KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA & ORS. versus STATE OF U.P. & ANR. on 8 March 2021

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 2 S.C.R.

KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA & ORS.

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STATE OF U.P. & ANR.

(Criminal Appeal No. 283 of 2021)

MARCH 08, 2021

B[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR ANDR. SUBHASH REDDY JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

s. 482 – Complaint u/s. 200 Cr.P.C – Alleging offences u/ss.323, 504, 506, 429 IPC and ss.10 and 11 of Prevention of CrueltyCto Animals Act, 1960 – Lodged by respondent No. 2, against theappellants, in the year 2018, in respect of an incident that occurredin the year 2012 – Magistrate issued process against the appellants– Confirmed by Sessions Judge – Appellants’ petition for quashingthe orders of Magistrate and the Sessions Judge dismissed – AppealDto Supreme Court – Held: In the complaint in question, thecomplainant (respondent No. 2) had suppressed the material factthat a charge-sheet was already filed u/ss. 323, 325, 504 and 506IPC against him and his wife in relation to the same incident –Institution of fresh complaint was a concerted effort to mislead theCourt with the oblique motive to harass the appellants – conduct ofErespondent No. 2 in filing delayed complaint case, suppressingmaterial facts and utilizing the fresh proceedings to materiallyimprove on his earlier version, amounts to gross abuse of the processof the Court – Permitting multiple complaints by the same party inrespect of same incident would run counter to the principlesFenvisaged u/Art.21 of the Constitution i.e. right to life and libertyand right to speedy trial – In exercise of inherent powers u/Art. 142of the Constitution, in order to prevent abuse of process of the Court,the criminal proceedings against the appellants are quashed – Allother litigations between the parties arising out of the incident inquestion, are also quashed – Constitution of India – Arts.21 andG142.

Administration of Criminal Justice:

Role of lower judiciary – The trial Judge has a duty underthe Constitution and Cr.P.C. to identify and dispose of frivolouslitigation at an early stage.H

Judiciary:

Justice delivery system – Should not be used as a tool to fulfillpersonal vendetta – Frivolous litigations by misusing PIL jurisdictionor by abusing criminal procedure should not become order of theday.

Constitution of India:

Art. 21 – Right to speedy trial – Would include not only theactual trial, but also the preceding stages of inquiry and policeinvestigation as well.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Any further complaint by the same complainantagainst the same accused, after the case has already beenregistered, will be deemed to be an improvement from theoriginal complaint. [Para 5][561-D-E]

Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash & Ors. (2004) 13 SCC292 – relied on 1.2 Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees that the rightto life and liberty shall not be taken away except by due processof law. Permitting multiple complaints by the same party in respectof the same incident, whether it involves a cognizable or privatecomplaint offence, will lead to the accused being entangled innumerous criminal proceedings. As such, he would be forced tokeep surrendering his liberty and precious time before the policeand the Courts, as and when required in each case. Such an absurdand mischievous interpretation of the provisions of the CrPCwill not stand the test of constitutional scrutiny, and thereforecannot be adopted. [Para 6][562-D-E]

T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 : [2001]3 SCR 942; Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI & Anr.(2013) 6 SCC 348 : [2013] 6 SCR 623 – relied on 1.3 Thus, it is incumbent upon this Court to preserve thedelicate balance between the power to investigate offences underthe CrPC, and the fundamental right of the individual to be freefrom frivolous and repetitive criminal prosecutions forced uponhim by the might of the State. [Para 7][563-B-C]

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A1.4 If Respondent No. 2 was aggrieved by lack of speedyinvestigation in the earlier case filed by him, the appropriateremedy would have been to apply to the Magistrate under Section155(2), CrPC for directions to the police in this regard. Filing aprivate complaint without any prelude, after a gap of six yearsfrom the date of giving information to the police, smacks of malaBfide on the part of Respondent No. 2. [Para 7][563-C-D]

