M/S EUREKA BUILDERS & ORS. versus GULABCHAND S/O VELJEE DAND SINCE DECEASED BY L.RS. & ORS. ETC. ETC. on 3 May 2018

[2018] 4 S.C.R. 779

M/S EUREKA BUILDERS & ORS.

v.

GULABCHAND S/O VELJEE DAND SINCE DECEASED BYL.RS. & ORS. ETC. ETC.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 4757-4760 of 2018)

MAY 3, 2018

[R. K. AGRAWAL AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.]

Karnataka Village Abolition Act, 1961: Grant of property andre-grant of property in favour of the original holders by the State –Devolution on holders – Held: Person can only transfer to otherperson a right, title or interest in any tangible property which he ispossessed of to transfer it for consideration or otherwise – Once itis proved that on the date of transfer of any tangible property, theseller of the property did not have any subsisting right, title or interestover it, then a buyer of such property would not get any right, titleand interest in the property purchased by him for consideration orotherwise – Such transfer would be an illegal and void transfer –On facts, appellants failed to substantiate the right, title and interestof the original holders in the suit land through whom they claim toderive interest in the suit land, whereas the respondent was able toprove his subsisting right, title and interest in the suit land – Originalholders parted with the suit land, one through court auctionproceedings in 1942 and the other by direct sale/purchase in 1943in favour of the purchaser– Furthermore, though the originalholders got back the land by re-grant but they lost all their rights,title and interest in the suit land on the expiry of 12 years from thedate of re-grant in their favour (assuming the re-grant to be valid)in 1985 – They again lost their ownership rights due to dismissal oftheir two suits – In view thereof, the appellants, have no locus toclaim any interest in the suit land – Thus, the High Court rightlyheld that neither the original holders and nor appellants, whoclaimed through original holders, had any right to claim any interestin the suit land – Maharashtra Hereditary Offices Act.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 It is a settled principle of law that a person canonly transfer to other person a right, title or interest in any tangible

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Aproperty which he is possessed of to transfer it for considerationor otherwise. In other words, whatever interest a person ispossessed of in any tangible property, he can transfer only thatinterest to the other person and no other interest, which hehimself does not possess in the tangible property. So, once it isproved that on the date of transfer of any tangible property, theBseller of the property did not have any subsisting right, title orinterest over it, then a buyer of such property would not get anyright, title and interest in the property purchased by him forconsideration or otherwise. Such transfer would be an illegaland void transfer. The appellants have failed to substantiate theCright, title and interest of the original holders (three PATIL) inthe suit land through whom they claim to derive interest in thesuit land, whereas the respondent (plaintiff) has been able to provehis subsisting right, title and interest in the suit land on the dateof filing of the suit, out of which these appeals arise. The appellants, therefore, have no locus to claim any interest in theDsuit land. [Para 40-42, 39] [790-C-E; 790-A-B]

1.2 The reasons as to why the appellants failed to provethe subsisting right, title and interest of the original holders(intending sellers-three PATIL) in the suit land are more thanone. First, the original holders (three PATIL) had filed two suits,inErelation to the suit land asserting therein their ownership rightsover the suit land against the present plaintiff and other membersof SV but both the suits were dismissed by the Civil Court on23.11.2004. These dismissal attained finality regardless of thefact as to on what grounds they suffered dismissal. TheseFdismissals were binding on the original holder (three PATIL). Afortiori, these dismissals are binding on the appellants too becausethe appellants were claiming through the original holders (threePATIL). It is for this reason, the original owners did not have anysubsisting right, title and interest in the suit land, which they could have or/and were capable to transfer to the appellantsGwhether for consideration or otherwise on the date when theyentered into an agreement of sale of the suit land to the appellantson 23.03.2001. Second, it cannot be disputed that original holders(three PATIL) had parted with the suit land long back by legalmode of transfer, one through Court Auction proceedings in 1942H

and the other by direct sale/purchase on 14.05.1943 in favour ofSV. These rights were then devolved on his legal representativesby inheritance consequent upon the death of SV. Since then, theoriginal holders (three PATIL) did not have any subsisting right,title and interest in the suit land.[Para 46-51] [791-A-F]

