C.S. GOPALAKRISHNAN ETC. versus THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU & OTHERS on 9 May 2023

1. The question that would arise is as to the locus standi ofFthe appellants, who admittedly purchased their lands after theinitiation of land acquisition proceedings, to maintain a challengeto the provisions of the Industrial Purposes Act and theproceedings initiated thereunder. [Para 18][951-F-G]

2. As regards the issue of the appellants’ locus standi, thatGvery aspect was considered by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court inShiv Kumar and another Vs. Union of India and others [(2019) 10SCC 229]. The question therein was whether subsequentpurchasers of acquired land would be entitled to seek invalidationof the acquisition on the ground of delay under Section 24(2) of H

the new LA Act. The Bench held that a sale transaction, effectedafter the Notification under Section 4 of the old LA Act, is voidand would be ineffective to transfer the land and such a sale wouldnot clothe the subsequent purchasers with title, whereby theycould claim to be in possession. It was observed that it would beprofoundly unfair and unjust and against the policy of law to permitsuch a purchaser to claim resettlement or claim the land back, asenvisaged under the new LA Act. [Para 22][953-A-C]

2. As both appellants seek to assail the validity of theIndustrial Purposes Act only in the context of the acquisitionproceedings initiated thereunder in relation to the landspurchased by them after issuance of the Public Notice underSection 3(2) thereof, viz., the equivalent of a Notification underSection 4 of the old LA Act, their challenge is tainted andunacceptable in its very inception. They were both subsequentpurchasers and are deemed to be aware of the acquisitionproceedings. In that regard, it may also be noted that the originalowners of the subject lands raised their objections in responseto the Public Notice issued under Section 3(2) in the year 2007,but chose to sell their lands in 2012 and 2013. In any event,neither of these subsequent purchasers can be permitted to claimignorance of the acquisition proceedings. In effect, the very saletransactions under which they claim title and interest in thesubject lands are rendered void in the eye of law. Mere passageof time and publication of the Section 3(1) Notice after theirpurchase of the lands would not save their sale transactions orvest them with a right to attack the acquisition. In consequence,this Court finds no reason to entertain their challenge to theIndustrial Purposes Act on the grounds of arbitrariness andviolation of Article 14 of the Constitution or their consequentialchallenge to the acquisition proceedings. Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5693 of 2021 are, therefore, liable to be dismissed on this shortground. [Para 23][953-F-H; 954-A-C]

Civil Appeal No.5697 of 2021

3. The Highways Act in the State of Tamil Nadu stoodprotected even at the time the old LA Act was in force and effect, AB

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Aowing to the Presidential assent that it had received under Article254(2) of the Constitution, and it continued to operate and providealtogether different yardsticks for acquisition of land and paymentof compensation till the advent of the new LA Act. [Para 40][961-E-F]

B4. No doubt, the scheme of the new LA Act advocates timelymeasures being adopted in implementation of the acquisition andsuch general temporal restrictions would benefit the land owners,but the absence of such restrictions in the Highways Act may notbe reason enough to invalidate it, as the very premise on whichthe Highways Acts was enacted by the State of Tamil Nadu was toCcut down on time-consuming processes. In G. Mohan Rao , thisCourt had noted that the letter dated 25.07.2019 written by theState of Tamil Nadu, for obtaining the assent of the President ofIndia for the Validation Act of 2019, specifically emphasized thatthe three State Acts were made for the purpose of speedy

Dacquisitions but the new LA Act rendered them repugnant.Therefore, it is not the intendment or purpose of the HighwaysAct that the processes for acquisition of land thereunder shouldbe protracted or be ridden by avoidable delays. [Para 42][962-D-F]

E5. Further, there is no possibility of the State of Tamil Naduexercising arbitrary discretion in adopting one legislation or theother for the purpose of acquiring lands, as contended by thelearned counsel. Sections 3, 7 and 11 of the Validation Act of2019 expressly exclude the operation of the new LA Act for thepurposes contained in the State Acts which stood revived owingFto the assent of the President of India. Therefore, the State ofTamil Nadu would be bound to apply only the Highways Act foracquiring lands for the purposes reserved thereunder. [Para44][963-B]

6. The Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, is not liable to beGinvalidated on the ground that its provisions manifestdiscrimination or arbitrariness when compared with the provisionsof the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in LandAcquisition; Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. [Para45][963-C-D]H

The State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.C. Mandawar AIR1954 SC 493 : [1955] SCR 599; P. Vajravelu Mudaliarv. Special Deputy Collector, Madras and Others AIR1965 SC 1017 : [1965] SCR 614 – followed.

G. Mohan Rao and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu andOthers AIR 2021 SC 3126; – relied on.

State of Tamil Nadu and Others v. Ananthi Ammal andOthers (1995) 1 SCC 519 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 666;K. Ramakrishnan v. The Government of Tamil Nadu2007 WLR 372; S.N. Sumathy v. State of Tamil Naduand Others 2015 SCC OnLine Madras 14055; SriVenkateswara Educational and Charitable Trust v. TheSecretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and Others WritAppeal No. 1063 of 2012, decided on 17.10.2022; ShivKumar and Another v. Union of India and Others (2019)10 SCC 229; UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow, and Another v.Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (1996) 3 SCC 124 : [1996] 1SCR 683; Sneh Prabha and Others v. State of UP andAnother (1996) 7 SCC 426 : [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 264;Union of India v. Shivkumar Bhargava and Others(1995) 2 SCC 427 : [1995] 1 SCR 354; Meera Sahniv. State (NCT of Delhi) and Others (2008) 9 SCC 177 :[2008] 10 SCR 1012; V. Chandrasekaran and Anotherv. Administrative Officer and Others (2012) 12 SCC133 : [2012] 10 SCR 603; Rajasthan State IndustrialDevelopment & Investment Corporation v. SubhashSindhi Co-op. Housing Society, Jaipur (2013) 5 SCC427 : [2013] 4 SCR 978; M. Venkatesh and Others v.Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority (2015)17 SCC 1 : [2015] 11 SCR 454; Nagpur ImprovementTrust and Others v. Vithal Rao and Others AIR 1973SC 689 : [1973] 3 SCR 39; Union of India v. TarsemSingh and Others (2019) 9 SCC 304 : [2019] 13 SCR49; Savitri Cairae and Others v. U.P. Avas Evam VikasParishad and Others (2003) 6 SCC 39; Joseph Shinev. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 : [2018] 11 SCR765; State of Kerala and Others v. T.M. Peter and Others(1980) 3 SCC 554 : [1980] 3 SCR 290; State of A

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944SUPREME COURT REPORTS

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5695 of 2021.

