THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI, BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION versus MAHESH AND OTHERS on 10 November 2021

THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECTAMBADI, BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHAIRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

v.

MAHESH AND OTHERS

(Civil Appeal Nos. 6673-6674 of 2021)

NOVEMBER 10, 2021

[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in LandAcquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013:

ss. 25 and 24(1)(a) – Interpretation of s. 24(1)(a) –Determination of period within which an award to be made – Held:s. 11A of the 1894 Act and s. 25 of the 2013 Act prescribe twodifferent periods of limitation – If two year period for making anaward in terms of s.11A of the 1894 Act is applied to awards madeu/s. 24(1)(a), it may lead to practical absurdities and anomalies –This would mitigate against the legislative intent behind prescriptionof time for making of an award in respect of saved acquisitionproceedings initiated under the repealed 1894 Act – Therefore togive effect and making the underlying intention of the Parliament,the limitation for passing/making of an award u/s. 24(1)(a) wouldbe in terms of s. 25, which would commence from 01.01.2014, thatis, the date when the 2013 Act came into force – Awards passed u/s.24(1)(a) would be valid if made within twelve months from01.01.2014, subject to the caveat that a declaration which haslapsed in terms of s.11A of the 1894 Act before or on 31.12.2013would not get revived – Thus, the choice is exercised to arrive at ajust, fair and harmonious construction consistent with the legislativeintent – Rational approach so as to further the object and purposeof ss.24 and 26 to 30 is required – On facts, publication ofdeclaration for land acquisition u/s. 6 of the 1894 Act, on 08.08.12– On 01.01.14, the Act of 2013came into force and 1894 Act stoodrepealed – On 30.10.14, award purportedly made in terms of s.24(1)(a) – Writ petitions by landowners challenging the award –High Court set aside the award holding that the acquisitionproceeding had lapsed since in terms of s. 11A award ought to have

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Abeen passed within two years from the date of declaration-before08.08.14; and that the award purportedly made on 30.10.14 wasbackdated – Award purportedly dated 30.08.2014, was in any caseduly made on or before the extended date of 20.03.2015 – Periodof 79 days from 26.05.2014 when the High Court stayed operationof the notification dated 19.03.2014, till the new notification datedB13.08.2014 was issued has to be excluded –– Thus, the award islegal and valid and order passed by the High Court is set aside –Land Acquisition Act 1894.

ss. 25, 24(1)(a) and 30 – Compensation u/s. 24(1)(a) –Determination of – Explained.C

s.24(1)(a) and 25 –Words “all the provisions relating todetermination of compensation” in s. 24(1)(a) – Meaning of – Held:It would be read as including the period of limitation specified in s.25 of the 2013 Act – Word ‘all’ and the expression “relating to”used in s. 25 of the 2013 Act, are to be given a wide meaning toDensnare the legislative intent – Words and phrases.

s. 24(1) – Interpretation of – Constitution Bench decision inIndore Development Authority’s case held that the 2013 Act operatesprospectively, and that s. 114 of the 2013 Act effects a repeal butwith certain savings, in accordance with s. 24 – Thus, the acquisitionEproceedings are preserved under the 1894 Act till the stage of makingof the award – Where an award is not made, the provisions relatingto determination of compensation under the 2013 Act would apply;where the award is made, proceedings would continue under theprovisions of the 1894 Act as if the said Act has not been repealed.F

s. 24(2) – Interpretation of – Decision in Indore DevelopmentAuthority’s case holding that where proceedings for acquisition hadbeen initiated under the 1894 Act but no award u/s. 11 of the 1894Act had been made, the provisions of the 2013 Act would applylimited to determination of compensation – Where, however, anGaward had been made under the 1894 Act, s. 24(1)(b) protects thevested rights of the parties – 2013 Act provides for highercompensation along with provisions for rehabilitation, which shouldnot be taken away – Furthermore, full effect has to be given to theprovisions contained in s. 24 as it is not for the court to legislate –Courts can and do, in appropriate cases, clear ambiguity inHlegislations.

THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION v. MAHESH

Land Acquisition Act 1894: s. 11A – Two year period withinwhich award to be made u/s. 11A – Application of, even after repeal– Held: s. 11A requires that an award u/s. 11 must be passed withina period of two years from the date of publication of the declarationand if no award is so made, the proceedings for acquisition of landwould lapse – Period during which any action or proceedings to betaken pursuant to the declaration is stayed by an order of a court isto be excluded while calculating the period of two years.

Limitation: Statutes of limitation – Nature of – Held: Isgenerally regarded as procedural as its object is not to create anyright but prescribe periods within which legal proceedings shouldbe instituted for enforcement of rights or adjudication orders shouldbe passed – Statutes of limitation have retrospective effect insofaras they apply to all legal proceedings brought after they come intoforce – However, the laws relating to limitation have been held tobe prospective since they do not have the effect of reviving the rightof action which is already barred on the date of their coming intooperation, nor do they have the effect of extinguishing a right ofaction subsisting on the date – Thus, unless the language of theprovision dealing with period of limitation clearly manifests, inexpress terms or by necessary implication, a contrary intentiondivesting vested rights, such provision is to be construed asprospective.

General Clauses Act, 1897: s. 6 – Effect of repeal – Discussed.

Interpretation of statutes: Retrospective application of statutes– Constitution Bench decision in Indore Development Authority’s caseholding that extent of retrospectivity would also depend upon thedegree of unfairness it causes to the parties – Absence of expresslimiting words is not to be used as a basis for implying retrospectiveoperation as this would be reverse of the true presumption –However, presumption in favour of retrospectivity may be necessarywhen distinct implications typically arise in the context of the statutewhich repeals a previous statute, and would leave a ‘lacuna’ if thenew statute were not construed as having retrospective effect – Statutewhich is prospective in its direct operation cannot be called asretrospective because a part of the requisites for its action is drawnfrom time antecedent to its passing – Furthermore, for interpretation,a construction which results in unreasonably harsh and absurdresults must be avoided.

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AAllowing the appeals, the Court

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1126SUPREME COURT REPORTS

AAllowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. Section 25 of the Right to Fair Compensationand Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation andResettlement Act, 2013 would apply to the awards made andpublished under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. The limitationBperiod for passing/making of an award under Section 24(1)(a) interms of Section 25 would commence from 1st January 2014,that is, the date when the 2013 Act came into force. Period duringwhich the Court order would inhibit action on the part of theauthorities to proceed with the making of the award would beexcluded while computing the period under Section 25 of theC2013 Act. Accordingly, period of 79 days from 26th May 2014when the High Court had stayed operation of the notification dated19th March 2014, till the new notification dated 13th August 2014was issued has to be excluded. The award purportedly dated 30thOctober 2014, was in any case duly made on or before theDextended date of 20th March 2015. Hence, the concerned awardis valid. The State of Maharashtra may conduct an inquiry inreference to the imputation regarding manipulation andbackdating of the subject award and take such remedial andcorrective action as may be necessary and to ensure suchsituations do not arise in future.The impugned judgment settingEaside the award and holding that the acquisition proceedings hadlapsed is set aside. The acquisition proceedings had notlapsed and the award is legal and valid. [Paras 40, 41][1160-G;1161-A-E]

2.1 Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 requiresFthat an award under Section 11 must be passed within a period oftwo years from the date of publication of the declaration and if noaward is so made, the proceedings for acquisition of land shalllapse. As per the explanation, the period during which any actionor proceedings to be taken pursuant to the declaration is stayedGby an order of a court is to be excluded while calculating theperiod of two years. [Para 5][1140-G-H]

2.2 Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 interdictsthe common law principle that an enactment after repeal isineffective as if it had never existed, except as to matters pastHand closed. Section 6 is a general transitory provision that THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION v. MAHESH

resurrects operation of the repealed law in terms ofcomprehensive and broadly worded clauses (a) to (e). Clauses(b), (c) and (e) of Section 6, in particular, state that the repealdoes not affect anything duly done or suffered under the repealedenactment; any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired oraccrued under any repealed enactment; or any investigation, legalproceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege,obligation, liability, penalty, etc. Legal proceedings, investigationor remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and anypenalty, punishment or forfeiture may be enforced as if therepealed Act or regulation were still in existence notwithstandingits repeal. However, the savings of Section 6 do not apply to someextent or in entirety when the legislative intent is different. Thecontrary intent can be expressed or gathered by necessaryimplication. Further, the ambit of repeal cannot be wider than theboundary envisaged by the repealing enactment. Therefore, acomprehensive repeal may be limited if the repealing enactmentdirectly or by necessary implication clamours that it will not applyto certain matters. [Para 7][1143-A-D]

2.3 Section 114 of the 2013 Act repeals the 1894 Act, whichceases to be effective and applicable from the date of enforcementof the 2013 Act. In terms of sub-section (2) to Section 114, therepeal shall not act so as to prejudice or affect application ofSection 6 of the General Clauses Act. However, the applicationof Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is subject to “save asotherwise provided” by the 2013 Act. In other words, when it iscommanded or imperative by the provisions of the 2013 Act,Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not to be given legaleffect. [Para 8][1143-E-F]

