SHYAM KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. versus SHUBHAM JAIN on 2 February 2023

SHYAM KUMAR GUPTA & ORS.

v.

SHUBHAM JAIN

(Civil Appeal No. 765 of 2023)

FEBRUARY 02, 2023

[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]

Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 – s.17 r/w Or. IX,r.13 of CPC – Court of Small Causes – Application for setting asideex-parte decree – Maintainability – Requirement u/s. s.17 of the Actof 1887 of depositing the amount due and payable under the decreeat the time of filing application for setting aside ex-parte decree –Respondent, purported owner of a shop, filed suit against thepredecessor of appellants, who was a tenant in the shop – The suitwas for recovery of arrears of rent and for eviction on ground ofdefault in payment of rent – Trial Court decreed the suit ex-partewith costs – Defendant (predecessor of appellants) movedapplication u/Or. IX r.13 CPC and also an application u/s.17 of theAct, 1887, alongwith a tender seeking permission to deposit thedecretal amount, inclusive of the amount of costs – Objection takenby plaintiff-respondent, that under the decree in question, he wasentitled not only to arrears of rent and costs but also to damagesuntil possession continued with the defendant; and necessary deposittowards damages having not been made, the application for settingaside ex parte decree was not maintainable – Trial court upheld theobjections of respondent – High Court affirmed the order of trialcourt – Held: The impugned orders cannot be approved and theappellants deserve an opportunity to contest the suit on merits – Asum of Rs. 8,000/- towards arrears of rent had been quantified inthe decree and another sum of Rs. 3,212/- towards costs could havebeen taken as quantified – Though plaintiff-respondent was furtherheld entitled to receive Rs. 2,000/- per month towards rent/mesneprofits during the suit and until getting the actual vacant possessionof the suit shop after payment of requisite court fees but, the trialcourt did not specifically quantify the amount payable by thedefendant even until the date of decree – In the circumstances, whenthe defendant immediately moved the Court after noticing the decreein question and deposited the amount directly quantified thereunder

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Ai.e., the sum of Rs. 8,000/- towards arrears of rent and Rs. 3,212/-towards costs, totalling to Rs. 11,212/-, while seeking the order forsetting aside ex parte decree, it was not a case where the defendanthad ignored the requirements of deposit altogether – Moreover, thedecree in question had not been merely a money decree but hadbeen for eviction too – The trial court and the High Court viewedBthe requirements of s.17 of the Act of 1887 from an exacting andrather impractical standpoint and the bonafide attempt of thedefendant to seek a merit decision of the suit after due contest wastotally ignored – In response to queries of Supreme Court, theappellants immediately took bonafide steps and deposited theCamount relatable to rent / mesne profits until the month of April,2023 – They deserve an opportunity to contest the suit on merits –Accordingly, application filed by appellants-defendants under Or.IX,r.13 CPC allowed – Consequently, suit in question restored for beingconsidered on merits.DAllowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. In relation to the suit to which the ProvincialSmall Cause Courts Act, 1887 applies, an applicant seeking anorder to set aside the decree passed ex parte is required todeposit the amount due under the decree/judgment or has toEfurnish security for due performance of the decree or compliancewith the judgment. Even under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, whilemaking an order for setting aside the decree passed ex parte,the Court may put the defendant to terms as to costs, paymentinto Court or otherwise. However, these requirements need tobe visualized from a practical standpoint and cannot be appliedFas if to penalize the defendant for every mistake, even if theamount payable is not explicitly quantified in the decree inquestion. [Para 15][883-E-G]

