BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. versus STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS on 8 August 2019

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2019] 11 S.C.R.

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BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. ANDOTHERS ETC. ETC.

v.

STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS

(Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.30404–30442 of 2017)

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AUGUST 08, 2019

[ARUN MISHRA, ABDUL NAZEER ANDM. R. SHAH, JJ.]

Delay/laches: Delay in filing Special Leave Petitions –CCondonation of – On facts, SLP’s filed with regard to inadequacyof compensation awarded by the High Court in 1996, claiming parityin compensation awarded to their co-villagers in a different location– Inordinate delay of 21 years in filing SLPs challenging the orderpassed by the High Court – Applications seeking condonation ofDdelay –Held: Petitioners miserably failed to make out a case tocondone the huge delay of 21 years – No sufficient cause has beenshown – Only explanation in approaching this Court is given in theapplication that it was only in December 2016, the claimantspertaining to village Kasana got enhanced compensation of Rs.65/- per sq. yard from this Court – Nothing on record that after theEimpugned order of the High Court, the petitioners made anygrievance/objection with respect to inadequacy of the compensationdetermined by the High Court – On the contrary, they accepted thecompensation awarded – Even if the petitioners are denied theinterest and/or the other statutory benefits for the delayed period,Fto direct the State/acquiring body to pay the enhanced amount ofcompensation after 21 years would be unreasonable and wouldhave a financial burden upon them and it would be very difficultfor them to recover the same from the allottees – Thus, the hugedelay in filing the special leave petitions cannot be condoned andthe applications for condonation are dismissed.G

Jurisprudence: Non-exercise of right for a long time – Effectof – Held: Right becomes non-existent – In cases where there is nolimitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certainproceedings, the courts on the basis of doctrine of laches and delayas well as doctrine of acquiescence, have non-suited the litigants H

who approached the court belatedly without any justifiableexplanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay – Incases where the action is not brought within that prescribed period,the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal rightafter the period of limitation is over – However, if there is a justifiableexplanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period oflimitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may allowthe prayer for condonation of delay – If the aggrieved party doesnot initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation withoutany sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground ofunexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that suchperson has waived his right or acquiesced with the order.

Dismissing the Special Leave Petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1 The petitioners have miserably failed to makeout a case to condone the huge delay of approximately 21 years.No sufficient cause has been shown to condone the huge delay ofapproximately 21 years. In the application itself it is submittedby the petitioners there is an inordinate delay in approachingthis Court. The only explanation in approaching this Court afterabout 21 years is given in paragraph 3 of the application that itwas only in December 2016, the claimants pertaining to villageKasana got the enhanced compensation from this Hon’ble Courtto the tune of Rs. 65/- per sq yard. [Para 7][655-F-H; 656-A]

1.2 The petitioners have stated that though there is areasonable case made out by the petitioners to get the enhancedcompensation to the tune of Rs.65/- per square yard, but fairlyenough in order to balance the equity, this Court may not grantinterest from the date of the judgment of the High Court till thefiling of the special leave petitions before this Court. Except theexplanation in paragraph 3, there is no other explanationwhatsoever explaining the huge delay of approximately 21 years.Neither any poverty is pleaded nor any financial difficulty ispleaded. Nothing is on record that after the impugned commonjudgment and order is passed by the High Court, the petitionersmade any grievance/objection with respect to inadequacy of thecompensation determined by the High Court. On the contrary, ABC

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Aall the petitioners have accepted the compensation as per thejudgment and award passed by the reference Court determiningthe compensation at the rate of Rs. 30/- per square yard. It appearsthat with respect to some of the land owners even the executionpetitions are pending with respect to recovery of the differentialamount of compensation, determined by the reference Court andBthe High Court as by the impugned common judgment and orderthe High Court has reduced the compensation from Rs.30/- persq. yard to Rs. 22/- per sq. yard. The fact remains that after theimpugned common judgment and order is passed by the HighCourt, no grievance at all is made by the petitioners with respectCto inadequacy of the compensation determined by the High Court.Thus, it can be said that for a period of approximately 21 years nogrievance was made by the petitioners. Therefore, consideringthe terms of doctrine of acquiescence, the petitioners lose theirright to complain. This principle is based on the doctrine ofacquiescence implying that in such a case the party who did notDmake any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act ofthe other party and therefore has no right to complain againstthat alleged wrong. [Para 7.1][656-C-H; 657-A-B]