From the Judgment and Order dated 03.07.2019 of the High Courtof Judicature at Madras in WP Nos. 26234, 26028 of 2013, 10282 and10283 of 2015.

With

Civil Appeal No. 5697 of 2021

Amit Anand Tiwari, AAG, K.K. Venugopal, V. Krishnamurthy,Sr. Advs., Suhrith Parthasarathy, Ms. Rashmi Nandakumar, Ms. RemyaRaj, N. Subramaniyan, Pranav Sachdeva, Jatin Bhardwaj, Ms. NehaRathi, Sabarish Subramanian, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Naman Dwivedi, P.Shankar, Ms. Shivani Jena, C. Kranti Kumar, Danish Saifi, Ms. DevyaniGupta, Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., M. Yogesh Kanna, Advs. for the appearingparties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SANJAY KUMAR, J.

1. Past events, contextual to these appeals, being of relevancerequire recount at some length.

2. Long ago, the State of Tamil Nadu chose to exercise its right ofeminent domain to acquire land for its harijan welfare schemes, itsindustrial purposes and its highways by deviating from the law andprocedure prescribed in the Central legislation, viz., ‘The Land AcquisitionAct, 1894’. In exercise of concurrent power under Entry 42 in List III ofthe Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, it enacted ‘The TamilNadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978’;‘The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997’;and ‘The Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001’. These three State Actsstood protected, despite being repugnant to the Land Acquisition Act,1894 [hereinafter, ‘the old LA Act’], owing to the Presidential assentthat they had received on 21.07.1978, 25.05.1999 and 16.09.2002respectively, under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. However, uponthe Parliament promulgating the Right to Fair Compensation andTransparency in Land Acquisition; Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,2013 [hereinafter, ‘the new LA Act’], replacing the old LA Act, theseState Acts were rendered void, being repugnant thereto.

3. Pertinently, Section 105 of the new LA Act provided that thesaid legislation would not apply or would apply with modifications to theCentral Government’s enactments relating to land acquisition, specified A

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Ain the Fourth Schedule thereto. In an attempt to save the three StateActs, by taking a cue from Section 105 of the new LA Act, the TamilNadu Legislative Assembly passed Bill No. 5 of 2014 on 22.02.2014,amending the new LA Act. Thereby, Section 105-A was inserted in thenew LA Act, making the provisions thereof inapplicable or applicablewith modifications to the Acts relating to land acquisition in the State ofBTamil Nadu, which were specified in the newly added Fifth Schedule.The three State Acts were shown in this Schedule. However, Bill No. 5of 2014 was returned by the President of India pointing out some defectsand after curing of the same, it was reintroduced as Bill No. 30 of 2014.It was then sent to the President of India for his assent and received theCsame on 01.01.2015. In consequence, the Right to Fair Compensationand Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement(Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2014 (Act No.1 of 2015), came intoforce with retrospective effect from 01.01.2014.

4. Act No.1 of 2015 was subjected to challenge before the MadrasDHigh Court in a batch of writ petitions. Writ Petition No.21323 of 2015was also filed raising a challenge to the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001(for brevity, ‘the Highways Act’). On the same lines, Writ Petition Nos.26028 and 26234 of 2013 were filed assailing the validity of the TamilNadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (for brevity,‘the Industrial Purposes Act’), on the ground that it was ultra vires theEConstitution of India and seeking a consequential direction to theauthorities to drop the acquisition of the petitioners’ lands thereunder.

5. In W.P.No.26028 of 2013, the consequential prayer of the twopetitioners, viz. P.K. Muralidharan and V. Thirunarayanan, was to directthe authorities not to acquire their lands in old Survey No. 93/4B(3),Fpresently Survey Nos. 93/58 and 93/59, of Pillaipakkam Village,Sriperumbudur Taluk No. 103, Kancheepuram. In W.P.No.26234 of 2013,the prayer of C.S. Gopalakrishnan, the petitioner therein, was to directthe authorities to return his land in Survey No. 92/60, Patta No.1317,Plot No. 236, Thripura Sundari Nagar, Pillaipakkam Village,GSriperumbudur Taluk. Further, V. Thirunarayanan, the second petitionerin W.P.No.26028 of 2013, also filed W.P.No.10282 of 2015 seeking adeclaration that Act No.1 of 2015 was ultra vires the Constitution and aconsequential direction to the authorities not to acquire his lands inKancheepuram District. Similarly, C.S. Gopalakrishnan, the sole petitionerin W.P.No.26234 of 2013, filed W.P.No.10283 of 2015 seeking identicalH

reliefs. These four writ petitions, along with several others, were partlyallowed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, vide commonorder dated 03.07.2019.

6. The common order dated 03.07.2019 reflects that the HighCourt framed the following issues for consideration: - ‘1) Are the State enactments void because of inherentarbitrariness?

2) Did the President of India fail to apply his mind while grantingassent to Section 105-A?

3) Did the impugned State enactments become repugnant oncethe Parliament ‘made’ the new Land Acquisition Act. If so, didthe presidential assent to Section105-A inserted by Tamil NaduAct No. 1 of 2015 revive the three Acts?

