THIRU K. PALANISWAMY versus M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. on 23 February 2023

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2023] 7 S.C.R.

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY

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M. SHANMUGAM & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 1392 of 2023)

BFEBRUARY 23, 2023

[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]

Injunction – Prayer for temporary injunction – Political Party– Party Constitution – Dispute inter-se in the political party – Thetopmost position in the party was earlier assigned to the GeneralCSecretary but, after the demise of the then General Secretary on05.12.2016, the party organisation went through various changesand ultimately, a system of joint leadership, by Co-ordinator andJoint Co-ordinator – However, when the proposition for amendmentsof the byelaws, essentially to revert to the system of single leadershipDat the apex level, was likely to come up in the meeting of the GeneralCouncil dated 23.06.2022, it led to the litigation – In the said meeting(23.06.2022) resolution to propose one ‘TMH’ as a chairman wasproposed – It is alleged that the said ‘TMH’ announced next date ofGeneral Council meeting as 11.07.2022 – Various civil suits werefiled – The Single Judge of the High Court took note of the variousEinterim applications and proceeded to decide the same by orderdated 17.08.2022 – It held, inter-alia, that the General Councilmeeting dated 11.07.2022 was not convened by the person competentto convene the General Council meeting – The said meeting wasnot convened providing 15 days advance notice – The status quoFante as existing on 23.06.2022 was held to be maintained and itwas directed that there would be no Executive Council meeting orGeneral Council meeting without the joint consent of the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator – However, the said order was setaside by the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugnedorder dated 17.08.2022 – On appeal, held: The Division BenchGreferred to the principles governing the grant or refusal of temporaryinjunction and pointed out that the directions given by the SingleJudge for convening the meeting only with the joint consent of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator was leading to a situation wherethe party as a whole would undergo irreparable hardship becauseHthere was no possibility of the appellant and the respondent No. 1-

OPS and EPS – acting jointly to convene the meeting – The DivisionBench pointed out that the directions of the Single Judge wouldonly further the “functional deadlock” already existing in the party– The logic and reasoning of the Division Bench of the High Courtstand accord with the law and also facts of the present case – Sofar as convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 is concerned,the same had never been in doubt or in any dispute – The saidmeeting was indeed convened by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator jointly – They had been working in tandem until that stage– However, they seem to have fallen apart immediately thereafter,particularly when a proposition for amendment of the byelaws andreverting to the system of single leadership was in the offing – Ifmajority of members gave a requisition on 23.06.2022 for conveningthe General Council meeting and the Presidium Chairmanannounced the date of this requisitioned meeting as 11.07.2022, inthe given set of facts and circumstances, such announcement, atleast at the present stage, cannot be dubbed as wholly redundant –Single Judge while passing the order dated 17.08.2022 hadcommitted a serious error in convening of the meeting dated11.07.2022 as an act unauthorised – Another alleged infirmity asto 15 days’ notice, the Division Bench appears to have rightlyanalysed the frame of the said Rule 19(vii), where the requirementof 15 days’ notice is referable to the regular meeting and not assuch to a requisitioned or special meeting – Thus, the Single Judgedid not examine the questions in the correct perspective.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

Conclusion

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The Division Bench also referred to theprinciples governing the grant or refusal of temporary injunctionand pointed out that the directions given by the learned SingleJudge for convening the meeting only with the joint consent ofCo-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator was leading to a situationwhere the party as a whole would undergo irreparable hardshipbecause there was no possibility of the appellant and therespondent No.1 – OPS and EPS – acting jointly to convene themeeting. The Division Bench pointed out that the directions ofthe learned Single Judge would only further the “functionaldeadlock” already existing in the party. [Para 26.2][1191-B-D]

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1120SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A2. The facts of the case make it abundantly clear that so faras convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 is concerned, thesame had never been in doubt or in any dispute. The said meetingwas indeed convened by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinatorjointly. They had been working in tandem until that stage.However, they seem to have fallen apart immediately thereafter,Bparticularly when a proposition for amendment of the byelawsand reverting to the system of single leadership was in the offing.In any case, the meeting dated 23.06.2022 was duly convenedand the efforts to prevent the same did not meet with success inthe Court. Even if the slated business was not transacted in theCmeeting dated 23.06.2022, all that had happened in that meetingcould not have been ignored. It remains undeniable that theplaintiff OPS and the persons standing with him were also verymuch present in the said meeting. The General Council is said tobe consisting of 2665 members. If 2190 members out of these2665 gave a requisition on 23.06.2022 for convening the GeneralDCouncil meeting and the Presidium Chairman announced the dateof this requisitioned meeting as 11.07.2022, in the given set offacts and circumstances, such announcement, at least at thepresent stage, cannot be dubbed as wholly redundant. At thatpoint of time, when Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator wereEshown to be not functioning jointly (for whatsoever reason), afunctional deadlock came into existence for the party and aworkable solution was required to be found. In the given scenario,the actions and steps taken by the requisitioning members asalso by the Presidium Chairman cannot be declared asunwarranted or illegal at this stage. That being the position,Fconvening of meeting dated 11.07.2022 could not have beentaken as an act unauthorised. The learned Single Judge whilepassing the order dated 17.08.2022 seems to have fallen in seriouserror and said order was clearly suffering from perversity whenconvening of the meeting dated 11.07.2022 was taken as an actGunauthorised. The Division Bench of the High Court, has rightlylooked at the substance of the matter and realities of the situation.[Para 28.1][1192-A-G]

3. The other alleged infirmity about want of clear 15 days’notice has also been rightly dealt with by the Division Bench ofHthe High Court in the impugned order dated 02.09.2022. Such an internal matter of the party, approach of the Court and that too,while considering the prayer for interim relief, cannot be of findingtechnical faults and flaws detached from the substance of thematter. Even as regards technicalities, the Division Benchappears to have rightly analysed the frame of the said Rule 19(vii),where the requirement of 15 days’ notice is referable to the regularmeeting and not as such to a requisitioned or special meeting.[Para 28.2][1192-G-H; 1193-A]

4. The Single Judge of the High Court in the present matterdid not examine the questions relating to balance of convenienceand irreparable injury in the correct perspective and particularlyfailed to weigh the competing possibilities and risk of injustice ifultimately the decision of main matter would run counter to thecourse being adopted and suggested in the order grantingtemporary injunction in the manner and form it was being granted.It gets perforce reiterated that if the order as passed by thelearned Single Judge was to remain in force until decision of thesuits, it would have been drastically detrimental to the interestof political party in question, which is a recognised political partywith the Election Commission of India. In the matters of thepresent nature, the simple and precise view, as stated by thelearned Single Judge at the initial stage on 22.06.2022 whiledeclining the prayer for interim relief, had been on the correctstatement of law that ordinarily the Court would not interfere inthe internal issues of an association/party and would leave it opento the association/party and its members to take a particulardecision for better administration; and that had been the correctapproach towards the facts of the case. In the present case, whenGeneral Council is shown to be the apex body of the party, takingany exception to the meeting of the General Council could haveneither been countenanced nor interfered with by way oftemporary injunction. In the given set of facts and circumstances,the hyper-technical suggestions as sought to be made about thewant of valid notice with reference to date, time and place ofmeeting i.e., with reference to Chapter 5 from Shackleton on theLaw and Practice of Meetings do not further the cause of theappellants, particularly when it is noticed that the date, time andplace of the meeting in question were duly declared in the meetingdated 23.06.2022. [Para 30][1193-H; 1194-A-F]

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A5. The submission on behalf of the appellants based on thedecision in S. Thirunavukkarasu that the scheme of byelaws doesnot envisage the requisitionists to convene the General Councilmeeting; and if the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator jointlyfail to convene the meeting, the only option is to seek interventionof the Court has its own shortcomings. As rightly noticed by theBDivision Bench in the order impugned, in the said case, anexpelled member of the party called for a General Councilmeeting, parallel to the meeting called by the then GeneralSecretary. In the given fact situation, the Court granted interiminjunction in favour of the General Secretary against conveningCof the parallel meeting. In the present matter, no parallel meetingof General Council has been called for or requisitioned by any ofthe Members. The Division Bench of the High Court has rightlyobserved that as a general rule, it cannot be laid down that therequisitionists have no option but only to go to the Court if themeeting is not convened. It has also been pointed out that in theDpast, when the interim General Secretary could not act in theyear 2017, the Office Bearers stepped in and convened themeeting based on a requisition received. The present situationtoo, where the position as occupied earlier by the GeneralSecretary was assigned to the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-Eordinator in their jointness and it remains beyond a shadow ofdoubt that Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator do not standin jointness and cannot act jointly, is akin to the situation whenthe apex position holder was not in a position to act. Obviously, aworkable solution was to be found; and when the solution as foundand applied, does not otherwise appear offending the spirit ofFbyelaws as also the norms of functioning of an association or aparty, it cannot be said that declaration of the Presidium Chairmanfor the meeting of the General Council on 11.07.2022 and thefollow-up notice by the Office Bearers at Party Headquarters hadbeen wholly unauthorised. [Para 31][1194-F-H; 1195-A-D]

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6. It is also noteworthy that the ultimate injunction issuedby the Single Judge had been that of restoring status quo ante ason 23.06.2022 and further to that, the learned Single Judgedirected that the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator would haveto function jointly; meetings have to be called with their joint H

consent; and on being properly requisitioned, they would notrefuse to convene the General Council meeting and that theycould approach the Court for necessary directions for conductingthe General Council meeting. Apart from the fact that the injunctionas issued by the learned Single Judge had been far away andbeyond the scope of applications before him, the said injunctioncould have only perpetuated the functional deadlock in the party.The order passed by the learned Single Judge could not havebeen countenanced from any angle and thus, the Division Bench,has rightly interfered with the same. [Para 33][1196-B-D]

Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited v.S.L. Vaswani and Anr. (2010) 2 SCC 142; NilkanthaSidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath SomannaNingashetti and Ors. AIR 1962 SC 666 : [1962] SCR551; Union of India and Ors. v. M/s. Raj Grow ImpexLLP and Ors. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 429 – relied on.

S. Thirunavukkarasu and Anr. v. Selvi J. Jayalalithaand Anr. 1997 (III) CTC 229; Wander Ltd. and Anr. v.Antox India (P) Ltd. (1990) Supp SCC 727; State ofKarnataka v. State of A.P. and Ors. (2000) 9 SCC 572: [2000] 3 SCR 301; Surya Nath Singh and Ors. v.Khedu Singh (Dead) by LRS and Ors. (1994) 3 SuppSCC 561; Assistant Collector of Central Excise,Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. andOrs. (1985) 1 SCC 260 : [1985] 2 SCR 190; DalpatKumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors. (1992) 1SCC 719 : [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 472; American ExpressBank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. and Ors. (1993) 2 SCC199 : [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 833; Seema Arshad Zaheerand Ors. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai andOrs. (2006) 5 SCC 282 : [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 865;K. Rajendran and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.(1982) 2 SCC 273 : [1982] 3 SCR 628; B. N.Viswanathan and Anr. v. Tiffin’s Barytes, Asbestos andPaints Ltd. (1953) 66 LW 124; T.P. Daver v. LodgeVictoria No. 363 S.C. Belgaum and Ors. (1964) 1 SCR1– referred to.

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1124SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2023] 7 S.C.R.

A“Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings”Edited by Madeleine Cordes, John Pugh-Smith, 13thed., Thomson Reuters at p. 41 (Para 17.2) – referred to.

Case Law Reference

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.06.2022 of the High Courtof Judicature at Madras in CMP No. 9962 of 2022.

EWith

Civil Appeal Nos. 1393, 1394, 1395 and 1396-1397 of 2023.

Mukul Rohatgi, C A Sundaram, Atul Chitale, C. S. Vidyanathan,Guru Krishna Kumar, Parag P. Tripathi, Shyam Divan, Sr. Advs.,Gowtham Kumar, Balaji Srinivasan, Shiva Krishnamurti, Mrs. LakshmiFRao, Thangadurai, Ms. Rohini Musa, Mrs. P. Rajalakshmi, GouthamShivshankar, Ms. Ruchira Goel, Shantanu Singh, Ravi Sehgal, AditJayeshbhai Shah, Amit Sharma, Dipesh Sinha, Ms. Pallavi Barua, Ms.Awantika Manohar, Ms. Diksha Rai, Ankit Agarwal, Prateek Dhankhar,Vinodh Kanna B., Ms. Garima Jain, Pai Amit, Ms. Pankhuri Bhardwaj,GAbhiyudaya Vats, Saurabh Agrawal, Ms. Komal Mundra, Ms. SonaliSuryawanshi, Arunava Mukherjee, Ashutosh Kumar, Ms. Mahamaya Chatterjee, P. V. Yogeswaran, Ashish Kumar Upadhyay, Sachin KumarVerma, Surya Narayan Patro, Ms. Yakeen Bishoyi, Akshat Shrivastava,Ms. Anzu. K. Varkey, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.

Leave granted.

2. These appeals involving inter-related issues and same set ofcontesting parties, have been considered together and are taken up fordisposal by this common judgment.

3. Before embarking upon the requisite details, a few preliminarycomments and brief outline shall be apposite.

3.1. The matters in issue essentially relate to the internalmanagement of a political party, All India Anna Dravida MunnetraKazhagam[1], which is registered with the Election Commission of India.This political party, said to be having the primary cadre consisting ofmore than 1.5 crore members, has its own byelaws, which have beenamended from time to time. The two upper levels of party structureinclude the Central Executive Committee[2] and the General Council ofthe Central Organization[3]. Though, in the scheme of byelaws, the topmostposition in the party was earlier assignedto the General Secretary but,after the demise of the then General Secretary on 05.12.2016, the partyorganisation went through a sea of changes and ultimately, a system ofjoint leadership, by Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, was establishedby way of amendment of byelaws on 12.09.2017.However, thepropositions for further amendmentshave met with divergent views ofdifferent factions within the party and have led to these litigations in asmany as at least five civil suits.The prayers for temporary injunctionduring the pendency of these civil suits have led to different orders atdifferent stages by the High Court of Judicature at Madras on the Originalside and on the Appellate side as also by this Court.

3.2. For introductory purposes, we may indicate that in the firstthree civil suits, being CS Nos. 102 of 2022, 106 of 2022 and 111 of 2022, 1 ‘AIADMK’, for short; hereinafter also referred to as ‘the party’ or ‘the politicalparty’.

2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Executive Committee’.

3 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the General Council’.

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Avarious applications seeking interim reliefs were dealt with by an orderdated 22.06.2022 whereby, the learned Single Judge of the High Courtdeclined to grant any injunction against the meeting of the General Councilscheduled to be held on 23.06.2022. This order was challenged by oneof the plaintiffs in an intra-court appeal, OSA No. 160 of 2022; andtherein,by an order dated 23.06.2022, as passed after an early morningBhearing, the Division Bench of the High Court,though allowed the saidscheduled meeting of the General Council but, placed fetters on its scopeby providing that no decision shall be taken on any other matter except23 items of draft resolution. The said order dated 23.06.2022 came to bechallenged in this Court in the three appeals arising out of Special LeaveCPetition (C) Nos. 11237 of 2022, 11578 of 2022 and 11579 of 2022 in thisbatch of matters. By way of an interim order dated 06.07.2022, thisCourt stayed the operation and effect of the said order dated 23.06.2022and further to that, the next proposed meeting of the General Councilslated to be held on 11.07.2022 was also permitted but while leaving itopen to the parties to seek any other interim relief before the learnedDSingle Judge dealing with the civil suits. Before the aforesaid order dated06.07.2022 by this Court, two more civil suits, being CS Nos. 118 of2022 and 119 of 2022, came to be filed before the High Court against thesaid proposed meeting dated 11.07.2022. Therein again, a learned SingleJudge of the High Court conducted early morning hearing on 11.07.2022Eand declined the interim relief. The said meeting dated 11.07.2022 was,accordingly, held at the scheduled time and various resolutions wereadopted therein but, the said order dated 11.07.2022 was subjected tochallenge in this Court and, by an order dated 27.09.2022, this Courtremanded the matter for reconsideration. Thereafter, the interim reliefapplications in the said newly filed civil suits were decided by a learnedFSingle Judge of the High Court on 17.08.2022 granting certain interimreliefs and providing, inter alia, that status quo ante, as existing on23.06.2022, shall be maintained and there would be no Executive Councilor General Council meeting without joint consent of the Co-ordinatorand Joint Co-ordinator. The said order dated 17.08.2022 was questionedGin intra-court appeals, being OSA Nos. 227 of 2022, 231 of 2022 and 232of 2022. These three appeals were allowed by the Division Bench of theHigh Court by its order dated 02.09.2022, which is under challenge inthe appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 15753 of 2022and 15705-15706 of 2022.

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4. The aforesaid outline would make it clear that though the issuerelating to the meetings of the General Council of the party-AIADMKhas gone into serious questions with different parties having differentpropositions to make and different reliefs to seek but, the position obtainingas at present is that the said meeting dated 11.07.2022 has taken placeand the said civil suits remain pending at different stages. The twoprincipal orders in challenge before us, i.e., the one dated 23.06.2022and another one dated 02.09.2022 essentially relate to the question ofgrant of temporary injunction during the pendency of the respective civilsuits. In this regard too, it is to be noticed that insofar as the order dated23.06.2022 is concerned, the operation and effect whereof was stayedby this Court on 06.07.2022, has practically lost its relevance because ofthe supervening and subsequent events. The position where the contestingparties stand at present is that on one hand, the plaintiff-appellantschallenging the order dated 02.09.2022 would submit that the said orderis required to be set aside and that of the learned Single Judge dated17.08.2022 is required to be restored, whereby interim relief was grantedto them whereas, the parties opposing would support the order dated02.09.2022 as being just and proper, requiring no interference.