1.3 It also cannot be disputed, that the Civil Court hadalready recognized the rights, title and interest of the legalrepresentatives of SV in the suit land in O.S. No.9/1969 filed bythem against the purchaser-Society. This suit was decreed infavour of legal representative of SV on 26.08.1977 and remainedupheld up to this Court. It is due to these reasons also, all therights, title and interest of original holders (three PATIL) in thesuit land stood extinguished. [Para52-53] [791-G-H; 792-A]

1.4 Assuming for the sake of argument that as a result ofthe re-grant orders made by the State in favour of the originalholders (three PATIL), the rights, title and interest in the suitland again reverted to them in 1973 but they failed to exercisetheir right of ownership over the suit land for a long time, hencetheir right of ownership stood extinguished. It was only after 31years from the re-grant order, the original holders woke up fromslumber and filed two suits against the plaintiff and other membersof SV in the Civil Court. The two civil suits also suffered dismissalfrom the Civil Court on 23.11.2004 and attained finality. [Para58-59] [792-E-G]

1.5 Whatever so-called rights, title and interest which theoriginal holders derived from the orders of re-grant in 1973 inthe suit property in their favour, the same stood extinguished byefflux of time. The reason was that in order to keep such newrights intact and enforceable, the original holders (three PATIL)were under a legal obligation to have filed a suit for claiming adeclaration and possession of the suit land and this ought to havebeen done by them within 12 years from the date of re-grant, i.e.,1973. They, however, failed to do so within 12 years and whenthey actually tried to exercise their rights by filing the suit in2004 (after 31 years), by then it was too late to exercise suchrights. By that time, their rights in the suit land stoodextinguished. [Para 60-62] [792-G-H; 793-A-B]

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A1.6 Section 27 of the Limitation Act deals withextinguishment of right to property. It says that at thedetermination of the period prescribed in the Act for any personto institute a suit for possession of any property, his right to suchproperty shall be extinguished. Articles 64 and 65 of the Scheduleprovide 12 years period for filing a suit to claim possession ofBany immovable property. The period of 12 years prescribed inthese two articles is required to be counted from “the date ofdispossession” (Article 64) and “when the possession of thedefendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff” (Article 65). [Para63] [793-C-D]

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1.7 The original holders failed to file the civil suit againstthe plaintiff claiming possession of the suit land on the strengthof their new title namely, re-grant in relation to the suit land,within 12 years from the date of re-grant and, therefore, by virtueof Section 27, their all rights, title and interest in the suit land gotDextinguished. [Para 64] [793-D-E]

1.8 Neither the original holders (three PATIL) and nor theappellants could take any benefit of the orders of re-grant dated31.03.1973 and 01.04.1973 made by the State so as to divest thelegal representatives of SV (plaintiffs) from their rights, title andEinterest in the suit land which they had legally acquired throughCourt Auction in 1942 and direct purchase of part of the suit landon 14.05.1943 from the original holders (three PATIL) in 1942/43. The plaintiff in alternative can be held to have acquired titleagainst the original holders by operation of law. The reason isnot far to seek. [Para 65, 68] [793-F; 794-A]F

1.9 The plaintiff continued to remain in lawful possessionof the suit land since 1942/1943, first through SV and after hisdeath through his legal representatives. It is not disputed thatthe original holders (three PATIL) were aware of the ownershiprights of SV over the suit land since 1942/1943 as SV got the suitGland by State Auction proceedings and also by direct sale/purcahse. It was proved that the possession of SV over the suitland was throughout long, continuous, uninterrupted, open andpeaceful with assertion of ownership from 1942 till 2004 to theknowledge of the whole world. The facts confirm the possessoryHrights, title and interest of the plaintiff in the suit land against everyone including the original holders by operation of law. [Para69-71] [794-B-D]

1.10 A right in the property once extinguished by operationof law, it cannot be revived unless the law itself provides for itsrevival in a particular situation. Such is not the case here. Thereis, however, another infirmity in the case of the appellants, whichdisentitle them to claim any relief in relation to the suit land. Theappellants, for proving the right of ownership of the originalholders in the suit land, have placed reliance on the orders dated31.03.1973 and 01.04.1973 of the State by which the State isalleged to have made re-grant of the suit land in favour of theoriginal holders (three PATIL). [Para 75-77] [794-G-H; 795-A]