2.4 Sub-section (1) to Section 24 of the 2013 Act is a non-obstante clause. It confers the provision with an overriding statusover other provisions. Accordingly, in terms of Sections 24(1) ofthe 2013 Act, Section 114 of the 2013 Act as well as Section 6 ofthe General Clauses Act will not apply to the extent hindered bySection 24(1) of the 2013 Act. The reason is that s. 114 of the2013 Act, while accepting the applicability of Section 6 of theGeneral Clauses Act, makes its application subject to “save as

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Aotherwise provided” in the 2013 Act. Further, s. 6 of the GeneralClauses Act itself states that the general savings will not applywhen the legislative intent is contrary. [Para 9][1143-F-H]

2.5 Section 24(1) deals with two specific situations wherethe land acquisition proceedings were initiated before the repealBof the 1894 Act, namely: (i) where an award has been made, and(ii) where an award has not been made. As per clause (b) to Section24(1) where an award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has beenmade, the proceedings would continue under the repealed 1894Act, notwithstanding its repeal. In such cases, the 2013 Act willnot apply. Clause (b) to s. 24(1) is not applicable in the case atChand as it is admitted that no award was made on or before 31stDecember 2013. [Para 10][1144-A-C]

2.6 In the instant case, clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the2013 Act would apply as the land acquisition proceedings initiatedunder the 1894 Act had not culminated into an award till the repealDof the 1894 Act. Section 24(1)(a) partly nullifies the legal effect ofsavings under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act as it hybridizesapplication of the 1894 Act and the 2013 Act. While preservingvalidity of the acquisition proceedings by issue of declarationsunder the 1894 Act, it states that all the provisions forEdetermination of compensation under the 2013 Act shall apply.The section consciously saves the legal effect of the notificationsissued under Section 4 and/or Section 6 of the 1894 Act andobviates the necessity to issue a fresh notification under the 2013Act. This ‘perseveration of the determination date’ for thecomputation of compensation for the awards made under SectionF24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act is a thought through legislative invocationthat curtails time delays and cost escalation of infrastructureprojects, as well as checks the post-acquisition notificationmalpractices, and at the same time ensures that the landownersare entitled to the benefit of the enhanced compensation as perGthe 2013 Act. [Para 11][1144-C-F]

2.7 Section 11A of the 1894 Act and Section 25 of the 2013Act prescribe two different periods of limitation with adverseconsequences, as on failure to make the award the acquisition THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION v. MAHESH

proceedings lapse. The choice is between Section 11A of the 1894Act and s. 25 of the 2013 Act. Absence of precise words or expressdeclaration would not inhibit from interpreting and exercisingthe right choice, keeping in view the language as also the objectand purpose of clause (a) to s. 24(1). In other words, effect andmeaning is to be given to the underlying intention of theParliament in the words “all the provisions relatingto determination of compensation” under the 2013 Act.[Para 15][1146-B-D]

Procedure

2.8 The words “all the provisions relating to determinationof compensation” in Section 24(1)(a) would be read as includingthe period of limitation specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act.To elaborate, the word ‘all’ and the expression “relating to” usedin Section 24(1)(a) are required to be given a wide meaning toensnare the legislative intent. Given this trend in interpretation,the words “all the provisions of this Act relating to thedetermination of compensation” must not be imputed a restrictedunderstanding of the word ‘relating’ only to the substantialprovisions on calculation of compensation, that is, Sections 26 to30 of the 2013 Act. Rather, the expression should be given anexpansive meaning so as to include the provision on limitationperiod for calculation of compensation, that is, Section 25 of the2013 Act. [Para 16][1146-D-F]

The State Wakf Board, Madras represented by itsSecretary v. Abdul Azeez Sahib & Ors. AIR 1968Madras 79; Navin Chemicals Mfg. and Trading Co.Ltd. v. Collector of Customs (1993) 4 SCC 320:[1993]2 Suppl. SCR 326; Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limitedv. Amit Gupta and Others 2021 SCC Online SC 194;Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Companyand Another (1984) 4 SCC 679 : [1985] 1 SCR 432;Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain and Others v. Eknath VithalOgale (1995) 2 SCC 665 : [1995] 1 SCR 996; M/s.Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Others(1988) 2 SCC 299 : [1988] 2 SCR 962; H.H.Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao ScindiaBahadur of Gwalior etc. v. Union of India & Anr. (1971)1 SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9 – referred to.

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A2.9 Law of limitation is generally regarded as proceduralas its object is not to create any right but prescribe periods withinwhich legal proceedings should be instituted for enforcement ofrights or adjudication orders should be passed. Statutes oflimitation, therefore, have retrospective effect insofar as theyapply to all legal proceedings brought after they come into force.BHowever, the laws relating to limitation have been held to beprospective in the sense that they do not have the effect ofreviving the right of action which is already barred on the date oftheir coming into operation, nor do they have the effect ofextinguishing a right of action subsisting on the date. In this sense,Cthe limitation provisions can be procedural in the context of oneset of facts and substantive in the context of a different set offacts. Therefore, unless the language of the provision dealingwith period of limitation clearly manifests, in express terms or bynecessary implication, a contrary intention divesting vested rights,such provision is to be construed as prospective. In the contextDof clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, it is to be statedthat the said clause would apply only if the period for making ofan award had not ended and time was available as on 1st January2014. Where and if the period for making of the award had alreadylapsed before 1st January 2014, clause (a) to Section 24(1) wouldEnot apply so as to deprive and deny the vested rights which havealready accrued in favour of the landowners. The instant case isnot of divesting of vested rights of the landowners on enactmentof the 2013 Act. [Para 17][1148-A-E]

2.10 Section 25 is a rule of procedure immediately following

2.10 Section 25 is a rule of procedure immediately following FSection 24 and a part of fasciculus of “all the provisions”, fromSections 25-30, “relating to determination of compensation”.Hence, the expression “all the provisions relating to thedetermination of compensation” under the 2013 Act willencompass Section 25. [Para 18][1148-F]G2.11 Given the object and purpose behind Sections 24, and26 to 30 of the 2013 Act, practical absurdities and anomalies mayarise if the two-year period for making of an award in terms ofSection 11A of the 1894 Act commencing from the date of issueof the declaration is applied to the awards to be made under H

THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION v. MAHESH

Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. This would mitigate against theunderlying legislative intent behind prescription of time formaking of an award in respect of saved acquisition proceedingsinitiated under the repealed 1894 Act, which is two-fold: (i) togive sufficient time to the authorities to determine compensationpayable under the 2013 Act; and (ii) to ensure early and expeditedpayment to the landowners by reducing the period from two yearsunder Section 11A of the 1894 Act to twelve months under Section25 of the 2013 Act. In case of declarations issued in January 2012,on application of Section 11A of the 1894 Act, the time todetermine compensation under the 2013 Act would vary from aday to a month, and while in cases where the declarations wereissued within twelve months of the repeal of the 1894 Act, thelandowners would be at a disadvantage as an award beyond thetwelve-month period specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act wouldbe valid. In the first set of cases, given the onerous factual andlegal exercise involved in determination of compensation andthe need to issue notification under Section 26(2) of the 2013Act, publication of the awards would be impractical. Hasty andincorrect awards would be deleterious for the landowners. If theawards are not pronounced, the acquisition proceedings wouldlapse defeating the legislative intent behind Section 24(1)(a) ofthe 2013 Act to save such proceedings. Therefore, the choice isexercised to arrive at a just, fair and harmonious constructionconsistent with the legislative intent. A rational approach so asto further the object and purpose of Sections 24 and 26 to 30 ofthe 2013 Act is required. Section 25 refers to publication of anotification under Section 19 as the starting point of limitation.In the context of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act therewould be no notification under Section 19, but declaration underSection 6 of the 1894 Act. When the declarations under Section 6are valid as on 1st January 2014, it is necessary to give effect tothe legislative intention and reckon the starting point. In thecontext of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, declarations underSection 6 of the 1894 Act are no different and serve the samepurpose as the declarations under Section 19 of the 2013 Act.Consequently, in cases covered by clause (a) to Section 24(1) ofthe 2013 Act, the limitation period for passing/making of an awardunder Section 25 of the 2013 Act would commence from 1st AB

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AJanuary 2014, that is, the date when the 2013 Act came into force.Awards passed under clause (a) to Section 24(1) would be valid ifmade within twelve months from 1st January 2014. This dictumis subject to the caveat that a declaration which has lapsed interms of Section 11A of the 1894 Act before or on 31st December2013 would not get revived. [Para 20][1149-E-H; 1150-A-F]

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2.12 The submission of the land owners, relying upon Rule19 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in LandAcquisition, Rehabilitation and Settlement (Maharashtra) Rules,2014, for giving a restrictive meaning and excluding Section 25of 2013 Act is misplaced. This Rule states that the formulaCprovided in Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act would apply wherea notification under Section 4(i) of the 1894 Act was issued before31st December 2013, and an award has not been made beforethe 31st December 2013. The Rule refers to the formula forcomputation of compensation to be applied under Section 24(1)(a)Dof the 2013 Act, but it does not follow that Section 25 whichprescribes the limitation for making of an award would not apply.Section 25 of the 2013 Act applies to awards made under Section24(1)(a) and the period of limitation of twelve monthswould commence from 1st January 2014. [Para 21][1150-F-H;1151-A-C]E

2.13 The submission by the State that neither the periodfor making of an award under Section 11A of the 1894 Act norSection 25 of the 2013 Act would apply, would result in a situationwhich the legislature had never envisaged. The consequencewould be that there is no time period prescribed for making andFpassing of an award under clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013Act. This would be unacceptable and again completely contraryto the legislative intent in enacting Section 25 in the 2013 Act.Sensible and purposive construction to avoid absurdities andinconsistencies is, therefore, justified when Section 25 isGinterpreted. [Para 22][1151-C-E]

Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others(2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1 – followed.