1.5 It is also crucial to note that, in the fresh complaintcase, Respondent No. 2 seems to have deliberately suppressedthe material fact that a charge-sheet was already filed in relationto the same incident, against him and his wife, pursuant to NCRCNo.160/2012 (Crime No. 283/2017) filed by Appellant No.1’s son.No reference to this charge-sheet is found in the privatecomplaint, or in the statements under Section 200, CrPC filed byRespondent No. 2 and his wife. In fact, both the private complaintand the statement filed on behalf of his wife, merely state that theDpolice officials have informed them that investigation is ongoingpursuant to their NCR No.158/2012. The wife’s statementadditionally even states that no action has been taken so far bythe police. It is the litigant’s bounden duty to make a full and truedisclosure of facts. It is a matter of trite law, and yet bearsrepetition, that suppression of material facts before a courtEamounts to abuse of the process of the court, and shall be dealtwith a heavy hand. [Para 8][563-D-G]

Ram Dhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2012) 5SCC 536:[2012] 3 SCR 1059; K.D. Sharma v. SteelAuthority of India Ltd., (2008) 12 SCC 481:[2008] 10FSCR 454 – relied on 1.6 It is also pertinent to note that as on 5.08.2012,Appellant No.1 was a 76-year-old man; Appellant No.2 wassuffering from epileptic seizures; and Appellant No. 4 was ofunsound mind. There is no equity in allowing them to be draggedGinto criminal proceedings pertaining to a petty offence, instituted6 years after the alleged incident. The sword of Damocles cannotbe allowed to forever hang on their heads, falling unpredictablyat the whims of a litigant seeking to harass and persecute at will.

The right under Article 21 of the Constitution, which encapsulatesthe right to a speedy trial would include not only the actual trialbefore the Court, but also the preceding stages of inquiry andpolice investigation as well. [Para 9][563-G-H; 564-A-B]

Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2009) 3 SCC355 : [2009] 1 SCR 517; Abdul Rehman Antulay &Ors. v. R.S. Nayak & Anr. (1992) 1 SCC 225 : [1991] 3Suppl. SCR 325 – relied on.

1.7 Thus, respondent No. 2’s institution of the freshcomplaint case in 2018 under Section 200 CrPC was a concertedeffort to mislead the Magistrate with the oblique motive ofharassing the appellants with a frivolous and vexatious caseagainst them. That the same was a counter-blast to the chargesheet dated 17.09.2017 filed against respondent No. 2 and hiswife in the case registered by the appellant. The history of ill-willand malice between the parties leads further credence torespondent No.2’s motivations for tying up the appellants infrivolous and harrowing criminal litigation, long years after thealleged incident. Respondent No.2’s conduct in filing a delayedcomplaint case, suppressing material facts, and utilising freshproceedings to materially improve on his earlier version, intotality, amounts to gross abuse of the process of court.[Para 10][564-C-E]

2.1. The justice dispensation machinery in India is plaguedwith backlogs, with 70% of the pendency before the subordinatecourts being on the criminal side. A significant factor in this backlogis the vast mass of frivolous litigation instituted year after yearby litigants with an intent to use the courts of justice for theirown mischievous ends. Curtailing such vexatious litigation is,thus, a crucial step towards a more effective justice system – astep that cannot be taken without the active involvement of thelower judiciary, especially in criminal proceedings. [Para 11][564-F-H]

Roshni Sinha, ‘Examining pendency of cases in theJudiciary’, PRS India (August 8, 2019) – referred to 2.2 Sections 154 and 200 Cr.P.C make it abundantly clearthat the Magistrate carries the stream of criminal proceeding A

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Aforward after it is set in motion by the informant/complainant.Consequently, and automatically, the Magistrate also carries theresponsibility for ensuring this stream does not carry forward incases where it should not. The aforesaid powers bestowed onthe Magistrate have grave repercussions on individual citizens’life and liberty. Thus, these powers also confer great responsibilityBon the shoulders of the Magistrate – and must be exercised withgreat caution, and after suitable judicial application of mind. [Paras12 and 13][565-B-D]

Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998)5 SCC 749 : [1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 12 – relied on.

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2.3 The power conferred on the Magistrate under Section202, CrPC to postpone the issue of process pursuant to a privatecomplaint also provides an important avenue for filtering out offrivolous complaints that must be fully exercised. [Para 14][566-A-B]D

Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose & Anr.,AIR 1963 SC 1430 : [1964] SCR 639 – relied on.