1.11 In the absence of any adjudication of the right ofownership of the original holders (three PATIL) on the strengthof these two orders by the competent Court as against the otherstakeholders having an interest in the suit land and especiallythe legal representatives of SV, it is not possible to give any benefitof these two orders in favour of the original holders (three PATIL)in these proceedings. That apart, what is the effect of passing ofthe two orders on the rights, title and interest of the purchasersof the suit land because admittedly, the suit land was sold to thepurchaser (Late SV) prior to passing of these two orders andwhether these orders will ipso facto divest the purchasers of theirrights, title and interest in the suit land were required to be goneinto by the competent Court after affording an opportunity to suchaffected persons.[Para 78-79] [795-B-D]

1.12 The original holders (three PATIL) though filed thecivil suits to get these issues adjudicated against the affectedpersons but failed in their attempt to get these issues adjudicated.In other words, by the time the original holders (three PATIL)approached the Civil Court, their all rights in the suit land itselfgot extinguished on account of efflux of time (31 years). Thus,the appellants have no case. [Para 80, 81] [795-E-F]

1.13 The High Court was right in holding that neither theoriginal holders (three PATIL) and nor the appellants, who claimedthrough original holders, had any right to claim any interest inthe suit land. [Para 82] [795-F-G]

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ACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4757-4760 of 2018.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.09.2015 of the High Courtof Karnataka Dharwad Bench in Regular First Appeal Nos. 100017,100018, 100016 & 100099 of 2015 (PAR &POS).

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Shekhar Naphade, Sr. Adv., R. S. Hegde, Prakash Jawalkar, Ms.Farhat Jahan Rehmani, Chandra Prakash, Abhikalp Pratap Singh, RajeevSingh, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Prateek Rusia, Advs. for the Appellants.

Basava Prabhu S. Patil, Sr. Adv., Vasant Ron, Balaji Srinivasan,C. M. Poonacha, Ms. Vaishnavi Subrahmanyam, Ms. Pratikasha Mishra,CMs. Anindita Srinivasan, G. V. Chandrashekar, N. K. Verma, Ms. AnjanaChandrashekar, Ranbir Singh Yadav, Raghavendra S. Srivatsa, VenkitSubramonium T. R., Rahat Bansal, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals arise from the common final judgment and orderdated 30.09.2015 passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Circuit Benchat Dharwad in R.F.A. Nos.100017 of 2015, 100018 of 2015, 100016 of2015 and 100099 of 2015, whereby the Division Bench of the High Courtdisposed of the appeals by allowing the plaintiff’s appeal and accordinglyEmodified the finding of the Trial Court as regards the status and theownership rights of the plaintiff in the suit land and held that the plaintiffis the owner of the suit land and is, therefore, entitled to claim his 1/5[th]share in it along with defendants Nos.1 to 4, who are legal representativesof late Shah Veljee Kanjee.F

3. In order to appreciate the issues involved in these appeals, it isnecessary to set out the background facts, which led to filing of the suitby the predecessor-in-title of respondent Nos.1 and 2 and nowrepresented by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 against the appellants andremaining respondents No.3 to 34 herein out of which these appealsGarise.

4. The case has a history of litigation as it would be clear from thenarration of the facts stated hereinbelow. The facts mentionedhereinbelow are taken from SLP paper books and its list of dates.

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5. The appellants herein are defendant Nos. 18 to 25 (who arebuilder, firm and its partners) whereas respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are thelegal representatives of original plaintiff and respondent Nos. 3 to 34 areproforma defendants in a civil suit (O.S. No.37/2010) out of which theseappeals arise. The contest in these appeals is essentially among theappellants and respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

6. The dispute relates to a land bearing CTS Nos. 361 and 366 ofCTS Ward No.1 (originally bearing RS Nos. 20/1/& 20/2 admeasuring 3Acres 20 Guntas and 1 Acre 25 Guntas respectively) situated at KusugalRoad, Keshwapur, Hubli described in detail in the schedule to the plaint(hereinafter referred to as “the suit land”).

7. The suit land was a “watan” property under the MaharashtraHereditary Offices Act (hereinafter referred to as “the MHO Act”) andon its repeal in 1961, was governed by the Karnataka Village AbolitionAct, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the KVA Act”).

