Supreme Court of India
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS versus RAMESH BISHNOI on 29 November 2019
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
v.
RAMESH BISHNOI
(Civil Appeal No.9109 of 2019)
NOVEMBER 29, 2019
[UDAY UMESH LALIT AND VINEET SARAN, JJ.]
Service Law:
Appointment – Cancellation of – On the ground that criminalcase had been lodged against the candidate – Propriety of –Held: The criminal case accusing the delinquent of teasing a girlwhen he was minor, had resulted in acquittal – However, suchoffence is not even covered under the definition of moral turpitude– The delinquent cannot be deprived of a job on the basis of chargescommitted as a juvenile also in view of clause (xiv) of s. 3 of JuvenileAct – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015– s. 3 (xiv) – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 354. 447 and 590.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodgedagainst the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor,he had teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catchinghold of her hand. However, the girl and her parents finally decidedto pardon the respondent by not giving any evidence against him,resulting in the acquittal of the respondent. In the aforesaid facts,even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that therespondent had committed such a crime, which would be coveredunder the definition of moral turpitude, specially when therespondent is said to have committed the alleged offence whenhe was a minor. [Para 8] [1100-G-H; 1101-A]
2.1 The respondent could not have been deprived of gettinga job on the basis of such charges as the same had been committedwhile the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation,i.e. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,2000 as well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection ofChildren) Act, 2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the
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Asame should be obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regardto any crime committed by such person as a juvenile. This iswith the clear object to reintegrate such juvenile back in thesociety as a normal person, without any stigma. Section 3 of theJuvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 laysdown guidelines for the Central Government, State Governments,Bthe Board and other agencies while implementing the provisionsof the said Act. Clause (xiv) of Section 3 clearly providedes thatall the past records of any child under the Juvenile Justice systemshould be erased except in special circumstances. [Para 9][1101-C-F]C
2.2 In the present case, it is an admitted fact that therespondent was acquitted of the charges. However, even if hehad been convicted, the same could not have been held againsthim for getting a job, as admittedly he was a minor when thealleged offences were committed and the charges had been Dframed against him. Section 3(xiv) provides for the same and theexception of special circumstances does not apply to the facts ofthe present case. [Para 9] [1101-G-H; 1102-A]
3. The respondent had very fairly disclosed about thecharges which had been framed and his acquittal on the basis ofEno evidence having been adduced by the complainant against therespondent can not be said to be a suppression by therespondent, on the basis of which he could be deprived of a job,for which he was duly selected after following the due processand appointment having been offered to him. [Para 10][1102-B-C]F
Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 471 :[2016] 7 SCR 445 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2016] 7 SCR 445G
referred to. Para 4
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9109of 2019
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.05.2018 of the High Courtof Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.702 of 2018H
Aman Lekhi, ASG, R. Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv., Ms. RekhaPandey, Ms. Pooja Dhar, B. V. Balaram Das, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Kumar Prashant, Ms. Jayati Sharma,Manish Sharma, Virag Gupta, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VINEET SARAN, J.
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1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal pertains to the appellants (Union of India) denyingappointment to the respondent, (even though selected) on the post ofSub-Inspector, on the ground of a criminal case having been registeredin the past against the respondent.
3. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of this case are that inresponse to an advertisement dated 28.03.2015, for recruitment on thepost of Sub-Inspector in the Central Industrial Security Force (for short‘CISF’) issued by the Staff Selection Commission (SSC), the respondenthad appeared in the written examination and physical endurance testand was thus selected and offered appointment on 15.09.2016. Therespondent was then required to submit a form, wherein there was acolumn relating to whether any First Information Report (for short ‘FIR’)had been lodged against the respondent in the past. The respondent hadgiven the details of the FIR (No.70/2009) under Sections 354, 447 and509 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) having been lodged againstthe respondent and in the further column of the questionnaire form, therespondent had clearly mentioned that on the matter having beencompromised, he was acquitted of the aforesaid offence on 24.11.2011,as there was no evidence adduced against the respondent. Therespondent had thus rendered all necessary information regarding thecriminal case lodged against him and did not conceal any material fact.The case was then referred to the Standing Screening Committee, whichfound the respondent unsuitable for appointment in CISF on the aforesaidground that a criminal case had been lodged against him in the past.Consequently, on 03.06.2017 the National Industrial Security Academycancelled the appointment of the respondent, on the ground of registrationof a criminal case in the past.