1.3 It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that aright not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even whenEthere is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating tocertain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined thedoctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescenceand non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedlywithout any justifiable explanation for bringing the action afterFunreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitationis prescribed within which the action is to be brought before thecourt, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period,the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legalright after the period of limitation is over, however, subject tothe prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiableGexplanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period oflimitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court maycondone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period oflimitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the

period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiatedafter the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonationof delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficientcause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. Itis not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause isnot shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court maycondone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay,the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason whichprevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period oflimitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. Ifthe aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within theperiod of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be deniedthe relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and onthe presumption that such person has waived his right oracquiesced with the order. These principles are based on theprinciples relatable to sound public policy that if a person doesnot exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent. [Para 8][657-C-H; 658-A]

1.4 In the instant case, lands were acquired as far back asin the year 1985 and the award by the Special Land AcquisitionOfficer was declared in the year 1988. The reference Courtenhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.30/- per square yard,which came to be reduced by the High Court by the impugnedcommon judgment and order in the year 1996. The lands wereacquired for Industrial development purposes. That after theacquisition, the land has been developed, infrastructure andamenities are laid and the developed land has been allottedapproximately before 30 years. It is the specific case on behalf ofthe respondents that the rate of allotment was based on the costof acquisition and the amount spent on development, laying outthe infrastructure. Therefore, if the cost of acquisition is increasednow and the State/acquiring body is directed to pay enhancedcompensation, in that case, it would be very difficult to recoverthe difference of amount of compensation from the allottees afterdecades of allotment. The acquiring body will have to makeadditional budgetary provision and it would be very difficult forthe acquiring body to recover the difference of compensation from AB

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Athe allottees after so many years. Even if the petitioners aredenied the interest and/or the other statutory benefits for thedelayed period as requested by the counsel for the petitioners,in that case also, to direct the State/acquiring body to pay theenhanced amount of compensation after number of years (21years) would be unreasonable and would have a financial burdenBupon them and it would be very difficult for the State/acquiringbody to recover the same from the allottees. [Para 9][658-E-H;659-A-C]

1.5 The huge delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 daysrespectively in filing the special leave petitions cannot beCcondoned and the applications for condonation are dismissed.[Para 10][659-D]

Market Committee, Hodal v. Krishan Murari (1996) 1SCC 311; Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana (2014) 14SCC 127; K. Subbarayudu v. Special Deputy CollectorD(Land Acquisition) (2017) 12 SCC 840 – heldinapplicable.

Case Law Reference

WithFSpecial Leave Petition (C) Nos. 30455-30460 of 2017, 23522-23530 of 2018.

From the Judgment and Order dated 02.04.1996 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in First Appeal Nos. 919, 887, 843, 839, 837,857, 829, 865, 851, 867, 842, 838, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 965, 942, 859,G860, 940, 892, 840, 875, 831, 869, 929 and 833 of 1993

Rishi Malhotra, Utkarsh Singh, Prem Malhotra, Advs. for thePetitioners.

Akshay Amritanshu, Anuvrat Sharma, Ravindra Kumar, MissHTulika Prakash, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. R. SHAH, J.

1. Delay of 193, 224 and 142 days respectively in refiling thespecial leave petitions is condoned.

2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the common impugnedjudgment and order dated 2.4.1996 passed by the High Court of Judicatureat Allahabad in First Appeal No. 919/1993 and other allied first appeals,the respective original claimants – land owners have preferred the presentspecial leave petitions.

3. At the outset, it is required to be noted that there is an inordinatedelay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days respectively (approximately 21 years)in preferring the special leave petitions before this Court challenging theimpugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court. Thereis a further delay of 193, 224 and 142 days respectively in refiling thespecial leave petitions.

3.1. The application/applications for condonation of delay is/arevehemently opposed by the respondents herein. Therefore, this Court isfirst required to consider and decide the application/applications submittedby the petitioners/applicants praying to condone the huge delay of 7534,7542 and 7886 days respectively in preferring the special leave petitions.