8. The suit land originally belonged to three persons namely,Marigouda Patil, Basangouda Patil and Adveppagouda Patil (hereinafterreferred to as “three PATIL”).

9. On 23.10.1915, three PATIL leased out land bearing CTS No.366 (3 acres 20 guntas) to one Chaturbhuj Ratansi for a period of 50years whereas the land bearing CTS No. 361 (1 acre 25 guntas) waspermanently leased out to one Kanjee Ghelabhai Shet alias Gujjar on09.03.1920.

10. In 1942, land bearing CTS No.361 was sold in Court Auctionproceedings and one person by name – Shah Veljee Kanjee purchasedthe said land being the highest bidder.

11 On 14.05.1943, Shah Veljee Kanjee purchased another parcelof land bearing CTS No.366 by direct sale/purchase. Shah Veljee Kanjeedied on 02.12.1957 leaving behind his widow-Gunwantibai, two majordaughters and four minor sons. By inheritance, the legal representativesstepped into his shoes and became the joint owners of the suit land.

12. On 19.12.1957, the widow and 2 major daughters of late ShahVeljee Kanjee sold the suit land to one Gadag Co-operative Cotton SalesSociety Ltd.-defendant No. 17 (hereinafter referred to as the “Society”).

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A13. The son of late Shah Veljee Kanjee, who is plaintiff (sincedead) and defendant Nos. 1 to 4 in the present suit out of which theseappeals arise felt aggrieved by the sale dated 19.12.1957 made by theirmother and two sisters in favour of the Society and accordingly filedcivil suit being O.S. No.9/1969 praying therein for a declaration that thesale made by their mother and two sisters is bad in law and void to theBthextent of plaintiff’s share (5/8) in the suit land. The mother, two sistersand the Society contested the suit as defendants.

14. This suit was, however, decreed on 26.08.1977 by the PrincipalCivil Judge (Sr. Division) in plaintiff’s favour. It was held that the salemade by the mother and two sisters of the plaintiff in favour of theCSociety is illegal and thus is not binding on the plaintiff to the extent of thhis 5/8 share in the suit land.

15. This decree was challenged by the purchaser (Society) in theHigh Court and later in this Court but was not successful. In other words,the Society lost the legal battle throughout up to this Court and resultantly,Dthe decree dated 26.08.1977 passed by the Principal Civil Judge (Sr.Division) in plaintiff’s favour became final.

16. In execution of this decree, the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1-4, who are the legal representatives of late Shah Veljee Kanjee, wereaccordingly placed in joint possession of their shares in the suit land.E

17. As mentioned above, the appellants herein are the builder,firm and its partners. They claimed to have entered into an agreementwith the original owners (three PATIL) on 23.03.2001 for purchase ofthe suit land on certain terms and conditions.

18. In the year 2004, the original owners (three PATIL) claimingFtheir ownership rights over the suit land filed two civil suits being O.S.Nos.364 & 365 of 2004 against the legal representatives of Shah VeljeeKanjee and the Society. The Civil Court dismissed both these civil suitsas barred by time vide judgment dated 29.01.2007. The two dismissalsattained finality because the three PATIL did not pursue the matter furtherGin appeals to the higher Courts.

19. During interregnum period, there were several rounds oflitigation in civil, revenue and rent courts among the parties and theirrepresentatives. Similarly some subsequent developments in relation tothe suit land conferring some rights by the State on the parties also took H

place. However, at this stage, it is not necessary to give details of thislitigation and its development. The same will be referred to at a laterstage while dealing with these submissions.

20. It is basically with the aforementioned background facts, oneson of Shah Veljee Kanjee (respondent No.1 herein (since dead) andrepresented by his legal representatives son/daughter as respondent Nos.1and 2 filed civil suit (O.S.No.37/2010) on 23.02.2010 in the Court ofPrincipal Civil Judge, Sr. Division at Hubli out of which these appealsarise against 27 defendants which included the members of Shah VeljeeKanjee family, their legal heirs, legal representatives of original holders(three PATIL) and two intending purchasers/buyers of the suit land,namely, Society and the other, M/s Eureka builders - a firm and theirpartners (appellants herein).

