Case details

Court: Supreme Court of India
Decided: 6 September 2021
Bench: D.Y. Chandrachud
Citations: 2021 INSC 450[2021] 6 S.C.R. 146
Type: Judgment (Appeal(s) allowed)

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Citation: [2021] 6 S.C.R. 146 (search it on the Supreme Court's e-SCR portal)

Supreme Court of India

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR versus AKHILESH JHA & ANR on 6 September 2021

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146

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 6 S.C.R.

ASTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR

AKHILESH JHA & ANR

(Civil Appeal No. 5153 of 2021)

BSEPTEMBER 06, 2021

[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD,VIKRAM NATH AND HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]

Service Law – Departmental enquiry – First respondent-CSuperintendent of Police allegedly violated administrative ordersof the Inspector General of Police for disbanding “Gunda Squad”constituted, operated and supervised by the first respondent, anda person interrogated by the Squad died in custody – Magisterialenquiry was conducted and the report submitted containedobservations against the first respondent – Departmental enquiryDsubsequently convened against the first respondent and chargesheet was issued – Tribunal quashed the charge-sheet on groundsthat there was a delay of nearly two years in concluding thedisciplinary enquiry; and that the charges were ambiguous –Affirmation of the order, by High Court – Held: Not justified –ECharges against the first respondent were neither vague norambiguous – The charge-sheet, together with the statement ofimputations, contains detailed elaboration of the allegationsagainst the first respondent – Tribunal quashed the charge-sheetpurportedly on the basis that prejudice had been caused to thefirst respondent by denial of opportunity for deputation or forFpromotion as a result of the pendency of the proceedings – Thisline of reasoning which weighed with the Tribunal is plainlyerroneous – Every delay in conducting a disciplinary enquiry doesnot, ipso facto, lead to the enquiry being vitiated – Whetherprejudice is caused to the officer who is being enquired into is aGmatter which has to be decided on the basis of the circumstancesof each case – Prejudice must be demonstrated to have beencaused and cannot be a matter of surmise – Chargesheet wasissued to the first respondent while he was in service, and hencethe disciplinary enquiry can proceed to its logical conclusion –HDisciplinary enquiry directed to be concluded expeditiously.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

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Conclusion

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD:1. On the basis of the material placed on the record,it was impossible to come to the conclusion that the chargeagainst the first respondent is vague or ambiguous. Thecharge-sheet, together with the statement of imputations,contains a detailed elaboration of the allegations against the firstrespondent and does not leave the recipient in a measure ofdoubt or ambiguity over the nature of the case he is requiredto answer in the disciplinary enquiry. The finding that the chargeis vague is palpably in error. The Tribunal declined to quash thecharge-sheet by its initial order dated 28 July 2016. However,by a subsequent order dated 5 January 2018, it proceeded todo exactly what it had declined to do by its previous order. TheTribunal purportedly did so on the basis that prejudice had beencaused to the first respondent by the denial of an opportunityfor deputation or for promotion as a result of the pendency ofthe proceedings. The line of reasoning which weighed with theTribunal is plainly erroneous. The Tribunal would have beenjustified in directing the expeditious conclusion of the enquiry,but instead, it proceeded to quash the enquiry in its entirety.This was clearly impermissible. Every delay in conducting adisciplinary enquiry does not, ipso facto, lead to the enquiry beingvitiated. Whether prejudice is caused to the officer who is beingenquired into is a matter which has to be decided on the basisof the circumstances of each case. Prejudice must bedemonstrated to have been caused and cannot be a matter ofsurmise. Apart from submitting that the first respondent wasunable to proceed on deputation or to seek promotion, there isno basis on which it could be concluded that his right to defendhimself stands prejudicially affected by a delay of two years inconcluding the enquiry. The High Court, therefore, has clearlyfailed to properly exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by simplyaffirming the judgment of the Tribunal. The judgment of theTribunal suffered from basic errors which go to the root of thematter and which have been ignored both by the Tribunal as wellas by the High Court. [Para 13][152-C-H; 153-A]

2. The chargesheet was issued to the first respondentwhile he was in service, and hence the disciplinary enquiry can A

DEF

Aproceed to its logical conclusion. The disciplinary enquiry shouldbe concluded expeditiously, preferably by 31 July 2022. [Para14][153-B]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.5153of 2021.B

From the Judgment and Order dated 05.09.2019 of the HighCourt of Madhya Pradesh, Principal Seat at Jabalpur in MP NO.3854of 2018.

Ms. Ankita Chaudhary, AG, Mrinal Elker Mazumdar, ManishYadav, Advs. for the Appellants.C

Braj K. Mishra, Joby P. Varghese, Rajneesh Kumar Jha, NishantKumar Srivastava, Aby P. Varghese, Donna Xavier, Advs. for theRespondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered byDDR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises from a judgment of a Division Bench ofthe High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 5 September 2019.

