JASWANT SINGH versus STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. on 20 October 2021

1. By means of this appeal, the appellant Jaswant Singh has prayedfor quashing of the order dated 06.02.2020 passed by the learned SingleJudge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CRM-M-32011 of 2018(O&M) whereby the High Court declined to exercise its powers underSection 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code[1] to quash the criminalproceedings arising out of FIR No. 179 dated 29.10.2009 under Section406/420 of the Indian Penal Code[2] , Police Station Fatehgarh Sahib,District Fatehgarh Sahib. However, the High Court granted bail to theappellant subject to certain conditions contained in the said order. Thefactual matrix giving rise to the present appeal is narrated hereunder:

2. Respondent no.2 Nasib Singh (the Complainant) moved anapplication dated 18.08.2009 addressed to the Senior Superintendent ofPolice, District Fatehgarh Sahib stating therein that he was known toone Gurmeet Singh, who was in the business of sending people abroad.Gurmeet Singh had assured the Complainant that his two acquaintancesJaswant Singh and Gurpreet Singh who were already settled in Italy,would help his son to get a job and settle in Italy. For the aforesaidarrangement, Gurmeet Singh demanded a total amount of Rs 7 lacs.Further, according to the Complainant, Rs 4 lacs was paid in cash on10.12.2008 and thereafter Rs. 2 lacs were paid by way of a chequedated 18.02.2009 of the Punjab National Bank, Branch AS College,Khanna in favour of Gurmeet Singh which amount has since been creditedin the account of Gurmeet Singh. Soon thereafter Sarpreet Singh, son ofthe Complainant, was put on a flight to Italy on 19.02.2009. Further 1 Cr.P.C.

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Aallegation is that Jaswant Singh and Gurpreet Singh did not honour theirpromise and harassed his son. They did not arrange for a job as per theirpromise. The documents were misplaced by them and ultimately his sonhad to return after three/four months. The complaint further alleges thatthe named accused further demanded Rs. 3 lacs and also threatened ofdire consequences in case the money was not paid. That his son wasBmentally upset and he has also spent huge amount in travelling andtreatment of his son. It is thus prayed that appropriate action be takenand justice be done to the Complainant.

3. The said complaint was inquired into by the ASI Manjit Singhof the Economic Offences Wing, Fatehgarh Sahib. In the inquiry, theCstatements of the Complainant, his son and Gurmeet Singh were recorded.Further Jaswant Singh and Gurpreet Singh, who were settled abroadand named in the complaint, were also called upon to submit theirstatements which they have forwarded through e-mail. The InquiryOfficer did not find the case so as to make out any offence of cheating Dor breach of trust and, accordingly, recommended that the application beconsigned by order dated 04.09.2009.

4. The in-charge, Economic Offences Wing, Shri Gurdeep Singh,also examined the material and the evidence on record and concurredwith the recommendation made by the ASI on 04.09.2009. The DeputyESuperintendent of Police, Bassi Pathana, Shri Rajwinder Singh alsorecommended that there is no need of any action on the application andthe same may be consigned. However, the Senior Superintendent ofPolice Shri Kostav Sharma, directed the Station House Officer to registera first information report and accordingly an FIR was registered on29.10.2009. The matter was further investigated and a police reportFunder Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. was submitted with the finding thata triable case was made out only against Gurmeet Singh, and as againstthe other two named accused Jaswant Singh and Gurpreet Singh, asthere was no evidence of any offence, they were exonerated.

5. In the meantime, an additional statement of the complainantGNasib Singh was recorded on 20.05.2010 in which also he clearly statedthat he had paid the amount to Gurmeet Singh, Rs. 4 lacs in cash and Rs.2 lacs by cheque.

6. Based on the police report and the material enclosed with it,the Magistrate First Class at Fatehgarh Sahib took cognizance andHregistered the Case No CHI/0600029/2010. During the trial the prosecution moved an application on 11.06.2013 purported to be underSection 319 Cr.P.C. praying for summoning the appellant and the otherco-accused Gurpreet Singh to face trial under Section 420 I.P.C. On thesame day the Trial Court summoned both the accused under Section420 I.P.C. As the appellant was in Italy, he did not appear and accordinglywas declared as a proclaimed offender on 28.04.2014. The appellantfiled a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court inSeptember, 2018 for quashing of the order dated 28.04.2014 declaringhim as a proclaimed offender.