2. For the purpose of the case at hand, as regards theamount payable, a sum of Rs. 8,000/- towards arrears of rent hadGbeen quantified in the decree and another sum of Rs. 3,212/-towards costs could have been taken as quantified. Of course,the plaintiff was further held entitled to receive Rs. 2,000/- permonth towards rent/mesne profits during the suit and until gettingthe actual vacant possession of the suit shop after payment of H

requisite court fees but, the Trial Court did not specificallyquantify the amount payable by the defendant even until the dateof decree. In the given circumstances, when the defendant,predecessor of the appellants, immediately moved the Court afternoticing the decree in question and deposited the amount directlyquantified thereunder i.e., the sum of Rs. 8,000/- towards arrearsof rent and Rs. 3,212/- towards costs, totalling to Rs. 11,212/-,while seeking the order for setting aside ex parte decree, it hadnot been a case where the defendant had ignored the requirementsof deposit altogether. Moreover, the decree in question had notbeen merely a money decree but had been for eviction too.Looking to the subject-matter of the suit and the overallcircumstances, a practical view was required to be taken and ifany further deposit or furnishing of security was considerednecessary, appropriate orders could have been passed in thatregard. Putting it differently, in terms of Section 17 of the Act of1887 read with Order IX Rule 13 CPC, the Court could haveextended the time for making deposit if so required, or couldhave put the defendant to the terms of security for performanceof the decree. [Para 15.1][883-G-H; 884-A-D]

3.1. The trial court and the High Court viewed therequirements of Section 17 of the Act of 1887 from an exactingand rather impractical standpoint that the bonafide attempt of thedefendant to seek a merit decision of the suit after due contesthas been totally ignored. In the present set of facts andcircumstances, prayer of the defendant to set aside ex partedecree could not have been denied for want of further deposit interms of the decree in question. [Para 15.2][884-E-F]

3.2. Even if the requirements of Section 17 of the Act of1887 are held to be mandatory, the present one had not been acase where the defendant had altogether ignored thoserequirements. [Para 15.3][884-G-H]

3.3. In response to the queries of this Court, the appellantsimmediately took bonafide steps and deposited the amount whichmay be relatable to rent/mesne profits until the month of April,2023. For this bonafide and prompt step (albeit taken after AB

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Aapproaching this Court), they do deserve an opportunity to contestthe suit on merits, particularly when the matter relates to a shopwhere the predecessor of the appellants had been continuing astenant and the plaintiff-respondent is seeking the decree foreviction only on the ground of default in payment of rent. [Para16][885-C-D]B

4. Accordingly, the application filed by the appellants underOrder IX Rule 13 CPC is allowed and thereby, the ex partejudgment and decree are set aside. Consequently, the said suitshall stand restored for being considered on its own merits. [Para17][885-E]C

Kedarnath v. Mohan Lal Kesarwari and Ors. 2002 ALLCJ 145 = (2002) 2 SCC 16] : [2002] 1 SCR 144 – heldinapplicable.

Case Law Reference

D[2002] 1 SCR 144held inapplicablePara 15.3

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 765 of

2023.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.09.2022 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench at MUA227 No. 3536 ofE2022.

Prateek Kumar, Ruchir Ranjan Rai, Desh Deepak Singh, RavindraVikram, Advs. for the Appellants.

Vinayak Mohan, Yatish Mohan, E. C. Vidya Sagar, Advs. for theFRespondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.

Leave granted.G

G2. This appeal, by the legal representatives of deceased defendantin the civil suitbearing No. 1 of 2015 for recovery of arrears of rent andfor ejectment, is directed against the order dated 21.09.2022 passed bythe High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in the petitionbearing No. 3536 of 2022, whereby the High Court has declined tointerfere with the order dated 01.09.2022 passed by the Court of AdditionalH

District and Sessions Judge (POCSO Act)-II, Raebareli,rejecting anapplication under Order IX Rule 13 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(‘CPC’) for setting aside ex parte judgment and decree dated 09.03.2016/16.03.2016.

3. Shorn of unnecessary details and briefly put, the relevantbackground aspects of the matter are that the respondent herein, assertinghis capacity as owner and proprietary right holder, filed the suit aforesaidagainst the late father of present appellants in the Small Causes Court,stating that the defendant was a tenant in the suit shop at a monthly rentofRs. 2,000/- per month and had failed to make payment of rent fromthe month of February, 2015 to the month of May, 2015, amounting toRs.8,000/- and 15% municipal tax despite notice.