5. We have drawn the foregoing outline essentially to indicatethat though there are multiple parties representing different positionsbefore us but the matters in essence relate to the question of grant oftemporary injunction in the civil suits concerning the affairs of the politicalparty and the disputes inter se the members and the factions within theparty; and then, the civil suits giving rise to the orders impugned remainpending and ought to be tried in accordance with law. Thus, even whenthe learned counsel for the contesting parties have made elaboratesubmissions on a variety of factors and facets, we would confine thisjudgment and our consideration to the question of grant of temporaryinjunction in the civil suits; and to the extent adjudication is requisite bythis Court in that regard. Hence, we may not delve into the questionswhich are not germane to the present adjudication.

6. With the foregoing preliminary comments, observations, andoutline, we may take note of the relevant factual aspects, in brief, asfollows:

6.1. A few of the basic facts which admit of no controversy arethat the party-AIADMK was founded in the year 1972 and is dulyrecognised and registered with the Election Commission of India. The AB

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Aparty, said to be having primary cadre consisting of more than 1.5 croremembers, is governed by its own byelaws. As noticed, the upper levelsof party structure include the Executive Committee and the GeneralCouncil. The byelaws of the party have been amended from time totime, including the amendments in the years 2011 and 2017. Thepropositions for further amendments are at the root of controversy inBthe present matters. Before taking up the questions in controversy, itmay be noticed that in the scheme of the byelaws as originally framedand continued for a long time, the topmost position in the party wasassigned to its General Secretary, who was to be directly elected by theprimary cadre. Earlier, Dr. J. Jayalalitha washolding the said position ofCthe General Secretary but,after her demise on 05.12.2016, the partydrifted into a state of uncertainty as regards leadership.

6.2. On 29.12.2016, in a General Council meeting convened afterthe demise of Dr. J. Jayalalitha, Ms. V.K. Sasikala was nominated asthe interim General Secretary. However, on 14.02.2017, the said interimDGeneral Secretary came to be incarcerated in view of a judgment of thisCourt. Ultimately, on 28.08.2017, a notice was issued for a GeneralCouncil meeting on 12.09.2017. At that stage, one of the groups in theparty had staked its claim before the Election Commission of India asbeing in-charge of the affairs of the party. All these features of intra-party dispute at that stage are not of much implication in relation to theEissues at hand. The relevant aspect has been that in the meeting of theGeneral Council held on 12.09.2017, a unique system was put in placeby amendment of the byelaws. By way of this amendment, the said lateDr. J. Jayalalitha was assigned the status of “Eternal General Secretary”of the party while providing that the said post of General Secretary wouldFas such be abolished; andin place of the said post of General Secretary,two high level posts of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator were created.

6.3. At this juncture, it may also be noticed that the disputes in thecivil suits leading to the interim orders in question essentially relate tothe two persons who were respectively elected as Co-ordinator andGJoint Co-ordinator after such amendment of the byelaws; they being theappellant of the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 15753 of 2022, Thiru.O. Panneerselvam[4],who was elected as the Co-ordinator and the 4At several places and even during the course of submissions, Thiru. O. Panneerselvamhas been referred to with the initials ‘OPS’. For continuity, the same initials have beenHassigned in his reference in this judgment.

respondent No. 1 of that appeal, Thiru. E.K. Palaniswamy[5],who waselected as the Joint Co-ordinator.

6.4. In the amendment of the byelaws carried out on 12.09.2017,the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator were assigned the powersand role that were previously entrusted to the General Secretary. Terselyput, it established a system of joint leadership in the party whereby alldecisions were to be taken jointly by the said two office-holders of theparty. As per the amended byelaws, the tenure of Co-ordinator and JointCo-ordinator was fixed for a period of five years. From the date of thesaid decision dated 12.09.2017 and until the month of May 2021, thispolitical party-AIADMK remained in power, forming the government inthe State of Tamil Nadu.

6.5. However, on 01.12.2021, the Executive Committeeof the partypassed a special resolution for amending Rules 20-A(ii), 43 and 45 ofthe byelaws. These amendments empowered the primary membershipof the party to directly elect the persons to the said post of Co-ordinatorand Joint Co-ordinator and it was also provided that even when theGeneral Council could amend the rules of the party constitution andeven when the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator could relax ormake alterations in therules and regulations of the party, the provisionfor direct election of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator only by primarymembers of the party cannot be changed. The Executive Committee’sresolution dated 01.12.2021 also provided that the said amendments wouldcome immediately into effect but shall be approved by the GeneralCouncil.

6.5.1. On 02.12.2021, the party election for the said posts of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator was notified. On 06.12.2021, OPS andEPS jointly contested for the post of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator;they were elected unanimously and unopposed; the necessary certificateswere issued to both of them; and the election results were notified to theElection Commission of India. It appears that further elections for theposts of office bearers of the party at different levels of the organizationwere conducted in terms of Rules 6 to 14 of the byelaws in differentphases commencing from 13.12.2021 and continuing until 28.04.2022,when the office bearers of the Chief Committee of Kazhagam were

5At several places and even during the course of submissions, Thiru. E.K. Palaniswamyhas been referred to with the initials ‘EPS’. For continuity, the same initials have beenassigned in his reference in this judgment.

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Aappointed and then, on 29.04.2022, members of the Central ExecutiveCommittee were appointed by OPS and EPS functioning jointly as Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator. In the month of May, 2022, Form AAand Form BB were communicated by the party in relation to the electionof Tamil Nadu Legislative Council. These forms were also signed byOPS and EPS, functioning jointly as Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.

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6.6. Until the processes aforesaid, the Co-ordinator and the JointCo-ordinatorappear to have continued to function intandemand in thespirit of joint leadership envisioned by the amended byelaws. Continuingas such, they issued a joint notice convening the meeting of GeneralCouncil on 23.06.2022. This notice did not have any agenda or proposedCresolutions. However, with the issuance of this notice, a subtle simmeringappears to have started within the party for return to the system ofsingle leadership and this had been the trigger to the present litigation. Itappears that on 19.06.2022, OPS sent a letter to EPS asking foradjournmentof the General Council meeting scheduled to be held onD23.06.2022, which was replied in the negative by EPS. There had beena petition filed in Madras High Court for police protection at the meetingdated 23.06.2022. It is the case of EPS that OPS received the finalversion of resolution to be placed before the members of General Councilby the Party Headquarters and he conveyed the consentfor the same.Asnoticed hereinbefore, the proposed meeting dated 23.06.2022 led to theEsaid three civil suits, being CS Nos. 102 of 2022, 106 of 2022 and 111 of2022. In CS No. 111 of 2022, the plaintiff, Mr. M. Shanmugam soughtthe reliefs of prohibitory injunction against the party as also against theGeneral Council, the Executive Committee, the Co-ordinator, and theJoint Co-ordinator, that they may not convenethe General Council meetingFproposed to be held on 23.06.2022. Two applications, OA Nos. 327 of2022 and 328 of 2022, were also filed seeking temporary injunctionso asto restrain the defendants from placing any agenda in the General Councilmeeting to be held on 23.06.2022. Other OAs were alsofiled in the othercivil suits but, for the sake of brevity, we are not expanding on thembecause the subject-matter essentially remains the same.G

6.7. The aforesaid applications with the prayer for interim orderand direction were considered by a learned Single Judge of the HighCourt on 22.06.2022. The learned Single Judge declined to pass anyinterim order or to issue any interim direction; and the General Councilmeeting slated for 23.06.2022 was allowed to go on. The learned SingleHJudge observed, inter alia, as under: -

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“13. This Court, upon hearing the learned respective counsel andon-going through the entire record, finds that all the parties havereported no objection for conducting the General Council meetingto be held on 23.06.2022, however, the learned counsel appearingfor the plaintiffs and 3[rd] defendant/Co-ordinator would stronglyoppose to passing of any resolutions on the floor of the Meetingregarding amendment of the Rules and Regulations of the 1[st]Defendant/Party, mainly, abolishing the posts of Co-ordinator andJoint Co-ordinator as it would cause great prejudice to them. Noneof the parties have made any prima facie case for grant of interimorders. In fact, the plaintiffs have come forward with theapplications seeking interim directions based upon theirapprehension that resolutions may be passed in respect ofamendment of the Rules and Regulations of the 1st Defendant/Party. This Court, cannot imagine what would be going to takeplace during the General Council meeting held on 23.06.2022 andissued interim orders/directions in advance. In fact, it is well settledthat in matter of internal issues of an association/Party, the Courtsnormally do not interfere, leaving it open to the association/partyand its members to pass resolutions and frame a particular bye-law, rule or regulation for better administration of the Party sinceany decision comes forth among the Members of the GeneralCouncil, it is well within their collective wisdom and this Courtcannot insist the Members to act upon in a particular manner. It isfor the General Council and its members to decide and passresolutions and this Court cannot interfere with the process ofconducting the General Council meeting. Therefore, this Court isnot inclined to pass any interim orders/directions, except makingit clear that the General Council meeting which is scheduled to beheld on 23.06.2022 shall go on.

Issue Notice to the respondents returnable by 11.07.2022. Privatenotice is also permitted.

List the matters on 11.07.2022.”

6.8. The aforesaid order dated 22.06.2022 was questioned by theplaintiff of CS No. 111 of 2022 before the Division Bench of the HighCourt in OSA No. 160 of 2022.Taking note of the case of the plaintiff-appellant in the said intra-court appeal, the Division Bench of the HighCourt issued directions in the manner that the General Council meeting AB

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Aslated on 23.06.2022 could go on but no decision would be taken on anyitem other than 23 items mentioned in the draft resolution. While issuingnotice, the Division Bench observed and directed in its order dated23.06.2022 as under: -

“11. Since the draft resolution approved by the respondents 4 andB5 does not contain an item with regard to the amendment of theRule- 20A 1 to 13, 45 and 45 (sic), we are of the view that theappellant has made out a prima facie case for the grant of anorder of interim injunction. In the event of not granting any interimorder in the above petition, the appellant and the 4[th] respondentwould be greatly prejudiced. Further, if an order of injunction isCnot granted, the prayer sought for in the suit will becomeinfructuous. We are also of the view that the interim injunctionsought for by the petitioner to prohibit the respondents fromconducting the General Council Meeting cannot be granted.However, the General Council can discuss and take decisionsDonly with regard to 23 items mentioned in the draft resolution,which has been approved by the respondents 4 and 5. Therespondents shall not take any decision apart from the 23 itemsmentioned in the draft resolution. The General Council are at libertyto discuss any other matter apart from the 23 items mentioned inthe draft resolution, however, no decision shall be taken in theEGeneral Council meeting with regard to the same.

12. In the result, we permit the respondents 4 and 5 to convenethe General Council meeting at 10.00 a.m. on 23.06.2022 and wealso permit the General Council to discuss and take any decisionas per the Rules and Bye-Laws with regard to 23 items mentionedFin the draft resolution and we make it clear that the respondentsshall not take any decision other than the 23 items mentioned inthe draft resolution. The members of the General Council are atliberty to discuss any other matter, however, no decision shouldbe taken in the General Council with regard to the same.

GNotice to the respondents 1 to 3 returnable by 19.07.2022.”

7. What transpired after the aforesaid orderdated 23.06.2022 andin the meeting of the General Council that followed, has given risetoseveral disputed questions and issues. According to OPS andthepersonsstanding on his side, in the said meeting dated 23.06.2022, a H

resolution was proposed to appoint Mr. A. Tamizh Magan Hussainaspermanent Presidium Chairman and he conferred upon himself suchpost of Chairman; and thereafter, during the meeting, one of the membersof the General Council approached the stage and screamed out that allthe 23 resolutions that were to be voted upon, stood rejected. Then,around 2000 General Council members went on to hand over a fewdocuments in the form of alleged affidavits/requisition signed by them tothe Chairman of the meeting and simultaneously made a requisitiontoconvene the next meeting of General Council on the date of his choice.It is alleged that the said Mr. A. Tamizh Magan Hussain announced thenext date of General Council meeting as 11.07.2022 in breach of thebyelaws of the party. It is the case of OPS that resolution No. 1 astabled in the said meeting was materially different from the one whichwas approved by him in the email. On the other hand, it is the case ofEPS and the persons standing- with him that in the said meeting dated23.06.2022, the requisition given by 2190 members was read over andhanded to the Presidium Chairman, whoannounced in the same meeting,in the presence of OPS and all the members of General Council, that thenext General Council meeting based on the requisition, to discussanddecide on the single leadership, would be held at the same venue on11.07.2022 at 9:15 a.m. A report of this meeting dated 23.06.2022 wassent to the Election Commission of India alongwiththe report of PresidiumChairman on 28.06.2022.

7.1. After the aforesaid meeting/proceedings dated 23.06.2022, anotice dated 01.07.2022 came to be issued by “Party Headquarter’sBearers” for the General Council meeting to be held on 11.07.2022.OPS and the persons standing with him have serious questions as regardsthe legality and validity of the said notice dated 01.07.2022, essentiallyfor two reasons; one that the power to convene such meeting of GeneralCouncil was with Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator acting jointly andwith none other; and second, that this notice was sent only ten daysbefore the scheduled meeting even though the byelaws require minimum15 days’ notice.

7.2. In the wake of the said notice dated 01.07.2022, the said Mr.M. Shanmugam(plaintiff of CS No. 111 of 2022) moved applicationsbefore the Division Bench of the High Court alleging breach of its orderdated 23.06.2022. In regard to these applications, the Division Bench ofthe High Court made it clear, in its order dated 04.07.2022, that the ABC

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Ainterim order dated 23.06.2022 was pertaining only to the meetingscheduled to be held on 23.06.2022 and the same could not be extendedfor an indefinite period. The Division Bench also made it clear that theywere not expressing any opinion for the meeting scheduled to be held on11.07.2022.B8. Thus, when in the order dated 04.07.2022, the High Courtdeclined to intervene in relation to the meeting dated 11.07.2022, on thenext day i.e., on 05.07.2022, two other civil suits came to be filed, one byOPS and another by Mr. P. Vairamuthu. Before adverting to the prayersmade in the said civil suits as also the interim relief applications therein,for maintaining continuity and sequence of events, we may take note ofCan order passed by this Court on 06.07.2022.

8.1. While the aforesaid new civil suits and the interim reliefapplications were to be taken up by the High Court, the three petitionsseeking special leave to appeal led by SLP(C) No. 11237 of 2022, filedin challenge to the aforesaid order dated 23.06.2022 in OSA No. 160 ofD2022, came up for consideration before this Court on 06.07.2022. Aftertaking note of the submissions made and the events that had taken placeas also the scheduled meeting dated 11.07.2022, this Court, while issuingnotice, stayed the operation and effect of the impugned order dated23.06.2022 and made it clear that the meeting slated for 11.07.2022Ecould proceed in accordance with law while also leaving it open for thelearned Single Judge dealing with the said civil suits to examine the prayerfor any other interim relief and/or to pass any other order, as may berequired in the facts and circumstances of the case. The order dated06.07.2022 as passed by this Court reads as under: - F“Permission to file Special Leave Petitions in Dy. No. 19425of 2022 and Dy. No. 19419 of 2022 is granted.

I.A. No. 89644 of 2022 stands rejected for applicant being nota party to the civil suit(s) relating to these petitions.

Heard learned senior counsel for the petitioners and the learnedGsenior counsel appearing for the respective respondents in caveat.

The matters require consideration.

Issue notice, returnable in two weeks.

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Mr. Pai Amit and Mr. Goutham Shivshankar accepts notice onbehalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

Notices, therefore, be issued to the unrepresented respondents,returnable in two weeks.

Dasti service in addition to ordinary process is permitted.

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the caseand the subject-matter of the litigation as also the contents of theorder dated 22.06.2022 as passed by the learned Single Judge onthe Original Side and the order dated 23.06.2022 as passed by theDivision Bench of the High Court dealing with the intra Courtappeals, it is considered appropriate and hence ordered andobserved as under: -

a. Operation and effect of the impugned order dated23.06.2022 shall remain stayed.

It may be clarified that though the meeting dated 23.06.2022(forming the subject-matter of the orders aforesaid), has alreadybeen taken place but, in view of the further steps/proceedingstaken up or likely to be taken up pursuant to the impugned orderand pursuant to the observations/directions made therein, andlooking to the questions raised in these petitions, it appearsnecessary and expedient that the operation of the impugned ordershould remain stayed until further orders of this Court.

b. So far as the Meeting of the General Council of therespondent No. 3, slated to be held on 11.07.2022 is concerned,the same may proceed in accordance with law and in that relation,the other aspects of any interim relief ought to be projected andpresented before the learned Single Judge dealing with civil suit(s)on the Original Side.

c. We do not consider it necessary to pass any other orderof interim nature and all other aspects are to be examined at theappropriate stage.

d. It is made clear that pendency of these petitions in thisCourt shall not be of any impediment for the learned Single Judgedealing with the civil suit(s) to examine the prayer for any otherinterim relief and/or to pass any other necessary order, as may berequired in the facts and circumstances of the case.

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AThe respondents may file counter affidavit within twoweeks.

List these matters after two weeks.”

9. We may now revert to the subject-matter of, and the proceedingsin, the said two civil suits, being CS No. 118 of 2022 and CS No. 119 ofB2022.

9.1. Thiru. O. Panneerselvamfiled CS No. 118 of 2022 with OANo. 368 of 2022 for interim relief while questioning the convening ofGeneral Council meeting on 11.07.2022. The main prayers in CS No.118 of 2022 read as follows: - C

“a) For a Declaration that convening the General Council Meetingon 11.07.2022 or on any other date, without the joint authorizationof both Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinator is illegal, and incontravention to the bye laws of the 1[st] Defendant Party, moreparticularly rule 20A(iv) and 20A(v) of the rules and regulationsDof AIADMK Party.

b) For a Permanent Injunction restraining the Defendants fromconvening the General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022 or on anyother date without the express authorization of both the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinator.”

