LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR (SOUTH), NEW DELHI AND ANR. versus SURESH B. KAPUR & ORS. on 2 December 2022

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition(C) No. 2163 of 2015 by which the High Court has allowed the said writpetition preferred by the respondent No. 1 herein – original writ petitionerand has declared that the acquisition with respect to the lands in questionis deemed to have lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of the Right to FairCompensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

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AResettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”), theLand Acquisition Collector has preferred the present appeal.

2. That the dispute is with respect to the land comprised in KhasraNos. 717 (3-02), 718/1 (3-05), 756/2/1 (2-17) and 757/1 (3-07) measuring12 bighas and 11 biswas in village Chattarpur, New Delhi. A notificationBunder Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referredto as “Act, 1894”) was issued on 25.11.1980, which was followed bydeclaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 issued vide notification/declaration dated 07.06.1985.

2.1 It appears that under the said acquisition proceedings someCaffected parties challenged the same before the High Court by way offiling Writ Petition No. 1639 of 1985 titled “Balak Ram Gupta Vs.Union of India”, which batch of petitions were allowed by the HighCourt vide judgment and order dated 18.11.1988 and the declarationunder Section 6 of the Act, 1894 was quashed. That during the period,this Court while dealing with the impugned acquisition proceedings inDthe case of Union of India Vs. Gurdeep Singh Uban held that therelief of the judgment pronounced in Balak Ram Gupta (supra) wouldbe applicable only to the petitioners therein and it would not be a judgmentin rem. This Court further held in Gurdeep Singh Uban (supra) thatquashing of notification in Balak Ram Gupta (supra) cannot be treatedEas quashing of the entire proceedings.

2.2 It appears that after the pronouncement of the judgment inGurdeep Singh Uban (supra) sometimes in August, 1999, few of thelandowners again filed writ petitions challenging therein the acquisitionproceedings. The High Court dismissed the said writ petitions videFjudgment and order dated 19.05.2005. That during the period, the thenLand Acquisition Collector passed an award. The judgment and orderpassed by the High Court in the case of Gurdeep Singh Uban (supra)dated 19.05.2005 was challenged by the landowners before this Courtby way of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 26537 of 2005. This Courtdismissed the said special leave petition vide judgment and order datedG08.02.2010. That thereafter the authority deposited the compensationwith respect to the land in question with the Court on 30.12.2013.

2.3 That thereafter the respondent No. 1 – original writ petitionerfiled the writ petition before the High Court in the month of February,2015 for a declaration that the acquisition with respect to the lands inH

question is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013contending inter alia that neither the possession of the land in questionhas been taken over nor the compensation has been paid.

2.4 By the impugned judgment and order, though, the High Courthas specifically noted that the compensation has been deposited withthe Court, but the possession of the land in question is not taken over andrelying upon its earlier decision in the case of Gyanender Singh Vs.Union of India & Ors., W.P. (C) No. 1393 of 2014 decided on23.09.2014 by which the High Court took the view that unless and untilthe compensation is tendered to the persons interested, mere deposit ofthe compensation in Court would not be sufficient and cannot be regardedas having been paid. Relying upon the decision of this Court in the caseof Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. Vs. HarakchandMisirimal Solanki and Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 183, the High Court bythe impugned judgment and order has allowed the said writ petition andhas declared that the acquisition with respect to the land in question isdeemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. Theimpugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is the subjectmatter of the present appeal.

3. Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe appellant has vehemently submitted that the impugned judgment andorder passed by the High Court is just contrary to the decision of theConstitution Bench of this Court in the case of Indore DevelopmentAuthority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129.

3.1 It is submitted that in the present case and even as noted bythe High Court, the compensation with respect to the land in questionwas deposited in the Court. It is submitted that therefore once thecompensation was deposited in the Court, one of the conditions mentionedin Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 is satisfied and therefore, the acquisitionwith respect to the lands in question could not have been declared asdeemed to have lapsed.

3.2 It is further submitted that even otherwise, the Hon’ble HighCourt has failed to appreciate that the acquisition proceedings were underchallenge, which came to be appealed upto this Hon’ble Court. It issubmitted that therefore, because of the pendency of the proceedingschallenging the land acquisition proceedings, the possession could not betaken over and the benefit of that could not be given to the landowners.

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AIt is submitted that the aforesaid aspect ought to have been consideredby the High Court while passing the impugned judgment and order.

3.3 It is submitted that the decision of this Court in the case ofPune Municipal Corporation and Anr. (supra) has been subsequentlyoverruled by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of IndoreBDevelopment Authority (supra).

3.4 Making above submissions, it is prayed to allow the presentappeal.

4. Present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri Rajiv Ghawana,learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 – originalCwrit petitioner.

4.1 It is submitted that even as mentioned in the counter filed onbehalf of the appellant, the possession of the land in question was nottaken over. It is submitted that as rightly observed by the Hon’ble HighCourt that unless and until the possession is taken, the compensationDeven if it is lying deposited in a Court or in any designated accountmaintained, would not come to the aid of the appellant/authority.

