PRALHAD SHANKARRAO TAJALE & ORS. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY (REVENUE) & ANR. on 8 March 2018

PRALHAD SHANKARRAO TAJALE & ORS.

v.

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH ITS

SECRETARY (REVENUE) & ANR.

(Civil Appeal No. 2601 of 2018)

MARCH 08, 2018

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]

Practice and Procedure – Procedural laws vis-a-vis substantivelaws – Construction of – Writ petition filed by appellants challengingorder passed by State Minister for Revenue, dismissed by SingleJudge – Intra court appeal filed by appellants – Division Benchpermitted the appellants to withdraw the said appeal with liberty tofile review petition before Single Judge – Review petition filed byappellants along with application for condonation of delay in filingthe review petition – Review petition had some defects in its filingand the appellants were directed by Registry of High Court to curethe defects – Defects not cured by appellants – Review petition listedbefore Registrar (Judicial-1) for passing appropriate orders –Registrar granted four weeks’ time to the appellants to cure thedefects also directing that failing to cure the defects will result inrefusing the registration of the review petition, i.e., it will result inrejection of the review petition – Application filed by appellantsfiled for setting aside the said order, dismissed by Single Judge onground of delay – On appeal, held: As far as possible, procedurallaws should not be construed like a penal provision to punish theparities – Having regard to the nature of controversy involved inthe case, High Court should have been liberal and condoned thedelay and granted the appellants one more opportunity to cure thedefects – Impugned order set aside – Delay in filing the applicationfiled by appellants before High Court is condoned.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Procedural laws should not be construed like apenal provision to punish the parities as far as possible. Havingregard to the nature of controversy involved in the case, the HighCourt should have been liberal in taking a view in the matter andaccordingly should have condoned the delay and granted the

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Aappellants one more opportunity to cure the defects. The interestof justice demanded one more opportunity to the appellants tocomply with the orders of the Registry. [Paras 16, 17] [631-B, G]

Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah & Anr.,AIR 1955 SC 425 : [1955] SCR 1 – relied on.

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1.2 The delay in filing the application filed by the appellantsbefore the High Court is hereby condoned. The appellants aregranted one month’s time as an outer limit to cure the defectspointed out by the Registry in their Review Application.[Para 19] [632-A]

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Case Law Reference

[1955] SCR 1 relied on

Para 16

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2601of 2018.D

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.07.2017 of the High Courtof Judicature at Bombay in Civil Application No.120/2016.

Ms. Deeplaxmi S. Matwankar, Dr. Ravindra Chingale, ChanderShekhar Ashri, Advs. for the Appellants.

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Nishant Katneshwarkar, Ms. Deepa M. Kulkarni, Advs. for theRespondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. Leave granted.F

2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and orderdated 18.07.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay inCivil Application No.120 of 2016 in Rejected Case No.149 of 2016 inRejected Case No.148 of 2016 whereby the Single Judge of the HighCourt dismissed the appellants’ application on the ground of delay.

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3. In order to appreciate the short question involved in the appeal,few facts need mention infra.

4. The appellants herein were the Writ/Review Petitioners beforethe High Court in the proceedings out of which this appeal arises. On28.08.2012, the appellants filed a petition being Writ Petition No.8516 of H

2012 before the High Court of Bombay questioning therein the legalityand correctness of the order dated 14.05.2012 passed by the StateMinister for Revenue (MH). It was in relation to a certain land disputewhereby the appellants’ revision application was dismissed.

5. On 27.11.2012, the Single Judge of the High Court dismissedthe appellants’ writ petition. The appellants felt aggrieved and filed intracourt appeal (L.P.A.No.33 of 2013) before the Division Bench.

6. By order dated 22.03.2014, the Division Bench permitted theappellants to withdraw the intra court appeal and granted them liberty tofile review petition before the Single Judge against the order by whichtheir writ petition was dismissed.

7. The appellants accordingly filed review application (ReviewApplication No.3330/2015 in W.P.No.8516/2012) on 17.04.2014. Theappellants also filed application for condonation of delay in filing theReview application.

8. According to the Registry of the High Court, the ReviewApplication had some defects in its filing. The appellants were, therefore,directed to cure the defects so that the Review Application could belisted for orders before the appropriate Bench.

9. As the appellants did not cure the defects pointed out by theRegistry of the High Court, the Review Application was listed beforethe Registrar (Judicial-1) on 19.10.2015 for passing appropriate ordersin filing the Review Application.