4) Are the provisions of Section 105-A(2) and (3) mandatory, andif so, whether non-compliance with these provisions (is, sic) fatalto the validity of these enactments.’

7. As regards the first issue, the High Court noted that the validityof the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare SchemesAct, 1978, was upheld by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Naduand others Vs. Ananthi Ammal and others [(1995) 1 SCC 519] andthat the Industrial Purposes Act was upheld by a Division Bench of theMadras High Court in K. Ramakrishnan Vs. The Government of TamilNadu [2007 WLR 372], wherein it was specifically held that the saidenactment did not suffer from any illegality, irrationality or proceduralimpropriety. Similarly, the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 (for brevity,‘the Highways Act’), was upheld by the Madras High Court in S.N.Sumathy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others [2015 SCC OnLineMadras 14055]. The High Court, therefore, opined that the three StateActs could not be said to be irrational, capricious or without adequatedetermining principles and rejected the contention that they were liableto be invalidated on the ground of inherent arbitrariness.

8. On the second issue, the High Court held that all the materialwas placed before the President of India and, therefore, it could not besaid that there was any non-application of mind by the President of Indiawhile granting assent. The High Court also noted that the first Bill wasreturned by the President pointing out some defects and it was only A

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Aafter the same were cured that the Presidential assent was given. Thesecond issue was, therefore, decided accordingly.

9. Apropos the third issue, the High Court accepted the contentionof the writ petitioners that, as the new LA Act received Presidentialassent on 27.09.2013, all the three State Acts became void on that dateBitself and Act No.1 of 2015 did not have the effect of reviving these voidState Acts. It was noted that Article 254(2) of the Constitution wouldnot apply to a law already made by a State which becomes repugnant asa result of a new enactment made by the Parliament and it would notoffer protection to laws made by the State before the Central legislation.The High Court opined that Article 254(2) of the Constitution requiredCthe repugnant law to be reserved for consideration afresh by the Presidentfor giving his assent thereto and, therefore, these State Acts had to receivePresidential assent in the present sense. The High Court concluded that,in order to bring an Act within the purview of Article 254(2) of theConstitution, it must be re-enacted by the State and reconsidered by theDPresident and mere insertion of Section 105-A in the new LA Act wasinadequate. The High Court, accordingly, declared the three State Actsvoid and held that Section 105-A did not resurrect them and was a meredead letter.

10. On the last issue, the High Court held Section 105-A(2) andE(3) to be mandatory. Holding so, the Madras High Court allowed thewrit petitions to the extent indicated. However, the High Court deemedit appropriate not to reopen the acquisitions made under the State Acts,on or after 27.09.2013, where the acquired lands had already been putto use and the purpose for which the lands were acquired had beenaccomplished. The High Court held that as Section 105-A, inserted inFthe new LA Act by Act No.1 of 2015, was rendered virtually otiose asAct No.1 of 2015 did not meet the requirements of Article 254(2) of theConstitution and did not have the effect of reviving the State Acts, thevalidity of Section 105-A need not be independently examined.

11. SLP (C) Nos. 2063-2066 of 2020, which were thereafterGnumbered as Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5695 of 2021, arose out of thecommon order dated 03.07.2019 in so far as it pertained toW.P.Nos.26234 & 26028 of 2013 and W.P.Nos.10282 & 10283 of 2015respectively. V. Thirunarayanan, the second petitioner in W.P.No.26028of 2013, and C.S. Gopalakrishnan, the sole petitioner in W.P.No.26234Hof 2013, filed the first two SLPs aggrieved by the common order to the extent that it did not hold the Industrial Purposes Act to be void on thegrounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.The other two SLPs filed by them pertained to W.P.Nos.10282 and 10283of 2015 respectively, relating to the validity of Act No.1 of 2015 andSection 105-A.

12. During the pendency of these SLPs before this Court, theState of Tamil Nadu again attempted to revive the three State Acts byenacting ‘The Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Laws (Revival of Operation,Amendment and Validation) Act, 2019’ (for brevity, ‘the Validation Actof 2019’). This Act received the assent of the President, under Article254(2) of the Constitution, on 02.12.2019. It came into effectretrospectively from 26.09.2013. The Validation Act of 2019 waschallenged before this Court in a batch of writ petitions. By judgmentdated 29.06.2021, reported in G. Mohan Rao and others Vs. State ofTamil Nadu and others [AIR 2021 SC 3126], this Court held that thesaid enactment was a legitimate legislative exercise which was consistentwith and fell within the four corners of Article 254 of the Constitution.The writ petitions were, accordingly, dismissed.

13. It may be noted that one K.M. Vittal Babu and oneT. Chinnappan had filed W.P.No.5893 of 2018 before the Madras HighCourt, wherein they had sought a declaration that Section 105-A insertedin the new LA Act by Act No.1 of 2015 was unconstitutional. This writpetition was also clubbed with the batch of writ petitions, which came tobe disposed of by the common order dated 03.07.2019. While so, on07.07.2021, K.M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan filed I.A. No. 77573of 2021 in SLP (C) Nos. 2063-2066 of 2020, which were numbered asCivil Appeal Nos. 5692-5695 of 2021, seeking to be impleaded therein.They stated that the provisions of the Industrial Purposes Act are inpari materia with the provisions of the Highways Act, whereunder theirlands were acquired, and as there was no separate petition dealing withthe validity thereof, it was just and necessary that they get impleaded inSLP (C) Nos. 2063-2066 of 2020 so as to question the pari materiaprovisions of the Highways Act. Their impleadment application wasallowed on 09.09.2021. Surprisingly, two days later, on 11.07.2021, K.M.Vittal Babu chose to file SLP (C) Diary No. 15466 of 2021 in the contextof W.P.No.21323 of 2015, referred to hereinbefore, wherein he was nota party. In his application for permission to file the SLP, he stated thatW.P.No.21323 of 2015 raised a challenge to the Highways Act, which A

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Awas missing in his own writ petition and he, therefore, wanted to raisethat issue before this Court. He was granted leave to do so on 09.09.2021and his SLP was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 5697 of 2021. His prayertherein is to declare the Highways Act unconstitutional and void. Thus,K.M. Vittal Babu figures as the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 5697 of2021 and is also impleaded as a respondent in the other appeals, alongBwith T. Chinnappan.