21. The suit was filed for partition and separate possession ofplaintiff’s 1/5[th] share in the suit land and also for grant of permanentinjunction restraining the two intending buyers/purchasers of the suitland from interfering in plaintiff’s possession over the suit land.

22. In substance, the plaintiff (respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein)had claimed the aforementioned reliefs on the basis of his title over thesuit land which, according to him, was already adjudicated and recognizedin his favour by the Civil Court vide judgment dated 26.08.1977 passedin O.S. No.9/1969 and it remains upheld up to this Court.

23. So far as other family members of Shah Veljee Kanjee(defendant Nos. 1 (a) to (c), 2 and 4) are concerned, they filed theircounter claim and admitted the claim set up by the plaintiff in the suit.

24. The suit was mainly contested by appellant No.1 herein i.e.the Builder (defendant No. 18) on several grounds such as, firstly, thesuit is not maintainable because proper reliefs were not claimed by theplaintiff; Second, the suit property is not properly valued; Third, the plaintis insufficiently stamped; Fourth, the suit is barred by limitation.

25. So far as the merits of the claim is concerned, appellant No.1(defendant No.18) denied the plaintiff’s title over the suit land and averredinter alia that the original holders of the suit land (three PATIL) withwhom they entered into an agreement to purchase the suit land werehaving subsisting right, title and interest in the suit land by virtue of twore-grant orders (31.03.1973 and 01.04.1973) made by the State in their A

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Afavour under the KVA Act of 1961 on the application of the originalholders (three PATIL) and, therefore, the original holders (three PATIL)were competent to enter into an agreement to transfer the suit land intheir favour on 23.03.2001.

26. It was also averred that whatever ownership rights in the suitBland which the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 4 were possessing intheir favour stood extinguished on account of the two re-grant ordersdated 31.03.1973 and 01.04.1973 made by the State in favour of theoriginal holders (three PATIL) and, therefore, in the light of thesesubsequent events which came into existence, no decree can now bepassed in favour of plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 4 in relation to theCsuit land for any relief on the strength of their title.

27. Issues were framed and parties adduced their evidence. Byjudgment/decree dated 07.11.2014, the III Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Hublidecreed the plaintiff’s suit in part and passed the preliminary decree ofpartition and separate possession in relation to the suit land in plaintiff’sDfavour as prayed in the suit.

28. The Additional Senior Civil Judge answered almost all theissues in plaintiff’s favour and held that the plaintiff is entitled for 1/5[th]share in the leasehold right in respect of the suit scheduled property andso also defendant Nos. 1 (a) to (c), 2 and 4 are entitled to claim their 1/E5[th] share each in leasehold rights in respect of the suit land along withthe plaintiff.

29. The plaintiff, the legal representatives of defendant Nos. 2, 3and 4 and defendant No. 17- Society felt aggrieved of certain findingsabout the ownership status of the plaintiff in the suit land and accordinglyFfiled four separate first appeals in the High Court at Bangalore.

30. So far as the present appellants are concerned, they did notprefer any appeal as they seemed to be satisfied with the judgment ofthe Trial Court.

31. By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench disposed of allGthe four appeals. The High Court allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiffand accordingly modified the finding of the Trial Court as regards thestatus and the ownership rights of the plaintiff in the suit land and heldthat the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land and is, therefore, entitled toclaim his 1/5[th] share in the suit land along with defendants, who areHlegal representatives of late Shah Veljee Kanjee like the plaintiff.

32. It is against this judgment of the High Court, the appellantsherein (defendant Nos. 18 to 25 - who are builder, firm and its partners)have felt aggrieved and filed the present appeals by way of special leavepetitions in this Court.

33. Heard Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel for theappellants and Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel, Mr.G.V. Chandrashekhar, Mr. Ranbir Singh Yadav, Mr. Raghavendra S.Srivastava, learned counsel for the respective respondents.

34. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at length andon perusal of the record of the case, we find no merit in these appeals.In our view, the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the HighCourt cannot be faulted with. We are, therefore, inclined to uphold thereasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court by assigningour reasoning infra.