2.14 The determination of compensation is a complex factualand legal exercise. Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act postulates thatHthe market value calculated as per sub-section (1) shall be THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION v. MAHESH

multiplied by a factor specified in the First Schedule. The FirstSchedule enumerates different components which constitute theminimum compensation package to be given to those whose landis acquired and to the tenants referred to in clause (c) of Section3. Columns 2 and 3 of the First Schedule mandate that the marketvalue in case of rural areas is to be multiplied/factored between 1and 2 based on the distance of the project from urban area. Thefactor is to be notified by the “appropriate government”. Whenthe factor/multiplier is more than 1, the compensation payablewould be proportionately higher than the market value.[Paras 19, 23][1148-G; 1152-A-C]

2.15 The impugned judgment holds that the period whenthe stay order dated 26.05.2014 was effective is inconsequentialand irrelevant as the High Court had not stayed the acquisitionproceedings. It is difficult to accept the said reasoning for thesimple reason that it ignores the language of the interim orderand its true effect in redetermination of compensation. Theinterim order passed by the High Court had inhibited furtheraction on the part of the authorities to proceed with the acquisitionof land. This period of inhibition is excluded while computing theperiod for passing of the award by an authority, under section ofthe 1894 Act. Further, the stay granted would be applicableto others also who had not obtained stay in that behalf.[Para 25][1152-F-H; 1153-B]

Abhey Ram (D) by LRs. and Others v. Union of Indiaand Others (1997) 5 SCC 421 : [1997] 3 SCR 931– referred to.

2.16 The reasoning that the statute cannot provide for allpossible scenarios, and it is for the courts to plug the gaps throughthe process of judicial interpretation by ascertaining the legislativeintent and that the Court resorts to construe the words of theprovision in a reasonable way having regard to the context wouldbe applicable to Section 25 of the 2013 Act as well. If interpretedotherwise, it would bring inconsistencies and would causeinjustice. [Paras 27, 29][1154-B-C; 1154-G-H]

Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others(2020) 8 SCC 129:[2020] 3 SCR 1 – followed.

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1134SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A2.18 Inasmuch as the High Court had, on 26th May 2014,stayed the operation of the notification dated 19th March 2014,and subsequently modified the order on 23rd September 2014permitting publication of the awards, the intervening period of129 days between 26th May 2014 until 23rd September 2014and in any case of 79 days from 26th May 2014 till the newBnotification dated 13th August 2014 was issued must be excluded.Ordinarily, an award made or passed before 31st December 2014would be valid. However, owing to the intervening period of 79days, it could be made up to 20th March 2015. The specific caseof the landowners before the High Court was about lapsing ofCacquisition proceedings owing to the mandate of Section 11A ofthe 1894 Act. It was not even remotely suggested that theacquisition proceedings had lapsed even in terms of the mandateof the new legislation being 2013 Act, in particular Section 25thereof. In other words, the High Court was essentially calledupon to answer the assail in reference to the lapsing provision inDthe 1894 Act. However, that will have no bearing on the factsituation of the instant case, to which the regime predicated inSection 25 of the 2013 Act ought to apply. [Para 30][1155-A-D]2.19 Indeed, the High Court leaned in favour of theargument that the stated award dated 30th October 2014 isEbackdated. That, however, was in the context of applicability ofSection 11A of the 1894 Act and by not excluding the period duringwhich the High Court stay was operating. Indisputably, the HighCourt did not examine the matter in the context of applicabilityof provisions of Section 25 of the 2013 Act and further, as hasFbeen held hitherto, the period during which the court’s stay tothe notification dated 19th March 2014 was operative, needs tobe excluded. In the case of latter, the factum of manipulation andbackdating of award becomes insignificant unless the High Courtwas to go a step further and hold that the award was not madeeven until 20th March 2015. In that view of the matter, theGconclusion reached is inevitable and it must follow that theacquisition proceedings in question had not lapsed in law.[Para 34][1158-E-G]

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THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION v. MAHESH

2.20 Arguendo, if the afterthought plea raised by thelandowners was to be entertained before this Court for the firsttime that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed even on accountof the mandate of Section 25 of the 2013 Act, the same needs tobe negatived for more than one reason. First, no factual foundationwas set out by the landowners including to assert that the statedaward was not made even till 20th March 2015 nor was the HighCourt called upon to examine that fact. Secondly, the landowners“themselves” stated (admitted) that the Commissioner had givenpermission/approval to the draft award on 20.11.2014. Further,the High Court had not held that the award was made orpronounced beyond the period specified under Section 25.[Para 35][1158-G-H; 1159-A-B]

2.21 Ordinarily, in terms of Section 25, the award ought tohave been published up to 31.12.2014. However, the period of79 days, when interim stay order was in operation, needs to beexcluded, in which case the award could be validly made until20th March 2015. Given this date, even if it is assumed that theaward dated 30th October 2014 is backdated, it was duly madesoon after the approval was accorded by the Commissioner on20.11.2014, which was certainly without any doubt, before20.03.2015. [Para 36][1159-C]

2.22 The prima facie opinion noted by the High Court onthe factum of backdating of the subject award would not makeany difference to the outcome of the relief pursued by thelandowners by way of writ petition for a declaration that the subjectacquisition proceedings had lapsed. Such declaration cannot beissued in the fact situation of the instant case. However, as theHigh Court noticed certain discrepancies, as pointed out to it bythe landowners in the record and proceedings before the SpecialLand Acquisition culminating in making of the stated award, itwould be appropriate to leave that aspect open for being enquiredinto by the appropriate authority by conducting enquiry to identifythe relevant facts and circumstances and if it is found to be amischief, responsible person therefor may be proceeded againstas per law. Suffice it to state that neither the observations madeby the High Court nor this decision may affect the final opinion

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Aor conclusion that may have to be reached in such an enquiry.In other words, the enquiry be proceeded independently onits own merits by giving opportunity to all concerned.[Paras 37, 38][1159-D-G]

2.23 It is submitted that the notice under Section 12(2) ofBthe 1894 Act dated 6th May 2015 was served on the landownerson various dates in May 2015. Sub-section (1) to Section 37 ofthe 2013 Act as well as sub-section (1) to Section 12 of the 1894Act state that the award shall be filed in the Collector’s office andshall be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collectorand the persons interested. It would not matter whether theCperson interested have appeared before the Collector or not.Further, the award is final and conclusive evidence as of the truearea. Sub-section (3) to Section 37 of the 2013 Act requires theCollector to keep open to public and display summary of theentire proceedings undertaken in the case of acquisition of land, Dincluding the amount of compensation awarded. These mandatesmust be complied with, but as they are post the making of theaward and, therefore, would not affect the validity of the awardwhen made within the statutory time. Issue of notice by theCollector to the persons interested, which is to be given to the persons not present personally or through the representativesEwhen the award is made, is to be issued immediately, but theissue of notice is not a condition precedent for making the award.Belated issue of notice would not, therefore, legally affect thevalidity of the award, though there may be other consequences.Equally, limitation period to challenge and question theFcompensation awarded would commence on the service/intimation about making of the award on the landowners. Whensatisfied that the award was made/ published within the prescribedperiod, even when there was backdating of the award or delay ineffecting service on the landowners, the land acquisitionproceedings need not be set aside. [Para 39][1160-A-F]GRaja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy LandAcquisition Officer and Another AIR 1961 SC 1500 :[1962] SCR 676 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

[2020] 3 SCR 1H

followedPara 12, 14, 22, 29

THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION v. MAHESH

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6673-6674 of 2021.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.07.2017 in Writ PetitionNo. 6884 of 2015 and order dated 23.11.2017 in Misc. Civil ApplicationNo. 22747 of 2017 in Writ Petition No.6884 of 2015 of the High Court ofJudicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur.

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With

Civil Appeal Nos. 6675-6676 of 2021.

C. U. Singh, V. Giri, Sr. Advs., Nitin Mishra, Ms. Mitali Gupta,Rajat Sehgal, Advs. for the Appellant.

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B. H. Marlapalle, Sr. Adv., Dilip Annasaheb Taur, Rahul Chitnis,Sachin Patil, Aaditya A. Pande, Geo Joseph, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SANJIV KHANNA, J.

