RAJARAM S/O SRIRAMULU NAIDU (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH L.RS. versus MARUTHACHALAM (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH L.RS on 18 January 2023

RAJARAM S/O SRIRAMULU NAIDU (SINCE DECEASED)THROUGH L.RS.

v.

MARUTHACHALAM (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH L.RS.

(Criminal Appeal No. 1978 of 2013)

JANUARY 18, 2023

[B. R. GAVAI AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]

Money Lending – The appellant’s wife subscribed to chit funds(1992 and 1995) with the respondent for which two signed blankcheques were submitted as security – After maturity of the chit funds,appellant and his wife sought release of the subscription amount –However, respondent presented those cheques for encashmentwithout any intimation to appellant – Said cheques weredishonoured as the appellant had closed the account – Respondentfiled two complaint cases u/s 138 of NI Act – Both cases weredismissed by the trial Court – Thereafter, respondent filed suits forrecovery of money on the basis of the Promissory Notes –Both thesuits were dismissed – Appeals against the judgments in the criminalmatters were allowed by the High Court and order of convictionand sentence was passed – Also, the suits were decreed by the HighCourt – On appeal, held: Considering the criminal appeals first,the trial court found that Income Tax Returns of the complainantdid not disclose that he lent amount to the accused, and that thedeclared income was not sufficient to give loan of Rs. 3 lakhs –Thestandard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that ofpreponderance of probabilities – Applying this principle, the trialCourt had found that the accused had rebutted the presumption onthe basis of the evidence of the defence witnesses and attendingcircumstances – In the instant case, the defence raised by theappellant satisfies the standard of ‘preponderance of probability’ –High Court was not justified in reversing the order of acquittal ofthe appellant – Insofar as civil appeals are concerned, High Court

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Aon basis of the evidence on record, relying on the preponderanceof probability, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had thefinancial ability to lend sum of Rs.3 lakhs – As the appellant’s wifewas not examined as witness, the High Court found that the bestavailable evidence was withheld by the defendants/appellants andBas such principle of adverse inference applicable – Therefore, noreason to interfere with the judgments and the orders passed by theHigh Court in civil appeals.

Disposing of the appeals, the CourtCHELD: 1. Consider the criminal appeals first, after analyzingall these pieces of evidence, the Trial Court found that the IncomeTax Returns of the complainant did not disclose that he lentamount to the accused, and that the declared income was notsufficient to give loan of Rs.3 lakh. Therefore, the case of theDcomplainant that he had given a loan to the accused from hisagricultural income was found to be unbelievable by the TrialCourt. The Trial Court found that it was highly doubtful as towhether the complainant had lent an amount of Rs.3 lakh to theaccused. The Trial Court also found that thecomplaint had failedEto produce the promissory note alleged to have been executedby the accused on 25th October 1998. After taking intoconsideration the defence witnesses and the attendingcircumstances, the learned Trial Court found that the defencewas a possible defence and as such, the accused was entitled toFbenefit of doubt. The standard of proof for rebutting thepresumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. Applyingthis principle, the Trial Court had found that the accused hadrebutted the presumption on the basis of the evidence of thedefence witnesses and attending circumstances. In the presentGcase, this Court is of the considered opinion that the defenceraised by the appellant satisfies the standard of “preponderanceof probability”.The High Court was not justified in reversing theorder of acquittal of the appellant. [Paras 20, 25 and 27][819-E-H; 820-G-H; 821-C]H

2. A distinguishing fact between the criminal proceedingsand the civil proceedings in the present case is that, while in thecriminal proceedings the complainant had failed to produce thepromissory notes, in the civil proceedings, the complainant hadproved the promissory notes. The High Court found that the CivilAppeals were required to be decided on the basis of thepreponderance of probabilities. The High Court found that thecomplainant had established that he was working as a LIC Agent,that his father was owning extensive agricultural properties andthat he was deriving agricultural income. The High Court, on thebasis of the evidence placed on record, relying on thepreponderance of probability, came to a conclusion that the plaintiffhad the financial ability to lend the sum of Rs.3 lakh as on 20thOctober 1998. The High Court also found that the appellant’swife was not examined as a witness in the said case so as toprobabilize the defence plea. The High Court found that the bestavailable evidence was withheld by the defendants/appellantsherein and as such, the principle of adverse inference was alsoapplicable. [Para 29][821-E-G]