35. At the outset, we observe that so far as the right, title andinterest of the appellants in the suit land is concerned, the appellantsneither claim and nor do they have a right to claim any right, title andinterest in the suit land in their own rights. In other words, the status ofthe appellants in this litigation are that of the intending purchasers of thesuit land from the original holders of the suit land (three PATIL).

36. In our view, if the original holders (three PATIL) are able toprove their subsisting right, title and interest over the suit land againstthe plaintiff, the appellants would be able to get the relief in the suitbecause they are claiming through original holders (three PATIL). But ifthe original holders (three PATIL) are not able to prove their subsistingright, title and interest over the suit land against the plaintiff, then theappellants would also loose the case.

37. As mentioned above, the appellant alone was contesting thesuit as defendant No.18. It is not in dispute that original holders (threePATIL) did not contest the suit. It is also not in dispute that the appellantwas satisfied with the judgment/decree passed by the Trial Court,therefore, they did not file any appeal in the High Court.

38. It is with these background facts of the case, we have toexamine the question arising in these appeals as to whether the respondent(plaintiff) was able to prove his subsisting title over the suit land on thedate of filing of the suit and, if so, how, or in the alternative, whether the A

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Aappellants (builder, firm and its partners) were able to prove the subsistingtitle of the original holders (three PATIL) over the suit land, if so, how.

39. In our considered opinion, the appellants have failed tosubstantiate the right, title and interest of the original holders (three PATIL)in the suit land through whom they claim to derive interest in the suitBland, whereas the respondent (plaintiff) has been able to prove hissubsisting right, title and interest in the suit land on the date of filing ofthe suit, out of which these appeals arise. The appellants, therefore,have no locus to claim any interest in the suit land.

40. It is a settled principle of law that a person can only transferto other person a right, title or interest in any tangible property which heCis possessed of to transfer it for consideration or otherwise.

41. In other words, whatever interest a person is possessed of inany tangible property, he can transfer only that interest to the other personand no other interest, which he himself does not possess in the tangibleproperty.D

42. So, once it is proved that on the date of transfer of any tangibleproperty, the seller of the property did not have any subsisting right, titleor interest over it, then a buyer of such property would not get any right,title and interest in the property purchased by him for consideration orotherwise. Such transfer would be an illegal and void transfer.

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43. In such eventuality and subject to any terms and conditions ifagreed between the parties, a buyer will have a right to claim refund ofsale consideration from his seller, which he paid for purchase of theproperty under the law of contract. The reason is that the contract topurchase has failed and, therefore, the parties have to be restored backFto their original positions, which existed at the time of execution of thecontract.

44. This principle of law may apply inter se the original holders(three PATIL) of the land and the intending buyers of the suit land withwhich we are not concerned in this case because the present litigationGdoes not arise between these parties and nor we are deciding the interse rights of these parties in these appeals.

45. This principle we have mentioned only to clarify the inter serights of the parties against each other in relation to the suit land andespecially the right of the appellants against the original holders(threePATIL) and not beyond it. H

46. In our considered opinion, the reasons as to why the appellantsfailed to prove the subsisting right, title and interest of the original holders(intending sellers-three PATIL) in the suit land are more than one as areset out by us hereinbelow.

47. First, the original holders (three PATIL) had filed two suits(O.S. Nos. 364 and 365 of 2004) in relation to the suit land assertingtherein their ownership rights over the suit land against the present plaintiffand other members of Shah Veljee Kanjee but both the suits weredismissed by the Civil Court on 23.11.2004.

48. These dismissal attained finality regardless of the fact as toon what grounds they suffered dismissal. These dismissals were bindingon the original holder (three PATIL). A fortiori, these dismissals arebinding on the appellants too because the appellants were claimingthrough the original holders (three PATIL).

49. It is for this reason, we are of the view that the original ownersdid not have any subsisting right, title and interest in the suit land, whichthey could have or/and were capable to transfer to the appellants whetherfor consideration or otherwise on the date when they entered into anagreement of sale of the suit land to the appellants on 23.03.2001.

50. Second, it cannot be disputed that original holders (three PATIL)had parted with the suit land long back by legal mode of transfer, onethrough Court Auction proceedings in 1942 and the other by direct sale/purchase on 14.05.1943 in favour of Shah Veljee Kanjee.

