SEEMA SINGH versus CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ANR. on 18 April 2018

SEEMA SINGH

v.

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ANR.

(Criminal Appeal No. 569 of 2018)

APRIL 18, 2018

[A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]

Bail – Grant of – When justified – Appellant’s daughter gotmarried to respondent no.2 but thereafter went to live at appellant’splace due to social non-acceptance of the marriage by familymembers of respondent No.2 – Subsequently, Respondent No.2planned a trip with his wife, to New Delhi/Leh, who died during thecourse of their journey as the car they were travelling in allegedlymet with an accident – FIR registered by appellant u/ss. 498-A, 302and 120-B IPC – State Government transferred the case to CBI –Respondent no.2 was arrested but granted bail by High Court – Onappeal, held: No doubt, the offence with which respondent no.2 ischarged is a serious one, however, that by itself cannot be the groundto outrightly deny the benefit of bail if there are other overwhelmingcircumstances justifying grant of bail – It is not disputed that afterthe incident, appellant, other family members as well as some doctorswho were close to the family had arrived and post mortem wasconducted in their presence but nobody nurtured any suspicion –FIR was lodged nine days after the incident – Further, evidentiaryvalue of reports of CRRI, AIIMS, CFSL and IIT relied on by appellantare yet to be tested, more so, when these reports are given on thebasis of studies undertaken much after the incident – Impugnedorder is a speaking order – Reasons given by High Court forgranting bail to respondent no.2, cannot be termed as perverse –Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 498-A, 302 and 120.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Having regard to the limited scope ofinterference with an order granting bail and keeping in mind theparameters on which such an order can be interdicted, the reasonsgiven by the High Court to grant bail to respondent No. 2, cannotbe termed as perverse. The High Court kept in mind the relevant

A

B

CDE

F

G

H

Afactors while considering the bail application. No doubt, theoffence with which respondent No. 2 is charged is a serious one.That by itself cannot be the ground to outrightly deny the benefitof bail if there are other overwhelming circumstances justifyinggrant of bail. The High Court has discussed those factors. Nodoubt, the appellants have extensively referred to the reports ofBCRRI, AIIMS, CFSL and IIT. Their evidentiary value is yet tobe tested, more so, when these reports are given on the basis ofstudies undertaken much after the incident. Report of AIIMS isbased on the photographs and not on the basis of postmortem ofthe body of the deceased. Moreover, the respondent No. 2 hasCmade a submission that AIIMS has not given any conclusiveopinion. According to him, same is the position qua other reportsas well. These reports are not to be examined in depth at thisstage as that exercise has to be done by the trial court whenthese reports are proved by the makers of the report and they

are cross-examined thereupon. Moreover, in a criminal caseDwhere respondent No. 2 is charged of committing murder, theburden is upon the prosecution to establish, beyond reasonabledoubts, that the death of appellant’s daughter was the result of amurder and that it is respondent No. 2 who committed the saidmurder. His defence about alleged accident is only one of theEfactors that would be looked into as to whether such a story putforth by him is correct or not and the effect thereof. The HighCourt has taken into consideration relevant factors while grantingthe bail to respondent No.2. The impugned order is also aspeaking order with reasons. [Paras 13, 14][370-G-H; 371-A, E-G]1.2 It was not disputed that after the incident, the appellant,Fother family members as well as some doctors who were close tothe family had arrived. Postmortem was conducted in theirpresence. At that stage, nobody nurtured any suspicion. FIRwas lodged nine days after the incident. The material collectedby the CBI during investigation is documentary in nature whichGare given on the basis of photographs produced before them andhad to be tested during trial. [Para 15] [372-G-H]

Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2016)15 SCC 422 : [2015] 10 SCR 802; Prasanta KumarSarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee & Anr. (2010) 14 SCC 496 :H[2010] 12 SCR 1165 – held inapplicable.

Dataram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2018)3 SCC 22 – relied on.

Tomaso Bruno and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015)7 SCC 178 : [2015] 1 SCR 721; Siddharam SatlingappaMhetra v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2011) 1 SCC694 : [2010] 15 SCR 201 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.569 of 2018.