3. The High Court rightly observed that the adjudication incivil matters is based on preponderance of probabilities whereasadjudication in criminal cases is based on the principle that theaccused is presumed to be innocent and the guilt of the accusedshould be proved to the hilt and the proof should be beyond allreasonable doubt. [Para 30][822-A-B]

4. In the result, this Court pass the following order:

(i) Criminal Appeal Nos. 1978 of 2013 and 1990 of 2013 areallowed and the common judgment of conviction dated 28thOctober 2008 and order of sentence dated 30th October 2008respectively are quashed and set aside. The judgments and ordersdated 10th July 2011 passed by the Trial Court is confirmed.

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A(ii) Civil Appeal Nos. 10500 of 2013 and 10501 of 2013 aredismissed. However, the decrees of the High Court are modified,thereby restricting them to the amount already deposited by theappellants in this Court in the civil and criminal proceedings,along with interest accrued thereon. [Para 32][822-E-G]

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RohitbhaiJivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat and Anr.(2019) 18 SCC 106 - held inapplicable.

Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418 :[2019] 6 SCR 555; Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019)C4 SCC 197 : [2019] 2 SCR 24 ; Kalamani Tex and Anrv. P. Balasubramanian (2021) 5 SCC 283 - referredto.

Case Law Reference

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CRIMINAL/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CriminalAppeal No.1978 of 2013.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2008 and 30.10.2008of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in C.A. Nos.1031 &1032 ofF2001.

With

Criminal Appeal No.1990 Of 2013, Civil Appeal Nos.10500 And10501 of 2013.G

Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ms. Neha Sharma, Anil Agarwalla,Advs. for the Appellants.

V. Prabhakar, Pramit Saxena, R. Chandrachud, Advs. for theRespondents.H

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B. R. GAVAI, J.

1. The Criminal Appeals challenge the common judgment andorder of conviction and sentence dated 28[th] October 2008 and 30[th] October2008 passed by the Madras High Court whereby the Appellant has beenconvicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881(hereinafter referred to as “the N.I. Act”) and has been sentenced to afine of Rs. 7 Lakhs in each case in respect of two cheques for an amountof Rs. 3.5 Lakhs.

2. The Civil Appeals challenge the judgments dated 08[th] August2011 and 03[rd] February 2012 passed by the Madras High Court wherebythe Original Suits filed by the plaintiff- respondents for recovery of moneyon the basis of promissory notes were decreed.

3. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to astheir status before this Court.

4. Since both the Criminal Appeals arise out of a common judgment,we consider it apposite to refer to the facts in Criminal Appeal No.1978of 2013. Insofar as the Civil Appeals are concerned, while they arise outof different judgments, for the sake of convenience, we shall refer to thefacts arising from Civil Appeal No.10501 of 2013.

5. The present appeals arise from the following factual matrix:

5.1In 1992, the Appellant-Rajaram’s wife subscribed to a 5-year chit-fund with one Maruthachalam, the Respondent inCriminal Appeal No. 1978/2013 and Civil Appeal No.10500/2013. Upon the Respondent-Maruthachalam’s persuasionthat, in order to be a successful bidder, a security by way ofa blank cheque must be submitted, the Appellant submittedtwo signed blank cheques bearing nos. 237954 and 237956on behalf of his wife, since she did not have a bank account.It is to be noted that the cheques were drawn on the accountof M/s Brinda Engineering, the sole proprietorship concernof the Appellant, maintained with the Laxmi Vilas BankLtd.

5.2It is further the case of the Appellant that in 1995, his wifesubscribed to yet another 5-year chit-fund with theRespondent-Maruthachalam.

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A5.3.In 1997, the bank account on which the said cheques weredrawn was closed due to non-operation.