10. The Registrar, by his order dated 19.10.2015 further grantedfour weeks’ time to the appellants to cure the defects and at the sametime directed that failing to cure the defects will result in refusing theregistration of the Review Application, i.e., it will result in rejection ofthe Review application.

11. Felt aggrieved by the order dated 19.10.2015 passed by theRegistrar, the appellants filed an application being Civil Application No.120of 2016 and prayed therein for setting aside of the order dated 19.10.2015passed by the Registrar and for restoration of Review Application No.St. 3330 of 2015, which was dismissed due to non-compliance of theRegistrar’s mandatory order dated 19.10.2015.

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12. By impugned order, the Single Judge dismissed the appellants’application essentially on the ground of delay, which has given rise tofiling of the present appeal by way of special leave by the Writ/Reviewpetitioners in this Court.

13. On 05.03.2018, we requested Ms. Deepa M. Kulkarni, learnedBcounsel for the State of Maharashtra, who was present in Court, toaccept notice on behalf of the Respondent-State to enable us to disposeof the appeal finally on that day having regard to the short issue involvedin the appeal. Learned counsel, on our request, accepted the notice onbehalf of the respondent-State.

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14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusalof the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal and whilesetting aside of the impugned order, we restore the review ApplicationNo. (St. 3330/2015) for its hearing by the appropriate Bench in accordancewith law.D15. Paras 8, 12 and 13 of the impugned order, which deal with theissue, read as under:

“8. In Review Petition, office raised objections on 14[th] July,2015. On 1[st] June, 2015 as the Applicants failed to removeEall office objections, Section Officer made noting that alloffice objections are not removed on 14[th] July, 2015.Thereafter the matter appeared before the learnedRegistrar (Judicial-I) on 15[th] July, 2015, 19[th] August, 2015,21[st] September, 2015 and 19th October, 2015. No oneappeared on behalf of Applicants before the RegistrarF(Judicial-I) for removal of office objections. Hence, theRegistrar (Judicial-I) passed conditional order on19[th] October, 2015 granting four weeks time to remove alloffice objections, failing which, matter will standrejected.

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12. As the Applicants failed to disclose the sufficient causefor delay, I am of the opinion that Applicants have not madeout any case for allowing the Civil Application.

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13. Hence, Civil Application stand rejected.”

16. This case reminds us of the apt observations made by thelearned Judge of this Court, Vivian Bose J., in Sangram Singh vs.Election Tribunal Kotah & Anr., AIR 1955 SC 425. His Lordship,speaking for the Bench, in his distinctive style of writing with subtlepower of expression reminded the Courts as to how the code of procedureshould be construed in the context of rights of the parties to the lis,which affects their lives and properties. His Lordship reminded thatprocedural laws should not be construed like a penal provision to punishthe parities as far as possible. The following is the classic passage, whichis always followed for doing substantial justice to the parties to the lis:

“A code of procedure must be regarded as such. It isprocedure something designed to facilitate justice andfurther its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment andpenalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Tootechnical a construction of sections that leaves no room forreasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore beguarded against (provided always that justice is done toboth sides) lest the very means designed for the furtheranceof justice be used to frustrate it. Our laws of procedure aregrounded on a principle of natural justice which requiresthat men should not be condemned unheard, that decisionsshould not be reached behind their backs, that proceedingsthat affect their lives and property should not continue intheir absence and that they should not be precluded fromparticipating in them. Of course, there must be exceptionsand where they are clearly defined they must be given effectto. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, ourlaws of procedure should be construed, wherever that isreasonably possible, in the light of that principle.”

17. In our opinion, keeping in view the aforementioned observationsand further having regard to the nature of controversy involved in thecase, the High Court should have been liberal in taking a view in thematter and accordingly should have condoned the delay and granted theappellants one more opportunity to cure the defects. The interest ofjustice demanded one more opportunity to the appellants to comply withthe orders of the Registry.

18. As a consequence, the appeal succeeds and is, accordingly,allowed. The impugned order is set aside.

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632SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2018] 3 S.C.R.

A19. The delay in filing the application filed by the appellants beforethe High Court is hereby condoned. The appellants are granted onemonth’s time as an outer limit to cure the defects pointed out by theRegistry in their Review Application.

20. On curing the defects by the appellants, the Review ApplicationBbe placed before the appropriate Bench for passing orders in accordancewith law.

Divya Pandey

Appeal allowed.

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