4. It appears that in the said civil suit, the Trial Court held theservice of summons on the defendant sufficient and proceeded ex partefor want of appearance on behalf of the defendant; and after takingevidence, on 09.03.2016, decreed the suit with costs, for recovery ofarrears of rent in the sum of Rs. 8,000/- and for eviction of the defendantfrom the suit shop while also holding the plaintiff entitled to receivedamages from the defendant, for use and occupation of the suit shop, atthe rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month until delivery of actual vacant possession.The operative part of the judgment dated 09.03.2016 reads as under: - “The suit of the plaintiff is decreed ex-parte with cost againstthe defendant for recovery of the rent Rs. 8,000/- and for evictionof the shop in question and the defendant is ordered that he tohand over the vacant possession of the plaintiff’s shop which is atpresent situated in Municipality House No. 62/3, Ward No. 24,Malikmau Road, near Beliganj Phatak within the jurisdiction ofthe Municipality, Pargana, Tehsil and District Raebareli, the fourboundaries of which are – North by: Malikmau Road, South by:rest building of the plaintiff, East by: House of the plaintiff, Westby: House of Hariom are situated, within two months. The plaintiffwould be entitled to Receive Rs. 2,000/- per month as thecompensation for use of the aforesaid shop during the suit and tillhanding over the actual vacant possession and occupation of thesaid shop after paying the Court Fee in the Execution Department.”

5. Later on, the defendant, predecessor of the appellants, movedan application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC alongwith an applicationunder Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on 20.08.2016. He also moved A

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Aan application under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause CourtsAct, 1887 (‘the Act of 1887’), alongwith a tender seeking permission todeposit the decretal amount to the tune of Rs. 11,212/-, inclusive of theamount of costs. An objection was taken by the plaintiff-respondentagainst the application so moved by the defendant with the submissions,inter alia, that under the decree in question, he was entitled not only toBthe said arrears of rent and costs but also to damages at the rate of2,000/- per month until possession continued with the defendant; andnecessary deposit towards damages having not been made, the applicationfor setting aside ex parte decree was not maintainable. It is noticed thatduring pendency of the application aforesaid, the defendant, father ofCthe appellants, expired on 26.09.2017; and an application was moved bythe present appellantson 12.03.2018,for their substitution as applicantsin place of the deceased applicant.

6. The Trial Court took note of the respective submissions of theparties and upheld the objections of the plaintiff-respondent whileDobserving, inter alia, as under: - “The applicant Mata Prasad by submitting an application 7g2in the file of the present Miscellaneous Suit applied for depositingthe decretal amount Rs. 8,000/- and cost of the suit Rs. 3212/-total amount Rs. 11,212/- on which an order was passed by theECourt that the applicant can deposit the amount on which risk.Thus, it is clear that an amount of Rs. 11,212.00 has been depositedby the applicant Mata Prasad, whereas it is clear from perusal ofthe passed in the Small Cause Case no. 01/2015 and the decreedated 25-03-2016 passed in the pursuance of it, an order passedhas passed for paying the due rent from the month of February,F2016 to the month of May, 2016 (Total four months) @ Rs. 2,000/

- per month which is total Rs. 8,000/- and payment 15%Municipality Tax to be paid @ 9%. Apart from it, it is alsomentioned in the decree that until the defendant gives the possessionand occupation of the shop in question by vacating it to the plaintiff,Gtill then, compensation of use @ Rs. 2000/- per month be given tothe plaintiff from the defendant and the cost of the case be givento the plaintiff from the defendant.

It is clear from integrated perusal of the aforesaid judgmentand decree that the judgement and decree have not been compliedHby the applicant Mata Prasad. Neither the Municipality Tax nor SHYAM KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. v. SHUBHAM JAIN[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