5.4The first chit matured in 1997 and, since the wife of theAppellant was never a successful bidder, thus, the Appellantand his wife repeatedly requested the Respondent to releaseBthe amount of the chits, but the Respondent never did so.On the contrary, the Respondent promised to keep theamount as a deposit and pay interest. Similarly, the secondchit matured in 1999, whereafter also the wife of theAppellant was never a successful bidder. Thereafter,repeated requests for releasing the subscription amount toCthe tune of Rs. 6 lakhs for both the chits were made ontheir behalf, but to no avail. Finally, the Appellant and hiswife threatened the Respondent with legal action,whereupon the Respondent immediately presented thecheques for encashment without any information orDintimation to the Appellant.

5.5The Cheque No. 237954 was dated 20[th] October 1999 infavour of Respondent-Nachimuthu (who happens to be thebrother-in-law of Maruthachalam) for an amount of Rs.3,50,000/, and was presented for encashment on 04[th]ENovember 1999 by the Respondent through his bankerIndian Overseas Bank. The said cheque returned unpaidon 14[th] November 1999 with an endorsement stating“account closed”.

5.6The other Cheque No. 237956 was dated 25[th] October 1999Fin favour of the Respondent-Maruthachalam for an amountof Rs. 3,50,000/-, and was presented for encashment on04[th] November 1999 by the Respondent through his bankerIndian Overseas Bank. The said cheque too returned unpaidon 14[th] November 1999 with an endorsement stating“account closed”.

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5.7Statutory Notices dated 15[th] November 1999 were sent inrespect of the aforesaid dishonoured cheques, which wereduly replied by the accused/Appellant denying the existenceof any legally enforceable debt and stating therein that theRespondent is liable to pay the chit amount along withH

subsequent interest. Since the amount was not paid, theRespondents instituted Complaint Cases under Section 138of the N.I. Act, being CC No. 26 of 2000 in respect ofCheque No. 237954 and CC No. 32 of 2000 in respect ofCheque No. 237956. Both the cases were dismissed by thelearned Trial Court on 10[th] July 2001 vide separatejudgments.

5.8Pursuant to the dismissal of the aforesaid cases, both theRespondents instituted civil/original suits for recovery ofmoney on the basis of Promissory Notes.

5.9Original Suit No. 112/2003 (earlier OS No. 602/2002) wasinstituted by the Respondent-Nachimuthu, alleging that theAppellant had borrowed a sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs on 20[th]October 1998 from him and had executed a promissorynote on the same day thereby promising to repay the samewith interest at 24% per annum. It was further alleged thatthe Appellant had issued a cheque on 20[th] October 1999for Rs. 3,50,000/- towards the discharge of his liability andwhen the same was presented for encashment, it wasdishonoured as the Appellant had closed the account.Criminal Case No. 32/2000 was pursued under Section 138of the N.I. Act which was dismissed against which an appealwas pending before the High Court.

5.10Another Original Suit No. 266 of 2004 (earlier OS 746 of2002) was instituted by the Respondent-Maruthachalam,alleging that the Appellant had borrowed a sum of Rs. 3Lakhs on 25[th] October 1998 from him and had executed apromissory note on 25[th] October 1998, thereby promisingto repay the same with interest at 24% per annum. It wasfurther alleged that the Appellant issued a cheque on 20[th]October 1999 for Rs. 3,50,000/- towards the discharge ofhis liability and when the same was presented forencashment, it was dishonoured as the Appellant had closedthe account. Criminal Case No. 26/2000 was pursued underSection 138 of the N.I. Act which was dismissed againstwhich an appeal was pending before the High Court.

5.11Original Suit No. 112 of 2003 and Original Suit No. 266 of2004 came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 06[th] January AB

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A2004 and 29[th] July 2005 respectively. As against both thejudgments, appeals were preferred before the High Court.

5.12The Appeals against the judgments in criminal matters wereallowed by the High Court vide common judgment and orderof conviction and sentence dated 28.10.2008 and 30[th]BOctober 2008.

5.13In Appeal, Original Suit No. 266 of 2004 and Original SuitNo. 112 of 2003 were decreed by the High Court videjudgments dated 08[th] August 2011 and 03[rd] February 2012respectively.

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5.14The Appeals against all the 3 judgments of the High Courtare before us and are being disposed of vide this commonjudgment.