From the Judgment and Order dated 09.03.2017 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 4652of 2017

WITH

Crl. A. No. 570 of 2018.

Maninder Singh, ASG, Rana Mukherjee, Manan Kumar Mishra,Sr. Advs., Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Neha Rathi, Pranav Sachdeva,Ms. Sushma Manchanda, Rajesh Singh Chauhan, Ms. Daisy Hannah,Ms. Kasturika Kaumudi, Ms. Sreoshi Chatterjee, Ms. Ekta Pradhan,Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Sai Girdhar, Ms. Anjul Dwivedi, Anjani KumarMishra, Prakash Gautam, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A. K. SIKRI, J. 1. Delay condoned in Diary No. 26339 of 2017.

2. Leave granted.

3. In the Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition(Crl.) No. 5611 of 2017, the appellant, on whose complaint case isregistered against respondent No.2 herein under Sections 498-A, 302and 120-B IPC, has challenged order dated March 09, 2017 passed by A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Athe High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, whereby respondent No. 2has been enlarged on bail subject to the following conditions:

“(a) The applicant shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence.

(b) The applicant shall not pressurize the prosecution witnesses.

(c) The applicant shall appear on the date fixed by the trial court.

B

(d) The applicant shall not commit an offence similar to the offenceof which he is accused, or suspected of the commission, of whichhe is suspected.

(e) The applicant shall not directly or indirectly make anyinducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with thefacts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such factsto the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence.

C

In case of default of any of the conditions enumerated above,it would be open to the opposite party to approach the Courtconcerned for cancellation of bail.

D

However, it is directed that the aforesaid case pending beforethe court below be decided expeditiously, if possible within a periodof one year strictly, on day to day basis in accordance with Section309 Cr.P.C. and also in view of principle as has been laid down inthe recent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case ofVinod Kumar v. State of Punjab; 2015 (3) SCC 220 if there is nolegal impediment.

E

It is made clear that in case, the witnesses are not appearingbefore the court concerned, liberty is being given to the concernedcourt to take necessary coercive measures in accordance withlaw for ensuring the presence of the witnesses.

F

Apart from the aforesaid conditions, it is further provided thatthe applicant shall surrender his passport within a period of twoweeks’ from the date of his release before the concerned courtand shall co-operate with the investigation. It is further providedthat the applicant shall present himself before the court concernedon each and every date and will not seek any adjournmentwhatsoever and in case any adjournment is sought on anyexceptional circumstances, the court concerned shall specify the G

H

reasons in the order itself while granting such adjournment. It isalso provided that in case, there is any change of address, theconcerned S.S.P. and the Court shall be immediately informed.

Liberty is also being given to the learned counsel for thecomplainant to file a bail cancellation application before the courtconcerned itself, in case, there is any violation on the part of theapplicant of the aforesaid conditions.”

4. Other appeal is preferred by the Central Bureau of Investigation(CBI) for the same relief as CBI also feels aggrieved by the same veryorder granting bail to respondent No. 2, who is facing trial in the aforesaidcase.

5. The gravamen of the charge against respondent No. 2 is thathe has murdered his wife Smt. Sara Singh. The allegations in thechargesheet are that respondent No. 2 got married to the deceased atArya Samaj Mandir, Lucknow on July 27, 2013 where after the deceasedwent to live at her mother’s place due to the social non-acceptance oftheir marriage by the family members of respondent No. 2. She used tolive at her mother’s place when suddenly respondent No. 2 startedbehaving cordially with his wife and planned a trip in July, 2015 alongwith her to New Delhi/Leh. During the course of their journey, theMaruti Swift Car allegedly met with an accident on July 09, 2015 nearSirsaganj, District Firozabad. It was not an accident but a pre-plannedplot to get rid of the deceased and subsequently a FIR dated July 18,2015 was registered by the appellant herein who is the mother of thedeceased. Consequently the Case Crime No. 387 of 2015 under Sections498-A, 302 and 120-B IPC, Police Station Sirsaganj, District Firozabadwas registered. The State Government transferred the case to the CBIvide notification issued on July 24, 2015 and another notification wasissued by the Department of Personnel & Training, Government of India,New Delhi on October 14, 2015. In pursuance of the above notifications,the CBI registered a case bearing No. RC No. 6(S)/2015/ SCU.V/SC.II/CBI dated October 19, 2015 and accordingly the CBI commenced theinvestigation of the aforesaid case on October 19, 2015. Subsequently,on the basis of evidence collected by the CBI, respondent No. 2 wasarrested on November 25, 2016. Thereafter, respondent No. 2 filed hisbail application before the Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, Ghaziabadwhich was rejected vide order dated December 15, 2016. Another bail AB