7. In the meantime, the complainant Nasib Singh entered into acompromise with the main accused Gurmeet Singh and they jointly appliedbefore the Trial Court. The Trial Court, vide order dated 26.09.2014allowed the parties to amicably resolve their issue being of economicimport and accordingly compounded the offence. Proceedings wereeliminated against the accused Gurmeet Singh.

8. The High Court, vide interim order dated 10.09.2018, stayedthe order of the Trial Court dated 28.04.2014 and further directed theappellant to surrender before the Trial Court within two weeks and onhis doing so the Trial Court was directed to release him on interim bailsubject to its satisfaction. The appellant thereafter appeared before theTrial Court on 27.10.2018 whereafter the Trial Court admitted him tointerim bail on his furnishing bail bonds and surety bonds and in the sumof Rs.1 lac.

9. In the pending 482 Cr.P.C. petition before the High Court, theappellant filed another application registered as CRM No 4655/2020wherein he prayed for quashing of the proceedings on various groundsand in particular that the complainant had already settled his score withthe main accused Gurmeet Singh and on their joint request the TrialCourt had already eliminated/ acquitted Gurmeet Singh of the offence.

10. The High Court vide order dated 10.01.2020 permitted to placeon record the order granting interim bail and also the order ofcompounding/acquittal of the co-accused and any other material whichthe appellant may wish to file. All the relevant material was filed by theappellant before the High Court by way of an application dated04.02.2020.

11. The High Court, vide the impugned judgment, declined to quashthe proceedings on the ground that a perusal of the FIR goes to showthat the name of the appellant is specifically mentioned in the FIR and A

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Acriminal acts have been attributed to him. However, the High Court withrespect to the order dated 28.04.2014 declared the appellant to be aproclaimed offender and directed him to surrender before the Trial Courtwithin two weeks and to move an application for a regular bail, whichwas to be decided within two weeks subject to three conditions. It wouldbe worthwhile to reproduce the order of the High Court, which reads asBfollows:

“By way of filing the present petition, petitioner Jaswant Singh, anon resident Indian seeks quashing of F.I.R.No.179 dated29.10.2009 under Sections 406/420 IPC registered at Police StationFatehgarh Sahib, District Fatehgarh Sahib.C

I have gone through the F.I.R. A perusal thereof goes to showthat name of petitioner is specifically mentioned in the F.I.R. andcriminal acts have been attributed to him. Therefore, no ground isthere to quash the F.I.R., as such request in that regard is declined.With regard to order dated 28.4.2014 vide which he has beenDdeclared a proclaimed offender, he is directed to surrender in thetrial Court within two weeks. On his doing so and movingapplication for regular bail, the same be decided within two weeks.Till then he may not be arrested. This order is subject to thefollowing conditions:- Ei)The petitioner shall surrender his Passport in the trial Court.

ii)The petitioner shall appear in the trial Court on each andevery date of hearing.

iii)The petitioner shall not give any threat or intimidation to theprosecution witnesses.F

The petition is disposed of.”

12. When this matter came up before us on 24.09.2021, we hadissued notice and further provided that no coercive steps be taken againstthe appellant.G13. We have heard Shri Lakhwinder Singh Mann, learned counselfor the appellant and Shri Jaspreet Singh Gogia, learned counsel for therespondent.

14. In our view, the present one is amongst those fittest caseswhere the High Court ought to have exercised its powers under SectionH482 Cr.P.C. and ought to have secured the ends of justice by closing the proceedings against the appellants. It is also surprising as to how and inwhat circumstances after moving an application under Section 319Cr.P.C., the prosecution continued to contest the case even after26.09.2014 when the matter had already been compromised andcompounded as against the main accused Gurmeet Singh. Apparently,the parties were not able to correctly place the facts and material beforethe Trial Court or the High Court, which could have closed this matterthen and there without proceeding any further.

15. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised toprevent the abuse of process of any Court and also to secure the ends ofjustice. This Court, time and again, has laid emphasis that inherent powersshould be exercised in a given and deserving case where the Court issatisfied that exercise of such power would either prevent abuse ofsuch power or such exercise would result in securing the ends of justice.In the case of S.W. Palanitkar and others. v. State of Bihar andanother[3]. Shivraj V Patil, J., in paragraph 27 of the report, has laidsimilar emphasis. The same is reproduced below:

“Para 27:

…….whereas while exercising power under Section 482 CrPCthe High Court has to look at the object and purpose forwhich such power is conferred on it under the said provision.Exercise of inherent power is available to the High Court togive effect to any order under CrPC, or to prevent abuse ofthe process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends ofjustice. This being the position, exercise of power underSection 482 CrPC should be consistent with the scope andambit of the same in the light of the decisions aforementioned.In appropriate cases, to prevent judicial process from beingan instrument of oppression or harassment in the hands offrustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise of inherent poweris not only desirable but necessary also, so that the judicialforum of court may not be allowed to be utilized for any obliquemotive. When a person approaches the High Court underSection 482 CrPC to quash the very issue of process, the HighCourt on the facts and circumstances of a case has to exercisethe powers with circumspection as stated above to really servethe purpose and object for which they are conferred.”

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A16. A seven-Judge Bench in the case of P. Ramachandra Raovs State of Karnataka[4], also laid down the same principles for use ofthe power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in a case where the Court wasconvinced that such exercise was necessary for whatever reason inorder to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the endsof justice. Lahoti,J., speaking for himself and Bharucha, Quadri,BSantosh Hegde, Ruma Pal and Arijit Pasayat,JJ., observed as followsin paragraph 21:

“Para 21. “… In appropriate cases, inherent power of theHigh Court, under Section 482 can be invoked to make suchorders, as may be necessary, to give effect to any order underCthe Code of Criminal Procedure or to prevent abuse of theprocess of any court, or otherwise, to secure the ends ofjustice. The power is wide and, if judiciously and consciouslyexercised, can take care of almost all the situations whereinterference by the High Court becomes necessary on accountDof delay in proceedings or for any other reason amounting to oppression or harassment in any trial, inquiry or proceedings.In appropriate cases, the High Courts have exercised theirjurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of firstinformation report and investigation, and terminating criminalproceedings if the case of abuse of process of law was clearlyEmade out. Such power can certainly be exercised on a casebeing made out of breach of fundamental right conferred byArticle 21 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench in A.R.Antulay case referred to such power, vesting in the High Court(vide paras 62 and 65 of its judgment) and held that it was Fclear that even apart from Article 21, the courts can takecare of undue or inordinate delays in criminal matters orproceedings if they remain pending for too long and puttingan end, by making appropriate orders, to further proceedingswhen they are found to be oppressive and unwarranted.””

G17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh vs State ofPunjab[5] again summarized the legal position which emerged regardingpowers of the High Court in quashing criminal proceedings in exerciseof power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. R.M. Lodha, J., (as he then 4 (2002) 4 SCC 578H5 (2012) 10 SCC 303

was)speaking for the Bench, clearly observed in paragraph 61 of thereport that criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatinglycivil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing,particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile,civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out ofmatrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrongis basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolvedtheir entire dispute. The relevant extract from paragraph 61 is reproducedbelow:

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion canbe summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashinga criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of itsinherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the powergiven to a criminal court for compounding the offences underSection 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitudewith no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accordwith the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to securethe ends of justice, or (in) to prevent abuse of the process ofany court. In what cases power to quash the criminalproceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where theoffender and the victim have settled their dispute would dependon the facts and circumstances of each case and no categorycan be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power,the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravityof the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravityor offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittinglyquashed even though the victim or victim’s family and theoffender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not privatein nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, anycompromise between the victim and the offender in relationto the offences under special statutes like the Prevention ofCorruption Act or the offences committed by public servantswhile working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for anybasis for quashing criminal proceedings involving suchoffences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly andpredominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing forthe purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arisingfrom commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership orsuch like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony A

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Arelating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrongis basically private or personal in nature and the parties haveresolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, theHigh Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its View,because of the compromise between the offender and thevictim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak andBcontinuation of the criminal case would put the accused togreat oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice wouldbe caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despitefull and complete settlement and compromise with the victim.In other words, the High Court must consider whether it wouldCbe unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continuewith the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminalproceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of lawdespite settlement and compromise between the victim and thewrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it isappropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if theDanswer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the HighCourt shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminalproceeding.”

18. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Parbatbhai Aahir AliasParbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others v. State Gujarat andEothers[6] laid down the broad principles for exercising the inherent powersof the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud,J., speaking for the bench, enumerated the principles in paragraph 16and in sub paragraphs. The same are reproduced below:

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedentsFon the subject, may be summarised in the followingpropositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the HighCourt to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or tosecure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer newGpowers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inherein the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court toquash a first information report or a criminal proceeding onthe ground that a settlement has been arrived at between theH6 (2017) 9 SCC 641

offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation ofjurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. Whilecompounding an offence, the power of the court is governedby the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 isattracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceedingor complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdictionunder Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether theends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wideambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (0) to secure theends of justice, or ) to prevent an abuse of the process of anycourt.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or firstinformation report should be quashed on the ground that theoffender and victim have settled the dispute, revolvesultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case andno exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 andwhile dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled,the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravityof the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mentaldepravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoitycannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or thefamily of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offencesare, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a seriousimpact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial insuch cases is founded on the overriding element of publicinterest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. distinguished from serious offences, there may becriminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominantelement of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footinginsofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash isconcerned.

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Atransactions with an essentially civil flavour may inappropriate situations fall for quashing where parties havesettled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminalproceeding if in view of the compromise between theBdisputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and thecontinuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppressionand prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out inpropositions 16.8, and 16.9. above. Economic offencesCinvolving the financial and economic well-being of the Statehave implications which lie beyond the domain of a meredispute between private disputants. The High Court wouldbe justified in declining to quash where the offender isinvolved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraudor misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complainedDof upon the financial or economic system will weigh in thebalance.”

19. From the above discussion on the settled legal principles, it isclear from the facts of the present case that there was a clear abuse ofthe process of the Court and further that the Court had a duty to secureEthe ends of justice. We say so for the following reasons:

a)The allegations made in the FIR had an overwhelminglyand predominatingly a civil flavour inasmuch as thecomplainant alleged that he had paid money to GurmeetSingh, the main accused to get employment for his sonFabroad. If Gurmeet Singh failed the complainant could havefiled a suit for recovery of the amount paid for not fulfillingthe promise.

b)Initially, the investigating officer and two superior officersof the economic wing has found that there is no substanceGin the complaint making out even a prima facie triable caseand had therefore,recommended for closure. However, onthe orders of the Senior Superintendent of Police, the FIRwas registered and the matter was investigated. No criminalbreach of trust was found and the charge sheet was H

submitted only against Gurmeet Singh under section 420I.P.C.

c)The complainant Nasib Singh had clearly deposed that hehad paid Rs 4 lacs cash to Gurmeet Singh and had alsogiven a cheque of Rs 2 lacs favouring Gurmeet Singh whichhe had encashed.

d)During trial the present appellant as also the other co-accused Gurpreet Singh were summoned in April2014invoking powers of Section 319 Cr.P.C., for being triedunder Section 420 I.P.C. It may be noted that no specificallegations of cheating are made against these two accusedas they were both settled abroad in Italy.

e)The complainant Nasib Singh entered into a compromisewith the main accused Gurmeet Singh which was filed beforethe learned Magistrate and the same was accepted videorder dated 26.09.2014 and the alleged offence being offinancial transaction stood compounded. Proceedingsagainst Gurmeet Singh were closed.

f)Right from 2014, the present appellant and other co-accusedGurpreet Singh who were in Italy were being summonedby the Court.The appellant was declared proclaimedoffender. The appellant applied before the High Courtchallenging the order declaring him proclaimed offender andalso filed a 482 Cr.P.C. petition for quashing of theproceedings wherein, he also filed the compounding orderof 26.09.2014.

g)The High Court merely perused the FIR and noting thefact that the name of the appellant was mentioned in theFIR, declined to exercise the inherent power under Section482 Cr.P.C.

20. In our considered view, the High Court erred in firstly notconsidering the entire material on record and further in not appreciatingthe fact that the dispute, if any, was civil in nature and that the complainanthad already settled his score with the main accused Gurmeet Singh againstwhom the proceedings have been closed as far back as 26.09.2014. Inthis scenario, there remains no justification to continue with theproceedings against the appellant.

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A21. For all the reasons recorded above on facts and on law boththe present appeals deserve to be allowed. The impugned proceedingsarising out of FIR No.179 dated 29.10.2009, PS Fatehgarh Sahib and allconsequential proceedings stand quashed qua the appellant.

BBibhuti Bhushan Bose

Appeals allowed.

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