6. We have heard Ms. Neha Sharma, learned counsel appearingfor the Appellants in all the appeals, and Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned counselDappearing for both the Respondents in all the appeals.

7. Ms. Neha Sharma submits that the High Court has erroneouslyreversed the well-reasoned judgements of the learned Trial Court. Shesubmitted that blank cheques issued in the year 1992 by way of securityfor chit-funds were misused by the Respondents in the year 1999. SheEfurther submitted that in the year 1999, when the cheques were sent forencashment, the Appellant was no longer the proprietor of M/s BrindaEngineering and the bank account on which the said cheques were drawnwas not operated after 1992, and had already closed in 1997 due tonon-operation. She further submitted that even before the account wasFclosed down, the wife of the Appellant became the sole proprietor of theenterprise, and thus, the appellant could not have signed the said chequesin the capacity of the proprietor of M/s Brinda Engineering.

8. The learned counsel submitted that the Respondents herein didnot have the financial capacity to lend an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- eachas on 20[th] October 1998 and 25[th] October 1998, when the promissoryGnotes were said to have been executed. It is further submitted thatalthough it was the Respondents’ case that they had given the amountsout of their agricultural income, since they had not declared the same intheir Income Tax Returns from 1992-1999, thus, there was no materialto show that they could have lent money. To buttress her submissions, H

the learned counsel relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of,Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa[1],

9. Per contra, Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned counsel for theRespondents, submits that the Appellant-Raja Ram had failed to produceany material evidence to substantiate the claim that his wife subscribedto the chit-funds run by Respondent, Maruthachalam. He submitted thatthe High Court rightly observed that no material was produced by theAppellant-Raja Ram to prove that the cheques and promissory noteswere issued only as a security for such a chit. He further submitted thatno legal proceedings were initiated for the recovery of the alleged amountdue by the Appellant either.

10. The learned counsel submitted that there arose no occasionfor the Appellant-Raja Ram to issue a blank cheque in the year 1992 fora chit to be subscribed much later in the year 1995. It is further submittedthat even if certain amounts are not accounted for in the Income TaxReturns, this is a matter concerning only the defaulter and RevenueAuthority. Thus, a borrower cannot be allowed to take advantage of thesame solely on the ground that such an amount does not reflect in theIncome Tax Returns. The learned counsel relied on the judgments ofthis Court in the cases of Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar[2], RohitbhaiJivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat and Anr[3], Kalamani Tex and Anrv. P. Balasubramanian[4]to buttress his submissions.

11. We shall first consider the Criminal Appeals.

12. This Court in the case of Baslingappa v. Mudibasappa(supra) has summarized the principles on Sections 118(a) and 139 of theN.I. Act. It will be relevant to reproduce the same.

“25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court inthe above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarisethe principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:

25.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was forthe discharge of any debt or other liability.

1 (2019) 5 SCC 418

2 (2019) 4 SCC 197

3 (2019) 18 SCC 106

4 (2021) 5 SCC 283

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25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttablepresumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probabledefence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption isthat of preponderance of probabilities.

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25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accusedto rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on thematerials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probabledefence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawnnot only from the materials brought on record by the parties butalso by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.

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25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come inCthe witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed anevidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.

25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come in thewitness box to support his defence.”

13. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that once theDexecution of cheque is admitted, Section 139 of the N.I. Act mandates apresumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or otherliability. It has however been held that the presumption under Section139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raisethe probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumptionis that of preponderance of probabilities. It has further been held that toErebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence ledby him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by thecomplainant in order to raise a probable defence. It has been held thatinference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only fromthe materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference tothe circumstances upon which they rely.F

14. In the said case, i.e. Baslingappa v. Mudibasappa (supra),the learned Trial Court, after considering the evidence and material onrecord, held that the accused had raised a probable defence regardingthe financial capacity of the complainant. The accused was, therefore,acquitted. Aggrieved thereby, the complainant preferred an appeal beforeGthe High Court. The High Court reversed the same and convicted theaccused. This Court found that unless the High Court came to a findingthat the finding of the learned Trial Court regarding financial capacity ofthe complainant was perverse, it was not permissible for the High Courtto interfere with the same.