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1. Leave granted.

2. The legal issue that arises in these appeals relates tointerpretation of Section 24(1)(a) of The Right to Fair Compensationand Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and ResettlementAct, 2013 (‘2013 Act’, for short), and in particular the question:

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Whether the two-year period specified under Section 11A ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘1894 Act’, for short) willapply even after the repeal of the 1894 Act, or the twelve-month period specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act will H

Aapply for the awards made under clause (a) of Section 24(1)of the 2013 Act?

Subsequent to the decision on the aforesaid question of law, weshall consider the second aspect – whether the award dated 30[th] October2014 is within the permissible time-limit or whether the acquisitionBproceedings have lapsed? To answer this question, we shall also examinewhether the award claimed to have been passed on 30[th] October 2014 isbackdated and whether the date has been changed by manipulating theaward? For convenience and clarity, we would deal with the two issuesseparately.

C3. In order to answer the legal question, some elemental facts arerequired to be noted. The State of Maharashtra, on 16[th] June 2011, hadissued a notification under Section 4[1] of the 1894 Act for the acquisitionof 203.86 hectares of land in village Adyal, District Bhandara,Maharashtra for the Gosikhurd Project. This was followed by publicationof declarations under Section 6[2 ]of the 1894 Act, the last of which isDdated 8[th] August 2012. Vide Gazette Notification No. S.O. 3729(E) dated19[th] December 2013, the 2013 Act came into force on 1[st] January 2014,and in terms of Section 114 of the 2013 Act, the 1894 Act was repealed.On 30[th] October 2014, the Special Land Acquisition Officer purportedlymade an award in terms of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act.

E1 4.Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers thereupon - (1) Wheneverit appears to the appropriate Government the land in any locality is needed or is likelyto be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to that effect shallbe published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in thatlocality of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shallcause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenientplaces in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving ofFsuch public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of thenotification).

(2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally or specially authorized by such Government in this behalf, and for his servants and workman, - to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality;to dig or bore into the sub-soil; to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for suchGpurpose; to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended lineof the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon;

to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches;and, where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken andthe boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any standingHcrop, fence or jungle;

4. On 18[th] December 2015 and 25[th] January 2016, two writ petitionswere filed by some of the landowners for quashing and setting aside of Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enclosed court orgarden attached to a dwelling house (unless with the consent of the occupier thereof)without previously giving such occupier at least seven days’ notice in writing of hisintention to do so.

2 6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. – (1) Subject to the provisionsof Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after consideringthe report, if any, made under section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land isneeded for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effectunder the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorizedto certify its orders, and different declarations may be made from time to time inrespect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under section4, sub-section (1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or havebeen made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub-section (2):

Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by anotification under section 4, sub-section (1), -

(i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendmentand Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but before thecommencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shallbe made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publicationof the notification; or

(ii) Published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition(Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one yearfrom the date of the publication of the notification:

Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to beawarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out ofpublic revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.

Explanation 1 – In computing any of the periods referred to in the firstproviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance ofthe notification issued under section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Courtshall be excluded.

Explanation 2 – Where the compensation to be awarded for such property isto be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, suchcompensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues.(2) Every declaration shall be published in the Official Gazette, and in two dailynewspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of which at least oneshall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of thesubstance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality (thelast of the date of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafterreferred to as the date of publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall statethe district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose forwhich it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of theland, the place where such plan may be inspected.

(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a publicpurpose or for a Company, as the case may be; and, after making such declaration, theappropriate Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing.

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Athe award dated 30[th] October 2014, which have been allowed by thejudgment under challenge passed by the Nagpur Bench of the HighCourt of Judicature at Bombay on 27[th] July 2017, inter alia, ruling thatin terms of Section 11A of the 1894 Act, the award ought to have beenpassed within two years from the date of the declaration under Section6, that is, before 8[th] August 2014. The acquisition proceedings havingBlapsed, the award was considered to be of no consequence and hasbeen set aside. The High Court also agreed with the landowners that theaward purportedly made on 30[th] October 2014 was backdated. Discerningnegligence on the part of the officers, which necessitates fresh acquisitionproceedings thereby causing great financial burden to the acquisitionCauthority, directions have been issued to the State of Maharashtra toconduct an inquiry against the Collector, Bhandara and the LandAcquisition Officer, Bhandara.

Consideration and decision on interpretation of Section24(1)(a) of the 2013 ActD5. Section 11A of the 1894 Act reads:

“11A. Period within which an award shall be made

(1) The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within aperiod of two years from the date of the publication of thedeclaration and if no award is made within that period, the entireEproceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:

Provided that in a case where the said declaration has beenpublished before the commencement of the Land Acquisition(Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a periodof two years from such commencement.FExplanation – In computing the period of two years referred to inthis section, the period during which any action or proceeding tobe taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an orderof a Court shall be excluded.”

Simply put, Section 11A requires that an award under Section 11Gmust be passed within a period of two years from the date of publicationof the declaration and if no award is so made, the proceedings foracquisition of land shall lapse. As per the explanation, the period duringwhich any action or proceedings to be taken pursuant to the declarationis stayed by an order of a court is to be excluded while calculating theHperiod of two years.

THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION v. MAHESH [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]

6. Sections 24, 25 and 114 of the 2013 Act read thus:

“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shallbe deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.–

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case ofland acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land AcquisitionAct, 1894 (1 of 1894), - (a) where no award under section 11 of the said LandAcquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Actrelating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, thensuch proceedings shall continue under the provisions of thesaid Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not beenrepealed.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in caseof land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land AcquisitionAct, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11has been made five years or more prior to the commencement ofthis Act but the physical possession of the land has not been takenor the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shallbe deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if itso chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisitionafresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

Provided that where an award has been made and compensationin respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited inthe account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specifiedin the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said LandAcquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordancewith the provisions of this Act.

25. Period within which an award shall be made.–The Collectorshall make an award within a period of twelve months from thedate of publication of the declaration under section 19 and if noaward is made within that period, the entire proceedings for theacquisition of the land shall lapse:

Provided that the appropriate Government shall have the powerto extend the period of twelve months if in its opinion,circumstances exist justifying the same:

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AProvided further that any such decision to extend the period shallbe recorded in writing and the same shall be notified and beuploaded on the website of the authority concerned.

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114. Repeal and saving. – (1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894B(1 of 1894) is hereby repealed.

(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the generalapplication of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of1897) with regard to the effect of repeals.”

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7. Before we interpret the above provisions, it would beappropriate to refer to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 whichdeals with the effect of repeal of any statute or regulation and reads:

“6. Effect of repeal ––DWhere this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after thecommencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto madeor hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears,the repeal shall not–

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at whichEthe repeal takes effect; or (b)affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealedor anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or F

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred inrespect of any offence committed against any enactmentso repealed; or (e)affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy inGrespect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability,penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy maybe instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty,forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealingAct or Regulation had not been passed.”

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Section 6 of the General Clauses Act interdicts the common lawprinciple that an enactment after repeal is ineffective as if it had neverexisted, except as to matters past and closed. Section 6 is a generaltransitory provision that resurrects operation of the repealed law in termsof comprehensive and broadly worded clauses (a) to (e). Clauses (b),(c) and (e) of Section 6, in particular, state that the repeal does notaffect anything duly done or suffered under the repealed enactment;any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or accrued under anyrepealed enactment; or any investigation, legal proceedings or remedyin respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, etc.Legal proceedings, investigation or remedy may be instituted, continuedor enforced, and any penalty, punishment or forfeiture may be enforcedas if the repealed Act or regulation were still in existence notwithstandingits repeal. However, the savings of Section 6 do not apply to some extentor in entirety when the legislative intent is different. The contrary intentcan be expressed or gathered by necessary implication. Further, theambit of repeal cannot be wider than the boundary envisaged by therepealing enactment. Therefore, a comprehensive repeal may be limitedif the repealing enactment directly or by necessary implication clamoursthat it will not apply to certain matters.

8. Section 114 of the 2013 Act repeals the 1894 Act, which ceasesto be effective and applicable from the date of enforcement of the 2013Act. In terms of sub-section (2) to Section 114, the repeal shall not actso as to prejudice or affect application of Section 6 of the General ClausesAct. However, the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Actis subject to “save as otherwise provided” by the 2013 Act. In otherwords, when it is commanded or imperative by the provisions of the2013 Act, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not to be given legaleffect.

9. Sub-section (1) to Section 24 of the 2013 Act is a non-obstanteclause. It confers the provision with an overriding status over otherprovisions. Accordingly, in terms of Sections 24(1) of the 2013 Act, Section114 of the 2013 Act as well as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act willnot apply to the extent hindered by Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. Thereason is that Section 114 of the 2013 Act, while accepting the applicabilityof Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, makes its application subject to“save as otherwise provided” in the 2013 Act. Further, Section 6 of theGeneral Clauses Act itself states that the general savings will not applywhen the legislative intent is contrary.