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9.2. The prayer in OA No. 368 of 2022 filed with the said CS No.118 of 2022 had been as follows: - “Pass an order of ad-interim injunction restraining the Respondentsfrom convening the alleged General Council meeting on 11.07.2022or any other date without the express authorization of both theFcoordinator and joint coordinator pending disposal of the suit andpass such further or other orders as this Hon’ble Court may deemfit and proper in the interest of justice.”

9.3. CS No. 119 of 2022 was filed by Mr. P. Vairamuthu alongwith application for injunctive relief (OA No. 370 of 2022). The mainGprayers in CS No. 119 of 2022 are as follows: - “a)For a Permanent Injunction restraining the Defendants fromconvening the General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022 or on anyother date without the express authorization of both the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinator.

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b) For a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants or anyother office bearer of the party to convene the General Councilmeeting on 11.07.2022 or any other dated without giving itsmembers, a 15 days’ notice in advance as contemplated in therules of the 1[st] Defendant party.”

9.4. In OA No. 370 of 2022, filed with the said CS No. 119 of2022, the prayer for interim relief had been in the following terms: - “A. Pass an order of ad-interim injunction restraining theRespondents from convening the alleged General Council meetingof the 1[st] Respondent party which is scheduled to be held on11.07.2022 based on an unsigned notice dated 01.07.2022 issuedwithout giving 15 days notice in advance of the date of meetingand in violation of the bye-laws of the party pending disposal ofthe suit and pass such further or other orders as this Hon’bleCourt may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.”

9.5. Further to the foregoing, it is also relevant to notice that on07.07.2022, another interim relief application, being OA No. 379 of 2022,was filed in CS No. 119 of 2022, seeking additional interim relief in thefollowing terms: - “A. pass an order of ad-interim injunction restraining theRespondents from passing any resolution relating to the abolitionof the post of Co-Ordinator and Joint Coordinator as they wereelected by the primary members of the party for the term of 5years as per the by-law 20(A)ii, 20 A(iii) and consequentially directthe Respondents from not implementing the resolutions/decisionsrelating to item 3,4,5,6,7 mentioned in the notice dated 01.07.2022in the alleged General Council meeting, which is to be held on11.07.2022 pending disposal of the suit and pass such further orother orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in theinterest of justice.”

10. The aforesaid interim relief applications filed in relation to thesaid two subsequent suits were considered and decided by the learnedSingle Judge of the High Court on 11.07.2022 at 09:00 a.m., a few minutesbefore the scheduled time of the meeting of the General Council. LearnedSingle Judge took note of the background aspects as also the orderspassed by this Court and proceeded to dismiss the applications.

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A10.1. Thereafter, the meeting of General Council was held on11.07.2022, wherein certain resolutions were adopted which are the boneof contention between the parties. A summary of the resolutions adoptedin the said meeting, being questioned by the plaintiffs of CS Nos. 118 of2022 and 119 of 2022, could be usefully extracted from the written notefiled on their behalf (while omitting paper book page numbers) as follows:

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“The General Council meeting was held immediately after thesaid Order was delivered, and various illegal resolutions werepassed at the meeting for the conversion of the leadership structureof the AIADMK from a system of joint leadership under theCoordinator and Joint Coordinator to single leadership under theCpost of General Secretary. Illegal resolutions were also passed atthe meeting expelling the OPS and other primary members fromthe primary membership of the Party and removing OPS fromthe post of Treasurer of the Party.

•Expulsion of OPS as primary member and relieving himDfrom position of Coordinator in the Party •Expulsion of 3 other senior leaders including 2 MLAs •Reverting to Single Leadership and amendments tocorresponding byelaws: Resolution 3

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•Creation of post of Interim General Secretary:Resolution 4

•Election of EPS as Interim General Secretary:Resolution 5

•Notification of elections to post of General Secretary:FResolution 6

•Summary of Amendments to Byelaws approved oAmendments to Rule 2 of Byelaws imposing veryhigh threshold conditions introduced for a personto contest for elections to General Secretary.Previously, any member of the Party could contestfor the post.”

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11. Even though the said meeting had taken place on 11.07.2022,the plaintiffs of the aforesaid CS Nos. 118 of 2022 and 119 of 2022Hquestioned the order dated 11.07.2022 passed by the Single Judge of the High Court, declining to interfere with the meeting of the given date, inthis Court by way of SLP(C) Nos. 12784-12785 of 2022 and SLP(C)No. 12782 of 2022.While considering the said petitions, this Court noticedthat the High Court did not adjudicate on the reliefs sought for, essentiallywith reference to the order dated 06.07.2022 of this Court; and formedthe view that the said applications of interim reliefs ought to bereconsidered by the High Court, particularly when in the order dated06.07.2022, there had been no restriction on powers of discretion of theHigh Court. The said petitions were decided on 29.07.2022 and whileremanding the matter, this Court also provided that status quo as existingon the date shall be maintained by the parties until hearing of the matterby the High Court but, while making it clear that status quo order wasnot to be construed as any expression of opinion by this Court on themerits of the case. The said order dated 29.07.2022 reads as under: - “1. Exemption applications are allowed.

2. Heard learned Senior Advocates for the parties at considerablelength.

3. From the record, it appears that some of the parties to theunderlying dispute pending before the High Court of Madras, filedSpecial Leave Petitions, being Special Leave Petition (C) No.11237 of 2022, Special Leave Petition (C) No.11578 of 2022 andSpecial Leave Petition (C) No. 11579 of 2022, before this Court.These petitions were listed before this Court on 06.07.2022, whenthis Court passed certain directions, inter alia, relating to the meetingof the General Council of respondent no. 1 to be conducted on11.07.2022.

4. The petitioners presently before this Court filed civil suitschallenging, inter alia, holding of the meeting of the General Councilof respondent no. 1 dated 11.07.2022 and sought interim reliefs inthe pending suits. However, vide the impugned order, rather thanadjudicating on the interim reliefs, it appears that the learned SingleJudge of the High Court of Madras has not adjudicated upon thereliefs sought. Rather, the learned Single Judge held as follows:

“11. Having heard the learned counsel for parties, this Courtfinds considerable force in the contentions put forth by thelearned Senior counsel for the respondent/defendant. At theoutset, it is pertinent to note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court AB

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has in unequivocal terms, observed that the Meeting of theGeneral Council of the respondent No.3slated to be held on11.07.2022 is concerned, the same may proceed in accordancewith law. Therefore, having regard to the direction of theHon’ble Supreme Court, this Court cannot take a contrarydecision by interpreting the same as technically projected bythe learned Senior counsel for the applicants, stating that if theapplicants make out a prima facie case that the General Councilmeeting is not in accordance with law, this Court can very wellinterfere and override the direction of the Hon’ble SupremeCourt and pass orders injuncting the respondents/defendantsfrom convening the meeting. This Court is unable to fortify thecontention put forth by the learned Senior counsel for theapplicants rather amazed, for more than one reason, firstly, inthe order, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the learnedsingle Judge can decide the issue regarding the convening ofthe General Council meeting on 11.07.2022 without bearing inmind the direction already given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court;secondly, no other interim relief has been sought for beforethis Court by the applicants apart from not to convene themeeting, to examine and pass necessary orders by this Court;thirdly, since the order has been passed permitting therespondents/defendants to convene the meeting, if at all, thesame is not proceeded in accordance with law as projected bythe learned Senior counsel for the applicants, being custodianof the order, it is for the Hon’ble Supreme Court to considerthis aspect of the matter and not by this Court; fourthly, all thegrounds which were vehemently raised before this Court onbehalf of the applicants regarding the subject meeting is notgoing to be proceeded in accordance with law, were in fact,very well available at the time of passing of the order by theHon’ble Supreme Court and this Court fails to understand asto why the applicants have not brought the same to the noticeof the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of review and seekmodification of the order instead calling upon this Court to sitover and interpret the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,which, being inferior and abiding by law of precedent, this Courtis not inclined to venture upon such course and pass contraryorders.”

5. From the above, it is clear that the learned single judge hastaken the view that, by virtue of the earlier order dated 06.07.2022passed by this Court, he is unable to properly adjudicate thematters. However, a perusal of the order dated 06.07.2022indicates no such restriction on the power or discretion of theHigh Court.

6. 1Taking into consideration the above, we are of the consideredview that it would be appropriate to remand this issue to the HighCourt for reconsideration, without being influenced by any of theorders passed by this Court either in the present Special LeavePetitions or in Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11237 of 2022,Special Leave Petition (C) No.11578 of 2022 and Special LeavePetition (C) No. 11579 of 2022 respectively.

7. We request the High Court to dispose of the said matters,pending adjudication before it,expeditiously and preferablywithina period of two weeks reckoned from the date of communicationof a copy of this order.

8. Till the High Court hears the matters, status-quo as it existstoday shall be maintained by the parties.

9. Before parting with these matters, we make it clear that wehave not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. It isfurther clarified that the status-quo order being granted today,shall not be construed as an expression of any opinion by thisCourt on the merits of the case. The High Court shall deal with,and decide, the matters on their own merits in accordance withlaw.

10. The Special Leave Petitions and all the pending applicationsare disposed of on the above terms.”

12. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge of the High Court tookup for consideration the said interim relief applications inCS Nos. 118 of2022 and 119 of 2022 and proceeded to decide the same by his orderdated 17.08.2022. Therein, the learned Single Judge formulated the pointsfor determination in the following words: - “(1) Whether the plaintiff have locus to maintain the suit?

(2) Whether the General Council Meeting dated 11.07.2022was convened by the person authorised to convene theMeeting?

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1142SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A(3) In whose favour the prima facie case and balance ofconvenience lie?”

12.1. The learned Single Judge examined the facts of the case,byelaws of the party as also a Division Bench decision of the HighCourt concerning the same political party in S. Thirunavukkarasu andBAnr. v. Selvi J. Jayalalitha and Anr.: 1997 (III) CTC 229 andobserved, inter alia, that if anything was done contrary to the party constitution and was likely to cause injury to the rights of the members,there was no bar to seek redressal from the Civil Court. The learnedSingle Judge also observed that the principle of indoor management wouldapply only in respect of deliberations in the meeting convened inaccordance with byelaws and if the process of convening the meetingitself was faulty and contrary to law, there was no bar under Section 9of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to approach the Civil Court. Thus,the first point for determination was answered in the affirmative whileholding that the plaintiffs had locus to maintain the suit as framed.

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D12.2. After taking note of the rival submissions and after havingsurveyed through the byelaws of the party, the learned Single Judgerecorded his conclusion on the second point for determination in thefollowing terms: - “75. To put it in a nutshell: - E

(i) . The General Council meeting dated 11/07/2022 was notconvened by person competent to convene the General Councilmeeting.

(ii) . The said meeting was not convened providing 15 daysadvance notice.F

(iii) . The contention that the post of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator lapsed after 23.06.2022 is borne out of imagination. Thereason to claim these post fall vacant after 23/06/2022 is baseless.Invented to suit the convenience and cover up the violation of theParty Constitution.

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(iv) . Rule-20(A)(vii) of the Party Constitution is a provisionwhich deals with exigencies when the post of Co-ordinator andJoint Co-ordinator becomes vacant before the expiry of thenominated Central Executive Committee office bearers tenure.This provision will no way give right to the temporary PresidiumHChairman to convene the General Council Meeting.

(v) . The Sub-Rule(viii) of Rule 20-A vest with the Co-ordinatorand the Joint Co-ordinator, the powers and responsibility to convenethe Executive Committee and General Council Meeting, toimplement policies and programmes of a Party and to conductElections and bye-Elections for the party organ. In case, if theyrefuse to convene the meeting, the General Council membersshould resort to the 2nd limb of Rule 19(vii) of the PartyConstitution. If a valid request is made by 1/5th of the totalmembers, the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are bound toconvene the meeting within 30 days of the Notice. The date ofthe meeting should be informed in writing, 15 days in advance.Thus, the General Council Meeting dated 11.07.2022 not convenedby person authorised, also suffers short of 15 days notice inadvance.”

12.3. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge dealt with the questionof primafacie case and balance of convenience and held as under: - “76. The final submission made by the Learned Senior Counselfor the respondents/defendants is that the balance of convenienceis in favour of the respondents, who commands the support ofmore than 95% of the General Council Members, who were electedby the primary members. Which, in other words means that, morethan 95% of the primary members are behind Thiru.EdappadiK.Palaniswami, who has now been elected as temporary GeneralSecretary of the Party in the General Council meeting held on11.07.2022. In that meeting, it is resolved to conduct the GeneralSecretary Election and Election Officer already nominated forthe said purpose. However, in view of the interim order of theHon’ble Supreme Court, which has directed parties to maintainstatus quo, the election process for the post of General Secretarynot proceeded any further. The balance of convenience is in favourof the respondents/defendants, who want to run the partydemocratically and face the primary members to be elected asthe Party General Secretary. If the prayer of the injunctionacceded, it will cause irreparable loss to the respondents.

77. This Court, while considering the prayer for injunction, boundto apply the triple test, namely, prima facie case, balance ofconvenience and irreparable injury. Undoubtedly, if injunction isnot granted, Thiru.Edappadi K.Palaniswami, who convened the ABC

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General Council meeting contrary to the written provisions of theParty Constitution will be in a more convenient position, sinceafter the impugned meeting, the plaintiffs/applicants and few othersare removed from the Party Primary Membership. They cannoteven participate/contest in the proposed General SecretaryElection.

78. The balance of convenience in the given contest must be testedfrom the arm chair of the Primary Members who are the foundationof the Party and not from the Leaders point of view. The pleamade by the respondents/defendants that the majority of theprimary members in the Party feel that dual leadership causesinconvenience in the administration of the Party and they cry forSingle Leadership is not based on any quantifiable data.Particularly, when the very same dual leadership were able to runthe Government as Chief Minister and the Deputy Chief Ministerfor nearly 4½years successfully amist (sic) various speculationand administering the Party as Joint Co-ordinator and Co-ordinatorfor nearly 5 years. During this period they together decided theelectoral alliance, they jointly selected candidates for Electionsheld at all levels and fought several elections. While so, howsuddenly between 20.06.2022 and 01.07.2022, the Party with morethan 1 ½ crores of cadre strength decided for change the existingdispensation through 2500 old General Council Members andwhether, the views of abext (sic) 2500 members really reflectsthe view of 1½ crores primary members are questions need to beexamined and be tested. As per the party Constitution, amendmentscan be made, but it should be by alone following due process. It isfor the members of the Party to decide about Leadership and theCourt cannot interfere in their decision, but if there is patentviolation of the process, there is no bar to seek remedy throughCourt.

79. This Court has no doubt in its mind that notice dated 01.07.2022calling for General Council meeting for on 11.07.2022 by a personwho is not authorised to call for meeting is void ab initio. If theconsequence of the void meeting allowed to sustain, it will causeinconvenience to the Party cadres, who will be uncertain abouttheir Leadership. From the typed set of documents, this Courttake notice of the fact that due to the dispute between these two Leaders, in the local body election held recently, the party men atthe grass root those who contested the election were not able toget the recognised Election Symbol ‘two leaves’. Since, they bothfailed to make request to the Election Commission jointly forallocation of reserved symbol to their Party candidates, the ElectionCommission declined to allot reserved symbol. This is an irreparableinjury as far as the partymen are concerned.”

12.4. In view of the above, the learned Single Judge disposedofthe interim relief applications in the following terms: - “80. For the above said reasons, the Original ApplicationNos.368, 370 and 379 of 2022 are disposed of, with thefollowing directions:-

(i) There shall be an order of status quo ante as on23.06.2022.

(ii) There shall be no Executive Council meeting or GeneralCouncil meeting without joint consent of the Co-ordinatorThiru.O.Panneerselvam and Joint Co-ordinator Thiru.EdappadiK.Palaniswami.

(iii) There shall be no impediment for the Co-ordinator andthe Joint Co-ordinator on their own to convene the GeneralCouncil Meeting jointly to decide the affairs of the partyincluding amendment of the party constitution restoring Singleleadership.

(iv) If a proper representation from not less than 1/5[th]members of the total members of the General Council isreceived, the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator shall notrefuse to convene the General Council meeting.

(v) The General Council meeting, on such requisition shallbe convened within 30 days from the date of receipt of therequisition and it shall be held after 15 days advance Noticegiven in writing.

(vi) In case, the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinatorare of the opinion that, for any reason further direction isrequired for conducting the General Council meeting or needassistance of Commissioner for conducting the meeting, it isopen for them to approach this Court and seek necessary relief.

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A81. With the above directions, these Original Applicationsare disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.”

13. The aforesaid order dated 17.08.2022 came to be questionedin three intra-court appeals filed by EPS, being OSA Nos. 227 of 2022,231 of 2022 and 232 of 2022. These three intra-court appeals have beenconsidered and allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court by itsimpugned order dated 02.09.2022. The relevant passages in this orderdated 02.09.2022 could be usefully reproduced as under: - B

“28. So far as the contention with regard to the convening of theGeneral Council Meeting is concerned, the General CouncilMeeting was convened by the appellant and the 1[st] respondent (inO.S.A.No.227of 2022) on 23.06.2022. The appellant and the 1[st]respondent were also very much present in the General CouncilMeeting on 23.06.2022. By order dated 23.06.2022 made inC.M.P.No. 9962 of 2022 in O.S.A.No.160 of 2022, this Courtpermitted the General Council to decide 23 Draft Resolutions andalso permitted the Members to discuss other matters, however,restrained them from taking any final decision apart from 23 DraftResolutions. In the said meeting, 2190 members gave writtenrequest to conduct General Council Meeting. Based on the saidletter, it was announced in the General Council Meeting itself thatthe next General Council Meeting would be conducted on11.07.2022. It is pertinent to note that the 1[st] respondent was verymuch present at the time of such announcement. As per Rule19(vii) of the Bye-Law of the Party, the General Council Meetingshould be convened every year or as and when the Co-Ordinatorand the Joint Co-Ordinator consider it necessary by giving 15days notice in advance of the meeting. The quoram for the meetingshall be 1/5[th] of the total number of Members of the GeneralCouncil. If 1/5[th] of the members of the General Council requeststhe Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator to convene the SpecialGeneral Council Meeting, they should do so within 30 days onreceipt of such representation. It would be appropriate to extract19(vii) of the Bye-Law both in Tamil and English version.