14. In the light of G. Mohan Rao (supra), the challenges beforethis Court to Act No.1 of 2015 and Section 105-A are rendered redundant.SLP (C) No. 4106 of 2020, involving such a challenge, was disposed ofon 09.09.2021. Therefore, Issue Nos. 2, 3 and 4 dealt with by the HighCCourt in the common order dated 03.07.2019 no longer requireconsideration on merits. In consequence, though numbered thereafter,Civil Appeal Nos. 5694 and 5695 of 2021 are infructuous and need noadjudication. The only issue left for consideration is whether the IndustrialPurposes Act and the Highways Act are void owing to inherentDarbitrariness and infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution. In thiscontext, it may be noted that, in paragraph 74 in G. Mohan Rao (supra),this Court observed that the contention, based on comparative analysisof the State Acts and the new LA Act, to establish violation of the equalityclause under Article 14 of the Constitution, is left open. Parties weregiven liberty to raise all other issues not dealt with in that judgment, inErelation to the validity of the State laws, in the pending cases arisingfrom the order dated 03.07.2019, including by getting themselvesimpleaded.

15. Heard Mr. Suhrith Parthasarathy, learned counsel for theappellants in Civil Appeal Nos.5692-5693 of 2021; Mr. N. Subramaniyan,Flearned counsel, appearing for K.M. Vittal Babu and T. Chinnappan;and Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel, appearing for the Stateof Tamil Nadu and its authorities.

16. Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5693 of 2021: The IndustrialPurposes Act is founded on the premise that the State of Tamil NaduGfound it expedient to make special provision for speedy acquisition oflands for industrial purposes in the State of Tamil Nadu and for mattersconnected therewith. The scheme therein envisages that the Governmentwould cause a Public Notice to be given under Section 3(2) of the IndustrialPurposes Act, in such manner as may be prescribed, calling upon theHowner of the land and any other person, who in the opinion of the

Government may be interested in such land, to show-cause, within suchtime as may be specified in the Public Notice, why the land should notbe acquired. Section 3(3) provides that after hearing and considering thecause, if any, shown by the owner or person interested, the Governmentmay pass an order under Section 3(1). In turn, Section 3(1) states thatthe Government may acquire any land required for any industrial purpose,or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act, bypublishing a Notice in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, specifyingthe particular purpose for which the land is required. Once the Noticeunder Section 3(1) is published in the Gazette, Section 4 states that theland would vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances,on and from the date of such publication.

17. The gravamen of the attack in the present appeals is that theMadras High Court erred in holding that the Industrial Purposes Actwas not liable to be invalidated on the grounds of arbitrariness and violationof Article 14 of the Constitution. Various issues were raised in the courseof arguments in this regard, citing an abundance of caselaw. However, itis an admitted fact that C.S. Gopalakrishnan purchased the land in SurveyNo. 92/60, Patta No. 1317, Plot No. 236, Pillaipakkam Village,Kancheepuram District, under registered sale deed dated 14.12.2012,long after initiation of the acquisition proceedings, by issuance of thePublic Notice on 23.10.2007, for setting up SIPCOT Industrial Park.Similarly, V. Thirunarayanan, the other appellant, also purchased the landin old Survey No. 93/4B(3), presently Survey Nos. 93/58 and 93/59,Pillaipakkam Village, Kancheepuram District, under registered sale deeddated 21.02.2013, well after the initiation of the aforestated acquisitionproceedings. However, the Notice under Section 3(1) of the IndustrialPurposes Act was published in the Gazette only in March, 2013, aftertheir purchase of the lands in question.

18. In the above milieu, the question that would arise is as to thelocus standi of the appellants, who admittedly purchased their landsafter the initiation of land acquisition proceedings, to maintain a challengeto the provisions of the Industrial Purposes Act and the proceedingsinitiated thereunder.

19. It is the argument of the State that such subsequent purchaserswould have no right to challenge the acquisition proceedings and, in thatcontext, maintain an attack against the legislation under which suchacquisition is being made. It is further contended that, as the Section AB

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A3(1) Notice was published in the year 2013, i.e., before the coming intoforce of the new LA Act, determination of the compensation in relationthereto would be only on the basis of the old LA Act and not under thenew LA Act.

20. Per contra, the appellants assert that they would have locusBto challenge the validity of the Industrial Purposes Act, as their saletransactions were nearly 6 years after issuance of the Public Noticeunder Section 3(2) of the Industrial Purposes Act and any reasonableperson would have a bonafide belief that such proceedings would havelapsed owing to passage of time. They also contend that as per Section4 of the Industrial Purposes Act, the acquired land would vest in theCGovernment only on publication of the Notice under Section 3(1) and,therefore, a sale transaction prior thereto would not be rendered void.They would argue that the State cannot freeze property rights for aperiod of six years by issuing a Public Notice under Section 3(2) of theIndustrial Purposes Act and forgetting about it thereafter for years

Dtogether. Reference is made to the judgment of the Madras High Courtin Sri Venkateswara Educational and Charitable Trust Vs. TheSecretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and others [Writ AppealNo. 1063 of 2012, decided on 17.10.2022], which held that in caseswhere compensation still needed to be determined for acquisitions madeunder the Industrial Purposes Act, the new LA Act would apply perforceEand the base date for determining compensation would not be the dateon which the Section 3(2) Notice was issued but 01.01.2014, the date onwhich the new LA Act came into force.

