INDRAJEET YADAV versus SANTOSH SINGH AND ANR. on 19 April 2022

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned commonDjudgment and order dated 30.03.2019 passed by the High Court ofJudicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No.1083 of 2012 and CriminalAppeal No.1178 of 2012 by which the High Court has allowed the saidappeals preferred by the original accused and has acquitted them for theoffences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IndianPenal Code (for short, ‘IPC’), the original complainant/informant hasEpreferred the present appeals.

2. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respectiveparties.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant – originalFcomplainant/informant and learned counsel appearing on behalf of theState have drawn our attention to the fact that in the present case theargumentsin the appeals were concluded on 30.03.2019 and the HighCourt allowed the said appeals on the very day and pronounced theoperative portion of the order and set aside the judgment and order ofconviction passed by the learned Trial Court and directed the accusedGwho was in jail to be released, but a reasoned judgment and order waspronounced after a period of approximately five months.

3.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant – originalcomplainant/informant has heavily relied upon the recent decision of thisCourt dated 29.10.2020 in Civil Appeal No.3564 of 2020 in the caseH

of Balaji Baliram Mupade & Anr. versus The State of Maharashtra,by which such a practice of pronouncing the final order without a reasonedjudgment has been deprecated. It is submitted that in the aforesaid casethis Hon’ble Court considered another decision of this Court in the caseof State of Punjab & Ors. versus Jagdev Singh Talwandi, (1984)1 SCC 596 as well as other decisions referred in para 4 of the saiddecision. It is submitted that this Court also considered in detail anotherdecision in the case of Anil Rai versus State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC318 by which guidelines have been issued by this Court regarding thepronouncement of judgments and orders.

4. Applying the law laid down in the case of Balaji BaliramMupade (supra) and the earlier decisions of this Court in the case ofJagdev Singh Talwandi (supra) to the facts of the case on hand, theimpugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable.

4.1 In the case of Balaji Baliram Mupade (supra) in paragraphs1 to 4 it is observed and held as under:

“1. Judicial discipline requires promptness in delivery of judgments– an aspect repeatedly emphasized by this Court. The problem iscompounded where the result is known but not the reasons. Thisdeprives any aggrieved party of the opportunity to seek furtherjudicial redressal in the next tier of judicial scrutiny.

2. A Constitution Bench of this Court as far back as in the year1983 in the State of Punjab &Ors. v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi -1984 (1) SCC 596 drew the attention of the High Courts to theserious difficulties which were caused on account of a practicewhich was increasingly being adopted by several High Courts,that of pronouncing the final orders 2 without a reasoned judgment.The relevant paragraph is reproduced as under:

“30. We would like to take this opportunity to point out that seriousdifficulties arise on account of the practice increasingly adoptedby the High Courts, of pronouncing the final order without areasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final order which theHigh Court intends to pass should not be announced until a reasonedjudgment is ready for pronouncement. Suppose, for example, thata final order without a reasoned judgment is announced by theHigh Court that a house shall be demolished, or that the custody A

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aof a child shall be handed over to one parent as against the other,or that a person accused of a serious charge is acquitted, or thata statute is unconstitutional or, as in the instant case, that a detenube released from detention. If the object of passing such orders isto ensure speedy compliance with them, that object is more oftendefeated by the aggrieved party filing a special Leave Petition inBthis Court against the order passed by the High Court. That placesthis Court in a predicament because, without the benefit of thereasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for this Court to allowthe bare order to be implemented. The result inevitably is that theoperation of the order passed by the High Court has to be stayedCpending delivery of the reasoned judgment.”

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3. Further, much later but still almost two decades ago, this Courtin Anil Rai v. State of Bihar - 2001 (7) SCC 318 deemed itappropriate to provide some guidelines regarding thepronouncement of judgments, expecting them to be followed byDall concerned under the mandate of this Court. It is not necessaryto reproduce the directions except to state that normally thejudgment is expected within two months of the conclusion of thearguments, and on expiry of three months any of the parties canfile an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment.EIf, for any reason, no judgment is pronounced for six months, anyof the parties is entitled to move an application before the thenChief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to re-assign thecase before another Bench for fresh arguments.

4. The aforementioned principle has been forcefully restated byFthis Court on several occasions including in Zahira Habibulla H.Sheikh &Ors. v. State of Gujarat &Ors. [AIR 2004 SC 3467 paras80-82], Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana (2008) 7 SCC 96 paras5-10] and most recently in Ajay Singh &Anr. Etc. v. State ofChhattisgarh &Anr.- AIR 2017 SC 310.”

G4.2 Despite the strong observations made by this Court as far asback in the year 1984 and thereafter repeatedly reiterated, still the practiceof pronouncing only the operative portion of the judgment without areasoned judgment and to pass a reasoned judgment subsequently hasbeen continued. Such a practice of pronouncing the final orders withouta reasoned judgment has to be stopped and discouraged.H

4.3 For immediate reference the order passed in the present casespeaks for itself. The High Court heard the arguments on 30.03.2019and passed only the following order on that day:

“Heard Sri V. M. Zaidi, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri M. J.Akhtar, learned counsel for the appellant in the Criminal Appeal No.1083 of 2012 and Sri Sunil Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant inconnected Criminal Appeal No. 1178 of 2012, Sri J. K. Upadhyay, learnedA.G.A. for the State and Sri P. C. Srivastava, learned counsel for theinformant.

We are making the operative order here and now. We willgive reasons later.

Both the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgementand order dated 24.02.2012 passed by Additional District and ·Session Judge, T.E.C.P., Court No. 1, Azamgarh in S.T. No. 151of 2009 is hereby set-aside.

Appellant Santosh Singh in Criminal Appeal No. 1083 of2012 is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are cancelledand his sureties discharged.

Appellant Avdhesh Singh @ Chhunnu Singh in connectedCriminal Appeal No. 1178 of 2012 is in jail. He shall be releasedforthwith unless he is wanted in some other case.

Both the appellants shall comply with the provisions ofSection 437-A Cr.P. C. within one month from today.

There shall however, be no order as to costs.”

4.4 From the record of proceedings it appears that the reasonedjudgment was pronounced and uploaded after a period of almost fivemonths. Therefore, applying the law laid down by this Court in thedecisions referred to hereinabove, we set aside the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High Court without further entering into themerits of the case nor expressing anything on merits in favour of eitherparty. We remand the appeals to the High Court to decide the sameafresh in accordance with law and on its own merits. We request theHigh Court to finally decide and dispose of the appeals at the earliestand preferably within a period of six months from the date of the receiptof the present order. However, it is observed that during the pendencyof the appeals before the High Court the accused need not surrender A

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Aand they may be treated to have been released on bail and continued tobe released on bail, however subject to the ultimate outcome of theappeals before the High Court. If the conviction is sustained the accusedshall surrender within a period of two weeks from the date of thepronouncement of the judgment.

BPresent appeals are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent.Registry is directed to return the record of proceedings of the casereceived to the High Court forthwith.

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Bibhuti Bhushan Bose

Appeals allowed.

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