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A10. Section 24(1) deals with two specific situations where theland acquisition proceedings were initiated before the repeal of the 1894Act, namely: (i) where an award has been made, and (ii) where anaward has not been made. As per clause (b) to Section 24(1) where anaward under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made, the proceedingswould continue under the repealed 1894 Act, notwithstanding its repeal.BIn such cases, the 2013 Act will not apply. Clause (b) to Section 24(1) isnot applicable in the case at hand as it is admitted that no award wasmade on or before 31[st] December 2013.[3]

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11. In the present case, clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013Act would apply as the land acquisition proceedings initiated under theC1894 Act had not culminated into an award till the repeal of the 1894Act. Section 24(1)(a) partly nullifies the legal effect of savings underSection 6 of the General Clauses Act as it hybridizes application of the1894 Act and the 2013 Act. While preserving validity of the acquisitionproceedings by issue of declarations under the 1894 Act, it states that allDthe provisions for determination of compensation under the 2013 Actshall apply. The section consciously saves the legal effect of thenotifications issued under Section 4 and/or Section 6 of the 1894 Act andobviates the necessity to issue a fresh notification under the 2013 Act.This ‘perseveration of the determination date’ for the computation ofcompensation for the awards made under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013EAct is a thought through legislative invocation that curtails time delaysand cost escalation of infrastructure projects, as well as checks the post-acquisition notification malpractices, and at the same time ensures thatthe landowners are entitled to the benefit of the enhanced compensationas per the 2013 Act.F

12. In Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal andOthers[4 ](Lapse - 5 Judges), a Constitution Bench held that whereproceedings for acquisition had been initiated under the 1894 Act but noaward under Section 11 of the 1894 Act had been made, the provisionsof the 2013 Act would apply limited to determination of compensation.GWhere, however, an award had been made under the 1894 Act, clause(b) to Section 24(1) protects the vested rights of the parties. We need 3 In the present case, we are not required to examine Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act,which provision when applicable prevails over sub-section (1) to Section 24 of the2013 Act and has been interpreted in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal andothers (lapse – 5 Judges).H4 (2020) 8 SCC 129

not, for the purpose of the present case, elucidate the ratio of theaforementioned judgment on interpretation of Section 24(2) of the 2013Act, but it is apposite to notice that the Constitution Bench has emphasisedthat the 2013 Act provides for higher compensation along with provisionsfor rehabilitation, and that this intended benefit, wherever applicable,should not be taken away. At the same time, on the aspect of legalinterpretation, it is observed that full effect has to be given to the provisionscontained in Section 24 as it is not for the court to legislate. The courtscan and do, in appropriate cases, clear ambiguity in legislations.

13. Dealing with the interplay of vested rights and retrospectiveapplication of statutes, Indore Development Authority (supra) refersto several decisions to draw a distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘procedure’,to observe that the question of extent of retrospectivity would also dependupon the degree of unfairness it causes to the parties. Thus, if the limitationperiod is shortened but the claimant has time to sue before the expiry ofthe shortened period, then notwithstanding that he is likely to be statutorilybarred if he does not sue within the shortened period, retrospectivitymay be given effect to. We add that when the law extends the limitationperiod, benefit of extended period applies to proceedings to be initiatedthat are not time barred. Per contra, if the limitation period is extendedafter the shorter limitation period has already expired, which could havebeen an absolute defence for the party sued, then it may not be fair todeprive the party sued of the accrued right of claiming such defence.Further, absence of express limiting words is not to be used as a basisfor implying retrospective operation as this would be reverse of the truepresumption. However, presumption in favour of retrospectivity may benecessary when distinct implications typically arise in the context of thestatute which repeals a previous statute, and would leave a ‘lacuna’ ifthe new statute were not construed as having retrospective effect. Astatute which is prospective in its direct operation cannot be called asretrospective because a part of the requisites for its action is drawnfrom time antecedent to its passing. Another cardinal principle ofinterpretation is that a construction which results in unreasonably harshand absurd results must be avoided. These dictums being relevant wouldhelp us resolve and answer the question in issue.

14. In paragraph 195 in Indore Development Authority (supra),the Constitution Bench held that the 2013 Act operates prospectively.Further, Section 114 of the 2013 Act effects a repeal but with certain AB

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Asavings, in accordance with Section 24. Thus, the acquisition proceedingsare preserved under the 1894 Act till the stage of making of the award.Where an award is not made, the provisions relating to determination ofcompensation under the 2013 Act would apply; where the award is made,proceedings would continue under the provisions of the 1894 Act as ifthe said Act has not been repealed. Our interpretation of Section 24(1)Bof the 2013 Act respectfully follows this precedent.

15. Clearly, Section 11A of the 1894 Act and Section 25 of the2013 Act prescribe two different periods of limitation with adverseconsequences, as on failure to make the award the acquisition proceedingslapse. The choice is between Section 11A of the 1894 Act and SectionC25 of the 2013 Act.[5] Absence of precise words or express declarationwould not inhibit us from interpreting and exercising the right choice,keeping in view the language as also the object and purpose of clause(a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. In other words, we have to giveeffect and meaning to the underlying intention of the Parliament in the Dwords “all the provisions relating to determination of compensation” underthe 2013 Act.

16. We begin by examining the phrasing of clause (a) to Section24(1) of the 2013 Act. We would prefer to read the words “all theprovisions relating to determination of compensation”in Section 24(1)(a)Eas including the period of limitation specified in Section 25 of the 2013Act. To elaborate, the word ‘all’ and the expression “relating to” used inSection 24(1)(a) are required to be given a wide meaning to ensnare thelegislative intent. The expressions “relating to” or “in relation to” arewords of comprehensiveness which may have a direct as well as indirectsignificance depending on the context.[6] Similarly, interpreting SectionF129C of the Customs Act, 1962, this Court while giving the phrase ‘inrelation to’ a narrower meaning of direct and proximate relationship tothe rate of duty and to the value of goods for purpose of assessment, didobserve that ordinarily the phrase ‘in relation to’ is of a wider import.[7]Several cases assigning a wider import to the expression ‘relating to’, inG5 In paragraph 21 below we have rejected the State’s alternative argument that thelegislator has not prescribed any period for making of an award under Section 24(1)(a)of the 2013 Act.

6 The State Wakf Board, Madras represented by its Secretary v. Abdul Azeez Sahib &Ors., AIR 1968 Madras 79

7 Navin Chemicals Mfg. and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, (1993) 4 SCC320H

view of the contextual background, find reference in Gujarat Urja VikasNigam Limited v. Amit Gupta and Others.[8 ]In Renusagar PowerCo. Ltd. v. General Electric Company and Another[9], this Court heldthat the term ‘in relation to’, when used in the context of arbitrationclause, is of widest amplitude and content. In Mansukhlal DhanrajJain and Others v. Eknath Vithal Ogale,[10 ]the expression ‘relating to’in the context of Small Causes Court Act, 1887 has been held to becomprehensive in nature that would take in its sweep all types of suitsand proceedings which are concerned with recovery of possession. Broadand wider interpretation was again preferred in M/s. Doypack SystemsPvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Others,[11]observing that the expression“in relation to” is a very broad expression which presupposes anothersubject matter. In M/s. Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. (supra), in the contextof Section 3 of Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Limited (Acquisitionand Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1986, the expression “relating to”was held to mean ‘bring into association or connection with’.[12] The wordsare comprehensive and might have both direct as well as indirectsignificance. The decision in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (supra)refers to Corpus Juris Secundum, wherein the expression “relating to”has been held to be equivalent to or synonymous with as to “concerningwith” and “pertaining to”. It has been observed that the expression“pertaining to” is an expression of expansion and not of contraction. Theexpression “relating to” when used in legislation normally refers to “standin some relation, to have bearing or concern, to pertain, to refer, to bringinto association with or connection with”.[13] Therefore, the expression‘relating to’ when used in legislation has to be construed to give effect tothe legislative intent when required and necessary by giving an expansiveand wider meaning. Given this trend in interpretation, the words “all theprovisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation”must not be imputed a restricted understanding of the word ‘relating’only to the substantial provisions on calculation of compensation, that is,Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act. Rather, the expression should begiven an expansive meaning so as to include the provision on limitation 8 2021 SCC Online SC 194

9 (1984) 4 SCC 679

10 (1995) 2 SCC 665

11 (1988) 2 SCC 299

12 M/S Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and others, (1988) 2 SCC 29913 See judgment of Mitter, J. (paragraph 308) in H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav RaoJivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior etc. v. Union of India & Anr., (1971) 1 SCC 85.

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Aperiod for calculation of compensation, that is, Section 25 of the 2013Act.