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Rule 19(vii) reads as follows: -

Part vii: - The General Council Meeting shall be convenedonce in a year or whenever it is considered necessary by the H

Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator by giving 15 days noticein advance of the date of meeting.

The quoram for the meeting shall be one-fifth of the total numberof members of the General Council. If one-fifth of the membersof the General Council request the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator to convene the Special Meeting of the General Council,the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator should do so within 30days of the receipt of such a requisition.

On a reading of Rule 19(vii), it could be seen that the first partdeals with the regular General Council Meeting which should beconvened once in a year and in respect of the General CouncilMeeting convened at the instance of the Co-Ordinator and theJoint Co-Ordinator. For conducting such meeting, the first part ofRule 19(vii) stipulates giving 15 days notice in advance of thedate of meeting. Rule 19(vii) does not provide for any writtennotice for convening a meeting. The second part of Rule 19(vii)deals with the quoram for the meeting, which shall be 1/5[th] of thetotal number of members of the General Council. For conveningthe Special General Council Meeting at the request of 1/5[th] of theMembers of the General Council, the same should be convenedwithin 30 days of the receipt of such a requisition by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator. The second part does not providefor giving any notice to the members of the General Council. Fora requisitioner’s meeting of the General Council, Rule 19(vii) doesnot provide for any notice unlike the regular General CouncilMeeting, which requires 15 days of advance notice. The Tamilversion of the Bye-Laws clearly demarcates the differencebetween a regular General Council Meeting and a Special GeneralCouncil Meeting based on requisition of members. The TamilVersion of the Bye-Law refers to the regular meeting and states“Merpadi Kuttathirku 15 Natkkal Mun Arivippu KudukkaVendum”, while there is no such stipulation for the Special Meetingcalled by the requisitioners. For both the Meetings, the Bye-Lawsdoes not contemplate written notice to be issued. The noticementioned in Rule 19(vii) is that of the meeting and not a notice toeach member. It is clear that the notice can be by way ofpublication, affixing at notice board, announcement, etc. In thecase on hand, notice of Special General Council Meeting was by A

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announcement in the 23.06.2022meeting. Therefore, the noticegiven by announcement on 23.06.2022 was a due notice forconvening the Special General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022.When the notice for General Council Meeting on 12.09.2017 wasissued by the Headquarters office Bearers on 28.08.2017, theannouncement made at the floor of the General Council Meetingon 23.06.2022 for convening Special General Council Meeting on11.07.2022 can be construed as a proper notice. The word“notice”, denotes merely an intimation to the party concerned ofa particular fact. It cannot be limited to “notice in writing” andonly to a letter. A notice may take several forms. Even assumingthat the notice suffers from procedural irregularity, it is alwaysopen to the members of the General Council to ratify, as long asthere is a substantive right/function underlying in the notice. Thisratio has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in thejudgment reported in AIR 1962 SC 666 (cited supra).

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D29. Had the Framers of the Bye-Laws thought of giving 15 daysnotice even for the convening of the Special General CouncilMeeting at the request of 1/5[th] of the General Council members,they would have incorporated giving 15 days notice at the end ofthe second part of Rule 19(vii). The mentioning of giving 15 daysnotice in the first part would establish the intention of the framersEof the Bye-Laws was to give notice to the members of the GeneralCouncil only in respect of the regular Annual General CouncilMeeting and for the General Council Meeting convened at theinstance of the Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator. Sincethe Special General Council Meeting are being convened at theFrequest of the members of the General Council, there will not beany necessity for giving another notice to the members again forconvening the Special General Council Meeting. If 15 days noticeis again given even for convening Special General Council Meetingat the request of 1/5[th] of the members of the General Council, itleads to a situation where the meeting can be convened onlyGbetween 16[th] and 30[th] day.

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30. Admittedly, the Agenda for the meeting was issued on01.07.2022. On 23.06.2022 itself a decision has been taken toconvene a meeting on 11.07.2022. The requisition for conveninga Special General Council Meeting signed by 2190 General Council H

members was addressed to the Presidium Chairman, Co-Ordinatorand Joint Co-Ordinator and the same was given to the PresidiumChairman. It cannot be disputed that for convening the GeneralCouncil Meeting on 23.06.2022 necessarily there should be aPresidium Chairman. In the absence of Presidium Chairman, ameeting cannot be convened. Therefore, 2190 members gave arequisition for convening a Special General Council Meeting tothe Presidium Chairman for the reason that there was a riftbetween the Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator. As alreadystated, the announcement with regard to the next General CouncilMeeting on 11.07.2022 was made in the presence of the 1[st]respondent and also in the presence of about 2500 members. It isnot the case of the 1[st] respondent that they did not know about theannouncement made in the floor of the General Council Meetingon 23.06.2022. Though Rule 19(vii) says that the Co-Ordinatorand the Joint Co-Ordinator should convene the Special GeneralCouncil Meeting within 30 days from the date of receipt of therequisition by its 1/5[th] General Council members, since the Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator are at loggerheads, theywere not in a position to convene the Special General CouncilMeeting jointly. Since the Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinatorare at loggerheads one cannot expect them to jointly convene theSpecial General Council Meeting and if the 2[nd] part of rule 19(vii)of the Bye-Law is strictly applied then it would result in a deadlocksituation. If either the Co-Ordinator or the Joint Co-Ordinator isnot co-operating for convening the General Council Meeting, itwould lead to a situation where no General Council Meeting couldbe convened.

31. In the judgment reported in (1997) 3 CTC 229 (cited supra)the expelled member from the AIADMK Party viz., Mr.S.Thirunavukkarasu called for a General Council Meeting, parallelmeeting to the meeting called by the then General Secretary SelviJ.Jayalalithaa. The General Secretary approached this Courtseeking for an order of interim injunction against the convening ofparallel meeting and the same was granted in her favour. Therefore,the facts surrounding the said judgment is completely different tothe facts of the present case. In the case on hand, there was noparallel meeting called for by any of the Members. The ratio laiddown by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court reported in ABC

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(1997) 3 CTC 229 (cited supra) cannot be applied to the factsand circumstances of the present case. It cannot be said as ageneral rule that the requisitioners have no option but to go toCourt if the leaders do not call for a meeting. Such a statementwould be undemocratic and illegal. When the Interim GeneralSecretary could not act in the year 2017, the Office Bearersstepped in to convene the meeting on 12.09.2018 (sic) based on arequisition received.

32. It is not in dispute that the General Secretary was given powerto convene the General Council Meeting. After the death of SelviJ.Jayalalithaa, Mrs.V.K.Sasikala was appointed as the InterimGeneral Secretary and she could not perform as Interim GeneralSecretary in the year 2017 because of her incarceration in acriminal case. Therefore, the Office Bearers convened the meetingon 12.09.2017 based on the requisition made by the Members. Asimilar situation has arisen now, (i.e.) since the Co-Ordinator andthe Joint Co-Ordinator are in loggerheads, the calling for themeeting by the Presidium Chairman on 23.06.2022 at the floor ofthe General Council Meeting cannot be termed as illegal.

33. Admittedly, there is a functional deadlock in the Party due tothe stand taken by the appellant and the 1[st] respondent (inO.S.A.No.227 of 2022). Rules 5, 19(i) and 19(viii) are absolutelyclear that the General Council is the Supreme body of the Party.As per the By-laws of the Party, the Executive Council has notbeen given power either to amend the Rules or to take anyimportant decision. If such decision is taken, the same should beapproved by the General Council of the Party. Even if the Leaderstake any decision or action apart from what has been specificallyprovided to them under the Rules and Regulations, they have tobe ratified at the General Council. The supremacy of the GeneralCouncil is because it is elected ultimately by the Primary Membersin terms of Rules 6 to 14 of the Bye-Laws.

34. As already stated, the General Council consists of 2665members, who were elected through the Organizational Electionsunder Rules 6 to 14 of the By-laws. The elected General CouncilMembers represent the Primary Members of the Party. It cannotbe disputed that the General Council is the Supreme Body in theparty. As per Rules 19(i) and 19(viii) of the Bye-Laws, the General Council was given authority to decide on the policy matters. Asper Rule 43 of the Bye-Laws, the General Council was givenpower to amend the Bye-Laws. The General Council held on11.07.2022 was a requisitioners’ special meeting under Rule 19(vii)of the Bye-Laws. As already stated, 2190 members have madethe requisition for convening a special General Council Meeting.The requisition given at the General Council Meeting on 23.06.2022was announced at the floor of the meeting, informing the membersthat a General Council Meeting would be convened on 11.07.2022.The requisition made by 2190 members was followed by an agenda,which was signed by 2432 members. The meeting was conductedon 11.07.2022 and a total of 2460 members were present in themeeting. Thereafter, 2539 members, supporting the resolutionspassed in the General Council Meetings, filed affidavits beforethe Election Commission of India.

35. The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator could not act on therequisition since there was a dead lock in the decision making inthe Party. According to the appellant, the posts of Co-ordinatorand Joint Co-ordinator had lapsed on 23.06.2022 for want ofratification. It is pertinent to note that the elections of the othermembers of the General Council shall not lapse since their electionswere not based on any amended Bye-Law. The present situation,is identical to the situation that was prevailing in 2017. When theCo-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator were not in a position to callfor the meeting, the members cannot be forced to approach theCourt every time, therefore, the power vested on the office-bearersunder Rule 20 A (vii) should be exercised for this purpose asexercised for the meeting held on 12.09.2017.

36. For easy reference, the Bye-Laws of the Political Party isannexed with this judgement.

37. The amendments to the Bye-Laws can happen only at theGeneral Council under Rule 43 of the Bye-Laws.

38. The General Council Meeting was convened on 11.07.2022pursuant to the order passed by the learned Single Judge in O.A.Nos. 368, 370 and 379 of 2022 and thereafter, by order dated06.07.2022 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (C) No. 11237of 2022 has observed as follows: - AB

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“…….b. So far as the Meeting of the General Council of therespondent No. 3, slated to be held on 11.07.2022 is concerned,the same may proceed in accordance with law and in thatrelation, the other aspects of any interim relief ought to beprojected and presented before the learned Single Judge dealingwith civil suit(s) on the Original Side….”

39. The appellant-Co-Ordinator sent a letter dated 28.06.2022 tothe Election Commission of India stating that the posts of Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator had lapsed for the reasonthat the election in the Executive Council Meeting dated 01.12.2021was not ratified in the General Council Meeting held on 23.06.2022.From the said letter, it is clear that the appellant-Joint Co-Ordinatorhas given up his right to continue as Joint Co-Ordinator. Therefore,there is no Joint-Co-Ordinator in the Party after the said letter.The appellant cannot be compelled to continue as Joint Co-Ordinatorforever. When the appellant has given up his right to continue asJoint-Co-Ordinator, the appellant and the 1[st] respondent in O.S.A.No. 227 of 2022 cannot jointly conduct the General CouncilMeeting. The commonsenseapproach was followed on 12.09.2017,wherein the General Council Meeting was announced at theinstance of the Office Bearers Party Headquarters. The strictcompliance of Rule 19(vii) would lead to absurdity. In thesecircumstances, the General Council Meeting called for by thePresidium Chairman on 23.06.2022 to convene the Special GeneralCouncil Meeting on 11.07.2022 is proper.

40. The requisition for the meeting was made by 2190 membersout of the 2665 members of the General Council. This amounts tomore than 80% of the General Council members. The requisitionwas to be made by the members for deciding the issue of theSingle Leadership. The requisition was readout to all the memberswho were present and with their approval, it was handed over tothe Chairman of the meeting on the stage in front of therequisitioners. The requisition was followed with an Agenda beingsigned and requested by 2432 General Council Members.Thereafter, the meeting on 11.07.2022 was attended by 2460members and 2539 members have filed affidavits before theElection Commission of India affirming their support to theresolution passed at the General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022.

41. The learned Single Judge, while disposing of the OriginalApplications observed that since there is interpolation, it can onlybe a manufactured document. It is pertinent to note that none ofthe members, who signed the requisition or the agenda or attendedthe meeting, have come before this Court, claiming that they didnot do so. That apart, the 1[st] respondent-plaintiffs has not madeout any assertion in the plaint that there was no requisition thatwas placed at the meeting. Absolutely, there is no averment in thepleadings that the requisition letter is a fabricated document ornot genuine. In the absence of any pleading or averment, thecontention of the 1[st] respondent (in O.S.A. No. 227 of 2022) thatthe requisition letter given by 2190 members is not genuine cannotbe accepted. When none of the 2190 members, who have signedthe requisition letter to convene the Special General CouncilMeeting, disputed their signature or contents of the document, athird party to the said letter cannot question the same. The personwho can dispute the signature can only be that particular personand not a third party. In the absence of any challenge made by thesignatories to the requisition letter, the said letter cannot be heldas fabricated or not genuine document. Even assuming that theResolutions passed on 23.06.2022 and on 11.07.2022 are found tobe illegal or against the Bye-Laws of the Parties, it is alwaysopen to 1/5[th] members of the General Council to convene a SpecialGeneral Council Meeting and reverse the resolution passed inthose two meetings. In the case on hand, no such meeting wascalled for at the instance of 1/5[th] of the General Council membersto reverse the decision. This would establish that no irreparableinjury has been caused to the 1[st] respondent (in O.S.A.No.227 of2022).

42. The members of the General Council are representing thePrimary Members of the Party and when the majority of themembers of the General Council have given requisition forconvening the Special General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022and also supported the Resolutions on 23.06.2022 and 11.07.2022,the balance of convenience cannot be held in favour of the 1[st]respondent. On the contrary, the balance of convenience can onlybe in favour of the appellant.

43. With regard to the prima facie case is concerned, (2012) 6SCC 792 (cited supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that AB

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

even where prima facie case is in favour of the 1[st] respondent-plaintiff, the Court will refuse temporary injunction if the injurysuffered by the 1[st] respondent on account of refusal of temporaryinjunction was not irreparable. In the judgement reported in (1992)1 SCC 719 (cited supra) the Apex Court held that while grantingor refusing to grant interim injunction, the Court should exercisesound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischiefor injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunctionis refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused tothe other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competingpossibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Courtconsiders that pending the suit, the subject matter should bemaintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus theCourt has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting orrefusing the relief of interim injunction pending the suit.

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44. By giving a direction that there shall be no Executive CouncilMeeting or General Council Meeting without joint consent of theCo-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator, a situation has arisenwhere the party, as a whole, will undergo irreparable hardship,since there is no possibility of the appellant and the 1[st] respondent(in O.S.A.No.227 of 2022) acting jointly to convene a meeting,much less a General Council Meeting to discuss Single Leadership.The direction only furthers the “functional deadlock” that wasalready in existence in the Party.

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45. As per Rule 20A(ix), the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinatorare empowered to take such actions as he may deem fit onimportant political events, policies and programmes of urgent natureFwhich cannot brook delay and await the meeting of either ExecutiveCommittee or General Council of the Party. Such decisions andactions have to be ratified by the General Council in its nextmeeting. However, it is open to the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator to obtain the views of the General Council Members onGsuch urgent matters by post when the Council is not in session.Therefore, even if the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinator takeany decision/action, the same is to be ratified at the General CouncilMeeting.

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Single Judge, by order dated 11.07.2022 permitted the conveningof the Special General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022, which waschallenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Apex Court,by order dated 29.07.2022, while remanding the matter back tothe learned Single Judge for fresh consideration, directed the partiesto maintain status quo as on the date of 29.07.2022. It is pertinentto note that the Apex Court has not directed the parties to maintainstatus quo as on 11.07.2022 or on 23.06.2022. Therefore, it isclear that the Resolutions passed on 23.06.2022 and 11.07.2022were not disturbed till the pronouncement of the order by thelearned Single Judge in O.A. Nos. 368, 370 and 379 of 2022 on17.08.2022.

47. When the Presidium Chairman had announced the date ofnext Special General Council Meeting based on the requisitionmade by 2190 members of the General Council on 23.06.2022 the1[st] respondent-plaintiff should have challenged the decision takenon 23.06.2022 to convene a Special General Council Meeting on11.07.2022. In the case on hand, the 1strespondent has filed thesuit challenging only the Special General Council Meeting held on11.07.2022. When the 1[st] respondent did not challenge theResolutions passed in the General Council Meeting held on23.06.2022, an order of status quo ante as on 23.06.2022 cannotbe granted.

48. So far as the direction to the appellant and the 1[st] respondent(in O.S.A.No.227 of 2022) to conduct the Executive CouncilMeeting or General Council Meeting jointly is not workable, asthe appellant and the 1[st] respondent have not been able to acttogether and there has been a deadlock, which has resulted in theimpossibility to perform the functions, which is the very premisebased on which the General Council of the Party was held on12.09.2017, wherein the posts of Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator were created and the appellant and the 1[st] respondentcame to be elected to the said posts.

49. Since the appellant-Joint Co-Ordinator, by his letter dated28.06.2022 to the Election Commission of India, has stated thathis post along with the post of Co-Ordinator had lapsed, as alreadystated, he cannot be compelled to continue in the said post. That AB

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apart, the 1[st] respondent (in O.S.A.No.227 of 2022) alone cannottake any decision independently. In these circumstances, we arenot giving any finding with regard to the stand taken by theappellant that the posts of Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinatorhad lapsed for want of ratification on 23.06.2022. The said issuecan be decided in the pending suit.