4. Shri Rishi Malhotra, learned Advocate appearing on behalf ofthe respective petitioners has vehemently submitted that the lands of therespective petitioners have been compulsorily acquired under theprovisions of the Land Acquisition Act, and therefore, they are entitledto the fair compensation for the lands acquired. It is submitted that thedispute is with respect to the lands acquired of village Gulsitapur andTilpta which are only 4 kms. away from village Kasna. It is submittedthat the location wise the lands of village Gulsitapur and Tilpta werebetter located and were abutting the national highway, i.e, Noida – DadriRoad. It is submitted that village Kasna is 4 kms. behind village Gulsitapur.It is submitted that for the lands acquired of village Kasna, Section 4notification was issued on 1.3.1989 and the compensation was awarded@ Rs.65/- per square yard, which has been confirmed by this Courtvide order dated 05.12.2016. It is submitted that therefore the respectivepetitioners are entitled to the fair compensation for the lands acquired ofvillage Gulsitapur and Tilpta at par with the land owners of village Kasna, A

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Ai.e., at Rs.65/- per square yard. It is submitted that therefore theagriculturists/farmers are entitled to the fair compensation for the landsacquired. It is submitted that for the lands compulsorily acquired, thedelay should not defeat the valuable rights of the petitioners to get faircompensation. It is submitted that the petitioners may not be awardedthe interest and other statutory benefits under the Land Acquisition ActBfor the period of delay.

4.1 Making the above submissions and relying upon the decisionsof this Court in the cases of Market Committee, Hodal v.Krishan Murari reported in (1996) 1 SCC 311; DhirajSingh v. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 14 SCC 127;Cand K. Subbarayudu v. Special Deputy Collector (LandAcquisition) reported in (2017) 12 SCC 840, it is prayed tocondone the delay and consider the special leave petitions onmerits.

5. All these applications are vehemently opposed by the learnedDAdvocates appearing on behalf of respondent no.3 – Uttar Pradesh StateIndustrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) and on behalf ofrespondent no.4 – Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority.Counter affidavits are filed on behalf of respondent nos. 3 and 4 opposingthe present applications for condonation of delay.E5.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearingon behalf of the respondents that there is an inordinate delayof approximately 21 years in preferring the special leavepetitions. It is submitted that at no point of time earlier therespective petitioners made any grievance with respect toFinadequacy of the compensation as awarded by the High Court.

5.2 It is further submittedby the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the respondents that as such no sufficient cause hasbeen shown explaining the huge delay of approximately 21years. It is submitted that merely because in view of theGsubsequent decision in the case of lands acquired of anothervillage, relying upon which the petitioners have preferred thepresent petitions, huge delay of approximately 21 years maynot be condoned.

5.3 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing forthe respondents that even otherwise the reliance placed uponH

the decisions of the High Court and this Court is with respectto entirely different village, i.e., village Kasna and that too inrespect of the land which was acquired after about four yearsof acquisition of the petitioners’ land. It is submitted thattherefore the lands acquired of village Kasna are notcomparable at all with respect to the lands acquired of villageGulsitapur and Tilpta.

5.4 It is further submitted that so far as the impugned commonjudgment and order dated 2.4.1996 is concerned, as such, thesame has attained finality. It is submitted that not only thepetitioners accepted the compensation but after the saidjudgment was delivered by the High Court no special leavepetition has been filed by the present petitioners all these years.It is submitted that therefore they have acquiesced with theimpugned common judgment and order of the High Court.

5.5 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the respondents that any attempt by the presentpetitioners to reopen the judgment shall lead to a cascadingeffect where every one whose land has been acquired by thesaid notification with respect to the land acquired at villageGulsitapur and Tilpta would start demanding enhancedcompensation @ Rs.65/- per square yard. It is submittedthat similarly the other land owners whose land has beenacquired though at different villages between the years 1985-1989, too start demanding the same rate of compensation.

5.6 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the respondents that after the acquisition, the land isdeveloped, infrastructure and amenities are laid. They aremaintained. The developed land has been allotted decadesago. It is submitted that the rate of allotment is based on thecost of acquisition and the amounts spent on development,laying out the infrastructure. It is submitted that if the cost ofacquisition is increased, then how this cost would now berecovered from the allottees after decades of allotment. It issubmitted therefore that to entertain the present petitions nowafter a period of approximately 21 years and to increase theamount of compensation would have a cascading effect.

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A5.7 It is further submitted that it is disputed and denied that theland in village Gulsitapur is superior to the land in village Kasna.It is submitted that the correct fact is that village Kasna islocated on the main road, which connects Greater Noida toSikanderabad, District Bulandshar, unlike the land of villageGulsitapur which is in the interiors.