15. In the present case, the accused appellant had examined Mr.HSarsaiyyn, Income Tax Officer, Ward No.18, Circle (II) (5), who produced certified copies of the Income Tax Returns of the complainantfor the financial year 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99. Thecertified copies of the Income Tax Returns established that thecomplainant had not declared that he had lent Rs.3 lakh to the accused.It further established that the agricultural income also was not declaredin the Income Tax Returns.

16. The learned Trial Court further found that from the incomewhich was shown in the Income Tax Return, which was duly exhibited,it was clear that the complainant(s) did not have financial capacity tolend money as alleged.

17. The appellant had also examined D.W.2-Thiru Iyyappan,Assistant Manager, City Union Bank, Ramnagar Branch with regard tobank transactions made by the sole proprietorship firm, M/s BrindaEngineering.

18. D.W.3-Mr. Subramaniam, Manager, Lakshmi Vilas Bank,Ganapathy Branch was also examined on behalf of the defence. Thesaid witness also deposed that the complainant had signed the applicationform to introduce the accused to open the account in the bank.

19. D.W.4-Mr. Ganesan, Village Administrative Officer, GanapathyVillage was also examined and he deposed that the land in S.F. No. 591/3 and 592/3 was in joint ownership, and, in the aforesaid survey numbers,the names of 27 persons were found.

20. After analyzing all these pieces of evidence, the learned TrialCourt found that the Income Tax Returns of the complainant did notdisclose that he lent amount to the accused, and that the declared incomewas not sufficient to give loan of Rs.3 lakh. Therefore, the case of thecomplainant that he had given a loan to the accused from his agriculturalincome was found to be unbelievable by the learned Trial Court. Thelearned Trial Court found that it was highly doubtful as to whether thecomplainant had lent an amount of Rs.3 lakh to the accused. The learnedTrial Court also found that the complaint had failed to produce thepromissory note alleged to have been executed by the accused on 25[th]October 1998. After taking into consideration the defence witnessesand the attending circumstances, the learned Trial Court found that thedefence was a possible defence and as such, the accused was entitledto benefit of doubt. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumptionis that of preponderance of probabilities. Applying this principle, thelearned Trial Court had found that the accused had rebutted thepresumption on the basis of the evidence of the defence witnesses andattending circumstances.

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A21. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal islimited. Unless the High Court found that the appreciation of the evidenceis perverse, it could not have interfered with the finding of acquittalrecorded by the learned Trial Court.

22. Insofar as the reliance placed by Mr. Prabhakar on thejudgment of this Court in the case of Bir Singh v. Mukesh KumarB(supra) is concerned, in the said case, though the accused was convictedby the learned Trial Court, which conviction was maintained by theAppellate Court, the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction interferedwith the same and acquitted the accused. This Court found that inexercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code ofCCriminal Procedure, 1973, the High Court could not, in the absence ofperversity, upset concurrent findings of fact. In any case, in the saidcase, the accused had not led evidence with regard to the financialcapacity of the complainant. This Court held that once a cheque wassigned and handed over by the accused, it would attract presumptionunder Section 139 of the N.I. Act in the absence of any cogent evidence Dto show that the cheque was not issued in the discharge of a debt.

23. In the case of Kalamani Tex and another v. P.Balasubramanian (supra), the learned Trial Court had dismissed thecomplaint. In appeal, at the behest of the complainant, the same wasallowed and the accused were convicted for the offence punishableEunder Section 138 of the N.I. Act. In an appeal at the behest of theoriginal accused, this Court while affirming the order of the High Courtobserved thus:

“18. Considering the fact that there has been an admitted businessrelationship between the parties, we are of the opinion that thedefence raised by the appellants does not inspire confidence orFmeet the standard of “preponderance of probability”. In theabsence of any other relevant material, it appears to us that theHigh Court did not err in discarding the appellants’ defence andupholding the onus imposed upon them in terms of Section 118and Section 139 of NIA.”

G24. It can thus be seen that in the facts of the said case, this Courtfound that the defence raised by the appellants/accused did not inspireconfidence or meet the standard of “preponderance of probability”.