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50. The ratio laid down in the Judgments relied upon by the learnedSenior Counsels appearing for the appellant squarely applies tothe facts and circumstances of the present case. The ratio laiddown by the Gauhati High Court in an unreported judgement madein CRP No.22(AP) of 2015[cited supra] applies to the case ofthe 1[st] respondent.

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51. Though there is no dispute with regard to the ratio laid downby the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 1990Supp (1) SCC 727 (cited supra) relied upon by the learnedSenior Counsel appearing for the 1[st] respondent, since the factsDand circumstances of the present case differs, the said ratio is notapplicable to the present case.

52. For the reasons stated above, the order passed by the learnedSingle Judge in the Original Application in O.A.No. 368 of 2022 inC.S. No.118 of 2022 and the Original Applications in O.A. Nos.E370 and 379 of 2022 in C.S.No. 119 of 2022 are set aside.Consequently, the Original Applications in O.A.Nos.368, 370 and379 of 2022 are dismissed. The above Original Side Appeals areallowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected MiscellaneousPetitions are closed.”

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14. The aforesaid order dated 02.09.2022 has been challenged inthe appeal arising out ofSLP (C) No. 15753 of 2022 by the plaintiffOPSand in the appeal arising out ofSLP (C) No. 15705-15706 of 2022 by thesaid other plaintiffP. Vairamuthu. These two petitions were entertainedby this Court on 30.09.2022 and on that date, the learned counselGappearing on behalf of EPS stated at the Bar that until hearing of thesematters, there shall not be any election of the General Secretary. ThisCourt recorded the statement so made and directed the respondentsaccordingly. The order dated 30.09.2022 reads as under:

“Issue notice.

The respective learned counsel accepts notice on behalf ofthe respective respondents, therefore, the respondents need notbe served now. Notice be made returnable on 21.11.2022.

To be notified with SLP (C) No. 11237 of 2022.

In the meantime, all the parties are directed to completethe pleadings.

Shri C. Aryama Sundaram, learned Senior Advocateappearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 has stated at the Barthat till the present matters are heard, there shall not be any electionof the General Secretary held. We record the statement and directthe respondents accordingly.”

15. In the above backdrop, the appeals preferred in challenge tothe said order dated 02.09.2022 as also the previous order dated23.06.2022, as passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, havebeen taken up by this Court for analogous hearing. However, it may beusefully reiterated that so far as the order dated 23.06.2022 is concerned,it has practically lost its relevance because of the subsequent events ofholding of meeting dated 11.07.2022 and passing of other orders by theHigh Court and by this Court. The principal part of the matter, therefore,relates to the legality and validity of the order dated 02.09.2022.In thisposition and as agreed to by the learned counsel for the parties, we haveheard the respective submissions principally in relation to the order dated02.09.2022. Though as indicated hereinbefore, a wide variety ofcontentions have been urged by the learned counsel for the parties but,having regard to the fact that the appeals herein essentially relate to thematter of grant of temporary injunction, only the relevant submissions inthat regard need to be dealt with in this judgment.

16. We have heard the detailed and elaborate submissions of thelearned senior counsel Mr. Ranjit Kumar and Mr. Guru Krishna Kumarappearing for the respective appellants on one hand and those of thelearned senior counsel Mr. C. Aryama Sundaram, Mr. C. S. Vaidyanathan,Mr. Mukul Rohtagi and Mr. Atul Chitale appearing for the respectivecontesting respondents.

16.1. Before proceeding further, it may be indicated that whilethe detailed arguments were concluded on 11.01.2023 and judgment was A

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Areserved, the matters were taken up again on board in view of mentionmade on behalf of the respondent No. 1 of SLP(C) Nos. 15705-15706of 2022 and thereafter,this Court passed an order on 03.02.2023 for thelimited purpose of making arrangements for the party, in relation to theupcoming bye-election of 98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency.Therein, we provided for choosing of the candidate of the party by theBGeneral Council and it was also provided that expulsion of theappellantOPS and other persons would not operate for that limitedpurpose of decision-making by the General Council; and that the choiceof the candidate shall be conveyed to the Election Commission of Indiaby the PresidiumChairman. The said order was passed in theCpeculiarcircumstances and looking to the requirements of urgencyas alsoin the larger interest of democracy but, whilemaking it clear that sucharrangement shall be without prejudice to therights of the parties andwithout conferring any additional right in any of the parties.[6]

6 The said order dated 03.02.2023 reads as under:

D“In continuity with and as per the permission granted in the order dated 30.01.2023,we have heard learned counsel for the parties for the limited purpose in relation to thebye-election of 98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency.

We have taken note of the respective stand of the contesting parties as also theElection Commission of India in these matters.

As the judgment remains reserved, we do not wish to elaborate on any of thecontentious issues involved in the matters. However, having taken note of the fact thatEbye-election for 98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency has already been announcedwhere the last date for filing nominations is 07.02.2023, in our view, a workable solution/interim arrangement appears to be in the interest of the political party concerned asalso in the larger interest of democracy with participation of the party’s candidate inthe forthcoming bye-election.

Hence, after taking note of the submissions and counter-submissions of the learnedcounsel appearing for the contesting parties as also the propositions of the learnedFcounsel appearing for the Election Commission of India, we deem it appropriate tomake the interim arrangement only in relation to the forthcoming bye-election and onlyfor the purpose of participation of a candidate of the party concerned.

In regard to the above, without prejudice to the rights of any of the parties andwithout conferring any additional right in any of the parties, it is considered appropriateand hence provided thus :

(1) The proposal as regards choosing the candidate of the party shall be placed forGconsideration and for final decision by the General Council of the party.

(2) As regards the decision-making process of the General Council for choosing thecandidate and looking to the time constrains, it is also provided that this process maybe taken up by placing the necessary resolution for consideration by way of circulation.(3) In this process of decision-making by the General Council for arriving at thename of a candidate to be put up by the party in the forthcoming bye-election of 98-HErode (East) Assembly Constituency, the persons who had allegedly been expelled

17. The relevant contentions urged on behalf of the appellants inchallenge to the impugned order dated 02.09.2022 could be summarisedas follows:

17.1. Learned senior counsel for the appellants have submittedthat the Division Bench of the High Court could not have interfered withthe order dated 17.08.2022 as passed by the learned Single Judge of theHigh Court without recording a finding to the effect that the order aspassed was arbitrary, capricious, perverse or contrary to the settledprinciples of law regulating grant of injunctions. Highlighting the contoursof an Appellate Court’s jurisdiction in such appeals, they have placedreliance on the decision of this Court in Wander Ltd. and Anr. v. AntoxIndia (P) Ltd.: 1990 Supp SCC 727 to submit that the Appellate Courtcould interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Court of first instanceonly when the discretion is shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, orcapriciously or perversely or where the Court has ignored the settledprinciples of law regulating the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction.

from the party [namely S/Shri O. Panneerselvam (appellant), R. Vaithilingam, J.C.D.Prabakar and P.H. Manoj Pandian] and whose expulsion is also a matter of contentions,it is provided that such expulsion shall not operate so far as the present purpose isconcerned,

i.e., for the purpose of decision by the General Council to choose the candidate forthe forthcoming bye-election of 98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency. In otherwords, the aforesaid four persons shall be entitled to put forward their votes in thecirculation process for this limited purpose of selection of the candidate of the partyfor the said bye-election.

(4) The ultimate decision of the General Council, as regards choice of the candidateshall be conveyed to the Election Commission of India by the Presidium Chairperson,Dr. A. Tamizh Magan Hussain; and such communication of the decision of GeneralCouncil shall be accepted by the Election Commission of India as being the authorizationon behalf of the party for the limited purpose of putting up its candidate in theforthcoming bye-election and the returning officer shall take necessary steps accordingly.

We again make it clear that the judgment in the main matters remains reserved andthis interim arrangement shall otherwise not be of conferring any additional right in anyof the parties nor of taking away any of the rights of the parties. The interim arrangementin terms of this order shall remain confined to the process of bye-election of 98-Erode(East) Assembly Constituency and not beyond.

Copy of this order be provided to all the parties as also to the Election Commissionof India.

Having regard to the overall circumstances and the nature of order passed hereinabove,we do not find any necessity of impleadment as such of the Election Commission ofIndia in these proceedings nor any other order appears requisite. Therefore, both theapplications (for impleadment and directions) stand disposed of.Judgment remains reserved.”

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ANo such case having been made out in the appeals before the DivisionBench of the High Court, interference with and reversal of the well-considered order of the learned Single Judge deserves to be disapproved.

17.2. It has been strenuously argued that the very convening ofthemeeting of General Council, to be held on 11.07.2022, had been illegalBandnonest; the said meeting remains unauthorised; and no resolutiontaken therein could be said to be permissible in lawfor two main reasons.

First that, from a reading of the Rules 19(vii) and 20-A(viii), it isbut clear that the authority to convene the General Council meeting isvested only with the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator, acting jointly.CTherefore, the Presidium Chairman neither had the power to make anyannouncement on 23.06.2022 about convening of the General Councilmeeting on 11.07.2022 nor he could have convened any such meeting.Further, the written notice dated 01.07.2022, not signed by OPS andsent to the General Council members by an unspecified body (HeadQuarters’ Office Bearers) to call for the meeting on 11.07.2022, is voidforDhaving been issued by the persons without having authority to do sounder the byelaws of the party. It has also been submitted that in regardto such questions arising in the past, the High Court has held in the caseof S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra), that the scheme of byelaws does notenvisage the requisitionists to convene the General Council meeting;Eand if the General Secretary does not act on the requisition with sufficientdispatch, the only option in such a scenario is to approach the Court. Onthe same principles and analogy, if at all the Co-ordinator and the JointCo-ordinator would fail to convene the meeting, the only option is toseek intervention of the Court but a meeting cannot be convened by thepersons not authorised to do so.F

Secondly, the notice dated 01.07.2022 did not comply with therequirement of 15 days period as stipulated under Rule 19(vii) of thebyelaws of the party; and there is a long-standing practice of AIADMKparty to issue written invitations to the members of the General Councilfor the meetings. It is further submitted that the announcement made byGthe Presidium Chairman at the meeting was lacking in material particularssuch as venue, etc. which is contrary to settled principles of law as laidout in the authoritative book “Shackleton on the Law and Practice ofMeetings”[7].

H7 Edited by Madeleine Cordes, John Pugh-Smith, 13th ed., Thomson Reuters at p. 41.

17.3. Learned counsel for the appellants have further contendedthat the balance of convenience in the present matters has been in favourof grant of injunction as prayed for. It is submitted that the so-called willof a purported majority in the General Council does not reflect the will ofthe entire primary membership of the party; and no data has beensubmitted by the respondents to suggest that the primary members ofthe party want to revert to the regime of single leadership. It is furthersubmitted that the issue of balance of convenience is to be considered inlight of the nature of prima facie case set up by the plaintiffs in the suit;and not de hors such issue, as has been done by the Division Bench ofthe High Court in the order impugned. Reliance has been placed on onepassage in thedecision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. State ofA.P. and Ors.:(2000) 9 SCC 572 and on another decision of this Courtin Surya Nath Singh and Ors. v. Khedu Singh (Dead) by LRS andOrs.:1994 Supp (3) SCC 561 to submit that balance of conveniencewhile granting interim injunction is to be seen from the standpoint of the‘justice of the situation’.

17.4. It has also been argued that if the interim injunction is notgranted as prayed for, irreparable injury would be caused to theappellantOPS and the persons on his side or similarly situated, who havebeen purportedly expelled as primary members of the party as aconsequence of the resolutions passed in the General Council meetingheld on 11.07.2022. This expulsion coupled with other substantial changesmade in the leadership structure of the party would, in effect, excludeOPS from participating in the affairs of the party and by the time of finaladjudication of the suit, the changes made to the composition of theparty would be irreversible in the absence of protective interim order.

17.5. Furthermore, on the issue of grant of interim injunction as adiscretionary measure, balance of convenience and prima facie case,the learned counsel for the appellants haverelied upon the decisions ofthis Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar,West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and Ors.: (1985) 1 SCC 260,Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors.: (1992) 1 SCC719 and American Express Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. and Ors.:(1993) 2 SCC 199.

18. The contra contentions urged on behalf of the respondents insupport of the said order dated 02.09.2022 could also be usefullysummarised as follows:

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A18.1. Learned senior counsel for the respondents have submittedthat the decision as to acceptance or rejection of an interim injunction isa matter of discretion, which does not require interference under Article136 of the Constitution of India. It has also been argued that the reliefsclaimed in the applications in question had beenagainst holding of theGeneral Council meeting dated 11.07.2022, which has already beenBconcluded and hence, the reliefs have practically become infructuous.The decisions of this Court in Seema Arshad Zaheer and Ors. v.Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai and Ors.: (2006) 5 SCC 282and Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited v. S.L.Vaswani and Anr.: (2010) 2 SCC 142 have been relied upon to submitCthat in the matter of grant or refusal of injunction, interference by theSupreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India could onlybe considered when the discretion exercised by the High Court is vitiatedby an error apparent or perversity or manifest injustice. It is submittedthat the impugned order dated 02.09.2022 does not suffer from any suchinfirmity and hence, calls for no interference.D

18.2. It has further been argued that the General Council is thesupreme authority in the party as is evident from Rules 5, 5(vii), 19(i),19(viii) and 43. The General Council, therefore, has unfettered powersto amend, add or delete the byelaws; including the powers that are notspecifically placed in the byelaws; and it is for this supremacy that as aEcondition of membership into the party, one has to abide by the decisionof the General Council. Relying on the decision of this Court in K.Rajendran and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.:(1982) 2 SCC273 it has been submitted that the General Council has the power evento create, abolish and replace the post.F

18.3. It has been contended, particularly with reference to Rule19(vii) of the byelaws, that the notice sent on 01.07.2022 would qualifyto be a proper notice for, the byelaws only speak about notice of themeeting and not notice to the members; the byelaws do not require serviceof written notice for convening of meeting; the dictionary meaning ofGthe word ‘notice’ is intimation and does not necessarily mean notice inwriting; and 15 days’ notice is to be given only for the regular meeting ofthe General Council and not for the special meeting. Further, it has beensubmitted that in the Tamil version of byelaws, the expression ‘aforesaid’in the first part of Rule 19(vii) has been clearly used to denote that 15days’ notice is required to be given for the regular meeting and not forH

the special or requisitioned meeting.It has also been submitted that theformality of notice cannot vitiate the action when parties had intimationof the event, as announced by Presidium Chairman on 23.06.2022. Thesecontentions have been supported by relying on a decision of this Court inNilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath SomannaNingashetti and Ors.: AIR 1962 SC 666.

18.4. As to the functional deadlock, due to the divergent anddiscordant views of the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator leading tonon-functioning of party, the learned counsel for the respondents haverelied on the decision in the case of B.N. Viswanathan and Anr. v.Tiffin’s Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd.: (1953) 66 LW 124, whereinit was held that the General Body of shareholders had the power tocarry out the functions of the board, when it was impossible for theboard to perform its functions. It has been submitted that if there is avacuum and something is done within the framework, such an action isvalid unless it is impermissible within the framework. It has also beensubmitted that having regard to the position obtaining in the present case,the said decision in S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra) is of no applicationbecause therein an expelled member of AIADMK attempted to convenea General Council meeting, parallel to the meeting called by the thenGeneral Secretary whereas, in the present case no parallel meeting ofGeneral Council has been convened by anyone.

18.5. It has further been submitted, relying on the decision of thisCourt in T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria No. 363 S.C. Belgaum andOrs.: (1964) 1 SCR 1,that in the matters pertaining to internal affairsor management of an association, the Court would ordinarily be slow ininterfering; and the impugned order of the Division Bench of the HighCourt, standing in conformity with these principles, calls for nointerference.

19. In rejoinder submissions, learned senior counsel for theappellants have submitted that until 23.06.2022, there was not even awhisper of reverting to the system of singleleadership amongst the partymembers; the functions of the party were being carried out smoothly;and even during the Panchayat elections, by both the Co-ordinator andthe Joint Co-ordinator jointly. Hence, the argument of “functionaldeadlock” is disingenuous and incorrect.

19.1. It has been further submitted that the General Council is notsuperior to the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the party as pursuant AB

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Ato the amendments made to the byelaws on 01.12.2021, the Co-ordinatorand Joint Co-ordinator are to be elected directly through vote by anelectorate consisting of entire primary membership of the party. Further,Rule 45 of the byelaws authorizes them to relax or make alterations toany of the rules and regulations of the party. Therefore, the logic that aparty organ is supreme because its members are ultimately elected byBthe primary membership of the party applies even more to the posts ofCo-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.

19.2. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that if it beassumed that the posts of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator lapsedbecause of non-ratification of the amendments of 01.12.2021 by theCGeneral Council, the elections of other office-bearers held after theamendments of 01.12.2021 would also stand annulled and in any case,even according to Rule 20-A(vii) of the byelaws, the other office-bearersas mentioned therein do not have the power to convene the GeneralCouncil meeting.D20. We have given anxious consideration to the rival submissionsand have examined the record of the case with reference to the lawapplicable.

