M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. versus SHRI RAJENDRA D. HARMALKAR on 21 April 2022

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 5 S.C.R.

AM/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.

v.

SHRI RAJENDRA D. HARMALKAR

(Civil Appeal No. 2911 of 2022)

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APRIL 21, 2022

[M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]

Constitution of India: Art.226 – Writ Jurisdiction of HighCourt – Interference with the decision of disciplinary authority,Cscope of – Respondent-original writ petitioner was appointed ascasual employee in 1982 – He applied for the post of RefuelingHelper and in qualification he mentioned Secondary School – ChiefVigilance Officer received a complaint that respondent had securedhis job by submitting false and forged certificates – Similar complaintwas also made to the police authorities – Despite repetitive requestsDand follow up by the authorities, the respondent did not submit theoriginal SSLC Certificate – The authorities of Secondary Boardwere requested to check up their records – Board informed that asper record, SSLC mark sheet did not belong to the respondent –Departmental Enquiry was initiated against the respondent – AfterEtaking into consideration the gravity of the acts of misconduct,Disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of dismissal fromservices – Respondent was also prosecuted by the Criminal Court,however, he was acquitted by giving benefit of doubt – Against theorder of the Disciplinary Authority, the respondent filed writ petitionbefore High Court – High Court held that punishment imposed onFthe respondent was grossly disproportionate to the misconduct and–directed to reinstate the respondent Hence instant appeal – Held:Producing the false/fake certificate is a grave misconduct – Thequestion is one of trust – Whether such a certificate was material ornot and/or had any bearing on the employment or not is immaterialG– The question is not of having an intention or mens rea but is ofproducing the fake/forged certificate – Respondent’s case was thathe pleaded guilty and admitted the submission of forged and fakecertificate on the assurance that lesser punishment would be imposed,however, nothing on record to show who gave such assurance –The conduct on part of respondent showed his malafide intention –H

He was acquitted by the Criminal Court by giving benefit of doubtand there was no honourable acquittal – Once there was anadmission on the part of the respondent thereafter whether he hasbeen acquitted by the Criminal Court is immaterial – Unless anduntil it is found that punishment imposed by the DisciplinaryAuthority was shockingly disproportionate and/or there wasprocedural irregularity in conducting the inquiry, High Court wouldnot be justified in interfering with the order of punishment imposed– When a conscious decision was taken by the Disciplinary Authoritythe same could not have been interfered with by the High Courtunder Art.226 – High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interferingwith the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority– Service law.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. In the present case, the original writ petitionerwas dismissed from service by the Disciplinary Authority forproducing the fabricated/fake/forged SSLC. Producing the false/fake certificate is a grave misconduct. The question is one of aTRUST. How can an employee who has produced a fake andforged marksheet/certificate, that too, at the initial stage ofappointment be trusted by the employer? Whether such acertificate was material or not and/or had any bearing on theemployment or not is immaterial. The question is not of havingan intention or mens rea. The question is producing the fake/forged certificate. Therefore, the Disciplinary Authority wasjustified in imposing the punishment of dismissal from service.[Para 7.1][689-A-B]

2. It was a case on behalf of the petitioner – original writpetitioner before the High Court that he pleaded guilty andadmitted that he had submitted a forged and fake certificate onthe assurance that lesser punishment will be imposed. However,except the bald statement, there is no further evidence on thesame. Nothing was mentioned on record as to who gave him suchan assurance. [Para 7.2][689-C-D]

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A3. So far as the submission on behalf of the original writpetitioner that he was acquitted by the Criminal Court for theoffences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 IPC in respectof the same certificate is concerned, the said contention is neitherhere nor there and is of no assistance to the original writ petitioner.Apart from the fact that he was acquitted by the Criminal CourtBby giving benefit of doubt and there was no honourable acquittal,in the present case before the Disciplinary Authority the originalwrit petitioner as such admitted that he produced the fake andforged certificate. Therefore, once there was an admission onthe part of the respondent – original writ petitioner, thereafterCwhether he has been acquitted by the Criminal Court isimmaterial. [Para 7.4][689-H; 690-A-B]

4. As per the settled position of law, unless and until it isfound that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authorityis shockingly disproportionate and/or there is proceduralDirregularity in conducting the inquiry, the High Court would notbe justified in interfering with the order of punishment imposedby the Disciplinary Authority which as such is a prerogative ofthe Disciplinary Authority. [Para 7.5][690-D]