C

DE

F

G

H

Aapplication was rejected vide order dated January 13, 2017. Eventuallythe bail application was filed before the High Court of Judicature atAllahabad which has been allowed vide impugned order dated March09, 2017 and bail is granted.

6. It becomes clear from the above that respondent No. 2 maintainsBthat incident in question was merely an accident in which his wife died. On the other hand, the prosecution alleges that in reality, respondent No.2 murdered his wife and thereafter stage managed the said accident inorder to project that Sara Singh died in the said accident.

7. According to respondent No.2, when their car met with anCaccident on July 09, 2015 which was being driven by him and his wifeSara Singh was also sitting therein, she got badly injured and while shewas taken to the hospital, she expired and was declared brought dead bythe District Hospital, Ferozabad. Postmortem of the body was conductedand as per the report, the cause of death was due to the injuries receivedin the said accident. Sara Singh was cremated thereafter. However,Don July 18, 2015, the FIR was lodged doubting the postmortem reportand alleging that Sara Singh was murdered. After the investigation ofthe case was transferred to the CBI, CBI has obtained the report fromCentral Road Research Institute (CRRI), report of the Medical Boardconstituted by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), NewEDelhi, report from Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL), NewDelhi as well as from Indian Institute of Technology (IIT). On the basisof these reports and further investigation, chargesheet was preparedand submitted to the CBI court, Ferozabad.

8. Respondent No. 2 was arrested on November 25, 2016 andFwas granted bail on March 09, 2017. He, thus, remained in custody forthree and half months.

9. The case set up by respondent No. 2 in support of his plea forbail in the High Court was that the accused and his wife had planned atrip to Leh and when they reached Ferozabad, the accused found that aGsmall school girl was coming on her bicycle from the other side. Inorder to save her, the accused had to apply sudden brakes on his vehiclewhich was being driven at a high speed and diverted the stearing as aresult of which the car went out of control and fell in a ditch alongsideroad. The result was that the car skidded and over-turned. It was alsopleaded that there were no eye-witnesses of the incident and no evidence H

whatsoever which could show the participation of respondent No. 2 asper the role assiged by the CBI. The prosecution, while opposing thebail, had drawn the attention to the reports of CRRI, AIIMS, CFSL andIIT. On the basis of these reports, it was contended that there wasclear evidence to show that it was not an accident as narrated byrespondent No. 2 and, therefore, it was the result of a pre-plannedmurder. Referring to the report of the AIIMS, it was argued that SaraSingh was initially strangulated and thereafter crime scene was createdin which the accident became the culminating point. It was alsoemphasised that respondent No. 2 had a criminal history of three cases.

10. The order of the High Court shows that in coming to theconclusion that respondent No. 2 was entitled to bail, pending trial,following factors weighed with it:

(a) Videography of the postmortem was not done.

(b) After the alleged accident, respondent No. 2 had informedabout the same to the family members of the deceased. On receivingthis information, mother of the deceased had arrived and postmortemwas done in her presence and other family members. At that time, certaindoctors who were close and well-known to the family of the deceasedwere also present at the spot and they had taken certain photographs ofthe body before the postmortem was done. At that time, none of thesepersons raised any objection with regard to the videography of thepostmortem not being done. They did not demand second postmortemeither in case they had suspicion.