20.1. Before proceeding further, a few comments on the widthand limits of the consideration in these appeals appear necessary. HavingEregard to the subject-matter of the civil suits leading to the order dated17.08.2022 by the learned Single Judge and the impugned order dated02.09.2022 by the Division Bench of the High Court and the totality ofcircumstances, it may at once be observed in relation to the submissionsmade by either of the parties concerning the contents of the resolutionFtaken in the questioned meeting on 11.07.2022, that no challenge theretoas such has been laid in the suits as filed or by way of any amendment ofpleadings; and entering into any aspect relating to the substance, contentsand merits of the decisions said to have been taken in the said meetingdated 11.07.2022 would be practically traversing even beyond the scopeof the subject civil suits. In other words, the real question to be determinedGin these appeals against the order dated 02.09.2022 would only be asregards the prayer for temporary injunction against convening of themeeting dated 11.07.2022. Within this framework and boundaries, wemay examine the rival contentions to determine the question as to whetherthe impugned order dated 02.09.2022 calls for any interference.

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21. While dealing with the relevant contentions, we may usefullytake note of a few decisions cited in these appeals so as to define theparameters and contours of the discussion forthcoming.

21.1. The case of S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra) has beenreferred to by the learned counsel for the appellants in order to submitthat therein, a Division Bench of the High Court extensively interpretedthe scheme of the byelaws of the party-AIADMK and held that thescheme of byelaws does not envisage the requisitionists to convene theGeneral Council meeting; and if the General Secretary (now replacedby the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly) fail to convenethe meeting, the only option is to seek intervention of the Court but ameeting cannot be convened by the persons not authorised to do so.Therelevant paragraphs of the said decision read as under: - “69. As per rule 20(v) of the party, the General Secretary of theparty is competent to convene the general council meeting. Rule19(viii) does not authorise anyone else to convene the specialgeneral council meeting of the party. On facts, the learned singlejudge having held that the letter of requisition was not posted, hasalso held that even otherwise the plaintiff had convened the meetingof the general council as per Rule 19(viii). We have no good reasonto differ from the finding recorded by the learned single judge thatthe letter of requisition was not given to the plaintiff. Once wetake the view that the letter of requisition was not given to theplaintiff, the defendant had no authority to convene the meetingof the general council. Even otherwise Rule 19(viii) has not madeany provision for convening the meeting of the general council bythe requisitioning members in case the plaintiff as the generalsecretary failed to convene the meeting.

70. In this regard, the learned senior counsel for the defendantand the learned counsel for the impleading applicants relied onthe order of the learned single Judge of this Courtin Karuppasamy Pandian & 6 others v. All India AnnaDravida Munnetra Kazhagam and two others, (ApplicationNo.119 of 1988 disposed of on 20.1.1988 is C.S.No.28 of 1988).In our view it is not an authority for the proposition that in casethe General Secretary fails to convene the meeting under Rule19(viii), the requisitioning members can convene a meeting. Inthe said order the Court refused to convene a meeting by AB

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appointment of a Commissioner. But an observation was madethat if the General Secretary refused to convene a meeting, it isalways open to any member of the party’s general council toconvene a meeting and take any decision after they establish theirmajority. In our view the order governs the facts of that case inthe given circumstances. Even otherwise we do not agree thatthe requisitioning members may convene a meeting in case thegeneral secretary fails to convene a meeting in terms of Rule19(viii).

71. Rule 20 (v) specifically states that the general secretary ofthe party shall have the powers and responsibilities to convenethe executive and general council meeting. Rule 19(viii) also obligesthe General Secretary to convene special meeting of the generalcouncil on requisition within 30 days of the receipt of suchrequisition. Rule 19(viii) has made a specific provision to presideover the general council meeting, that in the absence of Chairman,one of the members of the general council elected by the bodyshall preside over the meeting. Again Rule 23(ii) states that in theabsence of the chairman, one of the members present will presideover and conduct the meeting of the central executive committeeand general council. In the very party rules, when provisions aremade for presiding over meetings in the absence of chairman, asimilar provision could have been made in case of Rule 19(viii) inthe matter of convening a meeting.

72. The argument of the learned senior counsel for the defendantis that Rule 19(viii) may be harmoniously construed so as to servethe purpose of the rule; if the general secretary does not convenethe meeting, the requisitioning members cannot be made helpless,and in the normal course, having given the requisition, they wereentitled to have a meeting, and if not convened by the generalsecretary within the given time, they could themselves convenesuch a meeting. He also added that even if the general secretaryconvenes a meeting within 30 days from the date of receipt of therequisition fixing the date of the meeting after several years, itwill create an anomalous situation. In that regard the learnedcounsel submitted that convening a meeting must be taken asholding a meeting. As already noticed above, general councilmeeting has to be called atleast once in six months. In case the general secretary convenes a meeting within the time given butscheduling to hold the meeting after few years, in such a situationit can always be challenged as unreasonable and stating that thevery object of the rule is defeated or on such other groundsavailable. It is equally open to the members of the party to amendthe rule if so desired so as to make a specific provision in thisregard.

73. Rule 19(vii) says that meeting of the general council shall beheld once in six months by giving 15 days notice in advance of thedate of the meeting. But in Rule 19(viii) of the same rules, it isstated that if a requisition is made the general secretary has toconvenespecial meeting within 30 days from the date of receiptof such requisition. Even when the rules were framed a cleardifference and distinction between holding a meeting andconvening a meeting was kept in view. The learned single Judgein paragraphs 38 to 41 of the order under appeal, referring tovarious decisions, has taken the view that convening a meeting isto call for a meeting. We agree with the same. As already noticedabove, even otherwise the plaintiff herself had convened themeeting. The defendant having been expelled on 19.5.1997 fromthe primary membership of the party, prima facie, he had no locusstandi to convene the meeting of the general council.

74. Nothing prevented even the requisitioning membersparticipating in the meeting convened by the plaintiff to ventilatetheir grievances, even though such a meeting was not called onrequisition, as according to the plaintiff there was no requisition tocall for such a meeting. Under the circumstances when therequisition was not at all received by the plaintiff to convene ageneral council meeting, the defendant has been expelled fromthe primary membership of the party on 19.5.1997 itself and whohad no locus-standi to convene a meeting, and the generalsecretary alone was competent to convene a meeting, prima-facie,we have no hesitation to agree with the finding of the learnedsingle Judge that the action of the defendant in convening of themeeting of the general council which was held on 3.6.1997 wasunauthorised and against the rules of the party.”

21.2. In Wander Ltd. (supra), a decision strongly relied upon bythe learned counsel for the appellants, this Court explained the principle AB

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Athat ordinarily, the Appellate Court would not be interfering with theexercise of discretion by the Court of first instance and substitute itsown discretion except in the cases where discretion was shown to havebeen exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or against the settledprinciples of law. This Court observed and held as under: - B“9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is ata stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by theplaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertainand remain uncertain till they are established at the trial onevidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settledprinciples of administration of this form of interlocutory remedyCwhich is both temporary and discretionary. The object of theinterlocutory injunction, it is stated “...is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of hisrights for which he could not adequately be compensated indamages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty wereDresolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protectionmust be weighed against the corresponding need of thedefendant to be protected against injury resulting from his havingbeen prevented from exercising his own legal rights for whichhe could not be adequately compensated. The court must weighEone need against another and determine where the ‘balanceof convenience’ lies.”

The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo,the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case. Thecourt also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what heFconsiders his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to beprevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whetherthe defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether hehas already been doing so in which latter case considerationssomewhat different from those that apply to a case where thedefendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted.

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14. ….. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere withthe exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substituteits own discretion except where the discretion has been shown tohave been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or H

where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulatinggrant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal againstexercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellatecourt will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusiondifferent from the one reached by the court below if the onereached by that court was reasonably possible on the material.The appellate court would normally not be justified in interferingwith the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the groundthat if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would havecome to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercisedby the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact thatthe appellate court would have taken a different view may notjustify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion.After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers(Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph (1960) 3 SCR 713: (SCR721)

“... These principles are well established, but as has beenobserved by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton &Co. v. Jhanaton: 1942 AC 130 ‘...the law as to the reversalby a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in theexercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficultythat arises is due only to the application of well settled principlesin an individual case’.”

The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.”

21.3. The case of State of Karnataka (supra) essentially relatedto a suit involving inter-State water disputes and in the referred passage,it was indicated that even when balance of convenience or inconvenienceis another requirement but no fixed rules or notions ought to be had inthe matter of grant of injunction; and the relief would depend on factsand circumstances of each case with justice of the situation being theguiding factor, in the following terms: - “168. ….Generally speaking, however, be it noted that the issueof grant of injunction is to be looked at from the point of view asto whether on refusal of the injunction, the plaintiff would sufferirreparable loss of injury keeping in view the strength of the parties’case. Balance of convenience or inconvenience is also anotherrequirement but no fixed rules or notions ought to be had in the AB

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matter of grant of injunction and the relief being always flexibledepending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Thejustice of the situation ought to be the guiding factor …..”

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21.4. In Surya Nath Singh (supra), this Court held that thoughthe grant of injunction was a matter of discretion, the same must be onBsettled principles of law to advance the cause of justice; and it is subjectto correction by the Appellate Court. This Court said: - “2.…..Though the grant of injunction is discretionary, the samemust be exercised on settled principles of law to advance thecause of justice. It is subject to correction by the appellatecourt….”

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21.5. In the case of Dunlop India Ltd. (supra), though expositingin relation to the matters of public revenue, this Court explained therequirements of due consideration of the questions relating to balance ofconvenience and irreparable injury in the following terms: - D

“5. We repeat and deprecate the practice of granting interim orderwhich practically give the principal relief sought in the petition forno better reason than that a prima facie case has been made out,without being concerned about the balance of convenience, thepublic interest and a host of other relevant considerations.E…..…..There are, of course, cases which demand that interimorders should be made in the interests of justice. Where grossviolations of the law and injustices are perpetrated or are about tobe perpetrated, it is the bounden duty of the court to intervene andgive appropriate interim relief. In cases where denial of interimrelief may lead to public mischief, grave irreparable private injuryFor shake a citizen’s faith in the impartiality of public administration,a court may well be justified in granting interim relief against publicauthority. But since the law presumes that public authoritiesfunction properly and bona fide with due regard to the publicinterest, a court must be circumspect in granting interim orders ofGfar-reaching dimensions or orders causing administrative,burdensome inconvenience or orders preventing collection of publicrevenue for no better reason than that the parties have come tothe court alleging prejudice, inconvenience or harm and that aprima facie case has been shown. There can be and there are nohard and fast rules. But prudence, discretion and circumspection E

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are called for. There are several other vital considerations apartfrom the existence of a prima facie case. There is the question ofbalance of convenience. There is the question of irreparable injury.There is the question of the public interest. There are many suchfactors worthy of consideration….”

21.6. In the case of Dalpat Kumar (supra), this Court explainedthe principles for exercise of judicial discretion in granting or refusingthe relief of injunction in the following terms: -

“4. Order 39 Rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may begranted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise,that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwisecause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute inthe suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction torestrain such act or make such other order for the purpose ofstaying and preventing … or dispossession of the plaintiff orotherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any propertyin dispute in the suit as the court thinks fit until the disposal of thesuit or until further orders…... Injunction is a judicial process bywhich a party is required to do or to refrain from doing anyparticular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant toprevent future possible injury. In other words, the court, on exerciseof the power of granting ad interim injunction, is to preserve thesubject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It issettled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief.The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1)there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and thatan act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of hisbeing entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2)the court’s interference is necessary to protect the party from thespecies of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damagewould ensue before the legal right would be established at trial;and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconveniencewhich is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will begreater than that would be likely to arise from granting it.

5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde byaffidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in hisfavour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of theprima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property A

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Aor the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction.Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title whichhas to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima faciecase is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needsinvestigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is aprima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. TheBCourt further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Courtwould result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief andthat there is no other remedy available to the party except one togrant injunction and he needs protection from the consequencesof apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however,Cdoes not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairingthe injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one,namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way ofdamages. The third condition also is that “the balance ofconvenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Courtwhile granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise soundDjudicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief orinjury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction isrefused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused tothe other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competingpossibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the CourtEconsiders that pending the suit, the subject matter should bemaintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus theCourt has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting orrefusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.”

21.7. In the case of American Express Bank Ltd. (supra), onFthe discretion of the Court in grant of declaration and injunction, thisCourt observed and held in the referred paragraph as under: - “22. Undoubtedly declaration of the rights or status is one ofdiscretion of the court under Section 34 of the Specific ReliefAct, 1963. Equally the grant or refusal of the relief of declarationand injunction under the provision of that Act is discretionary. Theplaintiff cannot claim the relief as of right. It has to be grantedaccording to sound principles of law and ex debito justitiae. Thecourt cannot convert itself into an instrument of injustice or vehicleof oppression. While exercising its discretionary power, the courtmust keep in its mind the well-settled principles of justice and fair G

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play and the discretion would be exercised keeping in view theends of justice since justice is the hallmark and it cannot beadministered in vacuum. Grant of declaration and injunction relatingto commercial transactions tend to aid dishonesty and perfidy.Conversely, refusal to grant relief generally encourages candourin business behaviour, facilitates free flow of capital, promptcompliance with covenants, sustained growth of commerce andabove all inculcates respect for the efficacy of judicial adjudication.Before granting or refusing to grant relief of declaration orinjunction or both the court must weigh pros and cons in eachcase, consider the facts and circumstances in their properperspective and exercise discretion with circumspection to furtherthe ends of justice. From the backdrop fact-situation we have nohesitation to hold that the relief of declaration granted is unjustand illegal. It tended to impede free flow of capital, thwarted thegrowth of mercantile business and deflected the course of justice.”

21.8. In the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer (supra), this Courtreiterated that the matter of grant or refusal of injunction was that ofdiscretion and not ordinarily calling for interference under Article 136 ofthe Constitution unless the discretion had been exercised arbitrarily,capriciously, or perversely or where the impugned order had been passedwhile ignoring the settled principles of law. In the said case, this Courtheld that the Appellate Court was justified in interfering with the matterand vacating the injunction of the Trial Court while observing as under: - “29. This Court also observed that this Court in exercise ofjurisdiction under Article 136, would not ordinarily interfere withthe exercise of discretion in the matter of grant of temporaryinjunction by the High Court and the trial court and substitute itsown discretion therefor, except where the discretion has beenshown to have been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perverselyor where the order of the Court under scrutiny ignores settledprinciples of law.

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protection of the defendant’s rights or likely infringement of thedefendant’s rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour ofthe plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury beingcaused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted.In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, thediscretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when theplaintiff’s conduct is free from blame and he approaches the courtwith clean hands.

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32. Where the lower court acts arbitrarily, capriciously orCperversely in the exercise of its discretion, the appellate court willinterfere. Exercise of discretion by granting a temporary injunctionwhen there is “no material”, or refusing to grant a temporaryinjunction by ignoring the relevant documents produced, areinstances of action which are termed as arbitrary, capricious orperverse. When we refer to acting on “no material” (similar toD“no evidence”), we refer not only to cases where there is totaldearth of material, but also to cases where there is no relevantmaterial or where the material, taken as a whole, is not reasonablycapable of supporting the exercise of discretion. In this case, therewas “no material” to make out a prima facie case and therefore,Ethe High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, was justified in interferingin the matter and vacating the temporary injunction granted bythe trial court.

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33. We find no reason to interfere with the order of the HighCourt in the seven appeals. We accordingly dismiss these SLPsFas having no merit. The petitioners are granted 15 days time tomake alternative arrangements. Parties to bear their respectivecosts.”

21.9. In Skyline Education Institute (supra), a 3-Judge Benchof this Court again explained that in the matter of injunction, interferenceGunder Article 136 of the Constitution would not ordinarily be made whileobserving as under: - “19. We have thoughtfully considered the entire matter. Beforepronouncing upon the tenability or otherwise of the appellant’sprayer for restraining the respondents from using the word“Skyline” for the Institute of Engineering and Technology H

established by them, we consider it necessary to observe that asthe suit filed by the appellant is pending trial and issues raised bythe parties are yet to be decided, the High Court rightly consideredand decided the appellant’s prayer for temporary injunction onlyon the basis of the undisputed facts and the material placed beforethe learned Single Judge and unless this Court comes to theconclusion that the discretion exercised by the High Court inrefusing to entertain the appellant’s prayer for temporary injunctionis vitiated by an error apparent or perversity and manifest injusticehas been done to it, there will be no warrant for exercise of powerunder Article 136 of the Constitution.

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22. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments is that once the courtof first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grantrelief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretionis based upon objective consideration of the material placed beforethe court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate courtwill be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo considerationof the matter it is possible for the appellate court to form a differentopinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience,irreparable injury and equity.”

21.10. In the case of Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti (supra),this Court held that formality of notice cannot invalidate the action whenthe parties had intimation of the event; and that the term notice doesnotnecessarily mean communication in writing. This Court observed andheld, inter alia, as under: - “8. Sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940(Act 10 of 1940) requires the arbitrators or umpire to give noticein writing to the parties of the making and signing of the award.Sub-section (2) of that section requires the Court, after the filingof the award, to give notice to the parties of the filing of the award.The difference in the provisions of the two sub-sections withrespect to the giving of notice is significant and indicates clearlythat the notice which the court is to give to the parties of the filingof the award need not be a notice in writing. The notice can begiven orally. No question of the service of the notice in the formalway of delivering the notice or tendering it to the party can arise AB

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in the case of a notice given orally. The communication of theinformation that an award has been filed is sufficient compliancewith the requirements of sub-section, (2) of Section 14 with respectto the giving of the notice to the parties concerned about the filingof the award. “Notice” does not necessarily mean “communicationin writing”. “Notice”, according to the Oxford Concise Dictionary,means “intimation, intelligence, warning” and has this meaning inexpressions like “give notice, have notice” and it also means“formal intimation of something, or instructions to do something”and has such a meaning in expressions like “notice to quit, tillfurther notice”. We are of opinion that the expression “give notice”in sub-section (2) of Section 14, simply means giving intimation ofthe filing of the award, which certainly was given to the partiesthrough their pleaders on 21-2-1948. Notice to the pleader is noticeto the party, in view of Rule 5 of Order 3 of the Civil ProcedureCode, which provides that any process served on the pleader ofany party shall be presumed to be duly communicated and madeknown to the party whom the pleader represents and, unless thecourt otherwise directs, shall be as effectual for all purposes as ifthe same had been given to or served on the party in person.