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5.8 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of thisCourt by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of thepetitioners, referred to hereinabove, is concerned, it isvehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the respondents that none of the aforesaid decisionsCof this Court shall be applicable to the facts of the case onhand. It is submitted that in the present case there is aninordinate delay of approximately 21 years. It is submittedthat in the present case the petitioners have failed to makeout a sufficient cause to condone the huge delay ofDapproximately 21 years in preferring the special leave petitions.It is submitted that in the relied upon cases this Court wassatisfied on the sufficient cause for delay. It is submitted thatin the relied upon cases the parity was claimed with respectto the land acquired under the very notification and it waspointed out that due to poverty and financial difficulty someEof the land owners whose land was acquired under the samenotification could not prefer the appeals earlier and theypreferred the appeals subsequently and claimed parity ofcompensation at par with the lands acquired under the verynotification. It is submitted that in the present case theFpetitioners are claiming the parity in compensation with respectto the land acquired of another village and that too the land inthe said village was acquired after a period of four years andlocation wise etc.the lands are different. It is submitted thattherefore on facts the same shall not be applicable to thefacts of the case on hand.

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5.9 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss thepresent applications for condonation of delay and consequentlydismiss the special leave petitions as barred by limitation.

6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the respectiveHparties at length.

6.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that as such there is aninordinate delay of approximately 21 years in preferring thespecial leave petitions before this Court challenging theimpugned common judgment and order passed by the HighCourt which has been passed in the year 1996. It is requiredto be noted that the notification under Section 4 of the LandAcquisition Act with respect to the land situated in villageGulsitapur and Tilpta was issued in the year 1985; possessionwas taken over in the month of January, 1987; the LandAcquisition Officer declared the award in the year 1988awarding compensation at the rate of Rs.8-10 per square yard.At the instance of the petitioners herein - the original landowners, reference under Section 18 of the Land AcquisitionAct was made to the reference Court. By judgment andaward dated 22.3.1993, the reference Court enhanced thecompensation to Rs.30/- per square yard. However, onappeals and considering the material on record, by theimpugned common judgment and order, the High Court reducedthe amount of compensation to Rs. 22-20 per square yard.That thereafter, after a period of approximately 21 years, nowthe petitioners have preferred the present petitions claimingcompensation at par with the compensation awarded for theland owners of another village Kasna. It is required to benoted that so far as the land acquisition of village Kasna isconcerned, notification under Section 4 of the Land AcquisitionAct was issued in the year 1989, i.e., after a gap of fouryears and it appears that in between certain developmentshave also taken place.

7. Having considered the averments made in the application/applications for condonation of delay, we are of the opinion that as suchthe petitioners have miserably failed to make out a case to condone thehuge delay of approximately 21 years. No sufficient cause has beenshown to condone the huge delay of approximately 21 years. It is requiredto be noted that as such in the application itself it is submitted by thepetitioners that there is an inordinate delay in approaching this Court.The only explanation in approaching this Court after about 21 years isgiven in paragraph 3 of the application, which reads as under:

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“That the primary reason in not approaching this Hon’ble Court intime was the fact that it was only in December, 2016, the claimantspertaining to village Kasana got the enhanced compensation fromthis Hon’ble Court to the tune of Rs.65/- per sq. yard. Thepetitioners herein came to know about the said fact in the monthof January, 2017 causing not only lots of heartburn but spellingmiseries over them. It took not only lots of courage in musteringsupport from number of affected families but also it took time forthe petitioners to collectively file the instant special leave petitionclaiming not only the enhanced compensation but also parity withregard to the compensation awarded to their co-villagers at villageKasana.”