21. It may be noted that, after publication of the Notice underSection 3(1), the appellants are stated to have filed writ petitions beforeFthe Madras High Court in which orders of status quo were passed.Those cases are stated to be pending as on date. We are not concernedat this stage with the validity of individual acquisition proceedings initiatedunder the Industrial Purposes Act. If the validity of such acquisitionproceedings is under challenge before the High Court, it is for the partiesGto pursue the same and invite an adjudication on merits. Issues pertainingto such individual acquisition proceedings, including quantification ofcompensation and other aspects based on facts, can be decided in thosewrit petitions and need not concern us at this stage. Presently, we areonly dealing with the challenge to the validity of the Industrial PurposesAct and the Highways Act on the grounds of arbitrariness and breach ofHArticle 14 of the Constitution and no more.

22. As regards the issue of the appellants’ locus standi, that veryaspect was considered by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Kumarand another Vs. Union of India and others [(2019) 10 SCC 229].The question therein was whether subsequent purchasers of acquiredland would be entitled to seek invalidation of the acquisition on the groundof delay under Section 24(2) of the new LA Act. The Bench held that asale transaction, effected after the Notification under Section 4 of theold LA Act, is void and would be ineffective to transfer the land andsuch a sale would not clothe the subsequent purchasers with title, wherebythey could claim to be in possession. It was observed that it would beprofoundly unfair and unjust and against the policy of law to permit sucha purchaser to claim resettlement or claim the land back, as envisagedunder the new LA Act. Support in this regard was drawn from the earlierjudgments in UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow, and another Vs. KalraProperties (P) Ltd. [(1996) 3 SCC 124]; Sneh Prabha and othersVs. State of UP and another [(1996) 7 SCC 426]; Union of India Vs.Shivkumar Bhargava and others [(1995) 2 SCC 427]; Meera SahniVs. State (NCT of Delhi) and others [(2008) 9 SCC 177]; V.Chandrasekaran and another Vs. Administrative Officer and others[(2012) 12 SCC 133]; Rajasthan State Industrial Development &Investment Corporation Vs. Subhash Sindhi Co-op. Housing Society,Jaipur [(2013) 5 SCC 427]; and M. Venkatesh and others Vs.Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority [(2015) 17 SCC1]. Be it noted that, in UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow (supra), Meera Sahni(supra) and V. Chandrasekaran (supra), this Court held that such apurchaser could not challenge the acquisition and would, at best, be entitledto receive compensation.

23. As both C.S. Gopalakrishnan and V. Thirunarayanan seek toassail the validity of the Industrial Purposes Act only in the context ofthe acquisition proceedings initiated thereunder in relation to the landspurchased by them after issuance of the Public Notice under Section3(2) thereof, viz., the equivalent of a Notification under Section 4 of theold LA Act, their challenge is tainted and unacceptable in its veryinception. They were both subsequent purchasers and are deemed to beaware of the acquisition proceedings. In that regard, we may note thatthe original owners of the subject lands raised their objections in responseto the Public Notice issued under Section 3(2) in the year 2007, butchose to sell their lands in 2012 and 2013. In any event, neither of thesesubsequent purchasers can be permitted to claim ignorance of the AB

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Aacquisition proceedings. In effect, the very sale transactions under whichthey claim title and interest in the subject lands are rendered void in theeye of law. Mere passage of time and publication of the Section 3(1)Notice after their purchase of the lands would not save their saletransactions or vest them with a right to attack the acquisition. Inconsequence, we find no reason to entertain their challenge to theBIndustrial Purposes Act on the grounds of arbitrariness and violation ofArticle 14 of the Constitution or their consequential challenge to theacquisition proceedings. Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5693 of 2021 are,therefore, liable to be dismissed on this short ground.

24. Civil Appeal No. 5697 of 2021 et al: K.M. Vittal Babu andCT. Chinnappan assail the common order dated 03.07.2019 passed by theMadras High Court, whereby challenge to the validity of the HighwaysAct, on the grounds of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14 of theConstitution, was rejected. The grievance of these two persons is withregard to the acquisition of their lands by the State of Tamil Nadu under Dthe Highways Act. The Government of Tamil Nadu had issuedGO.Ms.No.200, Highways and Minor Ports Department, dated07.12.2011, proposing to acquire land for construction of a Flyover/Roadover Bridge to replace Railway Level Crossing No. 184 in Salem.Thereafter, Public Notice dated 02.07.2016, under Section 15(2) of theHighways Act, which is the equivalent of Section 3(2) of the IndustrialEPurposes Act, was issued calling for objections as to why their landsshould not be acquired for the said purpose. After consideration of theobjections received, Notice dated 01.02.2017 was published in the TamilNadu Government Gazette, under Section 15(1) of the Highways Act,which is the same as Section 3(1) of the Industrial Purposes Act.FThereupon, these two persons filed W.P.No.3276 of 2017 before theMadras High Court challenging the acquisition proceedings and statusquo was ordered therein. This case is pending as on date.

25. The Validation Act of 2019 states that the provisions in theFirst Schedule, the Second Schedule and the Third Schedule to the newGL.A. Act shall apply to land acquisition proceedings under the HighwaysAct. Part III of the Validation Act of 2019 pertains to the Highways Act.Section 10(1) therein states that all the provisions of the Highways Act,except the provisions relating to determination of compensation, shallstand revived with effect on and from 26.09.2013. Section 10(2) statesthat all rules, notifications, notices, orders, directions issued or any otherH

Procedure

proceedings initiated under the Highways Act, except those relating todetermination of compensation, which were in force immediately before26.09.2013 shall, for all purposes, be deemed to have been revived onand from 26.09.2013. Section 10(3) states that the provisions relating todetermination of compensation as specified in the First Schedule;rehabilitation and resettlement as specified in the Second Schedule; andinfrastructure amenities as specified in the Third Schedule to the newL.A. Act, shall apply to the acquisition proceedings under the HighwaysAct. Section 11 states that except as provided in the Validation Act of2019, the provisions of the new L.A. Act shall cease to apply to any landwhich is required for the purposes specified in Section 15(1) of theHighways Act and any such land shall be acquired by the Governmentonly in accordance with the provisions of the Highways Act.