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10. We see no ground to construe the expression “date of serviceof notice” in column 3 of Article 158 of the Limitation Act tomean only a notice in writing served in a formal manner. Whenthe legislature used the word “notice” it must be presumed tohave borne in mind that it means not only a formal intimation butalso an informal one. Similarly, it must be deemed to have in mindthe fact that service of a notice would include constructive orinformal notice. If its intention were to exclude the latter sense ofthe words “notice” and “service” it would have said so explicitly.It has not done so here. Moreover, to construe the expression asmeaning only a written notice served formally on the party to beaffected, will leave the door open to that party, eventhough withfull knowledge of the filing of the award he has taken part in thesubsequent proceedings, to challenge the decree based upon theaward at any time upon the ground that for want of a propernotice his right to object to the filing of the award had not evenaccrued. Such a result would stultify the whole object which underlies the process of arbitration — the speedy decision of adispute by a tribunal chosen by the parties.”

21.11. In the case of T.P. Daver (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of thisCourt held that in the matters relating to internal management of anassociation, the Courts generally do not interfere while observing asunder: - “8. The following principles may be gathered from the abovediscussion. (1) A member of a masonic lodge is bound to abide bythe rules of the lodge; and if the rules provide for expulsion, heshall be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules. (2) Thelodge is bound to act strictly according to the rules whether aparticular rule is mandatory or directory falls to be decided ineach case, having regard to the well settled rules of constructionin that regard. (3) The jurisdiction of a civil court is rather limited;it cannot obviously sit as a court of appeal from decisions of sucha body; it can set aside the order of such a body, if the said bodyacts without jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or acts inviolation of the principles of natural justice as explained in thedecisions cited supra.”

22. Apart from the above, we may also take note of the principlesin relation to the matters concerning grant of interim relief,which havebeen stated and re-emphasised by this Court in the case of Union ofIndia and Ors. v. M/s. Raj Grow Impex LLP and Ors.: 2021 SCCOnLine SC 429as follows: -

“194. In addition to the general principles for exercise of discretion,as discussed hereinbefore, a few features specific to the mattersof interim relief need special mention. It is rather elementary thatin the matters of grant of interim relief, satisfaction of the Courtonly about existence of prima facie case in favour of the suitor isnot enough. The other elements i.e., balance of convenience andlikelihood of irreparable injury, are not of empty formality andcarry their own relevance; and while exercising its discretion inthe matter of interim relief and adopting a particular course, theCourt needs to weigh the risk of injustice, if ultimately the decisionof main matter runs counter to the course being adopted at thetime of granting or refusing the interim relief. We may usefullyrefer to the relevant principle stated in the decision of Chancery A

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Division in Films Rover International Ltd. v. Cannon Film SalesLtd. : (1986) 3 All ER 772 as under:—

“….The principal dilemma about the grant of interlocutoryinjunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is that there isby definition a risk that the court may make the “wrong”decision, in the sense of granting an injunction to a party whofails to establish his right at the trial (or would fail if there wasa trial) or alternatively, in failing to grant an injunction to aparty who succeeds (or would succeed) at trial. A fundamentalprinciple is therefore that the court should takewhichever course appears to carry the lower risk ofinjustice if it should turn out to have been “wrong” in thesense I have described. The guidelines for the grant of bothkinds of interlocutory injunctions are derived from this principle.”

(emphasis in bold supplied)

195. While referring to various expositions in the said decision,this Court, in the case of Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi SorabWarden : (1990) 2 SCC 117 observed as under:—

“16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thusgranted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of thelast non-contested status which preceded the pendingcontroversy until the final hearing when full relief may begranted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have beenillegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfullytaken from the party complaining. But since the granting ofsuch an injunction to a party who fails or would fail toestablish his right at the trial may cause great injusticeor irreparable harm to the party against whom it wasgranted or alternatively not granting of it to a party whosucceeds or would succeed may equally cause greatinjustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolvedcertain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:

(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall beof a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normallyrequired for a prohibitory injunction.

(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury whichnormally cannot be compensated in terms of money.

(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seekingsuch relief.

17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal ofan interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest inthe sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in thelight of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though theabove guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absoluterules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needingaction, applying them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal ofsuch injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicialdiscretion.”

(emphasis in bold supplied)

(emphasis in bold supplied)

196. In keeping with the principles aforesaid, one of the simplequestions to be adverted to at the threshold stage in the presentcases was, as to whether the importers (writ petitioners) werelikely to suffer irreparable injury in case the interim relief wasdenied and they were to ultimately succeed in the writ petitions. Adirect answer to this question would have made it clear that theirinjury, if at all, would have been of some amount of loss of profit,which could always be measured in monetary terms and, usually,cannot be regarded as an irreparable one. Another simple butpertinent question would have been concerning the element ofbalance of convenience; and a simple answer to the same wouldhave further shown that the inconvenience which the importerswere going to suffer because of the notifications in question wasfar lesser than the inconvenience which the appellants were goingto suffer (with ultimate impact on national interest) in case operationof the notifications was stayed and thereby, the markets of Indiawere allowed to be flooded with excessive quantity of the saidimported peas/pulses.”

23. A few of the referred provisions in the byelaws of the party,asexisting before the questioned meeting dated 11.07.2022 and even beforethe amendment dated 01.12.2021, could be usefully extracted as under:- “RULE - 5: MEMBERSHIP

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Avii)Members shall have no right to resort to Court proceedingsregarding Party matters. If any member of the party resortsto any Court proceedings against the Party Co-Ordinator’sand joint co-ordinator’s decision he/she shall cease to be aprimary member of the party.

The decision of the General Council shall be final with regardto party matters and only those who abide by this conditionare eligible to admission for Membership.

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All those who have become Members of the KAZHAGAMare bound by the decision of the General Council.

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RULE-18: FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

i)The responsibility and functions of the above mentionedOffice bearers of the Party units at different levels will beas follows:

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ii)CHAIRMAN:

He will preside over and conduct the General Body and theExecutive Committee Meetings. In his absence, the meetingshall be presided over and conducted by one of the members.

Eiii)SECRETARY:

The Secretary of the Party unit will be responsible for theadministration and execute the decisions of the respectiveExecutive Committee. In case of emergency, where theSecretary is not in a position to convene the ExecutiveFCommittee Meeting, he should get the decisions taken byhim ratified within fifteen days by the Executive Committee.He should submit any file required by the Audit Committeefor scrutiny.

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vi)Should a contingency of absence or void of Office Bearersin a Party unit arise, the person elected by the ExecutiveCommittee members will exercise the functions on adhocbasis till regular Office bearers of the set-up are electedwithin one month.

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RULE-19: GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE CENTRALORGANISATION

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i)The General Council of the AIADMK shall consist of theChairman, Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, Deputy Co-ordinators, Treasurer, Headquarters Secretaries of theParty, the members of the Central Executive Committee,Bthe members of the General Council elected from theDistricts and other States, the Members of the AuditCommittee, Property Protection Committee, and theParliamentary Board. The General Council shall be theSupreme body of the Party with all powers of theCKazhagam.

ii)The Secretaries of Union Kazhagams, the Secretaries ofthe Municipal Town Kazhagams and Township Kazhagams,the District Secretaries, the Chairman, Assistant Secretaryand Treasurer of the District Kazhagam etc. in Tamil Naduas well as the Secretaries of State Kazhagams and theChairman, Assistant Secretary, Treasurer of the StateKazhagams of other States shall be the members of theGeneral Council by virtue of their offices.

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iii)The General Council members shall be elected from eachDistrict Kazhagam in such numbers equivalent to the totalEnumber of Assembly Constituencies in the respective district.In respect of other, State including Pondicherry, the numberof the General Council members will be determined by theCo-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator with reference to thetotal number of members registered in the respective StateFKazhagams.

iv)The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the Party jointlycan nominate not exceeding 100 Members to the GeneralCouncil of the Central Organisation from among themembers of the Party.

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v)The General Council of the Central Organisation(Headquarters) shall meet and elect the Chairman of theCentral Organisation.

vi)The meeting of the General Council of the CentralOrganisation shall be presided over by the Chairman. In his H

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Aabsence, one of the members of the General Council maybe temporarily nominated to preside over the meeting ofthe General Council.

vii)The General Council Meeting shall be convened once in ayear or whenever it is considered necessary by the Co-Bordinator and Joint Co-ordinator by giving 15 days notice inadvance of the date of meeting.

The quorum for the meeting shall be one-fifth of the totalnumber of members of the General Council. If one-fifth ofthe members of the General Council request the Co-Cordinator and Joint Co-ordinator to convene the SpecialMeeting of the General Council, the Co-ordinator and JointCo-ordinator should do so within 30 days of the receipt ofsuch a requisition.

viii)The General Council will be the supreme authority to frameDpolicies and programmes of the Party and for theirimplementation. The decision of the General Council is finaland binding on all the members of the Party.

ix)A General Council will have five years tenure. However,the tenure shall get extended till the new General CouncilEMeeting is convened.

RULE-20: GENERAL SECRETARY

As per wishes of the members of the party and the party cadre,PURATCHI THALAIVI Dr.J.JAYALALITHA shall be theeternal General Secretary of the party and no person shall beFelected/ appointed/nominated to that post. The Post of GeneralSecretary stands abolished.

RULE 20-A: CO-ORDINATOR AND JOINT CO-ORDINATOR

i)The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall be primaryGmembers of the party for a continuous period of five years.

ii)The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall be electedby the members of the General Council.

iii)The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator elected as per subHrule (ii) shall hold the post for a period of 5 years.

iv)The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall discharge/perform their duties, obligations and functions and shallexercise their powers as per the Rules and regulations jointly.

v)The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the Party willbe responsible for the entire administration of the Party.

vi)The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will constitute theExecutive Committee of the Central Organisation consistingof the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, Chairman,Treasurer, Headquarters Secretaries, District Secretariesand the nominated members.

vii)The members of the Central Executive Committee,Treasurer and the Headquarters Secretaries nominated bythe Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will hold the officeduring the tenure of the office of the Co-Ordinator and JointCo-ordinator.

If for any reason the post of the Co-Ordinator and JointCo-ordinator becomes vacant before the expiry of the tenurethe office bearers who were nominated by the previousCo-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will hold office andcontinue to function till the new The Co-Ordinator andJointCo-ordinator are elected and assume office.

viii)The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the Party shallhave the powers and responsibilities to convene theExecutive and the General Council Meetings, to implementpolicies and programmes of the Party as decided by theGeneral and Executive Councils, to conduct elections andbye elections for Party Organisations, to examine theaccounts of all the Party units through the Audit Committee,to manage by self and through the Treasurer the incomeand expenditure of the Party organizations at all levels, tomanage the Party Office, movable and immovableproperties of the Party, to represent the Party in the legalproceedings that may arise in respect of Party propertiesand to take necessary legal steps on behalf of the Party toprotect them.

The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will presideover the Party conferences take all kinds of disciplinary A

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proceedings in accordance with the Party rules against theParty units and its office bearers who violate the Party rules,regulations or act against the Party interest, party discipline,policies and programmes, including immediate suspensionof any Party unit or office bearer. The Co-Ordinator andJoint Co-ordinator shall be the supreme authority to take afinal decision on the disciplinary proceedings recommendedby the Party units and shall have over all powers to take allsteps to promote and preserve the Party policies andprogrammes and to develop and protect the Partyorganizations.

The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are empoweredto take such actions as he may deem fit on importantpolitical events, policies and programmes of urgent naturewhich cannot brook delay/and await the meeting of eitherExecutive Committee or General Council of the Party. Suchdecisions and actions have to be ratified by the GeneralCouncil in its next meeting. However, it is open to the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator to obtain the views of theGeneral Council Members on such urgent matters by postwhen the Council is not in session.

The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are empoweredto deposit the funds of the AIADMK in any of the legallyconstituted Banks or Financial Institutions either in CurrentAccounts or Fixed Deposits; to withdraw such funds andto operate the accounts on behalf of the Party. The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are also empowered toobtain loans for the Party purposes from the abovementioned institutions on the security of the assets of theParty and to do all that is necessary in this regard for andon behalf of the Party.

The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are vested withpowers to authorize the Treasure of the Party to operateon his behalf the Bank Accounts namely to deposit or towithdraw funds, and also in respect of duties mentioned insub-rule (x) of this Rule.

xii)The Authorisation Forms addressed to the Election OfficersAfor the allotment of the Two Leaves Symbol to thecandidates contesting on behalf of the AIADMK shall besigned only by the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.

xiii)The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are vested withthe right to nominate Joint Secretaries or DeputyBSecretaries, in case of need to Branch units, Union, Town,Township and District Units and other state units, besideselected functionaries. Moreover, the Co-Ordinator and JointCo-ordinator are also vested with the Powers to nominatewomen in the posts, to compensate and give dueCrepresentation to women if in any of the party units at anylevel, women do not elected represent one third of the posts.

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Rule-23: CHAIRMAN

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i)The Members of the General Council will elect the Chairmanof the Central Organisation of the Party.

ii)The Chairman will preside over and conduct the proceedingsof the Central Executive Committee and the General CouncilMeetings. In the absence of the Chairman, one of theMembers present will temporarily preside over and conductEthe meetings.

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RULE-25: CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

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ii)Unless it could not be convened for valid reasons, theCentral Executive Committee shall meet once in six months.If found necessary, the AIADMK Co-ordinator and JointCo-ordinator an convene the meeting at any time.

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iii)Fourteen days notice should be given for ordinary meetingsand seven days notice for urgent meetings of the CentralExecutive Committee.

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ARULE-42: TENURE

If the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator feels that thereare genuine reasons according to changing situations, theCo-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator is vested with the powerto exempt from the abovementioned Rules and Regulations.

BRULE-43: AMENDMENTS

The General Council will have powers to frame, amend ordelete any of the Rules of the Party Constitution.

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CRULE-45: Authorisation to Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.

The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are fully authorizedto relax or make alterations to any of the aforesaid Rulesand Regulations of the Party.”

23.1. Some of these provisions were amended by the ExecutiveDCommittee on 01.12.2021. These provisions, as existing before and afterthe said amendment dated 01.12.2021, could be noticed in comparativeterms as follows:- E

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24. A quick recapitulation of the past events shall be apposite.Though, in the scheme of byelaws, the topmost position in the party wasearlier assigned to the General Secretary but, after the demise of thethen General Secretary on 05.12.2016, the party organisation went throughvarious changes and ultimately, a system of joint leadership, by Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, was established by way of amendmentof the byelaws on 12.09.2017. The principal contesting parties - OPSand EPS - were jointly, and unanimously, elected to the said positions ofCo-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator respectively and acted jointly for along time, until before convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022.However, when the proposition for further amendments of the byelaws– essentially to revert to the system of single leadership at the apex level– was likely to come up in the meeting of the General Council dated23.06.2022, it led to the litigation. Initially, in the first three civil suits,being CS Nos. 102 of 2022, 106 of 2022 and 111 of 2022, the prayers forinterim injunctionagainst holding of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 weredeclined by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by an order dated22.06.2022 with reference to the settled principles of law that in matterof internal issues of an association/party, the Courts normally do notinterfere while leaving it open to the association/party and its membersto pass the necessary resolutions and to frame a particular byelaw, ruleor regulation for better administration of the party; and that it were amatter well within their collective wisdom and the Court cannot insistupon the members to act in a particular manner for, it was for the GeneralCouncil and its members to decide and pass resolutions and the Courtcannot interfere with the process of conducting the General Council A

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Ameeting. This order was challenged in an intra-court appeal, OSA No.160 of 2022 wherein, by an order dated 23.06.2022, the Division Benchof the High Court, though allowed the said scheduled meeting of theGeneral Council to go on but, placed fetters by providing that no decisionshall be taken on any other matter except 23 items of draft resolution. ItBis the case of the respondents that in the said meeting, the proposedagenda items could not be taken up and hence, the proposal forcontinuance of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator lapsed. The appellantwould submit various reasons for which the said meeting dated23.06.2022 was nothing but faux pas and in any case, the PresidiumCChairman of that meeting had no authority to convene another meetingof the General Council. On 06.07.2022, while examining the challengeto the said order dated 23.06.2022 as passed by the Division Bench ofthe High Court, this Court took note of the events that had taken placeas also the fact that next meeting of the General Council was scheduledto be held on 11.07.2022 and hence, while issuing notice, stayed theDoperation and effect of the impugned order dated 23.06.2022and madeit clear that the meeting slated for 11.07.2022 could proceed in accordancewith law while also leaving it open for the learned Single Judge dealingwith the civil suits to examine the prayer for any other interim relief and/

or to pass any other order, as may be required on the facts and in theEcircumstances of the case. Then, the prayers made in the freshly institutedcivil suits, being CS Nos. 118 of 2022 and 119 of 2022, for preventing themeeting dated 11.07.2022 were declined by a learned Single Judge ofthe High Court on 11.07.2022, in the order passed just before thescheduled time of the meeting. The said meeting dated 11.07.2022 was,Faccordingly, held at the scheduled time and various resolutions wereadopted therein but, the said order dated 11.07.2022 as passed by thelearned Single Judge was found to have been passed on wrong notionabout the purport of the order of this Court dated 06.07.2022 and hence,by an order dated 27.09.2022, this Court remanded the matter forGreconsideration. Thereafter, the interim relief applications in the saidnewly filed civil suits were decided by a learned Single Judge of theHigh Court on 17.08.2022 granting certain interim reliefs and providing,inter alia, that status quo ante as existing on 23.06.2022 shall bemaintained and there would be no Executive Council or General Councilmeeting without joint consent of the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.H

The said order dated 17.08.2022 was, however, set aside by the DivisionBench of the High Court by its impugned order dated 02.09.2022. Thequestion is as to whether the order so passed by the Division Bench ofthe High Court calls for interference by this Court.