5. In any case in the facts and circumstances of the caseEand considering the charge and misconduct of producing the fakeand false SSLC Certificate proved, when a conscious decisionwas taken by the Disciplinary Authority to dismiss him fromservice, the same could not have been interfered with by theHigh Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of theConstitution of India. The High Court has exceeded in itsFjurisdiction in interfering with the order of punishment imposedby the Disciplinary Authority while exercising its powers underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India. The order passed by theDisciplinary Authority dismissing the original writ petitioner fromservice on the misconduct proved is restored. [Paras 7.6 andG8][690-F-H; 691-B]

Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : [2000]4 Suppl. SCR 693; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham,(1997) 7 SCC 463 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 549; Unionof India v. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari, (2006) 10 SCC 388

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: [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 217; Union of India v. DilerSingh, (2016) 13 SCC 71 : [2016] 4 SCR 473; B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749: [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644; Lucknow Kshetriya GraminBank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) v.Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 : [2013]17 SCR 309 – relied on.

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Case Law Reference

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2911 of2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.06.2015 of the High Courtof Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition No.660 of 2013.

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Rajiv Shukla, Ashwani Kumar Dubey, Ms. Shivani Kapoor, PankajSharma, Sanjay Kumar, Advs for the Appellant.

Ms. Suruchi Suri, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Advs. for theRespondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F

M. R. SHAH, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 29.06.2015 passed by the High Court of Judicature atBombay at Goa in Writ Petition No.660 of 2013 by which the HighCourt has partly allowed the said writ petition preferred by the respondentherein (hereinafter referred to as the “original writ petitioner”) directingthe petitioner herein to reinstate the original writ petitioner without anyback wages and other benefits by substituting the punishment of dismissalimposed by the Disciplinary Authority, the employer – Indian OilCorporation Ltd. has preferred the present appeal.

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A2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are asunder:

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A2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are asunder:

That the respondent herein original writ petitioner was initiallyappointed in the year 1982 as a casual employee. He moved an applicationseeking the position of Refueling Helper, wherein under the heading ofBqualifications, he mentioned that he has passed Secondary School LeavingCertificate (hereinafter referred to as “SSLC”) in April, 1986 fromKarnataka Secondary Education Board. That he was thereafter appointedas Helper as per the regularization policy regularizing the casualemployees, inter alia, subject to the contents prescribed in the applicationform for employment being correct. At that stage also the original writCpetitioner submitted SSLC of Karnataka Board bearing No.206271 dated19.05.1986.

2.1 In the year 2003, the Chief Vigilance Officer of the Corporationreceived a complaint that the original writ petitioner had secured his jobas Re-fueling Helper by submitting a false and forged SSLC. SimilarDcomplaint was also made to the police authorities also.

2.2 Despite repetitive requests and follow up by the authorities,original writ petitioner did not submit the original SSLC Certificate. Onthe contrary, the original writ petitioner sent a communication wherein itwas mentioned that the original SSLC has been misplaced. ThereafterEthe Manager, ER advised original writ petitioner to obtain a duplicatecopy of the original SSLC and to submit the same to the Manager, ER.However, he continued evading submission of the original certificate oreven the Duplicate SSLC from Karnataka Board.

2.3 The Manager, ER thereafter requested the authorities of theSecondary Board to check up their records and confirm whether theyFhad issued any marks certificate carrying details available on thephotocopy of the SSLC marks sheet issued by them. In response to thesame, the Board informed the authority that “as per the record, SSLCstatement of marks for the year March, 1986 bearing RegistrationNo.206271 relate to one Agrahar Jayant S/o Satyanarayana A.L. DOBG– 15.02.1968 and does not belong to Rajendra Dattaram Harmalkar S/oDatta Ram Harmalkar, DOB – 08.12.1962”.

2.4 In the above circumstances, a departmental enquiry wasinitiated against the original writ petitioner. The original writ petitionerwas served with the charge-sheet containing two charges which readas under:H

“1. Wilful insubordination or disobedience whether or not incombination with another, of any lawful and reasonable order of asuperior.

2. Giving false information regarding one’s age, father’s name,qualifications or previous service at the time of employment.”