(c) Insofar as the report of AIIMS is concerned, it is solely basedon photographs which were provided to the panel of doctors and, thus,doctors never conducted any postmortem on the body of the deceased.

(d) There is no eye-witness account which may show that the girlwas either tortured or threatened on the way or she was injured, thoughvague allegations have been made in this behalf but without anysupporting documents.

(e) After investigation, the chargesheet had been filed by the CBI.The main crux of the chargesheet is only the documentary evidence andnot any eye-witness account. Documentary evidence is already availablewith the CBI. Therefore, there is no possible apprehension of respondentNo. 2 in either hampering with the investigation or tampering with theevidence or threatening anybody in case he is released on bail.

AB

C

DE

F

G

H

A(f) There is no likelihood of accused absconding as well.

11. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, who argued on behalf of thecomplainant, and Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional SolicitorGeneral, who argued for CBI, read out extensively from the aforesaidreports of the expert bodies, namely, CRRI, AIIMS, CFSL and IIT. ItBwas submitted by them that the report of the CRRI clearly depicted thatthere was no likelihood of any such accident as narrated by respondentNo. 2 having regard to the condition of the car and the place of accident. It was, thus, a make-belief story putforth by the accused. From thereport submitted by the doctors from the AIIMS, it was pointed out thatcause of death was fatal pressure over neck by ligature and this wouldCindicate Sara Singh had not died in the accident but was strangulated todeath by the accused. Reports of CFSL and IIT, likewise, were readout to support the aforesaid case put up by the prosecution, namely,alleged accident as projected by respondent No. 2 could not havehappened and, therefore, he was making a false case that Sara SinghDhad died in an accident. It was also argued that the defence set up byrespondent No. 2 was false inasmuch as both were sitting in the said carwhen the alleged incident took place and how it was possible that insofaras one passenger (namely, Sara Singh) is concerned, she died and theother one (namely, respondent No. 2) did not suffer even minor injuries. It was, thus, pleaded that when there was nothing to show thatEchargesheet was false and it has also come on record that accused is ahistory-sheeter and belongs to influential political family, bail should nothave been granted by the High Court. Mr. Bhushan also referred to thefollowing judgments of this Court in support of his contention that it wasa fit case for setting aside the order of the High Court granting bail:F(i) Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.[1]

“15. This being the position of law, it is clear as cloudless skythat the High Court has totally ignored the criminal antecedentsof the accused. What has weighed with the High Court is thedoctrine of parity. A history-sheeter involved in the nature ofGcrimes which we have reproduced hereinabove, are not minoroffences so that he is not to be retained in custody, but thecrimes are of heinous nature and such crimes, by no stretch ofimagination, can be regarded as jejune. Such cases do createa thunder and lightning having the effect potentiality of torrential H1 (2016) 15 SCC 422

rain in an analytical mind. The law expects the judiciary to bealert while admitting these kind of accused persons to be atlarge and, therefore, the emphasis is on exercise of discretionjudiciously and not in a whimsical manner.

xxx xxx xxx

18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat with profitthat it is not an appeal for cancellation of bail as the cancellationis not sought because of supervening circumstances. Theannulment of the order passed by the High Court is sought asmany relevant factors have not been taken into considerationwhich includes the criminal antecedents of the accused andthat makes the order a deviant one. Therefore, the inevitableresult is the lancination of the impugned order [Budhpal v.State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 14815].”

(ii) Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee & Anr.[2]

“9. We are of the opinion that the impugned order is clearlyunsustainable. It is trite that this Court does not, normally,interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting orrejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbentupon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously,cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principleslaid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factorsto be borne in mind while considering an application for bailare:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground tobelieve that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if releasedon bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of theaccused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; 2 (2010) 14 SCC 496

A

B

C

DE

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses beinginfluenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant ofbail.

[See State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi (SCC p.31, para 18),Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi, and Ram GovindUpadhyay v. Sudarshal Singh.]