26. Though Civil Appeal Nos. 5692-5693 of 2021 are liable to bedismissed on the ground of maintainability, the arguments of Mr. SuhrithParthasarathy, learned counsel appearing therein, were adopted in totoby Mr. N.Subramaniyan, learned counsel for K.M. Vittal Babu and T.Chinnappan. This adoption of arguments is based on the premise thatthe provisions of the Industrial Purposes Act are in pari materia withthe provisions of the Highways Act, with which they are concerned. Inthat view of the matter, we shall advert to the arguments advanced byboth the learned counsel in the context of the Highways Act alone.

27. The Highways Act is stated to be discriminatory, both withregard to determination of compensation as well as the acquisitionprocedure, when compared to the new LA Act. Reference is made tothe provisions of the new LA Act which require the appropriateGovernment to consult the local authorities in the affected area and tocarry out a Social Impact Assessment Study in consultation with them.It is pointed out that a Social Impact Assessment Study Report wouldlapse, under Section 14 of the new LA Act, if the Preliminary Notificationunder Section 11 is not issued within 12 months from the date that suchreport is submitted, and in such an event, a fresh Social ImpactAssessment Study has to be undertaken before acquisition proceedingsare initiated. It is pointed out that the First Schedule to the new LA Actstates that the market value of the land is to be determined as per Section26 thereof. The proviso to Section 26(1) of the new LA Act, in turn,links the market value to the date on which the Preliminary Notificationis issued under Section 11. The Notification under Section 11 of the new AB

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ALA Act is equivalent to the Public Notice issued under Section 15(2) ofthe Highways Act. The Declaration under Section 19 of the new LAAct is on par with the Notice published under Section 15(1) of theHighways Act.

28. In the context thereof, it is pointed out that Section 19(7) ofBthe new LA Act prescribes the time limit of one year between theNotification under Section 11 and the publication of the Declaration underSection 19 and in the event of failure to abide by this time stipulation, thePreliminary Notification is deemed to lapse, subject to exceptions in termsof the second proviso to Section 19(7) of the new LA Act. Similarly,Section 25 of the new LA Act provides that the Award must be passedCwithin 12 months of the Declaration under Section 19 and if not, theentire proceedings would lapse, subject to the proviso to Section 25,which entitles the Government to extend the time. However, as all theseprovisions do not find reflection in the First Schedule to the new LA Act,which has been extended to the Highways Act, the timelines put in placeDto safeguard the interests of the land owners would not be applicable toan acquisition thereunder. In consequence, there would be no restrictionupon the State of Tamil Nadu to complete the exercise in a time-boundmanner and compensation would be determined by taking intoconsideration a market value from the distant past, which would not bethe case had the acquisition been under the new LA Act. In the light ofEthe flexibility afforded to the State Government, it is argued that themarket value of the acquired land would change to the detriment of theland owner.

29. It is further pointed out that the procedure prescribed in Section28 of the new LA Act for determining the amount of compensation isFnot followed by the State of Tamil Nadu under the Highways Act andmore particularly, the power given to the Collector under Section 28(7)of the new LA Act to take into consideration any other ground whichmay be in the interest of equity, justice and beneficial to the affectedfamilies. It is also their grievance that safeguards provided in the newGLA Act, which are beneficial to land owners, are not available in theHighways Act, both in relation to the quantum of compensation as wellas the procedure. Reference is made to Section 39 of the new LA Act,which provides for additional compensation in case of multipledisplacements and it is pointed out that no such relief is provided in theHighways Act, despite multiple acquisitions for widening of highways.H

30. It is contended that though the Validation Act of 2019 appliesthe provisions of the new LA Act to the Highways Act insofar ascompensation is concerned, the selective application of the provisions ofthe new LA Act would result in discrimination even in the matter ofcompensation. It is pointed out that timelines prescribed under the newLA Act, which are not relatable to the First Schedule to the new LA Act,are not made applicable under the Validation Act of 2019 and the absenceof such timelines would permit the State to peg the market value fordetermining compensation on a date in the remote past, thereby deprivingthe land owners of just and fair compensation. According to the learnedcounsel, though there is de jure parity between the new LA Act and theState Acts, there would actually be de facto discrimination in the paymentof compensation. Reference is made to P. Vajravelu Mudaliar Vs.Special Deputy Collector, Madras and others [AIR 1965 SC 1017],Nagpur Improvement Trust and others Vs. Vithal Rao and others[AIR 1973 SC 689], Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh and others[(2019) 9 SCC 304], Savitri Cairae and others Vs. U.P. Avas EvamVikas Parishad and others [(2003) 6 SCC 39] and The State ofMadhya Pradesh Vs. G.C. Mandawar [AIR 1954 SC 493].

31. It is asserted that there is no intelligible differentia betweenland owners whose lands are acquired under the Highways Act andthose whose lands are acquired under the new LA Act and it wouldamount to an unreasonable classification if they are denied compensationon the same terms, when their lands are acquired for public purposes.An example is cited, where a person’s land may be acquired under theHighways Act while his neighbour’s land, which is identically situated inall respects, is acquired under the new LA Act, but they would be givencompensation on different criteria owing to the absence of timelines inthe Highways Act, which would permit the State to peg the marketvalue on a past date to determine the compensation unlike the situationobtaining under the new LA Act. Reference is made to Joseph ShineVs. Union of India [(2019) 3 SCC 39] to contend that when a statuteis arbitrary, it would offend Article 14 of the Constitution and wouldrequire to be struck down. It is also argued that certain critical clausespertaining to compensation, contained in Sections 27 to 30 of the newLA Act, are not brought into play in the Highways Act, as only the FirstSchedule to the new LA Act has been incorporated therein, causingdiscrimination, as land owners whose lands have been acquired underthe Highways Act would not be entitled to the benefits under theseprovisions of the new LA Act.