4. Challenging the said order, the respondent filed Writ PetitionNo.7522 of 2017, which was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the A
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AHigh Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur vide judgment dated 06.12.2017,and the case of the respondent was directed to be decided afresh within15 days in the light of the guidelines issued by this Court in the case ofAvtar Singh vs. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 471. The case of therespondent was then re-examined by the Standing Screening Committeeon 02.01.2018, which by an order dated 16.01.2018, again rejected theBclaim of the respondent, holding that the respondent was acquitted merelyfor due to lack of adequate evidence and compromise, and that theoffence in the charge sheet falls in the category of serious offence, andthus the respondent was not considered suitable for appointment on thepost of Sub-Inspector in CISF.C5.Challenging the said order, the respondent filed Writ PetitionNo.1310 of 2018, which was allowed by an order dated 08.03.2018 withthe following directions:
“……….. the impugned Order dated 16.1.2018 (communicatedvide letter dated 17.01.2018) (Annex.1) is recashed and setDaside; the respondents are directed to activate offer ofappointment of the petitioner earlier made to the Petitionerfor the post of Sub-Inspector in Central Industrial SecurityForce. The order may be operated upon within a period ofthirty days from today and all notional benefits shall beEprospectively given.”
6. The appellants herein, challenged the order of the learned SingleJudge dated 08.03.2018 before the Division Bench of the High Court ofRajasthan at Jodhpur in Special Appeal Writ No.702 of 2018, which wasdismissed by the Division Bench by judgment dated 08.05.2018.FAggrieved by the said orders dated 08.03.2018 and 08.05.2018, passedby the learned Single Judge and Division Bench respectively of the HighCourt of Rajasthan at Jodhpur, this appeal has been filed by way ofSpecial Leave Petition.
7. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length andGhave perused the material on record.
8. In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against therespondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had teased agirl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of her hand.However, the girl and her parents finally decided to pardon the respondentby not giving any evidence against him, resulting in the acquittal of theH
respondent. In the aforesaid facts, even if the aforesaid is found to betrue, it cannot be said that the respondent had committed such a crime,which would be covered under the definition of moral turpitude, speciallywhen the respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence whenhe was a minor.
9. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the chargeswere framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the respondent waswell under the age of 18 years as his date of birth is 05.09.1991. Firstly,it was not disputed that the charges were never proved against therespondent as the girl and her parents did not depose against therespondent, resulting in his acquittal on 24.11.2011. Even if the allegationswere found to be true, then too the respondent could not have beendeprived of getting a job on the basis of such charges as the same hadbeen committed while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of thelegislation, i.e. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)Act, 2000 as well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection ofChildren) Act, 2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the sameshould be obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crimecommitted by such person as a juvenile. This is with the clear object toreintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal person, withoutany stigma. Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection ofChildren) Act, 2015 lays down guidelines for the Central Government,State Governments, the Board and other agencies while implementingthe provisions of the said Act. In clause (xiv) of Section 3, it is clearlyprovided as follows:
“……………..
(xiv) Principle of fresh start: All past records of any childunder the Juvenile Justice system should be erased except inspecial circumstances.
………………”
In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the respondent wasa minor when the charges had been framed against him of offencesunder Sections 354, 447 and 509 of IPC. It is also not disputed that hewas acquitted of the charges. However, even if he had been convicted,the same could not have been held against him for getting a job, asadmittedly he was a minor when the alleged offences were committedand the charges had been framed against him. Section 3(xiv) provides A
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10. Further, the case against the respondent is not with regard tothe suppression of any conviction or charges having been framed againsthim. The respondent had very fairly disclosed about the charges whichBhad been framed and his acquittal on the basis of no evidence havingbeen adduced by the complainant against the respondent. In ourconsidered view, the same can also not be said to be a suppression bythe respondent, on the basis of which he could be deprived of a job, forwhich he was duly selected after following the due process andappointment having been offered to him.C
11. For the reasons given hereinabove, we do not find any groundfor interference with the orders passed by the learned Single Judge aswell as the Division bench of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur.Consequently, this appeal is dismissed. The respondent shall be entitledto all the benefits of the judgment of the writ Court within 30 days fromDtoday.
No orders as to cost.
E
Devika Gujral
Appeal dismissed.
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