10. It is manifest that if the High Court does not advert to theserelevant considerations and mechanically grants bail, the said orderwould suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, renderingit to be illegal. In Masroor, a Division Bench of this Court, ofwhich one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a member, observed asfollows: (SCC p. 290, para 13)

“13...Though at the stage of granting bail an elaborateexamination of evidence and detailed reasons touching the meritof the case, which may prejudice the accused, should beavoided, but there is a need to indicate in such order reasonsfor prima facie concluding why bail was being grantedparticularly where the accused is charged of having committeda serious office.”

(See also State of Maharashtra v. Ritesh, Panchanan Mishrav. Digambar Mishra, Vijay Kumar v. Narendra and AnwariBegum v. Sher Mohammad.)

11. We are constrained to observe that in the instant case, whiledealing with the application of the accused for grant of bail, theHigh Court completely lost sight of the basic principles enumeratedabove. The accused, in the present case, is alleged to havecommitted a heinous crime of killing an old helpless lady bystrangulation. He was seen coming out of the victim’s house bya neighbour around the time of the alleged occurrence, giving riseto a reasonable belief that he had committed the murder. Wefeel that under the given circumstances, it was not the stage atwhich bail under Section 439 of the Code should have been grantedto the accused, more so, when even charges have not yet beenframed.”

12. Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra, learned senior counsel appearingfor the accused, strongly refuted the aforesaid submissions. He referredto the same very reports of the expert bodies and submitted that thesevery reports when read minutely, would indicate that none of thesereports have given any final and conclusive opinion. He laid muchstress on the fact that these reports were based on postmortem of the‘photographs’ of deceased and not of the ‘body of the deceased’ and,therefore, could not be given much credence in any case. He alsopointed out that insofar as opinion of doctors of AIIMS is concerned,while assigning the cause of death, the Medical Board itself had cautionedthat same should be corroborated with the circumstantial evidence ofthe investigation in this case. On that basis, he reiterated his submissionswhich were accepted by the High Court, as mentioned above, and arguedthat the High Court had rightly exercised its discretion in granting bail torespondent No. 2. He further argued that once such a discretion isexercised, unless it is shown that the same is perverse, the Court shouldnot interfere with the same. In support, he relied upon the judgments ofthis Court in:

(i) Tomaso Bruno and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh[3]:

“36. In the second post-mortem report, Ext. Ka-11, substantiallythere were no changes except signs of decomposition. Thesecond post-mortem report reiterates that cause of death is“asphyxia as a result of strangulation”. According to the medicalopinion, a hard blunt substance appears to have been used tocause strangulation leading to the death on account of asphyxia.However, no such hard or blunt substance was found or seizedfrom the room. Doctors have not found any physical signs ofinternal injuries viz. any extravasation of blood in the tissue orany laceration in the underlying muscles.

37. Considering the post-mortem reports, Exts. Ka-10 and Ka-11 and the evidence of PWs 10 and 11, in our view, reasonabledoubts arise as to the cause of death due to asphyxia as aresult of strangulation. Let us consider the injuries found onthe body of deceased Francesco Montis vis-à-vis symptomsof strangulation. As per Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence AndToxicology, 24th Edn. 2011, p. 453 the symptoms ofstrangulation are stated as under:

AB

CDEFG

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

“(b)Appearances due to Asphyxia.—The face is puffyand cyanosed, and marked with petechiae. The eyes areprominent and open. In some cases, they may be closed.The conjunctivae are congested and the pupils are dilated.Petechiae are seen in the eyelids and the conjunctivae. Thelips are blue. Bloody foam escapes from the mouth andnostrils, and sometimes, pure blood issues from the mouth,nose and ears, especially if great violence has been used.The tongue is often swollen, bruised, protruding and dark incolour, showing patches of extravasation and occasionallybitten by the teeth. There may be evidence of bruising atthe back of the neck. The hands are usually clenched. Thegenital organs may be congested and there may be dischargeof urine, faeces and seminal fluid.