2.5 The original writ petitioner replied to the charge-sheet. TheInquiry Officer held that both the aforesaid charges were proved andproposed the punishment of dismissal. After giving an opportunity to theoriginal writ petitioner on having agreed with the findings of the InquiryOfficer, and after taking into consideration the gravity of the acts ofmisconduct proved, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishmentof dismissal from services. The appeal preferred by the original writpetitioner came to be dismissed.

2.6 At this stage it is required to be noted that the original writpetitioner was also prosecuted by the Criminal Court, however the learnedTrial Court acquitted him by giving benefit of doubt mainly on the groundthat the original SSLC was not brought on record.

2.7 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of dismissalpassed by the Disciplinary Authority confirmed by the Appellate Authority,the original writ petitioner preferred the writ petition before the HighCourt. It was the case on behalf of the original writ petitioner that headmitted the alleged guilt of misconduct on the assurance of a lenientview being taken by the authorities. It was also argued that there was nominimum educational qualification and age limit (minimum or maximum)prescribed to secure the job or even for the promotion. It was submittedthat therefore in such circumstances, it cannot be said that he hadsubmitted a false and forged certificate with an attempt to secure thejob or promotion. That the certificate was produced only for the purposeof record and there was no dishonest intention to grab the job or promotion.It was also urged that the Criminal Court had acquitted him and that hehad a good service record and that the first charge of insubordination isnot established. The High Court framed only one point for determination,namely, whether the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is grosslydisproportionate to the misconduct committed by the petitioner. By theimpugned judgment and order the High Court observed and held that thepunishment imposed upon the original writ petitioner was grosslydisproportionate to the misconduct and interfered with the order ofpunishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority by observing that the A

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Arespondent was assured that on admission of his guilt a lenient view maybe taken while imposing the punishment. The High Court also observedthat the petitioner is out of service from the year 2006 and as the counselfor the petitioner had made a statement that he will forgive his backwages and promotion, by the impugned judgment and order the HighCourt allowed the said writ petitioner and the directed the appellant toBreinstate the original writ petitioner from the date of dismissal from servicein the post of Refueling Helper, however without any back wages orbenefits.

2.8 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High Court allowing the writ petitioner andCinterfering with the order of punishment imposed by the DisciplinaryAuthority, the Indian Oil Corporation – employer – Disciplinary Authorityhas preferred the present appeal.

3. Shri Rajiv Shukla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of theappellant had vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstancesDof the case the High Court has committed a grave error in interferingwith the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authoritypursuant to the charge of giving false information regarding his father’sname, his qualification by producing a fake and false SSLC was held tobe proved. It is contended that the High Court materially erred in observingEthat the punishment of dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary Authorityon the proved misconduct was disproportionate to the misconductestablished and proved.

3.1 It is urged that when an employee has produced a false andforged SSLC of the Education Board the same can be said to be a gravemisconduct and therefore the Disciplinary Authority was justified inFimposing the punishment of dismissal.

3.2 It is further submitted by learned counsel for the appellantthat the grounds on which the High Court interfered with the punishmentimposed by the Disciplinary Authority namely that original writ petitioner:-

(i) has admitted the guilt on an assurance that a lenient viewGshall be taken while imposing the punishment;

(ii) has been acquitted by the Criminal Court; and

(iii) that no minimum qualification or age limit was prescribedfor getting the job or promotion and that he had a goodHservice record, are all irrelevant and/or not germane.

3.3 It is submitted that the High Court has not properly appreciatedthe fact that the Criminal Court acquitted the original writ petitioner bygiving him a benefit of doubt and there was no honorable acquittal.

3.4 It is contended that it is immaterial, whether, there was aminimum qualification or age limit prescribed for the job or promotion ornot and therefore there was no intention to secure the job by producingthe fake/forged certificate. It is submitted that it is a case of TRUSTand therefore when the Disciplinary Authority/employer loses theConfidence and TRUST in such an employee who submitted a forged/fake certificate, the High Court ought not to have interfered with theorder of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority.

3.5 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of OmKumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386; Union of India v. G.Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463; Union of India v. Dwarka PrasadTiwari, (2006) 10 SCC 388; and Union of India v. Diler Singh, (2016)13 SCC 71, it is submitted that while interfering with the order ofpunishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority the High Court hasexceeded in its jurisdiction while exercising its powers under Article 226of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that as per the settled positionof law unless there is a procedural irregularity in conducting thedisciplinary proceedings and/or the punishment imposed is shockinglydisproportionate to the proved misconduct, then and then only, the HighCourt can exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indiaand interfere with the order of punishment imposed by the DisciplinaryAuthority.