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A32. On the other hand, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel,would point out that the timelines fixed in the new LA Act are notsacrosanct as the provisions thereof permit extension of time in certaincircumstances. It is pointed out that, once such an extension is granted,no outer limit is prescribed and, therefore, the argument that the new LAAct places binding temporal constraints on the State is not correct. It isBpointed out that the second proviso to Section 19(7) of the new LA Actempowers the Government to extend the period of 12 months if, in itsopinion, circumstances exist to justify the same and, in effect, there is nodistinction between the Highways Act and the new LA Act. Referenceis made in this regard to State of Kerala and others Vs. T.M. PeterCand others [(1980) 3 SCC 554]. Reliance is placed upon the State ofKarnataka Vs. Ranganatha Reddy [(1977) 4 SCC 471] in supportof the contention that a State law enacted on a subject in the ConcurrentList in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution would stand protectedafter it receives the assent of the President under Article 254(2), even ifit is repugnant to the Central legislation on the same subject, and it isDargued that any such repugnancy would stand cured and would no longerbe a ground to invalidate the Highways Act.

33. It is contended that the question of comparing the HighwaysAct with the new LA Act would not arise at all, as any repugnant provisionin the Highways Act would continue to operate notwithstanding theEcontrary provision in the new LA Act, as the Validation Act of 2019,which revived the Highways Act, stood protected by the assent given bythe President of India under Article 254(2). It is pointed out that thePublic Notice under Section 15(2) of the Highways Act was issued on02.07.2016 and was followed by publication of the Notice under SectionF15(1) thereof on 01.02.2017, i.e., a mere 7 months later. It is argued that,even in a case where delay ensued due to factors beyond control or anyother incidental reason, it would not be sufficient in itself to declare thelegislation void on that short ground.

34. Having given serious and thoughtful consideration to the matter,Gwe must first take note of certain crucial aspects that practically clinchthe issue. The very foundation and basis of Article 254(2) of theConstitution is that a particular State enactment runs contra to theprovisions of a Central legislation on the same subject, but despite thesame it would stand protected after it receives the assent of the Presidentof India thereunder. Therefore, it is a foregone conclusion that disparityH

and discrimination would be writ large between the two enactments andaspects relating to their implementation. In such a situation, the questionof comparing the two legislations, for the purpose of making out a caseunder Article 14 of the Constitution, would not arise. Such an exercisewould be akin to comparing chalk with cheese, i.e., two essentially unequalentities.

35. Notably, in G.C.Mandawar (supra), a Constitution Benchobserved that it is conceivable that, when the same legislature enactstwo different laws but in substance they form one legislation, it might beopen to the Court to disregard the form and treat them as one law andstrike it down if, in their conjunction, they result in discrimination, butsuch a course would not be open where the two laws sought to be readin conjunction are by different Governments and by different Legislaturesas Article 14 does not authorize the striking down of a law of one Stateon the ground that, in contrast with a law of another State on the samesubject, its provisions are discriminatory and nor does it contemplate alaw of the Centre or of the State, dealing with similar subjects, beingheld to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of theprovisions thereof. The Bench pointed out that the sources of authorityfor the two statutes being different, Article 14 can have no application.This was the very logic that was applied by this Court in Ananthi Ammal(supra), while upholding the validity of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition ofLand for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978.

36. In P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra), a Constitution Bench wasdealing with an amendment to the old LA Act brought by the MadrasLegislature, whereby different principles were specified for fixingcompensation for lands acquired for housing schemes when comparedwith acquisition for other purposes. Significantly, this was not a casewhere Presidential assent was obtained under Article 254(2) of theConstitution. It was in those circumstances that the Bench observedupon a comparative study of the old LA Act and the Amending Act that,if a land is acquired for a housing scheme under the Amending Act, theclaimant would get a lesser value than what he would get for the sameland if it was acquired for a different public purpose under the old LAAct and such classification between persons whose lands were acquiredfor housing schemes and those whose lands were acquired for otherpublic purposes would not be a reasonable one under Article 14. It wason that ground that the Bench held the Amending Act to be void, as it A

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Aclearly infringed Article 14 of the Constitution. Similar was the situationin Deputy Commissioner and Collector, Kamrup Vs. Durga NathSarma [AIR 1968 SC 394] and Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra),as those cases also did not involve validation of a repugnant State lawunder Article 254(2) of the Constitution.

B37. In Ranganatha Reddy (supra), a Constitution Bench of 7Judges observed that the repugnancy, if any, between a State Act and aCentral Legislation on a subject in the Concurrent List would stand curedif the State Act receives the assent of the President under Article 254(2)and such repugnancy cannot thereafter be a ground to invalidate theState Act. Again, in Javed and others Vs. State of Haryana and othersC[(2003) 8 SCC 369], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held that it is notpermissible to compare a piece of legislation enacted by a State in exerciseof its own legislative power with the provisions of another law, thoughpari materia it may be, but enacted by the Parliament or by anotherState Legislature within its own power to legislate, as the sources ofDpower are different and so do differ those who exercise the power. Itwas observed that two laws enacted by two different Governments andby two different legislatures can be read neither in conjunction nor bycomparison for the purpose of finding out if they are discriminatory andArticle 14 does not authorize the striking down of a law of one State onthe ground that, in contrast with a law of the Centre or of another StateEon the same subject, its provisions are discriminatory.