51. Since then, the original holders (three PATIL) did not haveany subsisting right, title and interest in the suit land because whateverrights, title and interest which they had in the suit land, the same weretransferred to Shah Veljee Kanjee through Court Auction proceedings in1942 and by direct sale/purchase on 14.05.1943. These rights were thendevolved on his legal representatives by inheritance consequent uponthe death of Shah Veljee Kanjee.

52. It also cannot be disputed, as taken note of above, that theCivil Court had already recognized the rights, title and interest of thelegal representatives of Shah Veljee Kanjee in the suit land in O.S. No.9/1969 filed by them against the purchaser-Society. This suit was decreedin favour of legal representative of Shah Veljee Kanjee on 26.08.1977and remained upheld up to this Court.

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53. It is due to these reasons also, all the rights, title and interestof original holders (three PATIL) in the suit land stood extinguished.

54. Now coming to the main argument of Mr. Shekhar Naphade,learned senior counsel for the appellants, which he pressed in servicewith vehemence.

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55. Learned senior counsel urged that the original holders of thesuit land (three PATIL) having parted with the suit land in 1942 and14.05.1943, again got back the suit land by way of re-grant in their favourby order dated 31.03.1973 in respect of land (CTS No. 361) passed bythe State under KVA Act of 1961 and by other re-grant order datedC01.04.1973 passed by the State in respect of land (CTS No. 366).

56. It was, therefore, his submission that in this way, the title inthe suit land stood reverted to the original holders (three PATIL) fromthe dates of these two orders.

57. On this basis, the contention of the learned counsel for theappellants was that whatever rights, title and interest in the suit landwhich the respondent (plaintiff) might have got in 1942 and on 14.05.1943while acquiring the suit land, the same stood extinguished on account ofre-grant made by the State in favour of original holder (three PATIL) in1973 by the two orders referred above.

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E58 We find no merit in this submission for more than one reason.Assuming for the sake of argument that as a result of the re-grant ordersmade by the State in favour of the original holders (three PATIL), therights, title and interest in the suit land again reverted to them in 1973 butthey failed to exercise their right of ownership over the suit land for along time, hence their right of ownership stood extinguished.F

59. It was only after 31 years from the re-grant order, the originalholders woke up from slumber and filed two suits (O.S. Nos.364 and365/2004) against the plaintiff and other members of Shah Veljee Kanjeein the Civil Court. It is not in dispute that the two civil suits also suffereddismissal from the Civil Court on 23.11.2004 and attained finality.

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60. In our considered opinion, whatever so-called rights, title andinterest which the original holders derived from the orders of re-grant in1973 in the suit property in their favour, the same stood extinguished byefflux of time.

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61. The reason was that in order to keep such new rights intactand enforceable, the original holders (three PATIL) were under a legalobligation to have filed a suit for claiming a declaration and possessionof the suit land and this ought to have been done by them within 12 yearsfrom the date of re-grant, i.e., 1973.

62. They, however, failed to do so within 12 years and when theyactually tried to exercise their rights by filing the suit in 2004 (after 31years from 1973), by then it was too late to exercise such rights in law.By that time, their rights in the suit land stood extinguished.

63. Section 27 of the Limitation Act deals with extinguishment ofright to property. It says that at the determination of the period prescribedin the Act for any person to institute a suit for possession of any property,his right to such property shall be extinguished. Articles 64 and 65 of theSchedule provide 12 years period for filing a suit to claim possession ofany immovable property. The period of 12 years prescribed in these twoarticles is required to be counted from “the date of dispossession” (Article64) and “when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to theplaintiff” (Article 65).

64. As held supra, the original holders (three PATIL) failed to filethe civil suit against the plaintiff claiming possession of the suit land onthe strength of their new title namely, re-grant in relation to the suit land,within 12 years from the date of re-grant and, therefore, by virtue ofSection 27 of the Limitation Act, their all rights, title and interest in thesuit land got extinguished.

65. In view of these reasons, we are of the considered view thatneither the original holders (three PATIL) and nor the appellants couldtake any benefit of the orders of re-grant dated 31.03.1973 and 01.04.1973made by the State so as to divest the legal representatives of Shah VeljeeKanjee (plaintiffs) from their rights, title and interest in the suit landwhich they had legally acquired through Court Auction and directpurchase in 1942/43.