E3. The first respondent was posted as Superintendent of Policeat Alirajpur from June 2012 to June 2015. It has been alleged that inspite of the instructions issued by the Inspector General of Police, IndoreZone to disband the “Gunda squad”, the first respondent constituted,supervised and operated the squad. It has been alleged that on 1 June2014, individuals belonging to such a squad, acting under the supervisionFof the first respondent arrested an accused who was taken into custodyafter being called to the police station by the members of the GundaSquad. The person, who was under interrogation, died in custody on 3June 2014. A magisterial enquiry was conducted into the custodial deathand a report was submitted on 10 October 2014. The report containedGobservations against the first respondent on his role in illegallyconstituting the squad.

4. Challenging the observations made by the JMFC Alirajpur, inhis report dated 10 October 2014, the first respondent institutedproceedings before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. By its orderHdated 2 March 2016, the High Court expunged some of the observations contained in the magisterial report against the first respondent on theground that they were in violation of the principles of natural justice.On 21 April 2016, the High Court directed that in case any action isinitiated against the first respondent on the basis of the magisterial report,a proper opportunity of being heard in response to the allegations shouldbe granted to him before drawing any adverse conclusion.

5. On 8 June 2016, a departmental enquiry was convened againstthe first respondent and a charge-sheet was issued. The allegation inthe charge-sheet was that the first respondent had committed acts ofindiscipline and insubordination by not following the instructions issuedby his superior officers regarding the disbanding of the Gunda Squad.The first respondent submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 7 July2016, denying the allegations levelled against him. Soon thereafter, hemoved the Central Administrative Tribunal[1] at Jabalpur for challengingthe charge-sheet which was served on him on 8 June 2016. The Tribunal,by its order dated 28 July 2016, declined to interfere with thecharge-sheet but granted an opportunity to the first respondent to initiateappropriate proceedings, if a decision adverse to him was taken on thebasis of the reply to the charge-sheet.

6. The first respondent once again moved the Tribunal forchallenging the charge- sheet dated 8 June 2016 in OA 587 of 2017 onthe ground that no decision had been taken following his reply to thecharge-sheet and that as a result of the pendency of the disciplinaryproceedings, his deputation and promotional avenues had been adverselyaffected.

7. The Tribunal, by its order dated 5 January 2018, quashed thecharge-sheet issued to the first respondent. The following three groundsweighed with the Tribunal:

(i) There was a delay of nearly two years;

(ii) The charges were ambiguous; and

(iii) The High Court had expunged the remarks in themagisterial enquiry which was held to enquire into thecustodial death.

The order of the Tribunal was assailed by the appellants beforethe High Court. By its judgment dated 5 September 2019, the DivisionBench dismissed the petition, affirming the findings of the Tribunal.

1 “Tribunal”

AWe have heard Ms Ankita Chaudhary, Deputy Advocate Generalappearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr Braj K Mishra, Counselappearing on behalf of the first respondent.

8. Assailing the judgment of the Tribunal which has beenconfirmed by the High Court, Ms Ankita Chaudhary submitted that exBfacie the charge-sheet and the imputations would indicate that thefinding of vagueness is unsustainable. Counsel submitted that thegravamen of the charge-sheet is that the first respondent, who wasposted as the Superintendent of Police, Alirajpur, had violated theadministrative orders of the Inspector General of Police for disbandingthe Gunda Squads and that a person who had been interrogated by theCSquad which was constituted, operated and supervised by the firstrespondent died in custody. Counsel submitted that first and foremost,the expunging of the remarks in the report of the magisterial enquirywould have no bearing on the entitlement of the State to exercise itsdisciplinary authority over the first respondent. Secondly, it was urgedDthat the Tribunal had declined to quash the charge-sheet in the first OAwhich was filed by the first respondent before the Bench at Jabalpur.Having declined to quash the charge-sheet at that stage, it was not opento the Tribunal to quash it on a second OA on the plea that there wasa delay in completing the enquiry. Thirdly, Counsel submitted that thereEwas, in fact, no delay and if there was a requirement for the enquiryto be concluded within a time schedule, such a direction could havebeen issued. However, there was no justification to quash the enquiryand to obstruct the disciplinary proceedings which have been convenedby the State in exercise of its authority over the respondent.F9. On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the firstrespondent that the charge-sheet is devoid of material particulars,including the date on which the instructions for disbanding the GundaSquads were issued by the Inspector General of Police as well as thespecific role alleged to have been performed by the first respondent inthe circumstances leading to the alleged death of the person who wasGunder interrogation. Moreover, it has been submitted that the delay, asa matter of fact, caused prejudice to the first respondent since he wasdeprived of his opportunities of deputation and promotion at par withhis other batch mates. Hence, it has been urged that the delay inconducting the disciplinary proceeding has caused serious prejudice toHthe first respondent.

