff; in other words, he admitted to the suit averments.The plaintiff also proved that he had possession of the property, by adducingpositive evidence of tenants, who paid rent to him. In these circumstances,the elements necessary to establish benami ownership within the meaningof Section 4 (3) (a) of the Act, in terms of the judgments in BinapaniPaul and Valliammal (supra) have been satisfied by the first plaintiff.

30. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The suit isconsequently decreed fully. In the circumstances there shall be no orderon costs.

Divya Pandey and Anurag Bhaskar(Assisted by : Adnan Khan, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

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