the interest accrued on it and nor the compensation for use till thedate of filing the application under Section 13 have been paid byhim. Only the rent due since the month of February to the monthof May, 2015 @ Rs. 2,000/- per month and the cost of the caseRs. 3212/- total amount Rs. 11,212/- has been deposited by him,the balance amount which was payable by the applicant MataPrasad to the Opposite Party in compliance of the aforesaid decreeand judgment, in that regard, neither any amount has been depositedby the applicant Mata Prasad and nor any permission has beensought from the court by filing any application with regard tosubmitting any undertaking about the compliance of it. Hence, itis clear that Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act,1887 which imposes compulsory liability on the applicant that theapplicant after paying the total amount due under the ex-partedecree and judgment will file the application under Order 9 Rule13 C.P.C. Word by word and complete compliance of the aforesaidlegal provision has not been done by the applicant Mata Prasadand nor any undertaking/guarantee in this regard has beensubmitted in the Court by him that he is ready and willing to complywith the aforesaid Judgement and decree. In such situation, it isthe opinion of the Court that the instant Miscellaneous Civil Suitdue to not complying with Section 17 of the Provincial Small CausesCourt Act, 1887 is liable to be dismissed and the preliminaryobjection application 36g2 filed by the Opposite Party is liable tobe allowed.”

7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 01.09.2022,appellants approached the High Court by filing a petition under Article227 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, with the submissions that thedefendant had not been served in the said civil suit, and the plaintiff-respondentobtained the decree with concealment of facts. Further, itwas submitted that father of the appellants had moved the applicationimmediately after coming to know about ex parte decree, and compliedwith the requirements of Section 17 of the Act of 1887. It was alsosubmitted that the Trial Court had failed to examine if the plaintiff-respondentat all informed the defendant about his ownership afterpurchasing the shop in question.

8. The High Court, however, agreed with the Trial Court aboutnon-compliance of the requirements of Section 17 of the Act of 1887

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Aand, with reference to the decision of this Court in the case of Kedarnathv. Mohan Lal Kesarwari and Ors.: 2002 ALL CJ 145 [= (2002) 2SCC 16], proceeded to dismiss the petition essentially for want ofrequisite compliance by the defendant, of depositing the amount due andpayable under the decree in question. The High Court, inter alia,observed and held as under: -B

“Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perusedthe records, what emerges is that the SCC Suit filed by therespondent had been decided ex-parte vide order dated 09.03.2016against which an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPCCwas filed by the petitioners. Admittedly, the petitioners did notcomply with the provisions of Section 17 of the Act, 1887, whichprovides that the applicant, at the time of presenting the application,shall deposit in Court the amount due from him under the decreeor in pursuance of the judgment, or give such security for theperformance of the decree or compliance with the judgment asDthe Court may, on a previous application made in this behalf, haddirected.

Perusal of the impugned order dated 01.09.2022 would indicatethat the court below has considered the violation of Section 17 ofthe Act, 1887 by specifically recording that the petitioners haveEfailed to deposit the amount as was due in pursuance to the orderdated 09.03.2016.

The Apex Court in the case of Kedar Nath(supra) has heldthe provisions of Section 17 of the Act, 1887 to be mandatory, asper the observations in the judgment, which, for the sake ofFconvenience, are reproduced below:- “In the case at hand, the application for setting aside exparte decree was not accompanied by deposit in the court ofthe amount due and payable by the applicant under the decree.The applicant also did not move any application for dispensingwith deposit and seeking leave of the court for furnishing suchsecurity for the performance of the decree as the court mayhave directed. The application for setting aside the decree wastherefore incompetent. It could not have been entertained andallowed.”

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Accordingly, considering the law laid down by the Apex Court inthe case of Kedar Nath(supra) and the specific finding given by thecourt below of the provisions of Section 17 of the Act, 1887 nothaving been complied with rather having been violated by thepetitioners, this Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in theorders impugned. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.”

9. Being aggrieved by the order so passed by the High Court, theappellants have approached this Court. While considering the petitionleading to this appeal at the initial stage yesterday, i.e., on 01.02.2023and after taking note of all the facts and circumstances of the case,when this Court queried learned counsel for the appellants regarding theamount towards rent/mesne profits until now due, it was submitted thatappellants were ready and willing toimmediately deposit the amount sodue and, at request, the matterwas adjourned for a day.

10. It has been pointed out that today, a sum of Rs.1,90,000/-(Rupees One Lakh Ninety Thousand) has been deposited by theappellants in the Trial Court, in compliance of this Court’s order dated01.02.2023, which is said to be the amount further payable under thedecree in question, being that of rent/mesne profits @ Rs. 2,000/- permonth, from the month of June, 2015 to the month of April, 2023. Aphotostat of the tender presented to the Trial Court, with endorsementof deposit in the bank today, has also been placed before us.