7.1 That thereafter the petitioners have stated that though there isa reasonable case made out by the petitioners to get the enhancedcompensation to the tune of Rs.65/- per square yard, but fairlyenough in order to balance the equity, this Court may not grantinterest from the date of the judgment of the High Court i.e.,2.4.1996 till the filing of the special leave petitions before thisCourt. Except the explanation in paragraph 3, reproducedhereinabove, there is no other explanation whatsoever explainingthe huge delay of approximately 21 years. Neither any poverty ispleaded nor any financial difficulty is pleaded. Nothing is on recordthat after the impugned common judgment and order is passed bythe High Court, the petitioners made any grievance/objection withrespect to inadequacy of the compensation determined by theHigh Court. On the contrary, all the petitioners have acceptedthe compensation as per the judgment and award passed by thereference Court determining the compensation at the rate of Rs.30/- per square yard. It appears that with respect to some of theland owners even the execution petitions are pending with respectto recovery of the differential amount of compensation, determinedby the reference Court and the High Court as by the impugnedcommon judgment and order the High Court has reduced thecompensation from Rs.30-/ per sq. yard to Rs.22/- per sq. yard.Be that as it may, the fact remains that after the impugned commonjudgment and order is passed by the High Court, no grievance atall is made by the petitioners with respect to inadequacy of the compensation determined by the High Court. Thus, it can be saidthat for a period of approximately 21 years no grievance wasmade by the petitioners. Therefore, considering the terms ofdoctrine of acquiescence, the petitioners lose their right to complain.This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implyingthat in such a case the party who did not make any objectionacquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party andtherefore has no right to complain against that alleged wrong.

8. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz.,laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence thata right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there isno limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certainproceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of lachesand delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigantswho approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanationfor bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, wherethe period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to bebrought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribedperiod, the aggrieved party losesremedy and cannot enforce his legalright after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayerfor condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringingthe action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficientcause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a casewhere the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not broughtwithin the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiatedafter the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation ofdelay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause andjustify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that ineach and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and thedelay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. Tomake out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make outa sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedingswithin the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of grossnegligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings withinthe period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be deniedthe relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on thepresumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with A

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Athe order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to soundpublic policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long timethen such right is non-existent.

9. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of thisCourt in the cases of Market Committee, Hodal(supra); Dhiraj SinghB(supra); and K. Subbarayudu (supra), relied upon by the learnedAdvocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners is concerned, havinggone through the said decisions, we are of the opinion that none of thesaid decisions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand and/orthe said decisions shall be of any assistance to the petitioners. First ofall, in the relied upon cases, there was no such inordinate delay ofCapproximately 21 years. In the relied upon cases, this Court was satisfiedon the sufficient cause for delay. In the relied upon cases, parity wasclaimed with respect to the land acquired under the very notification andit was pointed out that due to poverty and financial difficulty some of theland owners whose land was acquired under the same notification couldDnot prefer the appeals earlier and thereafter they preferred the appealssubsequently and claimed parity of compensation at par with the landacquired under the same notification. It is also required to be noted thatas such in none of the aforesaid decisions, this Court had dealt with and/or considered the adverse impact/effect on the State/acquiring body ifafter inordinate delay/laches the State/acquiring body is directed to payEthe enhanced amount of compensation. In the present case, lands wereacquired as far back as in the year 1985 and the award by the SpecialLand Acquisition Officer was declared in the year 1988. The referenceCourt enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.30/- per square yard,which came to be reduced by the High Court by the impugned commonFjudgment and order in the year 1996.It is required to be noted that thelands were acquired for Industrial development purposes. That after theacquisition, the land has been developed, infrastructure and amenitiesare laid and the developed land has been allotted approximately before30 years. It is the specific case on behalf of the respondents that therate of allotment was based on the cost of acquisition and the amountGspent on development, laying out the infrastructure. Therefore, if thecost of acquisition is increased now and the State/acquiring body isdirected to pay enhanced compensation, in that case, it would be verydifficult to recover the difference of amount of compensation from theallottees after decades of allotment. The acquiring body will have toH

make additional budgetary provision and as observed hereinabove it wouldbe very difficult for the acquiring body to recover the difference ofcompensation from the allottees after so many years. All these aspectsand the cascading effect on the State/acquiring body if they are directedto pay the additional compensation after number of years, have not beenconsidered by this Court in the aforesaid decisions relied upon by thelearned Advocate for the petitioners. Even if the petitioners are deniedthe interest and/or the other statutory benefits for the delayed period asrequested by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in that case also, todirect the State/acquiring body to pay the enhanced amount ofcompensation after number of years (21 years) would be unreasonableand would have a financial burden upon them and as observed hereinaboveit would be very difficult for the State/acquiring body to recover thesame from the allottees. Under the circumstances, none of the aforesaiddecisions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand and/or thesame shall not be of any assistance to the petitioners.

10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, werefuse to condone the huge delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 daysrespectively in filing the special leave petitions. Accordingly, theapplications for condonation of delay stand dismissed. Consequently, allthese special leave petitions are dismissed on the ground of limitation.However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be noorder as to costs.

Nidhi Jain

SLPs dismissed.

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