DHEERAJ SINGH versus GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS on 4 July 2023

[2023] 10 S.C.R.

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DHEERAJ SINGH

v.

GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTAUTHORITY & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 4172 of 2023)

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JULY 04, 2023

[KRISHNA MURARI AND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – O.41, r.22 – Cross objectionsfiled by the appellants for enhancement of compensation, notCconsidered by High Court – Held: Cross objections, unlike a regularappeal, are filed within an already existing appeal – However, asper O.41, r.22, cross objections have all the trappings of a regularappeal and therefore, must be considered in full by the courtadjudicating upon the same – Court of appeal has a duty to applyDits mind to all the issues raised before it and in cases where theHigh Court fails to do the same, the matter must be remanded to thesame court for fresh adjudication – In the present case, the issuesraised by the appellants in their cross objections were not consideredby the High Court – While, the High Court gave a detailed analysisof all other issues raised in the appeal and both the lower courtEorders, the cross objections in specific found no discussion, muchless even a mention – High Court was under an obligation toconsider the cross objections filed by the appellants – Since suchan obligation was not discharged, matter is remanded to the HighCourt for fresh adjudication – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.4(1),F6, 17, 18.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – O.41, r.22 – Held: In caseswhere the decree is partly in favour of the respondent, but is alsopartly against the respondent, two remedies within O.41, r.22 remainwith the respondent, to file their cross objections and to support theGdecree in whole – The third remedy in law is the right to file a crossappeal within the limitation period so prescribed, which in essenceis a separate appeal in itself, challenging part or whole of theoriginal decree, independent of the appeal filed by the other party– The respondent also has the right to fully support the originaldecree passed by the lower court in full.H

Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) by LRs.(2001) 2 SC 407; Madhukar and Ors. vs. Sangram andOrs. (2001) 4 SCC 756:[2001] 3 SCR 138; JitendraPrasad Nayak vs. Anant kumar Sah and Anr. (1998) 9SCC 383 – relied on.

Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4172of 2023.

From the Judgment and Order dated 05.01.2017 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in CA No. nil/2023.

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 4174, 4173, 4175, 4176 and 4177 of 2023.

S. K. Patri, Haraprasad Sahu, Ms. Velasree S., Mrs. KiranMohanto, Sanjay Kumar Mishra, Pranaya Kumar Mohapatra, Advs. forthe Appellant.

Ravindra Kumar, Sr. Adv., Binay Kumar Das, Ms. Priyanka Das,Ms. Neha Das, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. The present Appeals are directed against the impugned orderand judgment dated 05.01.2017 passed by the High Court of Allahabadat Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as “High Court”), whereby, theappeal preferred by the appellants herein was dismissed.

FACTS

4. The relevant facts necessary for the adjudication of the presentappeals, for the sake of convenience, the Respondent State Governmentof UP had issued a notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17

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Aof the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 30.04.1993 whereby a large tractof land, including the land of the appellants herein was acquired for thepurpose of Greater Noida. The declaration of the said lands under Section6 of the Act was issued on 25.06.1993, and the possession of the aforesaidlands was taken on different dates between 13.08.1993 and 31.05.1994.B5. Subsequent to the possession of the said lands being acquired,the Special Land Acquisition Officer, by order dated 27.08.1994,determined the market value of the plots at three different rates i.e.,Rs.32.52/-, Rs.22.44/- and Rs. 16.46/- paisa per square yard.

6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid award, the appellants herein soughtCreference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and claimedcompensation at the rate of Rs. 350/- to Rs. 500/- per square yard ongrounds of parity to other lands acquired in the vicinity. The LearnedDistrict Judge, in the aforesaid reference, vide its judgment dated09.05.2002, determined the market value of the said lands at Rs. 400/-,but deducted 1/3[rd] amount for development charge, and fixed the marketDvalue at Rs. 267/- per square yard and granted Rs. 80/- as solatium persquare yard with interest at the rate of 9% and 15% per annum, and anadditional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum on the marketvalue with effect from the date of transfer of possession.

7. As against this, the Respondent Greater Noida filed an appealEin the High Court, to which the appellants herein filed their cross appealsseeking a further enhancement.

8. Subsequently, the High Court, vide order and judgment dated04.01.2017, confirmed the compensation determined by the LearnedDistrict Judge. It is the contention of the appellants herein that the HighFCourt, while passing its judgment, did not consider the cross objectionsfiled by them.

9. The Appellants, aggrieved by the fact that their cross objectionfor enhancement was not properly considered, filed a review, however,the same was dismissed vide impugned order and judgment datedG05.01.2017. Hence, the present Special Leave Petition.

10. For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to mention that theacquisition of the land itself is not being challenged by way of the presentappeals, and the limited challenge is only confined to the extent of thequantum of compensation granted for the acquisition of the said lands.H

11. To appreciate the issue at hand and to come to a correctconclusion, we must analyze the impugned order passed by the HighCourt, to see whether there has been any application of mind by theHigh Court on the cross objections filed by the appellants herein, and ifsuch consideration has not been taken into account, then to what extentcan this Court grant relief.