2.4 It is said that every trial is a voyage of discovery inwhich the truth is the quest. In India, typically, the Judge is notEactively involved in ‘fact-finding’ owing to the adversarial natureof justice system in India. However, Section 165 of the EvidenceAct, 1872 by providing the Judge with the power to orderproduction of material and put forth questions of any form at anytime, marks the influence of inquisitorial processes in legalsystem. This wide-ranging power further demonstrates theFcentral role played by the Magistrate in the quest for justice andtruth in criminal proceedings, and must be judiciously employedto stem the flow of frivolous litigation. [Para 15][566-F-H]

2.5 Thus, the Trial Judge has a duty under the Constitutionand the CrPC, to identify and dispose of frivolous litigation at anGearly stage by exercising, substantially and to the fullest extent,the powers conferred on him. [Para 16][567-A-B]

All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (1992)1 SCC 119 : [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 206 – relied on.

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2.6 Frivolous litigation should not become the order of theday in India. From misusing the Public Interest Litigationjurisdiction of the Indian courts to abusing the criminal procedurefor harassing their adversaries, the justice delivery system shouldnot be used as a tool to fulfil personal vendetta. [Para 17][567-D-E]

2.7 A falsely accused person not only suffers monetarydamages but is exposed to disrepute and stigma from society.While running from pillar to post to find a lawyer to represent hiscase and arranging finances to defend himself before the court oflaw, he loses a part of himself. The trial courts and the Magistrateshave an important role in curbing this injustice. They are thefirst lines of defence for both the integrity of the criminal justicesystem, and the harassed and distraught litigant. The trial courtshave the power to not merely decide on acquittal or conviction ofthe accused person after the trial, but also the duty to nip frivolouslitigations in the bud even before they reach the stage of trial bydischarging the accused in fit cases. This would not only savejudicial time that comes at the cost of public money, but wouldalso protect the right to liberty that every person is entitled tounder Article 21 of the Constitution. In this context, the trialJudges have as much, if not more, responsibility in safeguardingthe fundamental rights of the citizens of India as the highest courtof this land. [Paras 17 and 18][567-H; 568-A-D]

Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC470 : [2014] 12 SCR 573 – relied on.

2.8 The present controversy poses a typical example offrivolous litigants abusing court process to achieve theirmischievous ends. In the case, the Magistrate was aware of thesignificant delay in the filing of private complaint by RespondentNo. 2, and of the material improvements from the earlier NCRNo. 158/2012 which were made in the private complaint. It wasincumbent on the Magistrate to examine any possibility of abuseof process of the court, make further enquiries, and dismiss thefrivolous complaint at the outset after judicial application of mind.However, the Magistrate issued process against the appellantsby order dated 4.04.2019, and this controversy has now reachedthis Court for disposal. [Paras 19 and 20][568-D-F]

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A3.1 This Court has inherent powers to prevent the abuseof its own processes, that this Court shall not suffer a litigantutilising the institution of justice for unjust means. Thus, it wouldbe only proper for this Court to deny any relief to a litigant whoattempts to pollute the stream of justice by coming to it with hisunclean hands. Similarly, a litigant pursuing frivolous andBvexatious proceedings cannot claim unlimited right upon courttime and public money to achieve his ends. [Para 21][568-G-H]

3.2 This Court’s inherent powers under Article 142 of theConstitution to do ‘complete justice’ empowers to give preferenceto equity and a justice-oriented approach over the strict rigoursCof procedural law. It is the constitutional duty of this Court toquash criminal proceedings that were instituted by misleadingthe court and abusing its processes of law, only with a view toharass the hapless litigants. In order to do complete justice, andto bring peace between the parties, who are fighting variousDlitigations since 2006, in exercise of powers under Article 142,all the litigations between the parties arising out of this incidentare quashed. [Paras 22 and 23][569-A-D]

State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (Whitewasher) (2014) 8SCC 883 : [2014] 8 SCR 228; Monica Kumar (Dr.) &EAnr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 8 SCC 781 : [2008]9 SCR 943 – relied on.

Sirajul & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh(2015) 9 SCC 201: [2015] 6 SCR 1021; State ofHaryana v. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SCC 604 : [1990]3 Suppl. SCR 259 – referred to.

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Case Law Reference

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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.283 of 2021

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.09.2020 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in Misc. Petition No. 2561 of 2020.

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Praveen Agrawal, Gautam Kumar Laha, Advs. for the Appellants.