66. This issue can be examined from yet another legal angle onthe admitted facts situation arising in the case.

67. It is not in dispute that Shah Veljee kanjee, in the first instance,acquired legal and valid title in the suit land through Court Auctionproceedings in the year 1942 and second, by direct purchase of the partof the suit land on 14.05.1943 from the original holders (three PATIL).

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68. In our view, the plaintiff in alternative can be held to haveacquired title against the original holders(three PATIL) by operation oflaw. The reason is not far to seek.

69. Admittedly, the plaintiff continued to remain in lawful possessionof the suit land since 1942/1943, first through Shah Veljee Kanjee andBafter his death through his legal representatives. It is not in dispute thatthe original holders (three PATIL) were aware of the ownership rightsof Shah Veljee Kanjee over the suit land since 1942/1943 as Shah VeljeeKanjee got the suit land by State Auction proceedings and also by directsale/purcahse.

70. In this way, it was proved that the possession of Shah VeljeeKanjee over the suit land was throughout long, continuous, uninterrupted,open and peaceful with assertion of ownership from 1942 till 2004 to theknowledge of the whole world.

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71. The aforesaid undisputed facts confirm the possessory rights,Dtitle and interest of the plaintiff in the suit land against everyone includingthe original holders (three PATIL) by operation of law.

72. Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel then referredthe provisions of MHO Act and KVA Act and pointed out the nature ofgrant and the re-grant of the suit land made in favour of the originalEholders by the State and how it devolved on the holders etc.

73. In our view, this submission need not be dealt with in detailbecause it has no relevance in the light of our findings recorded aboveagainst the appellants.

74. In other words, once the rights of the original holders in theFsuit land stood extinguished, this submission does not survive forconsideration on its merits.

75. A right in the property once extinguished by operation of law,it cannot be revived unless the law itself provides for its revival in aparticular situation. Such is not the case here.

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76. There is, however, another infirmity in the case of theappellants, which disentitle them to claim any relief in relation to the suitland.

77. As mentioned above, the appellants, for proving the right ofownership of the original holders (three PATIL) in the suit land, have H

placed reliance on the two orders dated 31.03.1973 and 01.04.1973 ofthe State by which the State is alleged to have made re-grant of the suitland in favour of the original holders (three PATIL).

78. In our view, in the absence of any adjudication of the right ofownership of the original holders (three PATIL) on the strength of thesetwo orders by the competent Court as against the other stakeholdershaving an interest in the suit land and especially the legal representativesof Shah Veljee Kanjee, it is not possible to give any benefit of these twoorders in favour of the original holders (three PATIL) in theseproceedings.

79. That apart, what is the effect of passing of the two orders onthe rights, title and interest of the purchasers of the suit land becauseadmittedly, the suit land was sold to the purchaser (Late Shah VeljeeKanjee) prior to passing of these two orders and whether these orderswill ipso facto divest the purchasers of their rights, title and interest inthe suit land were required to be gone into by the competent Court afteraffording an opportunity to such affected persons, namely, legalrepresentatives of late Shah Veljee Kanjee.

80. The original holders (three PATIL) though filed the civil suitsto get these issues adjudicated against the affected persons but failed intheir attempt to get these issues adjudicated. In other words, by the timethe original holders (three PATIL) approached the Civil Court, their allrights in the suit land itself got extinguished on account of efflux of time(31 years) as has been held supra.

81. It is for these reasons also, we are of the view that theappellants have no case.

82. In our view, therefore, the High Court was right in its reasoningand the conclusion in holding that the original holders (three PATIL)having lost all their rights, title and interest in the suit land on the expiryof 12 years from the date of re-grant in their favour (assuming the re-grant to be valid) in 1985 and secondly, they again lost their ownershiprights due to dismissal of their two suits (O.S. Nos. 364 and 365 of 2004)on 23.11.2004, neither the original holders (three PATIL) and nor theappellants, who claimed through original holders, had any right to claimany interest in the suit land.

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796SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2018] 4 S.C.R.

A83. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the consideredopinion that looking at the issues involved in this case from any angle,these appeals have no merits. The appeals thus fail and are accordinglydismissed.

BNidhi Jain Appeals dismissed.

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