ANALYSIS

12. Order 41 Rule 22, which is the governing law in the presentcase, elaborates on the remedies available to a respondent in the courtof first appeal where an original decree has been challenged. An analysisof the said provision, in our opinion, is essential to adjudicate upon thepresent case.

13. In cases where the decree passed by the court of first instanceis in favor of the respondent in whole, in such circumstance, no remedyexists in favour of the respondent to appeal such decree, since no rightto appeal can be vested onto a party, which is successful.

14. However, in cases where the decree given by the court offirst instance, is partly in favour of the respondent, but is also partlyagainst the respondent, two remedies within Order 41 Rule 22 remainwith the respondent, which are (i) To file their cross objections and, (ii)To support the decree in whole. A third remedy in law also exists,which is the right to file a cross appeal, which will also be discussed inbrief.

15. In cases where the opposing party files a first appeal againstpart or whole of the original decree, and the respondent in the said firstappeal, due to part or whole of the decree being in their favour, abstainsfrom filing an appeal at the first instance, in such cases, to ensure thatthe respondent is also given a fair chance to be heard, he is given theright to file his cross objections within the appeal already so instituted bythe other party, against not only the contentions raised by the other party,but also against part or whole of the decree passed by the court of firstinstance.

16. In a similar circumstance, where the other party in the firstinstance has preferred an appeal, apart from the remedy of crossobjections, the respondent can also file a cross appeal within the limitation AB

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Aperiod so prescribed, which in essence is a separate appeal in itself,challenging part or whole of the original decree, independent of theappeal filed by the other party. The respondent also has the right to fullysupport the original decree passed by the lower court in full.

17. In the present case at hand, the appellants herein, in theBcourt of first appeal filed a cross objection. It is the claim of theappellants herein that his cross objection was not considered by theHigh Court while passing the impugned judgment. At this stage, it mustbe noted that while cross objections, unlike a regular appeal, are filedwithin an already existing appeal, however, as per Order 41 Rule 22 ofCthe CPC, cross objections have all the trappings of a regular appeal,and therefore, must be considered in full by the court adjudicating uponthe same.

18. A bare perusal of the impugned order would show that theissues raised by the appellants in their cross objections have not beenDconsidered by the High Court. No mention of the cross objections filedby the appellants herein have been found in the said judgment. While theHigh Court has given a detailed analysis of all other issues raised in theappeal and the both the lower court orders, however, the cross objectionsin specific, finds no discussion, much less even a mention.

E19. In the case of Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari(Dead) by LRs.1, this Court held that the court of appeal has a duty toapply its mind to all issues raised before it, and to discharge such duty, itmust also record its findings against all such issues raised. For the sakeof convenience, the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is beingextracted herein:F

“The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirmthe findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable rightof the parties and unless restricted by law. the whole case istherein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law.The judgment of the Appellate Court must, therefore, reflectGits conscious application of mind, and record findingssupported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with thecontentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decisionof the Appellate Court.

While reversing a finding of fact the Appellate Court mustcome into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by thetrial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at adifferent finding. This would satisfy the Court hearing afurther appeal that the First Appellate Court had dischargedthe duty expected of it.”

20. In the case of Madhukar and Ors. Vs. Sangram and Ors.2,this Court, while reiterating the principles laid down in the SantoshHazari Judgment (Supra),observed that the court of first appeal hasa duty to record its findings qua all the issues raised before it, and incases where the High Court fails to do the same, the matter must beremanded to the same court again for fresh adjudication.

21. Further, in the case of Jitendra Prasad Nayak Vs. Anantkumar Sah and Anr.3, this Court, in an identical circumstance whereinthe cross objections filed by the appellant therein was not considered bythe court of first appeal, held that remanded the case back to the HighCourt and observed as under:

“....Admittedly, a cross-objection was filed by the appellant-landlord against the rejection by the first appellate court ofthe existence of one of the two grounds of eviction. However,while deciding the appeal of the respondent-tenant in hisfavour against the decision of the first appellate court on theother ground, the existance of the cross objection appears tohave been missed by the High Court with the result that thereis no decision given on the cross objection. The impugnedjudgment cannot, therefore, be sustained inter alia for thisreason. We are also of the opinion that the question relatingto existence of the ground of bona fide need which has beendecided in favour of the tenant requires a fresh determinationby the High Court along with the other point relating to defaultin payment of rent which was the subject mater of cross-objection.......”

22. The abovementioned discussions and judgments, whencontextualized to the present case, would show that the High Court 2 (2001) 4 SCC 756

3 (1998) 9 SCC 383

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132SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Awas under an obligation to consider the cross objections filed by theAppellants herein. Since such an obligation was not discharged whilepassing the judgment in appeal, we are of the considered opinion thatthe matter is fit for remand to the High Court for fresh adjudication onthe grounds raised in the cross objections during appeal by the appellantsBherein. Accordingly, the present appeals are therefore allowed to suchan extent.

Divya Pandey(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

Appeals allowed.

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