11. Taking note of the steps so taken by the appellants and in thetotality of circumstances, while granting leave, we have heard learnedcounsel for the parties finally at this stage itself.

12. Learned counsel for the appellants has essentially submittedthat the Trial Court and the High Court have taken too rigid a view of thematter and have failed to consider that the amount directly due underthe decree in question, being a sum of Rs. 8,000/- towards arrears ofrent and another sum of Rs. 3,212/- towards costs had indeed beendeposited by the defendant; and in the given circumstances, the applicationfor setting aside ex parte decree could not have been dismissed only forwant of deposit of the amount towards further use and occupation of thesuit shop. It has also been submitted that it had not been a case of wilfulavoidance of the requirements of Section 17 of the Act of 1887 and inany case, the appellants, having now deposited the amount towards rent/

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Amesne profits until the month of April, 2023, deserve an opportunity tocontest the suit on merits. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondenthas duly supported the orders impugned and has contended that for wantof specific compliance of the requirements of Section 17 of the Act of1887 at the time of filing of the application for setting aside ex partdecree, the view as taken by the Trial Court, duly affirmed by the HighBCourt, cannot said to be unjustified.

13. Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissionsand having examined the record, we are clearly of the view that theimpugned orders cannot be approved and the appellants deserve anopportunity to contest the suit on merits.C

14. Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, onwhich reliance has been placed by the Trial Court and by the High Courtwhiledeclining the prayer for setting aside ex parte decree, reads asunder: - D“17. Application of the Code of Civil Procedure.—(1) Theprocedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of1908), shall save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Codeor by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of SmallCauses, in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arisingout of such suits:EProvided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decreepassed ex parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time ofpresenting his application, either deposit in the Court the amountdue from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment,or give such security for the performance of the decree orFcompliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previousapplication made by him in this behalf, have directed.

(2) Where a person has become liable as surety under the provisoto sub-section (1), the security may be realized in mannerprovided by Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908G(5 of 1908).”

14.1. Rule 13 of Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908could also be extracted for ready reference as under: - “13. Setting aside decree ex part against defendants.- Inany case in which a decree is passed ex parte against aH

defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree waspassed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the Courtthat the summons was not duly served, or that he was preventedby any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was calledon for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside thedecree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment intoCourt or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day forproceeding with the suit:

Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannotbe set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside asagainst all or any of the other defendants also:

Provided further that no Court shall set aside a decree passedex parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularityin the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant hadnotice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear andanswer the plaintiffs claim.

Explanation. -Where there has been an appeal against a decreepassed ex parte under this rule, and the appeal has been disposedof an any ground other than the ground that the appellant haswithdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this rule forsetting aside the ex parte decree.”

15. It could be reasonably noticed that in relation to the suit towhich the Act of 1887 applies, an applicant seeking an order to set asidethe decree passed ex parte is required to deposit the amount due underthe decree/judgment or has to furnish security for due performance ofthe decree or compliance with the judgment. Even under Order IX Rule13 CPC, while making an order for setting aside the decree passed exparte, the Court may put the defendant to terms as to costs, paymentinto Court or otherwise. However, these requirementsneed to be visualizedfrom a practical standpoint and cannot be applied as if to penalize thedefendant for every mistake, even if the amount payable is not explicitlyquantified in the decree in question.

15.1. For the purpose of the case at hand, as regards the amountpayable, a sum of Rs. 8,000/- towards arrears of rent had been quantifiedin the decree and another sum of Rs. 3,212/- towards costs could havebeen taken as quantified. Of course, the plaintiff was further held entitledto receive Rs. 2,000/- per month towards rent/mesne profitsduring the A