3.6 It is further submitted that even denying the back wages onthe concession given by the employee cannot be said to be a sufficientpunishment imposed. It is submitted that in the present case as suchduring the interregnum period the respondent original writ petitioner wasworking with the petroleum unit of Reliance Industries as a driver forthe period between 2006 to 2017. Therefore, denying the back wagesand promotion by the High Court by the impugned judgment and ordercannot be said to be any punishment at all.

3.7 Making the above submissions and relying upon the abovedecisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.

4. The instant appeal is vehemently opposed by Ms. Suruchi Suri,learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.

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A4.1 It is submitted by Ms. Suri, learned counsel appearing on behalfof the respondent – original writ petitioner that in the present case therespondent – original writ petitioner did produce the fake/forged SSLC.However, the same had no relevance for securing the job as there wasno minimum qualification or age limit prescribed for getting the job orpromotion. It is submitted that the same was produced only for the purposeBof record.

4.2 Further, the original writ petitioner admitted his guilt of producingthe fake/forge certificate on an assurance that a lenient view would betaken at the time of imposing the punishment.

C4.3 It is submitted that even the respondent – original writ petitionerhas been acquitted by the Criminal Court for the offences punishableunder Sections 468 and 471 IPC regarding the said SSLC produced byhim.

4.4 It is further urged that even the respondent had an unblemishedDand good service record. Therefore, considering the aforesaid overallfacts and circumstances, when the High Court has interfered with theorder of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and hasordered reinstatement without any back wages and promotion, the sameis not required to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of powersunder Article 136 of the Constitution of India.E4.5 Making the above submissions it is prayed to dismiss the presentappeal.

5. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties.

6. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in exerciseFof powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has interferedwith the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority andhas ordered reinstatement without back wages and other benefits byobserving that order of punishment of dismissal from the service imposedby the Disciplinary Authority is disproportionate to the misconduct proved.

GTherefore, the short question which is posed for consideration bythis Court is, whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case theHigh Court is justified in interfering with the conscious decision taken bythe Disciplinary Authority while imposing the punishment of dismissalfrom service, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitutionof India.H

7. On the question of judicial review and interference of the courtsin matters of disciplinary proceedings and on the test of proportionality, afew decisions of this Court are required to be referred to:

i) In the case of Om Kumar (supra), this Court, after consideringthe Wednesbury principles and the doctrine of proportionality, hasobserved and held that the question of the quantum of punishment indisciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority to orderand the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitutionor of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to theapplicability of one or other of the well-known principles known as‘Wednesbury principles’.

In the Wednesbury case, (1948) 1 KB 223, it was said thatwhen a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, thescope of judicial review would remain limited. Lord Greene further saidthat interference was not permissible unless one or the other of thefollowing conditions was satisfied, namely, the order was contrary tolaw, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors wereconsidered, or the decision was one which no reasonable person couldhave taken.

ii) In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6SCC 749, in paragraph 18, this Court observed and held as under:

“18. A review of the above legal position would establish that thedisciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, beingfact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider theevidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are investedwith the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping inview the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannotnormally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose someother penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinaryauthority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of theHigh Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, eitherdirecting the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider thepenalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, inexceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment withcogent reasons in support thereof.”

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iii) In the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (NowAllahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) v. Rajendra Singh, (2013)12 SCC 372, in paragraph 19, it was observed and held as under:

“19. The principles discussed above can be summed up andsummarised as follows:

19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry thequantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case isessentially the domain of the departmental authorities.

19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishmentand nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusivelywithin the jurisdiction of the competent authority.

19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with thepunishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in caseswhere such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience ofthe court.

19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside asshockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed againstthe delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is toremit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellateauthority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. Thecourt by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty insuch a case.

19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above,would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesserpunishment by the disciplinary authority even when the chargesof misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foistedwith more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine ofequality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a completeparity between the two, not only in respect of nature of chargebut subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheetin the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges,indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment tohim would be justifiable.”