Jitendra M. Sharma, Sr. Adv. Pawanshree Agrawal, Sarvesh SinghBaghel, Ms. Shivranjani Ralawata, Ajit Sharma, Advs. for theRespondents.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of final order and judgement of the HighCourt of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter, ‘High Court’) dated28.09.2020, dismissing the Miscellaneous Petition No. 2561 of 2020 filedby Appellants herein praying for quashing of the following orders:

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(i) Order dated 4.04.2019 of Learned Additional Chief JudicialMagistrate, Meerut (hereinafter, ‘Magistrate’) in Complaint Case No.2943/2018, issuing summons against the Appellants; G

(ii) Order dated 13.01.2020 of the Ld. Additional District andSessions Judge, Meerut (hereinafter, ‘Sessions Judge’) in CriminalRevision No.202/2019, dismissing the Appellants’ revision applicationagainst the aforesaid summoning order.

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A3. The brief facts leading to this appeal are as follows:

3.1 The Appellants and Respondent No. 2 are neighbours. Thegenesis of the proceedings before us lies in a physical altercation thattook place between the Appellants, and the Respondent No. 2 and hiswife on 5.08.2012. While the occurrence of such an altercation is anBadmitted fact between the parties, the details thereof form the crux ofthis prolonged litigation.

3.2 On 5.08.2012, the Respondent No. 2 filed a Non-CognizableReport (NCR) No. 158/2012 against the Appellants alleging offencesunder Sections 323, 504 and 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter,C‘IPC’). It was his case that the Appellants came to his house, beat himand his wife with iron rods, and threatened to kill them.

3.3 The son of Appellant No. 1 also filed information on 5.08.2012,which was registered as Non-Cognizable Report (NCR) No. 160/2012with the Daurala Police Station, alleging offences under Sections 323,D504 and 506, IPC against the Respondent No. 2 and his wife. This Reportcounter-alleged that the Respondent No. 2 and his wife came to theAppellants’ house, beat them up with wooden sticks and iron rods, andthreatened to kill their family.

3.4 It seems that even prior to the alleged occurrences, thereEwere disputes between the parties in 2006. A mutual settlement tookplace on 6.02.2006 by which Respondent No. 2 agreed to pay a penaltyof Rs. 3,000/- to the Appellant No. 1. Subsequently, in another dispute,on 21.12.2013 the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate imposed a penaltyof Rs. 1,500/- on Appellant No. 4. Be that as it may, the fact remainsthat the parties have been at loggerheads from 2006 onwards. It appearsFthat they have been fighting litigations on one pretext or the other since2006. Though they were agriculturists and neighbours, peace did notprevail between them, which resulted in a number of cases being lodgedby them against each other.

3.5 The Appellants filed an application under Section 155(2) ofGthe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, ‘CrPC’) before theMagistrate on 27.04.2017, almost 5 years after the alleged incident,seeking permission for the police to investigate NCR No. 160/2012. Thelearned Magistrate directed that NCR No. 160/2012 filed by theAppellants be registered as FIR in Crime No. 283/2017. Investigationwas conducted, and on 17.09.2017 a charge sheet was filed against theH

Respondent No. 2 and his wife under Sections 323, 325, 504 and 506 ofthe IPC. Subsequently, the Magistrate framed charges againstRespondent No. 2 and his wife. There is nothing on record to show thateven a single witness has been examined till date, though charges wereframed by the Magistrate long back. Thus, there has been considerabledelay in these proceedings, during both the investigation and trial stages.

3.6 Being unsatisfied with the allegations made and charge sheetfiled against him, the Respondent No. 2 instituted a fresh private complaintagainst the Appellants under Section 200 of CrPC in Complaint CaseNo. 2943 of 2018 in respect of the very incident that took place on5.08.2012. This private complaint was filed only on 11.05.2018, that isabout six years from the date of alleged incident. In the private complaint,not only new allegations were added but all allegations are wilder anddifferent from the averments made in NCR No. 158/12, though the incidentis the same as of 5.08.2012 and between the same parties. It may not benecessary for us to narrate the contents of the private complaint inasmuchas we find and have satisfied ourselves that the allegations made in theprivate complaint are absolute material improvements over the allegationsin NCR No. 158/12. Among other things, not only three additional eyewitnesses are inducted in the private complaint, but allegations of fraud,injury to bull, forging of affidavit, etc. which were not found in the 2012complaint are also found in the private complaint. The private complaintfor the first time mentions commission of offences under Section 429,IPC and Sections 10 and 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act,1960. It is an admitted fact that Appellant No. 4 had inflicted injury onRespondent No. 2’s bull on 26.09.2011, for which Appellant No. 4 hadvoluntarily confessed and accepted penalty of Rs. 1,500 from theMagistrate as mentioned supra. Be that as it may, we see no reasonwhy Respondent No. 2 chose to rehash this incident in the privatecomplaint given that Appellant No. 4 has already been convicted for theoffence, and it is of no relevance to the present case.