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Asuit and until getting the actual vacant possession of the suit shop afterpayment of requisite court fees but, the Trial Court did not specificallyquantify the amount payable by the defendant even until the date ofdecree. In the given circumstances, when the defendant, predecessorof the appellants, immediately moved the Court after noticing the decreein question and deposited the amount directly quantified thereunder i.e.,Bthe sum of Rs. 8,000/- towards arrears of rent and Rs. 3,212/- towardscosts, totalling to Rs. 11,212/-, while seeking the order for setting asideex parte decree, it had not been a case where the defendant hadignored the requirements of deposit altogether. Moreover, the decreein question had not been merely a money decree but had been forCeviction too. Looking to the subject-matter of the suit and the overallcircumstances, a practical view was required to be taken and if all anyfurther deposit or furnishing of security was considered necessary,appropriate orders could have been passedin that regard. Putting itdifferently, in terms of Section 17 of the Act of 1887 read with OrderIX Rule 13 CPC, the Court could have extended the time for makingDdeposit if so required, or could have put the defendant to the terms ofsecurity for performance of the decree.

15.2. However, for what has been noticed and extractedhereinabove, it is apparent that Trial Court and the High Court haveviewed the requirements of Section 17 of the Act of 1887 from such anEexacting and rather impractical standpoint that the bonafide attempt ofthe defendant to seek a merit decision of the suit after due contest hasbeen totally ignored. In our view, in the present set of facts andcircumstances, prayer of the defendant to set aside ex parte decreecould not have been denied for want of further deposit in terms of theFdecree in question.

15.3. The High Court, while dismissing the petition filed by theappellants and endorsing the views of the Trial Court, has proceeded torely upon the decision of this Court in the case of Kedarnath(supra),that the provisions of Section 17 of the Act of 1887 are held to beGmandatory. In our view, reference to the said decision remains inappositein the present case. Even if the requirements of Section 17 of the Act of1887 are held to be mandatory, the present one had not been a casewhere the defendant had altogether ignored those requirements. InKedarnath (supra), in the very passage reproduced by the High Court,it was clearly noticed that the applicant did not make any deposit and didH

not move any application for dispensing with deposit or seeking leave ofthe Court for furnishing security. In the backdrop of such facts, showingtotal non-compliance of the requirements of Section 17 of the Act of1887, this Court held the application for setting aside the decree asincompetent. It is difficult to apply the decision in Kedarnath (supra) tothe facts of the present case.

16. Apart from the above, where we find that the Trial Court andthe High Court had taken too technical and impractical a view of thematter, there is another strong reason for which we are inclined to acceptthe prayer for setting aside the decree passed ex parte in this case. Asnoticed, in response to the queries of this Court,the appellants haveimmediately taken bonafide steps and have deposited the amount whichmay be relatable to rent/mesne profits until the month of April, 2023. Forthis bonafide and prompt step (albeit taken after approaching this Court),inour view, they do deserve an opportunity to contest the suit on merits,particularly when the matter relates to a shop where the predecessor ofthe appellants had been continuing as tenant and the plaintiff-respondentisseeking the decree for eviction only on the ground of default in paymentof rent.

17. Accordingly and in view of the above, this appeal succeedsand is allowed in the manner that while setting aside the impugned ordersdated 01.09.2022 and 21.09.2022, the application filed by the appellantsunder Order IX Rule 13 CPC is allowed and thereby, the ex partejudgment and decree dated 09.03.2016/16.03.2016 are set aside.Consequently, the said suit shall stand restored for being considered onits own merits.

18. For the purpose of proceedings in the suit, looking to the timethat has elapsed, it shall definitely be required of the Trial Court to assignthe same a reasonable priority and to proceed expeditiously, while curbingagainst unnecessary delay. Further, in the interest of justice, it is alsoconsidered appropriate and hence provided that it shall be required ofthe appellants to submit their written statement(s) on or before 28.02.2023and thereafter, the Trial Court shall proceed with expedition, as indicatedabove.

19. As regards the amount deposited by the appellants, weleave it open for the respondent-plaintiff to apply for its withdrawal,if so advised; and if any such prayer is made by the plaintiff, the A

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886SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2023] 4 S.C.R.

Asame may be given due consideration by the Trial Court in accordancewith law.

20. The parties through their respective counsel shall stand atnotice to appear before the Trial Court on 28.02.2023.

21. Pending applications also stand disposed of.B

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose

(Assisted by : Vinayak and Keya Rebello, LCRAs)

Appeal allowed.

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