25. In the present case, we are of the considered opinion that thedefence raised by the appellant satisfies the standard of “preponderanceof probability”.H

26. Insofar as the reliance on the judgment of this Court in thecase of Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat and Anr. (supra)is concerned, in the said case, the learned Trial Court had acquitted theaccused, the High Court, in appeal, reversed the acquittal and convictedthe accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. Affirming the order of the High Court, this Court held that merelyby denial or merely by creation of doubt, the accused cannot be said tohave rebutted the presumption as envisaged under Section 139 of theN.I. Act. This Court held that unless cogent evidence was led on behalfof the accused in defence of his case, the presumption under Section139 of the N.I. Act could not be rebutted. As such, the said judgmentalso would not be applicable to the facts of the present case.

27. In that view of the matter, we are further of the consideredview that the High Court was not justified in reversing the order ofacquittal of the appellant.

28. That leaves us to consider the Civil Appeals. Insofar as theCivil Appeals are concerned, the High Court, by two different judgmentsand orders, has reversed the judgments and orders of the learned TrialCourt dismissing the suits, thereby decreeing them. It is a settledproposition of law that the standard of proof in criminal proceedingsdiffers with that in civil proceedings.

29. A distinguishing fact between the criminal proceedings andthe civil proceedings in the present case is that, while in the criminalproceedings the complainant had failed to produce the promissory notes,in the civil proceedings, the complainant had proved the promissory notes.The High Court found that the Civil Appeals were required to be decidedon the basis of the preponderance of probabilities. The High Court foundthat the complainant had established that he was working as a LIC Agent,that his father was owning extensive agricultural properties and that hewas deriving agricultural income. The High Court, on the basis of theevidence placed on record, relying on the preponderance of probability,came to a conclusion that the plaintiff had the financial ability to lend thesum of Rs.3 lakh as on 20[th] October 1998. The High Court also foundthat the appellant’s wife was not examined as a witness in the said caseso as to probabilize the defence plea. The High Court found that the bestavailable evidence was withheld by the defendants/appellants herein andas such, the principle of adverse inference was also applicable.

30. Though it was sought to be argued before the High Court thatin view of the judgment in the criminal proceedings, the suit(s) was alsoliable to be dismissed, the High Court rightly observed that the adjudication AB

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Ain civil matters is based on preponderance of probabilities whereasadjudication in criminal cases is based on the principle that the accusedis presumed to be innocent and the guilt of the accused should be provedto the hilt and the proof should be beyond all reasonable doubt.

31. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the judgmentsand orders passed by the High Court in the Civil Appeals. However, inBthe facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to modify thedecree. During the pendency of the proceedings before this Court, theappellants have deposited an amount of Rs.7 lakh and Rs. 2 lakh pursuantto the orders of this Court dated 20[th] February, 2009 passed in CriminalAppeal No. 1978 of 2013 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal)CNo.1456 of 2009 and connected matter and dated 13[th] August, 2012passed in Civil Appeal No.10501 of 2013 (arising out of Special LeavePetition (Civil) No.23036 of 2012). The said amount has been directedto be invested in a Fixed Deposit Receipts from time to time. We are,therefore, of the view that, in the facts and circumstances of the presentcase, the decree needs to be modified restricting it to the amount alreadyDdeposited by the appellants in both the proceedings with interest accruedthereon.

32. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) Criminal Appeal Nos. 1978 of 2013 and 1990 of 2013 areallowed and the common judgment of conviction dated 28[th]EOctober 2008 and order of sentence dated 30[th] October2008 respectively are quashed and set aside. The judgmentsand orders dated 10[th] July 2011 passed by the learned TrialCourt is confirmed.

(ii) Civil Appeal Nos. 10500 of 2013 and 10501 of 2013 aredismissed. However, the decrees of the High Court areFmodified, thereby restricting them to the amount alreadydeposited by the appellants in this Court in the civil andcriminal proceedings, along with interest accrued thereon.

(iii) The respondents in both the Civil Appeals would be entitledto withdraw 50% of the amount each from the amountGdeposited in this Court with interest accrued upto date.33. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending application(s), ifany, shall stand disposed of.

Ankit Gyan(Assisted by : Rahul Rathi, LCRA)H

Appeals disposed of.