4.2 It is further submitted that the decision of the Delhi High Courtin the case of Gyanender Singh (supra), which has been relied uponby the High Court while passing the impugned judgment and order, theEappeal against the same has been dismissed by this Court vide orderdated 31.08.2016.

4.3 It is further submitted that the original writ petitioner wasnever offered or tendered the compensation by the Land AcquisitionCollector. It is submitted that the Land Acquisition Collector has failedFto disclose whether the respondent No. 1 was offered compensation bythe land Acquisition Collector at any point of time and whether it waspaid to him or not.

4.4 It is submitted that therefore when neither the possession wastaken over nor the compensation was actually paid to the respondentGNo. 1 – original writ petitioner, the Hon’ble High Court has not committedany error in declaring the acquisition with respect to the land in questionis deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.

5. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective partiesat length.

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6. We have gone through the impugned judgment and order passedby the High Court. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Courthas declared that the acquisition with respect to the lands in question isdeemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 solely onthe ground that the possession of the lands in question has not beentaken over. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt, it appears that though it was the case on behalf of the authoritythat the compensation was deposited in the Court, thereafter, the HighCourt has declared that the acquisition deemed to be lapsed by observingthat the question of compensation lying deposited in the Court only arisein a case where possession has been taken over. That thereafter theHigh Court relying upon its earlier decision in the case of GyanenderSingh (supra), in which the High Court held that unless and until thecompensation is tendered to the persons interested, mere deposit of thecompensation in Court would not be sufficient and cannot be regardedas having been paid.

6.1 By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court hasdeclared the acquisition as deemed to have lapsed, however, it is requiredto be noted that the decision of the High Court in the case of GyanenderSingh (supra) and even the view taken by the High Court in the impugnedjudgment and order is just contrary to the decision of the ConstitutionBench of this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority(supra). In paragraphs 365 and 366, the Constitution Bench of this Courthas observed and held as under:- “365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune MunicipalCorpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki,(2014) 3 SCC 183] is hereby overruled and all other decisions inwhich Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v.Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183] has beenfollowed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji NagarResidential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. Stateof T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353] cannot be said to be laying downgood law, is overruled and other decisions following the same arealso overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra[(2018) 3 SCC 412], the aspect with respect to the proviso toSection 24(2) and whether “or” has to be read as “nor” or as“and” was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decisiontoo cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the presentjudgment.

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366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer thequestions as under:

366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case theaward is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement ofthe 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation hasto be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

366.2. In case the award has been passed within thewindow period of five years excluding the period covered by aninterim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue asprovided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894Act as if it has not been repealed.

366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) betweenpossession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”.The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction ofauthorities for five years or more prior to commencement of thesaid Act, the possession of land has not been taken norcompensation has been paid. In other words, in case possessionhas been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is nolapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession hasnot been taken then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensationin court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the provisoto Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect tomajority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as onthe date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with theprovisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interestunder Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit ofcompensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of landacquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect tothe majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation underthe 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date ofnotification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensationas provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open tohim to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) dueto non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. Theobligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensationor who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claimthat the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2)of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is tobe treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Actand as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquestreport/memorandum. Once award has been passed on takingpossession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests inState there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapseunder Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for adeemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authoritieshave failed due to their inaction to take possession and paycompensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act cameinto force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with theauthority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence ofinterim orders passed by court has to be excluded in thecomputation of five years.

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise tonew cause of action to question the legality of concludedproceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceedingpending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014.It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopenconcluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question thelegality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings ormode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of courtto invalidate acquisition.”

In the case of Indore Development Authority (supra), thedecision of this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation andAnr. (supra) has been specifically overruled.

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A6.2 Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the respondentNo. 1 – original writ petitioner that the decision of the High Court in thecase of Gyanender Singh (supra), which has been relied upon by theHigh Court while passing the impugned judgment and order, against which,special leave petition has been dismissed by this Court is concerned, atthe outset, it is required to be noted that at the relevant time when theBappeal was dismissed by this Court, the issue was not settled, which hasbeen settled by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority (supra). Under the circumstances, no reliancecan be placed upon the decision of the High Court in the case ofGyanender Singh (supra) and/or dismissal of the appeal against theCsaid order in light of the decision of this Court in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority (supra). Even the High Court has also notappreciated the reasons why the authority could not take the possession.The acquisition proceedings were under challenge before the High Courtas well as thereafter before this Court. The acquisition proceedings haveattained finality pursuant to the judgment and order passed by this Court.DTherefore, the acquisition proceedings were under challenge and thesubject matter of litigation. Therefore, when the acquisition proceedingswere the subject matter of litigation and because of that the authoritycould not take the possession of the lands in question and as such nottaking over the possession cannot be in favour of the landowners, moreEparticularly, when the acquisition proceedings have been appealed uptothis Court.7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above andmore particularly, in view of the decision of the Constitution Bench ofthis Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra), theFview taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment and order isunsustainable. The impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashedand set aside.

Present appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.G

Devika Gujral(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

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