(ii) Internal Appearance.—The neck and its structuresshould be examined after removing the brain and the chestorgans, thus allowing blood to drain from the neck to theblood vessels. There is extravasation of blood into the sub-cutaneous tissues under the ligature mark or finger marks,as well as in the adjacent muscles of the neck, which areusually lacerated. Sometimes, there is laceration of thesheath of the carotid arteries, as also their internal coatswith effusion of blood into their walls. The cornua of thehyoid bone may be fractured also the superior cornua ofthyroid cartilage but fracture of the cervical vertebrae isextremely rare. These should be carefully dissected in situas they are difficult to distinguish from dissection artefactsin the neck.”

(emphasis in original)

xxx xxx xxx

(emphasis in original)

xxx xxx xxx

40. The courts, normally would look at expert evidence with agreater sense of acceptability, but it is equally true that thecourts are not absolutely guided by the report of the experts,especially if such reports are perfunctory and unsustainable.We agree that the purpose of an expert opinion is primarily toassist the court in arriving at a final conclusion but such report is not a conclusive one. This Court is expected to analyse thereport, read it in conjunction with the other evidence on recordand then form its final opinion as to whether such report isworthy of reliance or not. As discussed earlier, serious doubtsarise about the cause of death stated in the post-mortemreports.”

(ii) Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetra v. State of Maharashtra& Ors.[4]:

“87. The complaint filed against the accused needs to be thoroughlyexamined including the aspect whether the complainant has fileda false or frivolous complaint on earlier occasion. The court shouldalso examine the fact whether there is any family dispute betweenthe accused and the complainant and the complainant must beclearly told that if the complaint is found to be false or frivolous,then strict action will be taken against him in accordance withlaw. If the connivance between the complainant and theinvestigating officer is established then action be taken againstthe investigating officer in accordance with law.

88. The gravity of charge and the exact role of the accused mustbe properly comprehended. Before arrest, the arresting officermust record the valid reasons which have led to the arrest of theaccused in the case diary. In exceptional cases the reasons couldbe recorded immediately after the arrest, so that while dealingwith the bail application, the remarks and observations of thearresting officer can also be properly evaluated by the court.

89. It is imperative for the courts to carefully and with meticulousprecision evaluate the facts of the case. The discretion must beexercised on the basis of the available material and the facts ofthe particular case. In cases where the court is of the consideredview that the accused has joined investigation and he is fullycooperating with the investigating agency and is not likely toabscond, in that event, custodial interrogation should be avoided.

xxx xxx xxx115. In Joginder Kumar case [(1994) 4 SCC 260 : 1994 SCC(Cri) 1172] a three-Judge Bench of this Court has referred to the 4 (2011) 1 SCC 694

A

B

C

DE

F

G

A

A3rd Report of the National Police Commission, in which it ismentioned that the quality of arrests by the police in India mentionedthe power of arrest as one of the chief sources of corruption inthe police. The Report suggested that, by and large, nearly 60%of the arrests were either unnecessary or unjustified and that suchunjustified police action accounted for 43.2% of the expenditureBof the jails.

116. Personal liberty is a very precious fundamental right and itshould be curtailed only when it becomes imperative according tothe peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

C117. In case, the State considers the following suggestions in properperspective then perhaps it may not be necessary to curtail thepersonal liberty of the accused in a routine manner. Thesesuggestions are only illustrative and not exhaustive:

(1) Direct the accused to join the investigation and only when theDaccused does not cooperate with the investigating agency, thenonly the accused be arrested.

(2) Seize either the passport or such other related documents,such as, the title deeds of properties or the fixed deposit receipts/share certificates of the accused.

E(3) Direct the accused to execute bonds.

(4) The accused may be directed to furnish sureties of a numberof persons which according to the prosecution are necessary inview of the facts of the particular case.

(5) The accused be directed to furnish undertaking that he wouldFnot visit the place where the witnesses reside so that the possibilityof tampering of evidence or otherwise influencing the course ofjustice can be avoided.

(6) Bank accounts be frozen for small duration during theinvestigation.