17. Law of limitation is generally regarded as procedural as itsobject is not to create any right but prescribe periods within which legalproceedings should be instituted for enforcement of rights or adjudicationBorders should be passed. Statutes of limitation, therefore, haveretrospective effect insofar as they apply to all legal proceedings broughtafter they come into force. However, the laws relating to limitation havebeen held to be prospective in the sense that they do not have the effectof reviving the right of action which is already barred on the date of theircoming into operation, nor do they have the effect of extinguishing aCright of action subsisting on the date. In this sense, the limitation provisionscan be procedural in the context of one set of facts and substantive inthe context of a different set of facts. Therefore, unless the language ofthe provision dealing with period of limitation clearly manifests, in expressterms or by necessary implication, a contrary intention divesting vested Drights, such provision is to be construed as prospective. In the context ofclause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, it is to be stated that the saidclause would apply only if the period for making of an award had notended and time was available as on 1[st] January 2014. Where and if theperiod for making of the award had already lapsed before 1[st] January2014, clause (a) to Section 24(1) would not apply so as to deprive andEdeny the vested rights which have already accrued in favour of thelandowners. The present case is not of divesting of vested rights of thelandowners on enactment of the 2013 Act.18. Section 25 is a rule of procedure immediately following Section24 and a part of fasciculus of “all the provisions”, from Sections 25 toF30, “relating to determination of compensation”. Hence, the expression“all the provisions relating to the determination of compensation” underthe 2013 Act will encompass Section 25 of the 2013 Act.

19. The determination of compensation is never simple. It is acomplex factual and legal exercise. As per sub-section (2) to Section 26of the 2013 Act, the market value calculated under sub-section (1) is toGbe multiplied by the factor to be specified in the First Schedule. Section30(2) requires the Collector to issue individual awards detailing theparticulars of compensation payable and details of payment as specifiedin the First Schedule. As per the First Schedule, the factor/multiplier incase of rural areas can be between one and two, based on the distanceHfrom the urban area, and this factor/multiplier is to be notified by the

“appropriate government”. This aspect is of importance when weexamine the second issue and would be adverted to later. Thus, it clearlydelineates that until notification of the multiplier is issued by the“appropriate government” for rural areas, compensation in terms of sub-section (2) to Section 26 cannot be determined. When a multiplier ofmore than 1 applies, the compensation payable under Section 26 of the2013 Act would be higher than the market value of the land. Section30(1) of the 2013 Act adumbrates that the Collector having determinedthe total compensation shall, to arrive at the final award, impose ‘solatium’of an amount equivalent to 100% of the compensation amount. As perSection 30(3), the landowners in addition to the market value of the landare entitled to an amount calculated at the rate of twelve percent perannum commencing from the date of publication of “the notification ofthe Social Impact Assessment study under sub-section (2) of Section 4,in respect of such land, till the date of the award of the Collector or thedate of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier”.[14 ]Per contra,the provisions for determination of compensation under the 1894 Actare different. Under the 1894 Act, no multiplier/factor is to be appliedand solatium payable is 30 percent. Prescription of the outer limit oftwelve months in Section 25 is a calculated dictate, necessary andappropriate given the time, task and effort involved in making an awardunder the 2013 Act.

20. Given the object and purpose behind Sections 24, and 26 to 30of the 2013 Act, we notice that practical absurdities and anomalies mayarise if the two-year period for making of an award in terms of Section11A of the 1894 Act commencing from the date of issue of the declarationis applied to the awards to be made under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013Act. This would mitigate against the underlying legislative intent behindprescription of time for making of an award in respect of saved acquisitionproceedings initiated under the repealed 1894 Act, which is two-fold: (i)to give sufficient time to the authorities to determine compensation payableunder the 2013 Act; and (ii) to ensure early and expedited payment tothe landowners by reducing the period from two years under Section11A of the 1894 Act to twelve months under Section 25 of the 2013 Act.In case of declarations issued in January 2012, on application of Section11A of the 1894 Act, the time to determine compensation under the 2013Act would vary from a day to a month, and while in cases where the14 For the purposes of the present dispute, we are not interpreting provisions ofSection 30(3) of the 2013 Act.

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Adeclarations were issued within twelve months of the repeal of the 1894Act, the landowners would be at a disadvantage as an award beyondthe twelve-month period specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act wouldbe valid. In the first set of cases, given the onerous factual and legalexercise involved in determination of compensation and the need to issuenotification under Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act, publication of the awardsBwould be impractical. Hasty and incorrect awards would be deleteriousfor the landowners. If the awards are not pronounced, the acquisitionproceedings would lapse defeating the legislative intent behind Section24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act to save such proceedings. We would, therefore,exercise our choice to arrive at a just, fair and harmonious constructionconsistent with the legislative intent. A rational approach so as to furtherCthe object and purpose of Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act isrequired. We are conscious that Section 25 refers to publication of anotification under Section 19 as the starting point of limitation. In thecontext of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act there would be nonotification under Section 19, but declaration under Section 6 of the 1894DAct. When the declarations under Section 6 are valid as on 1[st] January2014, it is necessary to give effect to the legislative intention and reckonthe starting point. In the context of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act,declarations under Section 6 of the 1894 Act are no different and servethe same purpose as the declarations under Section 19 of the 2013 Act.Consequently, we hold that in cases covered by clause (a) to SectionE24(1) of the 2013 Act, the limitation period for passing/making of anaward under Section 25 of the 2013 Act would commence from 1[st]January 2014, that is, the date when the 2013 Act came into force.Awards passed under clause (a) to Section 24(1) would be valid if madewithin twelve months from 1[st] January 2014. This dictum is subject tothe caveat stated in paragraph 16 (supra) that a declaration which hasFlapsed in terms of Section 11A of the 1894 Act before or on 31[st] December2013 would not get revived.

21. The contention of the land owners, relying upon Rule 19 ofthe Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,Rehabilitation and Settlement (Maharashtra) Rules, 2014,[15] for giving aG15 19. Land Acquisition Proceedings Initiated Under Land Acquisition Act, 1894. –(1) Any proceeding where a notification under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894) has been issued before the 31[st ]December 2013 and anaward under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894) has not beenmade before the 31[st ]December 2013, then the proceeding shall be continued as per theformula provided in sections 26 to 30 of the Right to Fair Compensation andTransparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 ofH2013).”

restrictive meaning and excluding Section 25 of 2013 Act is misplaced.This Rule states that the formula provided in Sections 26 to 30 of the2013 Act would apply where a notification under Section 4(i) of the1894 Act was issued before 31[st] December 2013, and an award has notbeen made before the 31[st] December 2013. The Rule refers to the formulafor computation of compensation to be applied under Section 24(1)(a) ofthe 2013 Act, but it does not follow that Section 25 which prescribes thelimitation for making of an award will not apply. For the reasons statedabove, we hold that Section 25 of the 2013 Act applies to awards madeunder Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act and the period of limitation oftwelve months would commence from 1[st] January 2014.

22. Alternative argument by the State that neither the period formaking of an award under Section 11A of the 1894 Act nor Section 25of the 2013 Act would apply, would result in a situation which we believethe legislature had never envisaged. The consequence would be thatthere is no time period prescribed for making and passing of an awardunder clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. This would beunacceptable and again completely contrary to the legislative intent inenacting Section 25 in the 2013 Act. Section 24 read and as interpretedin Indore Development Authority (supra) would not support suchconstruction. Sensible and purposive construction to avoid absurditiesand inconsistencies is, therefore, justified when we interpret Section 25of the 2013 Act.

Whether the award has been passed within the periodstipulated under Section 25 of the 2013 Act or the acquisitionproceedings have lapsed?

23. As per the arguments put forth by the appellants, the awardwas pronounced on 30[th] October 2014, which is within the period oftwelve months prescribed by Section 25 of the 2013 Act coming intoforce on 1[st] January 2014. The landowners, however, dispute the date ofpublication. The impugned judgment holds that the award, though dated30[th] October 2014, has been backdated. However, before we examinethis controversy, it would be appropriate to first notice the effect of thestay order passed by the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Courtin Writ Petition No. 4274 of 2014. To understand the effect of the saidstay order, we must again advert to Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act. ThisSection postulates that the market value calculated as per sub-section(1) shall be multiplied by a factor specified in the First Schedule. The AB

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AFirst Schedule enumerates different components which constitute theminimum compensation package to be given to those whose land isacquired and to the tenants referred to in clause (c) of Section 3. Columns2 and 3 of the First Schedule mandate that the market value in case ofrural areas is to be multiplied/factored between 1 and 2 based on thedistance of the project from urban area. The factor is to be notified byBthe “appropriate government”. As noticed above, when the factor/multiplier is more than 1, the compensation payable would beproportionately higher than the market value.

24. On 19[th] March 2014, the State of Maharashtra had publisheda notification directing that the multiplier in all rural areas shall be aCfactor of 1. This notification was challenged before the AurangabadBench of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 4274 of 2014,whereupon the High Court stayed the operation, execution andimplementation of the notification vide the interim order dated 26[th] May2014. Consequently, the Government of Maharashtra had addressed itsDletter dated 7[th] July 2014 to the Divisional Commissioners directing themnot to declare awards till further orders of the High Court in Writ PetitionNo. 4274 of 2014. On 13[th] August 2014, the State of Maharashtrapublished another notification whereby the multiplier factor madeapplicable to some of the rural areas was 1.10. In response, an applicationwas made for the amendment of Writ Petition No. 4274 of 2014 toEchallenge and seek stay of the notification dated 13[th] August 2014. TheState Government, in turn, had moved an application for modification/vacation of the stay order. By order dated 23[rd] September 2014, theHigh Court, though denying a stay on the notification dated 13[th] August2014, held that the awards passed after the issuance of the notification Fdated 13[th] August 2014 would be subject to the decision in the writpetition.

