NORTHERN DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION versus RAM CHANDER SINGH AND ORS. on 9 February 2023

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in WritFPetition (C) No. 9333 of 2014 by which the High Court has allowed thesaid writ petition preferred by the respondents herein and has declaredthat the acquisition with respect to the land in question is deemed tohave lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensationand Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and ResettlementGAct, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”), the North DelhiMunicipal Corporation (NDMC) has preferred the present appeal.

2. In the present case, the lands of village Chowkri Mubarakbadwere acquired vide Notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1894 dated13.11.1959. The Award came to be passed on dated 20.02.1964. OneH

Bodey S/o Munna Singh and Kalu Ram S/o Hetu were the recordedowners. According to the appellant, actual vacant physical possessionof the subject land was taken over and handed over to the requisitionagency. Till the writ petition was filed, neither the writ petitioners nor therecorded owners challenged the acquisition proceedings under the Act,1894.

2.1 That the private respondents herein – original writ petitionersapproached the High Court by way of present writ petition for adeclaration that the acquisition with respect to the land in question isdeemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. The originalwrit petitioners claimed the ownership over the land admeasuring 3000sq. yards, i.e., 6 bigha from the share fallen to Bodey. It was the case onbehalf of the original writ petitioners that neither the compensation hasbeen tendered and/or paid to them nor the possession has been takenover and, therefore, entitled to declaration as prayed.

2.2 The Government of NCT of Delhi in its counter affidavit beforethe High Court has stated as follows:- “7. That it is submitted that the lands of village ChowkriMubarakbad were notified vide Notification under Section 4 ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 13.11.1959 which wasfollowed by the Notification under section 6 of the Act dated26.12.1962. The Award was also passed vide Award No.1686dated 20.2.1964 and none of the petitioners and/or the recordedowner/s challenged the same and accepted the acquisitionproceedings. In pursuance of the acquisition proceedings, theanswering respondent has duly taken the actual vacant physicalpossession of the subject land falling in khasra number 165 (12-19) which has been bifurcated in two parts as 165 min (6-10) and165 min (6-09) and the ownership as per the award is of Bodey S/o Munna Singh for (6-10) and for (6-09), the recorded owner hasbeen shown as Kalu Ram S/o Hetu. It is pertinent to mentionhere that the petitioners have been claiming the relief for the landmeasuring 3000 square yards i.e. 6 bigha from the share fallen toBodey i.e. (6- 10): It is submitted that in W.P.(C) 9333/2014pursuance of the Award, stated supra, the answering respondenthas duly taken the actual vacant physical possession of the subjectland falling in khasra number 165 (12-19) on 1.5.1964 and handed A

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Aover the requisition agency. It is further submitted that thecompensation was deposited with the Reference Court videcheque number 389384 dated 3.9.1965 however the same wasreturned by the court of Ld. ADJ and thereafter deposited inTreasury vide cheque number 394710 dated 10.3.1967.”

B2.3 Despite the above, the High Court, by the impugned judgmentand order has allowed the writ petition and has declared that the acquisitionwith respect to the land in question is deemed to have lapsed as theassessed compensation was never paid to the original owners – BodeySingh or his acknowledged successor-in-interest – Panna Lal and insteadCthe same was deposited sometime in the year 1967 with the Treasury.That thereafter, relying upon the decision of this Court in the case ofPune Municipal Corporation and Anr. Vs. Harakchand MisirimalSolanki and Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 183, the High Court has allowed thewrit petition and has declared that the acquisition with respect to theland in question is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of theDAct, 2013.

3. From the counter affidavit filed before the High Court, it canbe seen that it was the specific case on behalf of the appellant and theGovernment of NCT of Delhi that the possession of the land was dulytaken on 01.05.1964 and handed over to the requisition agency. It wasEalso the case on behalf of the appellant that the compensation wasdeposited with the Reference Court vide cheque number 389384 dated03.09.1965, however, the same was returned by the Court of Ld. ADJand thereafter deposited in the Treasury on 10.3.1967.

3.1 From the impugned judgment and order passed by the HighFCourt, it appears that the High Court has not accepted the case on behalfof the appellant that the actual vacant physical possession of the land inquestion was taken over solely on the ground that the land is vacant andthe vacant portions in fact have been mortgaged and who constructedthe boundary wall, which cannot be recited in the present proceedings.GHowever, it is required to be noted that it was never the case on behalfof the original writ petitioners that they constructed the boundary wall.Against which, it was the specific case on behalf of the Government ofNCT of Delhi that the possession of the land in question was taken overin the year 1964 and handed over to the requisition agency. It has comeon record that on some portion, there was a construction and the restH

was vacant to be surrounded by boundary wall. Thus, there is no reasonto disbelieve the case on behalf of the appellant that in fact the physicalpossession of the land in question was not taken over on 01.05.1964.

3.2 Even otherwise, the amount of compensation was initiallydeposited with the Reference Court and thereafter deposited in theTreasury in the year 1967. Nothing is on record that at any point of time,either the recorded owners or his successors had made any grievancewith respect to the non-payment of the compensation.

3.3 Even the decision of this Court in the case of Pune MunicipalCorporation and Anr. (supra) relied upon by the High Court whilepassing the impugned judgment and order has been subsequently overruledby the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors. (2020) 8 SCC129. In paragraph 365 and 366, the Constitution Bench of this Court hasobserved and held as under:- “365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune MunicipalCorpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki,(2014) 3 SCC 183] is hereby overruled and all other decisions inwhich Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v.Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183] has beenfollowed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji NagarResidential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. Stateof T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353] cannot be said to be laying downgood law, is overruled and other decisions following the same arealso overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra[(2018) 3 SCC 412], the aspect with respect to the proviso toSection 24(2) and whether “or” has to be read as “nor” or as“and” was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decisiontoo cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the presentjudgment.

366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer thequestions as under:

366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case theaward is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement ofthe 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation hasto be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

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366.2. In case the award has been passed within thewindow period of five years excluding the period covered by aninterim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue asprovided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894Act as if it has not been repealed.

366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) betweenpossession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”.The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction ofauthorities for five years or more prior to commencement of thesaid Act, the possession of land has not been taken norcompensation has been paid. In other words, in case possessionhas been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is nolapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession hasnot been taken then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensationin court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the provisoto Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect tomajority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as onthe date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with theprovisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interestunder Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit ofcompensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of landacquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect tothe majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation underthe 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date ofnotification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensationas provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open tohim to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) dueto non-payment or non- deposit of compensation in court. Theobligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensationor who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim NORTH DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. RAMCHANDER SINGH AND ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2)of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is tobe treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Actand as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquestreport/memorandum. Once award has been passed on takingpossession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests inState there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapseunder Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for adeemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authoritieshave failed due to their inaction to take possession and paycompensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act cameinto force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with theauthority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence ofinterim orders passed by court has to be excluded in thecomputation of five years.

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise tonew cause of action to question the legality of concludedproceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceedingpending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014.It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopenconcluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question thelegality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings ormode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of courtto invalidate acquisition.”

4. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority (supra) to the facts of the case on hand, theHigh Court has committed a very serious error in declaring that theacquisition with respect to the land in question, which as such wasacquired in the year 1959 is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2)of the Act, 2013. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment andorder passed by the High Court is unsustainable.

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A5. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, presentappeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt is hereby quashed and set aside. There shall not be any deemedlapse of the acquisition with respect to the land in question. If the originalwrit petitioners have any grievance with respect to the compensationand/or if the compensation is not paid to the recorded owners and/or theBsuccessors, it will be open for them to claim the same, which may beconsidered in accordance with law and on merits.