G

118. In case the arrest is imperative, according to the facts of thecase, in that event, the arresting officer must clearly record thereasons for the arrest of the accused before the arrest in the casediary, but in exceptional cases where it becomes imperative to H

SEEMA SINGH v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION &ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

arrest the accused immediately, the reasons be recorded in thecase diary immediately after the arrest is made without loss ofany time so that the court has an opportunity to properly considerthe case for grant or refusal of bail in the light of reasons recordedby the arresting officer.

119. Exercise of jurisdiction under Section 438 CrPC is anextremely important judicial function of a Judge and must beentrusted to judicial officers with some experience and good trackrecord. Both the individual and society have vital interest in orderspassed by the courts in anticipatory bail applications.

120. It is imperative for the High Courts through its judicialacademies to periodically organise workshops, symposiums,seminars and lectures by the experts to sensitise judicial officers,police officers and investigating officers so that they can properlycomprehend the importance of personal liberty vis-à-vis socialinterests. They must learn to maintain fine balance between thepersonal liberty and the social interests.

121. The performance of the judicial officers must be periodicallyevaluated on the basis of the cases decided by them. In case,they have not been able to maintain balance between personalliberty and societal interests, the lacunae must be pointed out tothem and they may be asked to take corrective measures in future.Ultimately, the entire discretion of grant or refusal of bail has tobe left to the judicial officers and all concerned must ensure thatgrant or refusal of bail is considered basically on the facts andcircumstances of each case.

122. In our considered view, the Constitution Bench in Sibbiacase [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] hascomprehensively dealt with almost all aspects of the concept ofanticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC. A number of judgmentshave been referred to by the learned counsel for the partiesconsisting of Benches of smaller strength where the Courts haveobserved that the anticipatory bail should be of limited durationonly and ordinarily on expiry of that duration or standard duration,the court granting the anticipatory bail should leave it to the regularcourt to deal with the matter. This view is clearly contrary to the A

B

CD

E

F

G

H

A

Aview taken by the Constitution Bench in Sibbia case [(1980) 2SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] . In the preceding para, it isclearly spelt out that no limitation has been envisaged by thelegislature under Section 438 CrPC. The Constitution Bench hasaptly observed that “we see no valid reason for rewriting Section438 with a view, not to expanding the scope and ambit of theBdiscretion conferred on the High Court or the Court of Sessionbut, for the purpose of limiting it”.

123. In view of the clear declaration of law laid down by theConstitution Bench in Sibbia case [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC(Cri) 465] , it would not be proper to limit the life of anticipatorybail. When the Court observed that the anticipatory bail is forlimited duration and thereafter the accused should apply to theregular court for bail, that means the life of Section 438 CrPCwould come to an end after that limited duration. This limitationhas not been envisaged by the legislature. The Constitution Benchin Sibbia case [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] clearlyobserved that it is not necessary to rewrite Section 438 CrPC.Therefore, in view of the clear declaration of the law by theConstitution Bench, the life of the order under Section 438 CrPCgranting bail cannot be curtailed.

C

D

E124. The ratio of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sibbiacase [(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] perhaps was notbrought to the notice of Their Lordships who had decided thecases of Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra[(1996) 1 SCC 667 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 198] , K.L. Verma v. State[(1998) 9 SCC 348 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1031] , Adri Dharan Das v.FState of W.B. [(2005) 4 SCC 303 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 933] andSunita Devi v. State of Bihar [(2005) 1 SCC 608 : 2005 SCC(Cri) 435] .”

E

13. We have deliberated on the respective arguments in conjunctionwith the record of the case. Since we are concerned with the order ofGthe High Court whereby respondent No. 2 has been granted bail, havingregard to the limited scope of interference with such an order and keepingin mind the parameters on which such an order can be interdicted, weare of the view that the reasons given by the High Court to grant bail to