7.1 In the present case, the original writ petitioner was dismissedfrom service by the Disciplinary Authority for producing the fabricated/fake/forged SSLC. Producing the false/fake certificate is a gravemisconduct. The question is one of a TRUST. How can an employeewho has produced a fake and forged marksheet/certificate, that too, atthe initial stage of appointment be trusted by the employer? Whethersuch a certificate was material or not and/or had any bearing on theemployment or not is immaterial. The question is not of having an intentionor mens rea. The question is producing the fake/forged certificate.Therefore, in our view, the Disciplinary Authority was justified in imposingthe punishment of dismissal from service.

7.2 It was a case on behalf of the petitioner – original writ petitionerbefore the High Court that he pleaded guilty and admitted that he hadsubmitted a forged and fake certificate on the assurance that lesserpunishment will be imposed. However, except the bald statement, thereis no further evidence on the same. Nothing has been mentioned onrecord as to who gave him such an assurance.

7.3 Even otherwise the conduct on the part of the original writpetitioner is required to be considered.

As observed hereinabove, prior to the issuance of the chargesheetand after the complaint was received by the Vigilance Officer, therewere repetitive requests and follow up by the authorities requesting theoriginal writ petitioner to produce the original SSLC. Initially the originalwrit petitioner did not even respond to the said requests. Thereafter, hecame up with a case that the original SSLC was misplaced. He wasthen called upon to obtain a duplicate copy of the SSLC and to submitthe same to the Manager, ER. However, he continued to evade obtainingthe duplicate certificate from Karnataka Board. Only thereafter theManager, ER directly contacted the authorities of the Board and requestedthe Education Board to check up from their records and only thereafterit was revealed that the SSLC produced by the original petitioner wasforged and fake and belonged to or related to some another student andit did not belong to the original writ petitioner. This shows the malafideintention on the part of the original writ petitioner.

7.4 Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the original writpetitioner that he was acquitted by the Criminal Court for the offencespunishable under Sections 468 and 471 IPC in respect of the samecertificate is concerned, the said contention is neither here nor there and AB

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Ais of no assistance to the original writ petitioner. Apart from the fact thathe was acquitted by the Criminal Court by giving benefit of doubt andthere was no honourable acquittal, in the present case before theDisciplinary Authority the original writ petitioner as such admitted thathe produced the fake and forged certificate. Therefore, once there wasan admission on the part of the respondent – original writ petitioner,Bthereafter whether he has been acquitted by the Criminal Court isimmaterial.

7.5 Even from the impugned judgment and order passed by theHigh Court it does not appear that any specific reasoning was given byCthe High Court on how the punishment imposed by the DisciplinaryAuthority could be said to be shockingly disproportionate to the misconductproved. As per the settled position of law, unless and until it is found thatthe punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is shockinglydisproportionate and/or there is procedural irregularity in conducting theinquiry, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the orderDof punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority which as such is aprerogative of the Disciplinary Authority as observed hereinabove.

7.6 From the impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt, it appears that the High Court has denied the back wages andother benefits and has ordered reinstatement on a concession given byEthe learned counsel on behalf of the original writ petitioner. However, itis required to be noted that for the period between 2006 to 2017 i.e.during the pendency of the writ petition the respondent was working inthe Petroleum Division of Reliance Industries. Therefore, he was awarethat even otherwise he is not entitled to the back wages for the aforesaidFperiod. Therefore, the concession given on behalf of the original writpetitioner as such cannot be said to be a real concession. In any case inthe facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated aboveand considering the charge and misconduct of producing the fake andfalse SSLC Certificate proved, when a conscious decision was taken byGthe Disciplinary Authority to dismiss him from service, the same couldnot have been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of powersunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court hasexceeded in its jurisdiction in interfering with the order of punishmentimposed by the Disciplinary Authority while exercising its powers underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India.H

M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. SHRI RAJENDRA D.HARMALKAR [M. R. SHAH, J.]

8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, theimpugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in interferingwith the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority ofdismissing the original writ petitioner from service and orderingreinstatement without back wages and other benefits is hereby quashedand set aside. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dismissingthe original writ petitioner from service on the misconduct proved ishereby restored.

The present appeal is accordingly allowed. In the facts andcircumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Devika Gujral(Assisted by : Shubhanshu Das, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

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