38. In U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Jainul Islam andanother [(1998) 2 SCC 467], this Court was dealing with a State Actfor acquisition of land for executing housing schemes. However, thecompensation payable thereunder was lesser than that payable underFthe old LA Act. This State law was of the year 1965 and had receivedthe assent of the President. However, the old LA Act was amended bythe Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, whereby several newprovisions were inserted in the interest of the land owners, by enhancingthe amount of solatium and interest. The State Act of 1965, however,Gremained unchanged. The High Court came to the conclusion that theland owners would be entitled to the benefit of the provisions introducedin the old LA Act by the Amendment Act of 1984. The matter thereuponcame before this Court. This Court held that Section 55 of the State Actof 1965, which incorporated the provisions of the old LA Act, also intendedthat the amendments to the old LA Act relating to determination ofH

compensation would be applicable to acquisition of lands under the StateAct of 1965. Owing to this construction and interpretation of the statutoryprovision, this Court held that it would not be necessary to deal with thesubmission that, if the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1984 werenot applicable to acquisitions under the State Act of 1965, the provisionsof the old LA Act made applicable under the State Act of 1965 would bevoid on the ground of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution.This judgment, therefore, does not aid or advance the case of theappellants.

39. Similar logic was applied by this Court in Savitri Cairae (supra),while dealing with the very same State Act of 1965. Noting that it providedfor acquisition of land in terms of the old LA Act and by reason of thelegal fiction created thereunder, this Court held that, even if the acquisitionwas made under the State Act of 1965, if higher amount of compensationis payable under the old LA Act, such higher amount of compensationhas to be paid. Pertinently, this Court observed that, ordinarily, the equalityclause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be invoked inthe matter of enforcement of a State legislation vis-à-vis Parliamentarylegislation and/or legislation of another State.

40. We are, therefore, not inclined to entertain the attack launchedagainst the Highways Act on the strength of the so-called disparity anddiscrimination in the norms and procedures prescribed therein whencompared with the new LA Act. In this regard, we may point out thatthe Highways Act in the State of Tamil Nadu stood protected even atthe time the old LA Act was in force and effect, owing to the Presidentialassent that it had received under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, andit continued to operate and provide altogether different yardsticks foracquisition of land and payment of compensation till the advent of thenew LA Act.

41. Even otherwise, in so far as the issue of social impactassessment and the timelines for various steps in the new LA Act areconcerned, this very argument was advanced in G. Mohan Rao (supra)and this Court observed that the whole exercise of pointing out anyrepugnancy after a validating Act has obtained the assent of the Presidentis otiose for the whole purpose of Article 254(2) of the Constitution is toresuscitate and operationalize a repugnant Act or repugnant provisionsof such Act. The inescapable fact also remains that the second provisoto Section 19(7) of the new LA Act empowers the appropriate AB

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AGovernment to extend the stipulated period of 12 months for publishingthe Declaration after issuance of a Preliminary Notification if, in itsopinion, circumstances exist to justify the same. The third proviso requiresthat any such decision to extend the period shall be recorded in writingand the same shall be notified and uploaded on the website of the authorityconcerned. More importantly, once such extension is granted, there isBno outer limit prescribed and the proceedings would not lapse owing to atime stipulation. In T.M. Peter (supra), while dealing with the attackagainst absence of a time limit for Government sanction in the TownPlanning Act, 1932, this Court observed that, as the scheme of the saidenactment was urgent improvement of a town and it was left to theCGovernment to deal with it with expeditious dispatch, no precise timescale could be fixed in the Act owing to the myriad factors which wouldhave to be considered by the Government before granting sanction to ascheme and concluded by stating that the Court would not be powerlessto quash and grant relief where, arbitrary protraction or malafide inactionof the authorities caused injury to an owner.D

42. No doubt, the scheme of the new LA Act advocates timelymeasures being adopted in implementation of the acquisition and suchgeneral temporal restrictions would benefit the land owners, but theabsence of such restrictions in the Highways Act may not be reasonenough to invalidate it, as the very premise on which the Highways ActsEwas enacted by the State of Tamil Nadu was to cut down on time-consuming processes. In G. Mohan Rao (supra), this Court had notedthat the letter dated 25.07.2019 written by the State of Tamil Nadu, forobtaining the assent of the President of India for the Validation Act of2019, specifically emphasized that the three State Acts were made forFthe purpose of speedy acquisitions but the new LA Act rendered themrepugnant. Therefore, it is not the intendment or purpose of the HighwaysAct that the processes for acquisition of land thereunder should beprotracted or be ridden by avoidable delays.

43. A particular instance or a stray case, involving some delay inGthe acquisition of land under the Highways Act, may have to be dealtwith on its own individual merits but that would not be sufficient in itselfto invalidate the legislation itself. As noted above, K.M. Vittal Babu andT. Chinnappan have already approached the Madras High Courtchallenging the individual acquisition proceedings initiated against themand those cases have to be considered on their own merits and inH

accordance with law, without reference to this adjudication which islimited only to the attack on the validity of the Highways Act.

44. Further, there is no possibility of the State of Tamil Naduexercising arbitrary discretion in adopting one legislation or the other forthe purpose of acquiring lands, as contended by the learned counsel.Sections 3, 7 and 11 of the Validation Act of 2019 expressly exclude theoperation of the new LA Act for the purposes contained in the StateActs which stood revived owing to the assent of the President of India.Therefore, the State of Tamil Nadu would be bound to apply only theHighways Act for acquiring lands for the purposes reserved thereunder.

45. On the above analysis, these appeals are bereft of merit. TheTamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, is not liable to be invalidated on theground that its provisions manifest discrimination or arbitrariness whencompared with the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation andTransparency in Land Acquisition; Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,2013.

The appeals are dismissed.

Parties shall bear their own costs.

Ankit Gyan(Assisted by : Aarsh Choudhary, LCRA)

Appeals dismissed.

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