Fdated 13[th] August 2014 would be subject to the decision in the writpetition.

25. The impugned judgment, however, holds that the period whenthe stay order dated 26[th] May 2014 was effective is inconsequential andirrelevant as the High Court had not stayed the acquisition proceedings.GIt is difficult to accept the aforesaid reasoning for the simple reason thatit ignores the language of the interim order and its true effect inredetermination of compensation. The interim order passed by the HighCourt had inhibited further action on the part of the authorities to proceedwith the acquisition of land. Indore Development Authority (supra)refers to a catena of authorities, including Abhey Ram (D) by LRs. andH

THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION v. MAHESH [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]

Others v. Union of India and Others[16], to give fitting meaning to thewords “stay of action or proceedings” used in the proviso to Section 11Aof the 1894 Act to mean any type of order passed by a court, which inone way or the other prohibits or prevents the authorities from passingan award. This period of inhibition is excluded while computing the periodfor passing of the award by an authority, under Section 11A of the 1894Act. Further, the stay granted in the present case would be applicable toothers also who had not obtained stay in that behalf.

26. In Indore Development Authority (supra), with reference toSection 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the Constitution Bench has noticed thatthere is no similar provision for exclusion of time, though there is expressprovision for exclusion of time under Sections 19 and 69 of the 2013Act. Nevertheless, the Constitution Bench, while discussing issue no.5– ‘the effect of interim order of a court granting stay or injunctionby which the authorities are unable to take possession or makepayment and its exclusion’, has observed that omission of suchexclusion and specific stipulation in Sections 19 and 69 of the 2013 Actdoes not indicate any special legislative intent. The provision for exclusionof time was read into Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. For the aforesaidpurpose, the relevant portions of the judgment have been reproducedbelow:

“331. For all these reasons, it is held that the omission to expresslyenact a provision, that excludes the period during which any interimorder was operative, preventing the State from taking possessionof acquired land, or from giving effect to the award, in a particularcase or cases, cannot result in the inclusion of such period orperiods for the purpose of reckoning the period of 5 years. Also,merely because timelines are indicated, with the consequence oflapsing, under Sections 19 and 69 of the 2013 Act, per se does notmean that omission to factor such time (of subsistence of interimorders) has any special legislative intent. This Court notices, inthis context, that even under the new Act (nor was it so under the1894 Act) no provision has been enacted, for lapse of the entireacquisition, for non-payment of compensation within a specifiedtime; nor has any such provision been made regarding possession.Furthermore, non-compliance with payment and deposit provisions(under Section 77) only results in higher interest pay-outs under A

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ASection 80. The omission to provide for exclusion of time duringwhich interim orders subsisted, while determining whether or notacquisitions lapsed, in the present case, is a clear result ofinadvertence or accident, having regard to the subject-matter,refusal to apply the principle underlying the maxim actus curiaeneminem gravabit would result in injustice.”B

27. In the context of absence of any provision excluding the periodof operation of stay orders under Section 24(2), it was noted that thestatute cannot provide for all possible scenarios, and it is for the courtsto plug the gaps through the process of judicial interpretation byascertaining the legislative intent. The Court resorts to construe the wordsCof the provision in a reasonable way having regard to the context.Accordingly, it was held that Section 24(2) ousts the period spent duringthe interim stay, and no fault or inaction could be attributed to theauthorities when the payment of compensation or taking possession ofland was inhibited by operation of a stay order. In arriving at this finding,Dthis Court relied on several judgments and treatises on statutoryinterpretation which elaborated on legal maxims encapsulated below:

•“lex non cogit ad impossibilia” – the law does not expectthe performance of the impossible; •“actus curiae neminem gravabit” – an act of the courtEshall prejudice no man; •“nemo tenetur ad impossibilia” – no one is bound to doan impossibility; and •“impotentia excusat legem” – where a person is disabledfrom performing a duty created by law, without any defaultFin him, and has no remedy over, there the law will in generalexcuse him.

28. It was further concluded, based on the maxim “commodumex-injuria sua nemo habere debet” (meaning: convenience cannotaccrue to a party from his own wrong), that the legislation did not intendGfor relentless litigants to derive the benefit of enhanced compensationunder the 2013 Act, but rather to deliver advantage to those who acceptedthe compensation and handed over possession.

29. The aforesaid reasoning will be applicable to Section 25 of the2013 Act as well. If interpreted otherwise, it would bring inconsistenciesHand would cause injustice.

30. The foregoing discussion makes it abundantly clear thatinasmuch as the High Court had, on 26[th] May 2014, stayed the operationof the notification dated 19[th] March 2014, and subsequently modified theorder on 23[rd] September 2014 permitting publication of the awards, theintervening period of 129 days between 26[th] May 2014 until 23[rd]September 2014 and in any case of 79 days from 26[th] May 2014 till thenew notification dated 13[th] August 2014 was issued must be excluded.Ordinarily, an award made or passed before 31[st] December 2014 wouldbe valid. However, owing to the abovementioned intervening period of79 days, it could be made up to 20[th] March 2015. Be it noted that thespecific case of the landowners before the High Court was about lapsingof acquisition proceedings owing to the mandate of Section 11A of the1894 Act. It was not even remotely suggested that the acquisitionproceedings had lapsed even in terms of the mandate of the newlegislation being 2013 Act, in particular Section 25 thereof. In other words,the High Court was essentially called upon to answer the assail inreference to the lapsing provision in the 1894 Act. However, as aforesaid,that will have no bearing on the fact situation of the present case, towhich the regime predicated in Section 25 of the 2013 Act ought toapply.

31. In light of the asseveration of the landowners, the High Courthad to consider the case made out by the landowners regarding subjectaward being not made within the specified period under Section 11A ofthe 1894 Act, to save acquisition proceedings. It, therefore, becamenecessary to examine the plea of the landowners that the concernedofficials backdated the award as 30[th] October 2014. While consideringthat issue, the High Court in the impugned judgment noted thus:

“It appears on a perusal of the documents annexed to the writpetition and the rejoinder and the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalfof the respondent nos. 1 to 4 that though the award was passedmuch later, a show is made by the respondent nos. 2 and 3 ofhaving passed the award on 30.10.2014. It is apparent from thedocuments annexed to the petition and the rejoinder which arenot disputed by any of the respondents that there is a mention ofthe issuance of the communication by the Town PlanningDepartment to the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 11.11.2014pertaining to the land acquisition proceedings in the award. Thereis an outward entry no. 32 in regard to the communication dated AB

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A11.11.2014 in the outward register maintained by the TownPlanning Department. This entry shows that indeed acommunication was issued by the Town Planning Department tothe Special Land Acquisition Officer on 11.11.2014. The respondentno.3 has the audacity to state that they have not received anysuch communication from the Town Planning Department andBthe reference to the said communication in the award is a clericalmistake. From outward entry no. 32, we find that thiscommunication was issued by the Town Planning Department tothe Special Land Acquisition Officer and from the reference ofthis communication in the award, it is apparent that the specialCland acquisition officer had received the communication dated11.11.2014 before passing the award and, hence a reference tothat communication is made in the award. This clearly shows thata show is made by the respondent nos. 2 and 3 that the awardwas passed on 30.10.2014 when the award was passed muchlater. Though the enquiry in the matter under Section 9 of the ActDwas conducted by the Deputy Collector, the District Collectorhas signed the award. It is clear from a perusal of the award, thedocuments annexed to the petition and the rejoinder that the awardis falsely stated to have been passed on 30.10.2014 though it waspassed much later.

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Actually, it was not necessary for the respondent nos. 2 and 3 tohave made the show of passing the award on 30.10.2014 as evenif the award was passed on 30.10.2014, the acquisition proceedingswould have lapsed in view of the provisions of Section 11-A ofthe Act as the last Section 6 notification was admittedly issued on08.08.2012 and the award ought to have been passed on or before08.08.2014. We do not find any merit in the submission made onbehalf of the respondent nos. 1 to 3 that since there was a stay tothe proceedings by the Aurangabad Bench, the State Governmentdecided not to proceed with the land acquisition proceedings. Weare afraid that Writ Petition No. 4274 of 2014 that was pendingbefore the Aurangabad Bench had no relation with the landacquisition proceedings in this case. The Aurangabad Bench hadmerely stayed the effect and operation of the notification dated19.03.2014 which pertains to the multiplier. The Aurangabad Benchhad not stayed the proceedings in any land acquisition matters,much less the land acquisition matter with which we are concerned.

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THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION v. MAHESH [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]

If that is so, the award could not have been passed on 30.10.2014,as the same would have lapsed in view of the provisions of Section11-A of the Act. It is surprising that though the respondent nos. 1to 3 have relied on the communication of the State Governmentdated 18.10.2014 that proceedings in all land acquisition mattersshould not be continued in view of the stay granted by theAurangabad Bench in Writ Petition No. 4274 of 2014, just withintwo weeks from the said date, the award is purportedly passed on30.10.2014.