respondent No. 2, cannot be termed as perverse. It can be discernedfrom the reading of the impugned order, from which we have culled outcircumstances, that the High Court kept in mind the relevant factorswhile considering the bail application. No doubt, the offence with whichrespondent No. 2 is charged is a serious one. That by itself cannot bethe ground to outrightly deny the benefit of bail if there are otheroverwhelming circumstances justifying grant of bail. The High Courthas discussed those factors which are reproduced above in para 9. Nodoubt, the counsel for the appellants have extensively referred to thereports of CRRI, AIIMS, CFSL and IIT. Their evidentiary value is yetto be tested, more so, when these reports are given on the basis ofstudies undertaken much after the incident. Report of AIIMS is basedon the photographs and not on the basis of postmortem of the body ofthe deceased. Moreover, the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 hasmade a submission that AIIMS has not given any conclusive opinion.According to him, same is the position qua other reports as well. We arenot supposed to examine these reports in depth at this stage as thatexercise has to be done by the trial court when these reports are provedby the makers of the report and they are cross-examined thereupon. Moreover, in a criminal case where respondent No. 2 is charged ofcommitting murder, the burden is upon the prosecution to establish, beyondreasonable doubts, that the death of Sara Singh was the result of a murderand that it is respondent No. 2 who committed the said murder. Hisdefence about alleged accident is only one of the factors that would belooked into as to whether such a story putforth by him is correct or notand the effect thereof. We have to keep in mind that, at this juncture,the limited question is as to whether the High Court is rightly used itsdiscretion to grant the bail.

14. We are of the opinon that the High Court has taken intoconsideration relevant factors while granting the bail to respondent No.2. The impugned order is also a speaking order with reasons that need tobe given in brief while deciding as to whether the undertrial is entitled tobail or not. Therefore, the judgment cited by the learned counsel for thecomplainant would not apply to the facts of this case. We may refer toa recent judgment dated February 06, 2018 in the case of DataramSingh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.[5] wherein this Court (speakingthrough Madan B. Lokur, J.) made the following pertinent observations:

AB

CDE

F

G

H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A

“2. A fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence is thepresumption of innocence, meaning thereby that a person is believedto be innocent until found guilty. However, there are instances inour criminal law where a reverse onus has been placed on anaccused with regard to some specific offences but that is anothermatter and does not detract from the fundamental postulate inrespect of other offences. Yet another important facet of ourcriminal jurisprudence is that the grant of bail is the general ruleand putting a person in jail or in a prison or in a correction home(whichever expression one may wish to use) is an exception.Unfortunately, some of these basic principles appear to have beenlost sight of with the result that more and more persons are beingincarcerated and for longer periods. This does not do any good toour criminal jurisprudence or to our society.

B

C

B

C

3. There is no doubt that the grant or denial of bail is entirely thediscretion of the judge considering a case but even so, the exerciseof judicial discretion has been circumscribed by a large number ofdecisions rendered by this Court and by every High Court in thecountry. Yet, occasionally there is a necessity to introspect whetherdenying bail to an accused person is the right thing to do on thefacts and in the circumstances of a case.

D

xxx xxx xxx

E

7. However, we should not be understood to mean that bail shouldbe granted in every case. The grant or refusal of bail is entirelywithin the discretion of the judge hearing the matter and thoughthat discretion is unfettered, it must be exercised judiciously andFin a humane manner and compassionately. Also, conditions forthe grant of bail ought not to be so strict as to be incapable ofcompliance, thereby making the grant of bail illusory.”

15. It has not been disputed that after the incident in which SaraSingh died, mother of the deceased, other family members as well assome doctors who were close to the family had arrived. Postmortemwas conducted in their presence. At that stage, nobody nurtured anysuspicion. FIR was lodged nine days after the incident. The materialcollected by the CBI during investigation is documentary in nature whichare given on the basis of photographs produced before them and had tobe tested during trial. Insofar as allegations of threat are concerned, it G

H

SEEMA SINGH v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION &ANR. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

was argued by Mr. Manan that the police examined the same and foundto be false. In any case, the High Court has given liberty to the prosecutionto apply for cancellation of bail in case any such threat is extended orthere is any violation on the part of respondent No. 2 to any of theconditions of the bail. The High Court has imposed strict conditions ofbail keeping in view the interest of the prosecution as well.

16. We, therefore, do not find any merit in these appeals whichare accordingly dismissed.

Divya Pandey

Appeals dismissed.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H