25. It is apparent from a close look at the order dated 17.08.2022that grant of temporary injunction in these matters by the learned SingleJudge was premised essentially on three factors: first and the foremostbeing that as per the byelaws of the party, the General Council meetingcould have been convened only by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinatorand they having not done so, the meeting dated 11.07.2022 was whollyunauthorised. Additionally, the said meeting dated 11.07.2022 was notconvened by providing 15 days’ advance notice, as required by Rule19(vii) of the byelaws. Secondly, the learned Single Judge was of theview that by not granting injunction, EPS, who convened the GeneralCouncil meeting contrary to the provisions of the byelaws, would be in amore convenient position for having allegedly removed the plaintiff OPSand few others from the party membership and they could not haveeven participated in the proposed General Secretary elections. Accordingto the learned Single Judge, balance of convenience and irreparable injuryin the given context were required to be visualised with reference to theviewpoints of the primary membersof the party. Thirdly, the learned SingleJudge was of the view that when OPS and EPS had successfullyfunctioned jointly as Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, how the party,with more than 1.5 crore cadre strength, suddenly decided to change theexisting dispensation. The ultimate injunction issued by the learned SingleJudge had been that of restoring status quoante as on 23.06.2022 andfurther to that, it was ordained that the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinatorhave to function jointly, meetings have to be called with their joint consentand on being properly requisitioned, they would not refuse to convenethe General Council meeting, and that they could approach the Court fornecessary directions for conducting the General Council meeting.

26. On the other hand, while dealing with the intra-court appealsagainst the order so passed by the learned Single Judge, the DivisionBench of the High Court, in the first place, took note of the events thattranspired on 23.06.2022 in the General Council meeting and notedthefact that the requisitionwas given by 2190 members and also the fact A

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Athat the plaintiffOPS was very much present in the said meeting dated23.06.2022 wherein, it was announced that the next meeting would beconducted on 11.07.2022. The Division Bench of the High Court, afterexamining the record and particularly Rule 19(vii) in its Tamil and Englishversions, took note of its frame whereby the requirement of 15 days’Bnotice appears to be referable to the regular meeting of the GeneralCouncil to be convened once in a year or whenever considered necessarybut not in relation to the meeting requisitioned by 1/5[th] members of theGeneral Council where the only requirement is for the Co-ordinator andJoint Co-ordinator to convene the meeting within 30 days of receipt ofCthe requisition. The High Court observed that it had not been the case ofthe plaintiffOPS that they were not knowing about announcement madeon the floor of the General Council meeting on 23.06.2022. The DivisionBench also referred to an undeniable factsituation that the Co-ordinatorand Joint Co-ordinator were at loggerheads and any strict application ofRule 19(vii) was likely to result in a deadlock. The Division Bench furtherDreferred to the past event when the interim General Secretary could notperform the functions because of her incarceration in a criminal caseand, therefore, the office bearers convened the meeting on 12.09.2017based on the requisition made by the members. The Division Bench alsotook note of the apex position assigned to the General Council in theEbyelaws to take all the decisions. Yet further, the Division Benchtooknote of the stance of the Joint Co-ordinator – EPS– who had sent acommunication to the Election Commission of India stating that the postof Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator had lapsed for the reason thatthe election in the Executive Committee meeting dated 01.12.2021 wasFnot ratified in the General Council meeting held on 23.06.2022. TheDivision Bench observed that when the Joint Co-ordinator had given uphis position to continue as such, there was no Joint Co-ordinator in theparty.

26.1. As regards the views of the learned Single Judge doubtingGthe requisition as a manufactured document, the Division Bench pointedout that none of the members who signed the requisition or attended themeeting came forward with any such claim. That apart, the plaintiffs didnot make any assertion in the plaint that there was no requisition placedin the meeting nor there was any averment that the requisition letter wasHa fabricated document. The Division Bench went on to observe that even if the resolutions passed on 23.06.2022 and on 11.07.2022 werefound to be illegal or against the byelaws, it was always open to 1/5[th]members of the General Council to convene a special meeting and reversethe resolutions passed in these two meetings but no such requisition wasgiven by 1/5[th] of the General Council members and this factor operatedagainst the claim of irreparable injury.

26.2. The Division Bench also referred to the principles governingthe grant or refusal of temporary injunction and pointed out that thedirections given by the learned Single Judge for convening the meetingonly with the joint consent of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator wasleading to a situation where the party as a whole would undergoirreparable hardship because there was no possibility of the appellantand the respondent No. 1 – OPS and EPS– acting jointly to convene themeeting. The Division Bench pointed out that the directions of the learnedSingle Judge would only furtherthe”functional deadlock” already existingin the party.

26.3. We are not elaborating on all other comments andobservations made by the Division Bench of the High Court in the relevantpassages quoted in extenso hereinbefore. Suffice it to observe for thepresent purpose that the Division Bench of the High Court, while passingthe order dated 02.09.2022, has amply and clearly pointed out as to howthe order of temporary injunction as passed by the learned Single Judgewas against the sound judicial principles and the discretion exercised bythe learned Single Judge was suffering from arbitrariness as alsoperversity.

27. In our view, the logic and reasoning of the Division Bench ofthe High Court stand in accord with law as also the facts of the presentcase.

28. The main plank of submissions on the part of the appellants inchallenge to the order dated 02.09.2022 has been that convening of themeeting dated 11.07.2022 suffered from illegalities inasmuch as themeeting was not convened by an authorised person and that 15 days’notice was not given. The same had been the reasoning adopted by thelearned Single Judge while finding aprima facie case in favour of theplaintiffs. The said reasoning and similar arguments remain fallaciousand cannot be accepted.

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A28.1. The facts of the case make it abundantly clear that so far asconvening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 is concerned, the same hadnever been in doubt or in any dispute. The said meeting was indeedconvened by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator jointly. They hadbeen working in tandem until that stage. However, they seem to haveBfallen apart immediately thereafter, particularly when a proposition foramendment of the byelaws and reverting to the system of single leadershipwas in the offing. In any case, the meeting dated 23.06.2022 was dulyconvened and the efforts to prevent the same did not meet with successin the Court. Even if the slated business was not transacted inthe meetingCdated 23.06.2022, all that had happened in that meeting could not havebeen ignored. It remains undeniable that the plaintiff OPS and the personsstanding with him were also very much present in the said meeting. TheGeneral Council is said to be consisting of 2665 members. If 2190members out of these 2665 gave a requisition on 23.06.2022 forconvening the General Council meeting and the Presidium ChairmanDannounced the date of this requisitioned meeting as 11.07.2022, in thegiven set of facts and circumstances, such announcement, at least at thepresent stage, cannot be dubbed as wholly redundant. At that point oftime, when Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator were shown to be notfunctioning jointly (for whatsoever reason), a functional deadlock cameEinto existence for the party and a workable solution was required to befound. In the given scenario, the actions and steps taken by therequisitioning members as also by the Presidium Chairman cannot bedeclared as unwarranted or illegal at this stage. That being the position,convening of meeting dated 11.07.2022 could not have been taken as anFact unauthorised. The learned Single Judge while passing the order dated17.08.2022 seems to have fallen in serious error and said order wasclearly suffering from perversity when convening of the meeting dated11.07.2022 was taken as an act unauthorised. The Division Bench ofthe High Court, in our view, has rightly looked at the substance of theGmatter and realities of the situation.

28.2. The other alleged infirmityabout want of clear 15 days’ noticehas also been rightly dealt with by the Division Bench of the High Courtin the impugned order dated 02.09.2022. In our view, in such an internalmatter of the party, approach of the Court and that too, while consideringHthe prayer for interim relief, cannot beof finding technical faults and flaws detached from the substance of the matter. Even as regardstechnicalities, the Division Bench appears to have rightly analysed theframe of the said Rule 19(vii), where the requirement of 15 days’ noticeis referable to the regular meeting and not as such to a requisitioned orspecial meeting.

29. The considerations of the learned Single Judge as regards thequestion of prima facie case had been suffering from basic flaws, asnoticed above; and interference by the Division Bench was but warrantedlooking to the subject-matter of the litigation and its implications. Thisapart, and even if it be assumed that the plaintiffs were able to projectsome arguable case before the Court and some elements of prima faciecase, in our view, the approach of the learned Single Judge while examiningthe questions of balance of convenience and irreparable injury had beenfrom an altogether wrong angle. As noticed, the learned Single Judgetook the view that by not granting injunction, EPSwould be in a moreconvenient position for having allegedly removed the plaintiff OPS andfew others from the party membership and they could not have evenparticipated in the proposed General Secretary elections. According tothe learned Single Judge, balance of convenience and irreparable injury,in the given context, were required to be visualised from the vantagepoint of the primary members. Such observations and considerations ofthe learned Single Judge, in our view, do not stand in conformity withsound judicial principles. The questions of balance of convenienceandirreparable injury in relation to the applications under consideration couldnot have been examined with reference to the consequences or falloutof the meeting dated 11.07.2022. Moreover, the authority of the GeneralCouncil to deal with the relevant matters could not have been brushedaside with reference to the strength of the primary membership of theparty. It is but clear that the learned Single Judge has not kept in viewthe relevant tests as expounded in the decisions above-referred. In thepresent case concerning the internal management of the political party,and looking to the nature of claim made by the plaintiffs, the balance ofconvenience had not been in favour of granting any interim injunction onthe applications under consideration.

30. Having examined the matter in its totality, we are constrainedto observe that the learned Single Judge in the present matter did not A

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Aexamine the questions relating to balance of convenience and irreparableinjury in the correct perspective and particularly failed to weigh thecompeting possibilities and risk of injustice if ultimately the decision ofmain matter would run counter to the course being adopted and suggestedin the order granting temporary injunction in the manner and form it wasBbeing granted. It gets perforce reiterated that if the order as passed bythe learned Single Judge was to remain in force until decision of thesuits, it would have been drastically detrimental to the interest of politicalparty in question, which is a recognised political party with the ElectionCommission of India. In the matters of the present nature, the simpleCand precise view, as stated by the learned Single Judge at the initialstage on 22.06.2022 while declining the prayer for interim relief, hadbeen on the correct statement of lawthat ordinarily the Court would notinterfere in the internal issues of an association/party and would leave itopen to the association/party and its members to take a particular decisionfor better administration; and that had been the correct approach towardsDthe facts of the case. In the present case, when General Council isshown to be the apex body of the party, taking any exception to themeeting of the General Council could have neither been countenancednor interfered with by way of temporary injunction. In the given set offacts and circumstances, the hyper-technical suggestions as sought toEbe made about the want of valid notice with reference to date, time andplace of meeting i.e., with reference to Chapter 5 from Shackleton onthe Law and Practice of Meetings (supra) do not further the cause ofthe appellants, particularly when it is noticed that the date, time andplace of the meeting in question were duly declared in the meeting datedF23.06.2022.

31. The submission on behalf of the appellants based on the decisionin S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra) that the scheme of byelaws does notenvisage the requisitionists to convene the General Council meeting;and if the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly fail to conveneGthe meeting, the only option is to seek intervention of the Court has itsown shortcomings. As rightly noticed by the Division Bench in the orderimpugned, in the said case, an expelled member of the party called for aGeneral Council meeting, parallel to the meeting called by the then GeneralSecretary. In the given fact situation, the Court granted interim injunctionHin favour of the General Secretary against convening of the parallel meeting. In the present matter, no parallel meeting of General Councilhas been called for or requisitioned by any of the Members. The DivisionBench of the High Court has rightly observed that as a general rule, itcannot be laid down that the requisitionists have no option but only to goto the Court if the meeting is not convened. It has also been pointed outthat in the past, when the interim General Secretary could not act in theyear 2017, the Office Bearers stepped in and convened the meetingbased on a requisition received. The present situation too, where theposition as occupied earlier by the General Secretary was assigned tothe Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator in their jointness and it remainsbeyond a shadow of doubt that Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinatordo not stand in jointness and cannot act jointly, is akin to the situationwhen the apex position holder was not in a position to act. Obviously, aworkable solution was to be found; and when the solution as found andapplied, does not otherwise appear offending the spirit of byelaws asalso the norms of functioning of an association or a party, it cannot besaid that declaration of the Presidium Chairman for the meeting of theGeneral Council on 11.07.2022 and the follow-up notice by the OfficeBearers at Party Headquarters had been wholly unauthorised.

32. Apart from the foregoing, the other considerations in theimpugned order dated 17.08.2022 which had prevailed with the learnedSingle Judge make it clear that the learned Single Judge hasproceededcontrary to the sound and applicable judicial principles. Itremains undeniable that law does not envisage performance of anyimpossibility nor any mandate could be issued by the Court forperformance of a practical impossibility. The learned Single Judgeexpressed the view that when OPS and EPS had successfully functionedjointly as Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator how the party, with morethan 1.5 crore cadre strength, suddenly decided to change the existingdispensation. With respect, in our view, such a question was not evengermane to the points for determination arising before the Court. As tohow any compact, be it an association or be it a political party, wouldmanage its affairs and what alterations its governing body would considerappropriate in its rules, regulations or byelaws, are all the matters squarelywithin the domain of that compact and its governing body. In any case,in the applications before the Court, the only relevant question was aboutthe validity of convening the meeting dated 11.07.2022. The learned AB

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ASingle Judgeappears to have traversed through such wide areas thatultimately the decision came to be based on entirely irrelevantconsiderations.

33. It is also noteworthy that the ultimate injunction issued by thelearned Single Judge had been that of restoring status quoante as onB23.06.2022 and further to that, the learned Single Judge directed that theCo-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator would have to function jointly;meetings have to be called with their joint consent; and on being properlyrequisitioned, they would not refuse to convene the General Councilmeeting and that they could approach the Court for necessary directionsCfor conducting the General Council meeting. Apart from the fact thatthe injunction as issued by the learned Single Judge had been far awayand beyond the scope of applications before him, the said injunctioncould have only perpetuated the functional deadlock in the party.Theorder passed by the learned Single Judge could not have beenDcountenanced from any angle and thus, the Division Bench, in our view,has rightly interfered with the same.

34. In the passing, we may also observe that while filing the suitand seeking interim relief, the plaintiff OPS and even the other plaintiff,have arrayed the parties to the litigation in the manner that the politicalEparty- AIADMK, as also its General Council and its Central ExecutiveCommittee are said to be represented by “Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator” in terms of assertions of these plaintiffs that the party and itsgoverning/executing bodies are only to be represented by the Co-ordinatorand the Joint Co-ordinator jointly. This effort on the part of the plaintiffsFcarries its own shortcomings when it remains undeniable that they i.e.,OPS and EPS, the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator respectively,do not stand in jointness or even togetherness so as to work cohesivelyas a unit. The effort on the part of the plaintiffs does not stand inconformity with the existing realities.G35. Before closing on these matters, we need to make it clear G35. Before closing on these matters, we need to make it clearagain that though several submissions have been made on behalf of theappellants assailing the validity and correctness of the resolutions said tohave been adopted in the meeting dated 11.07.2022 and in counter tothat, the respondents have attempted to justify the said decisions/Hresolutions but we have chosen not to deal with any of those contentions.

This is for the specific reason that the decisions taken in the meetingdated 11.07.2022 do not form the subject-matter of the applications fortemporary injunction, which were restored for reconsideration by thisCourt and were ultimately decided by the learned Single Judge by theorder dated 17.08.2022 and then the intra-court appeals against thatorder of the learned Single Judge were allowed by the Division Benchon 02.09.2022. In the interest of justice, we leave all the related aspectsconcerning the said resolutions open to be agitated, but strictly inaccordance with law; and all the objections and rebuttals of the contestingparties are also kept open.

35.1. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and thescope of these appeals, we have not found it necessary to deal with anyof the impleadment applications moved in these matters and we wouldleave it open for all such applicants also to take recourse to appropriateremedy in accordance with law, in case of any legal grievance existingwith a right to seek relief in the appropriate forum.

36. For what has been discussed hereinabove, the appeals arisingout of SLP(C) Nos. 15753 of 2022 and 15705-15706 of 2022 are requiredto be dismissed while affirming the impugned order dated 02.09.2022.

37. So far as the other appeals are concerned, therein, the aforesaidorder dated 23.06.2022 is in challenge. The operation and effect of thesaid order was stayed by this Court on 06.07.2022. As noticed, the saidorder dated 23.06.2022 has even otherwise lost its relevance. However,in order to put the records straight, we deem it appropriate to make thestay order dated 06.07.2022 absolute so as to dispose of the appealsfiled in challenge to the said order dated 23.06.2022.

38. Before concluding, we also make it clear that none of theobservations in this judgment shall have any bearing on the meritconsideration of the pending civil suits relating to these appeals; and thesaid suits shall be proceeded with on their own merits and in accordancewith law.

39. Accordingly, and in view of the above:

1. The appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 15753 of 2022 and15705-15706 of 2022 are dismissed and the order dated 02.09.2022, aspassed by the Division Bench of the High Court in OSA Nos. 227 of2022, 231 of 2022 and 232 of 2022 stands affirmed.

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1198SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2023] 7 S.C.R.

A2. The appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 11237 of 2022, 11579of 2022 and 11578 of 2022stand disposed of while making the interimorder dated 06.07.2022 absolute.

3. The parties are left to bear their own costs of these appeals.

4. All the pending applications also stand disposed of.

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Ankit Gyan

(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)

Appeals disposed of.

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