We find that several irregularities and illegalities have beencommitted while proceeding with the land acquisition case initiatedin pursuance of the Section 4 notification dated 16.06.2011. Itappears that the roznama is maintained only till 06.05.2014 as acopy of the roznama, that was received by the petitioners on13.03.2015 and that is placed on record, shows that the roznamais maintained till 06.05.2014 only. Had the roznama been maintainedtill the end, this Court could have gauged as to when the awardwas actually passed. It is surprising that the respondent no. 3 hastaken a stand that the roznama was never maintained after06.05.2014 as the proceedings were in the office of theCommissioner. Even assuming that the proceedings were in theoffice of the Commissioner, if they were received before30.10.2014, as the award was purportedly passed on that date,the roznama could have been maintained after the proceedingswere received from the office of the Commissioner however, theroznama ends on 06.05.2014. We do not know whether all thesubsequent pages of the roznama have been destroyed with aview to conceal as to what happened in the land acquisitionproceedings after 06.05.2014.”

32. The stand of the appellant(s) before the High Court and beforeus is that the High Court had erroneously quashed the award on thebasis of prima facie findings that for the same communication of theTown Planning Department, different dates are mentioned i.e., 26[th]September 2014 and 11[th] November 2014. Whereas, the High Courtfailed to consider the detailed affidavit filed by the State of Maharashtradated 5[th] July 2017 in W.P. No. 6884/2015, clarifying that the date atpage Nos. 32 and 37 of the award was wrongly written as 11[th] November2014 instead of 26[th] September 2014. The High Court had also noted AB

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Athat the Commissioner gave approval to the award on 20[th] November2014, but it failed to consider the letter dated 8[th] October 2014 of theDivisional Commissioner granting approval to the draft award. It is urgedthat the High Court ought not to have based its conclusion on a primafacie view especially in a beneficial project of such vital public importanceand burden the appellant(s) with heavy financial loss for no faultBwhatsoever.

33. Before us again the landowners rely on the fact note in theaward dated 30[th] October 2014, referring to communication dated 11[th]November 2014 from the Town Planning Department to the SpecialLand Acquisition Officer, indicative of the fact that the award was notCpublished until that date. The landowners are also relying on anothercommunication dated 1[st] December 2014 issued by the Special LandAcquisition Officer to the acquiring body stating that the draft awardhad been submitted to the Commissioner and was likely to be approved,calling upon the acquiring body to deposit the compensation amount ofDRs. 43.94 crores with their office. Reference is also made to the factthat roznama was not maintained by the Special Land Acquisition Officerafter 6[th] May 2014. Further, the landowners had received certified truecopy of the award along with notice only on 6[th] May 2015.

34. Indeed, the High Court leaned in favour of the argument thatEthe stated award dated 30[th] October 2014 is backdated. That, however,was in the context of applicability of Section 11A of the 1894 Act and bynot excluding the period during which the High Court stay was operating.Indisputably, the High Court did not examine the matter in the context ofapplicability of provisions of Section 25 of the 2013 Act and further, ashas been held by us hitherto, the period during which the court’s stay toFthe notification dated 19[th] March 2014 was operative, needs to beexcluded. In the case of latter, the factum of manipulation and backdatingof award becomes insignificant unless the High Court was to go a stepfurther and hold that the award was not made even until 20[th] March2015. In that view of the matter, the conclusion reached by us in theGpresent appeals is inevitable and it must follow that the acquisitionproceedings in question had not lapsed in law.

35. Arguendo, if we were to entertain the afterthought plea raisedby the landowners before this Court for the first time that the acquisitionproceedings had lapsed even on account of the mandate of Section 25Hof the 2013 Act, the same needs to be negatived for more than one reason. First, no factual foundation has been set out by the landownersincluding to assert that the stated award was not made even till 20[th]March 2015 nor was the High Court called upon to examine that fact.Secondly, the landowners “themselves” have stated (admitted) that theCommissioner had given permission/approval to the draft award on 20[th]November 2014[17]. Further, the High Court had not held that the awardwas made or pronounced beyond the period specified under Section 25of the 2013 Act.

36. Ordinarily, in terms of Section 25, the award ought to havebeen published up to 31[st] December 2014. However, as held by us, theperiod of 79 days, when interim stay order was in operation, needs to beexcluded, in which case the award could be validly made until 20[th] March2015. Given this date, in our opinion, even if it is assumed that the awarddated 30[th] October 2014 is backdated, it was duly made soon after theapproval was accorded by the Commissioner on 20[th] November 2014,which was certainly without any doubt, before 20[th] March 2015.

37. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the primafacie opinion noted by the High Court on the factum of backdating ofthe subject award would not make any difference to the outcome of therelief pursued by the landowners by way of writ petition for a declarationthat the subject acquisition proceedings had lapsed. Such declaration, inour opinion, cannot be issued in the fact situation of the present case.

38. However, as the High Court has noticed certain discrepancies,as pointed out to it by the landowners in the record and proceedingsbefore the Special Land Acquisition culminating in making of the statedaward, it would be appropriate to leave that aspect open for being enquiredinto by the appropriate authority by conducting enquiry to identify therelevant facts and circumstances and if it is found to be a mischief,responsible person therefor may be proceeded against as per law. Sufficeit to state that neither the observations made by the High Court nor thisdecision may affect the final opinion or conclusion that may have to bereached in such an enquiry. In other words, the enquiry be proceededindependently on its own merits by giving opportunity to all concerned.

17 As stated in paragraph B (ii) (Page 2) of the Written Arguments filed on behalf ofrespondent/claimants, dated 02.09.2021 in reference to the findings of fact noted by theHigh Court in the impugned judgment at the end of paragraph 7 thereof, relying onentry no. 1081 in the Inward Register of the Land Acquisition Officer.

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A39. While dealing with this submission made by the landowners,we must consider the submission that the notice under Section 12(2) ofthe 1894 Act dated 6[th] May 2015 was served on the landowners onvarious dates in May 2015. Section 37 of the 2013 Act is pari materiawith Section 12(2) of the 1894 Act and hence we are not required toexamine and consider in detail which of the two sections would apply inBa case covered by clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. Sub-section (1) to Section 37 of the 2013 Act as well as sub-section (1) toSection 12 of the 1894 Act state that the award shall be filed in theCollector’s office and shall be final and conclusive evidence as betweenthe Collector and the persons interested. It would not matter whetherCthe person interested have appeared before the Collector or not. Further,the award is final and conclusive evidence as of the true area. Sub-section (3) to Section 37 of the 2013 Act requires the Collector to keepopen to public and display summary of the entire proceedings undertakenin the case of acquisition of land, including the amount of compensationawarded. These mandates must be complied with, but as they are postDthe making of the award and, therefore, would not affect the validity ofthe award when made within the statutory time. Issue of notice by theCollector to the persons interested, which is to be given to the personsnot present personally or through the representatives when the award ismade, is to be issued immediately, but the issue of notice is not a conditionEprecedent for making the award. Belated issue of notice would not,therefore, legally affect the validity of the award, though there may beother consequences. Equally, the limitation period to challenge and questionthe compensation awarded would commence on the service/intimationabout making of the award on the landowners.[18] Be that as it may, whensatisfied that the award was made/ published within the prescribed period,Feven when there was backdating of the award or delay in effectingservice on the landowners, the land acquisition proceedings need not beset aside.

40. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold as under:

G(i)Section 25 of the 2013 Act would apply to the awards madeand published under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act.

18 See Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer andAnother, AIR 1961 SC 1500 - the date for counting limitation period means the date ofcommunication or is known by a party whether actually or constructively.

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THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, GOSIKHURD PROJECT AMBADI,BHANDARA, MAHARASHTRA VIDARBHA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION v. MAHESH [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]

(ii) The limitation period for passing/making of an award underSection 24(1)(a) in terms of Section 25 of the 2013 Actwould commence from 1[st] January 2014, that is, the datewhen the 2013 Act came into force.

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(iii) Period during which the Court order would inhibit action onthe part of the authorities to proceed with the making of theBaward would be excluded while computing the period underSection 25 of the 2013 Act.

(iv) Accordingly, period of 79 days from 26[th] May 2014 whenthe High Court had stayed operation of the notification dated19[th] March 2014, till the new notification dated 13[th] AugustC2014 was issued has to be excluded.

(v) The award purportedly dated 30[th] October 2014, was inany case duly made on or before the extended date of 20[th]March 2015. Hence, the concerned award is valid.

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(vi) The State of Maharashtra may conduct an inquiry inreference to the imputation regarding manipulation andbackdating of the subject award and take such remedialand corrective action as may be necessary and to ensuresuch situations do not arise in future.

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41. The impugned judgment setting aside the award and holdingthat the acquisition proceedings had lapsed is, accordingly, set aside. It isheld that the acquisition proceedings had not lapsed and the award islegal and valid. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms withoutany order as to costs.

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Appeals allowed.

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