10. The charge-sheet was issued to the first respondent inexercise of powers conferred by Rule 10 of the All India Services(Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1969 on 8 June 2016. The charge-sheetwhich is annexed to the communication issued by the Home Departmentof the State of Madhya Pradesh contains the following charge:

“You have violated the Rule 03 of All India Services (Conduct)Rules, 1968 by operating Gunda Squad illegally in the DistrictAlirajpur and by committing indiscipline and violation of directionsof the Senior Officers. The aforesaid act of yours is against theprovisions of Rule 3 of All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968and the same is punishable under All India Services (Disciplineand Appeal) Rules, 1969. The detailed particulars of the aforesaidcharges are attached.”

11. The statement of charges has been appended to thecharge-sheet. The statement of charges indicates that the gravamenof the allegation against the first respondent is that the Inspector Generalof Police, Indore Zone had issued instructions to all Superintendents ofPolice that no officer working in the District shall constitute a GundaSquad and if such a Squad is working, then it must be dissolvedimmediately. The incident leading to custodial death took place whilethe individual was in the custody of Police Station Sorwa of DistrictAlirajpur on 3 June 2014. The statement of imputations states, thus:

“The incident of the death in the police custody happened in PSSorwa of the District Alirajpur on 03.06.2014. The Superintendentof Police, District Alirajpur had sent Subedar K.P. Singh Tomarworking as the Squad In charge to interrogate the suspectdeceased Jhingla in Crime No.39/14 Section 307 IPC of the policeStation Sorwa. Subedar Tomar inflicted injuries to the deceasedJhingla by assaulting him during interrogation, which led thesuspect Jhingla to death. When the aforesaid incident took place,the squad in charge Subedar Tomar and other 05 policemen weresuspended on 03.06.2014.

In the aforesaid incident, Subedar K.P. Singh Tomar and his allsubordinate employees were appointed as the reserve force inthe police control room but Shri Akhilesh Jha, the thenSuperintendent of Police, District Alirajpur had been using all theseemployees regularly as the Gunda Squad, while Shri Akhilesh Jha A

Athe then Superintendent of Police Alirajpur refused “To haveconstituted Gunda Squad” in Letter No. SP/Ali/Steno/736/14dated 15.07.2014. In this regard, the clarification was sought fromthe then Superintendent of Police, Shri Akhilesh Jha vide letterno. IGP/E/Ka.F-29/47-45-3-A/14 dated 28.09.2014 of the office.”

B12. The statement of imputations contains a reference to the DutyRegister as well as the General Diary at the material time. The list ofdocuments annexed to the charge-sheet refers to 21 documents on thebasis of which the charges were intended to be proved.

13. On the basis of the above material which has been placedCon the record, it was impossible to come to the conclusion that thecharge against the first respondent is vague or ambiguous. The charge-sheet, together with the statement of imputations, contains a detailedelaboration of the allegations against the first respondent and does notleave the recipient in a measure of doubt or ambiguity over the natureof the case he is required to answer in the disciplinary enquiry. TheDfinding that the charge is vague is palpably in error. The Tribunaldeclined to quash the charge-sheet by its initial order dated 28 July 2016.However, by a subsequent order dated 5 January 2018, it proceededto do exactly what it had declined to do by its previous order. TheTribunal purportedly did so on the basis that prejudice had been causedEto the first respondent by the denial of an opportunity for deputation orfor promotion as a result of the pendency of the proceedings. The lineof reasoning which weighed with the Tribunal is plainly erroneous. TheTribunal would have been justified in directing the expeditious conclusionof the enquiry, but instead, it proceeded to quash the enquiry in itsentirety. This, in our view, was clearly impermissible. Every delay inFconducting a disciplinary enquiry does not, ipso facto, lead to the enquirybeing vitiated. Whether prejudice is caused to the officer who is beingenquired into is a matter which has to be decided on the basis of thecircumstances of each case. Prejudice must be demonstrated to havebeen caused and cannot be a matter of surmise. Apart from submittingGthat the first respondent was unable to proceed on deputation or to seekpromotion, there is no basis on which it could be concluded that hisright to defend himself stands prejudicially affected by a delay of twoyears in concluding the enquiry. The High Court, therefore, in our view,has clearly failed to properly exercise the jurisdiction vested in it bysimply affirming the judgment of the Tribunal. The judgment of theH

Tribunal suffered from basic errors which go to the root of the matterand which have been ignored both by the Tribunal as well as by theHigh Court.

14. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set asidethe impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 5 September2019. The charge- sheet was issued to the first respondent while hewas in service, and hence the disciplinary enquiry can proceed to itslogical conclusion. The disciplinary enquiry should be concludedexpeditiously, preferably by 31 July 2022. In the event that the firstrespondent is entitled to the release of any part of his retiral dues,including gratuity, in consonance with law, necessary steps for thatpurpose shall be taken within a period of two months from the date ofthis order.

15. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose

Appeal allowed.