Curiously, the Magistrate was pleased to issue process againstthe Appellants based on this vexatious private complaint, which came tobe confirmed by the Learned Sessions Judge in the impugned order. TheLearned Sessions Judge has thus not only misunderstood Section 200,CrPC and its scope but also made a new case in favour of RespondentNo.2 by reading Section 506 Part II, IPC which is punishable by 7 yearsin the place of Section 506, IPC, probably only to bring the private A

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Acomplaint within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 468CrPC. It is nobody’s case that the offence under Section 506(II) hastaken place, which means that the Courts took extra interest to improvethe case of the respondent/complainant.

This appeal is filed challenging both the orders of the MagistrateBas well as the Sessions Judge in respect of issuance of process, asmentioned supra.

4. The learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 sought to justify theimpugned orders by relying on the following excerpt from this Court’sdecision in Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash & ors., (2004) 13 SCC 292,Cwhich clarified the import of its previous holding in T.T. Antony v. Stateof Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181:

“23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T.Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] is to beaccepted as holding that a second complaint in regard to the sameDincident filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the Codethen, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to seriousconsequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical examplegiven hereinbelow i.e. if in regard to a crime committed by thereal accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaintEand the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then theaggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging acomplaint giving his version of the incident in question, consequentlyhe will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accusedto book. This cannot be the purport of the Code.”

FTherefore, Upkar Singh clarified that this Court’s previousdecision in T.T. Anthony will not bar the filing of a second complaintwith respect to the same incident, if such second complaint is filed as acounter-complaint by the other party. We are in agreement with theaforementioned construction of T.T. Anthony. However, we fail to seehow this position of law comes to Respondent No.2’s rescue. The questionGposed in the present case for consideration before us is wholly different,and concerns the validity of the private complaint filed by RespondentNo. 2, after an earlier information filed as NCR No. 158/2012 – both ofwhich were filed by the same party, against the same accused, and inrelation to the same incident that too after the charge sheet was filed inHcase arising out of NCR No. 160/12 in Crime No. 283/2017 after taking due permission of Magistrate. The aforementioned portion of UpkarSingh relied on by Respondent No. 2, thus, does not benefit his case.

5. Indeed, a closer look at the decision in Upkar Singh takes usto the contrary conclusion. In regard to the question of materialimprovements made in a subsequent private complaint by the samecomplainant against the same accused with regard to the same incident,it may be useful to refer to the following excerpt from Upkar Singh,which further clarifies the holding in T.T. Antony:

“17…In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that anyfurther complaint by the same complainant or others against thesame accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, isprohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regardwould have already started and further complaint against the sameaccused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned inthe original complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162of the Code.” (emphasis supplied)

It is the aforementioned part of the holding in Upkar Singh thatbears directly and strongly upon the present case. This Court in UpkarSingh has clearly stated that any further complaint by the samecomplainant against the same accused, after the case has already beenregistered, will be deemed to be an improvement from the originalcomplaint. Though Upkar Singh was rendered in the context of a caseinvolving cognizable offences, the same principle would also apply wherea person gives information of a non-cognizable offence and subsequentlylodges a private complaint with respect to the same offence against thesame accused person. Even in a non-cognizable case, the police officerafter the order of the Magistrate, is empowered to investigate the offencein the same manner as a cognizable case, except the power to arrestwithout a warrant. Therefore, the complainant cannot subject the accusedto a double whammy of investigation by the police and inquiry before theMagistrate.

We are cognizant of the fact that in the present case, noinvestigation had begun pursuant to NCR No. 158/2012 filed by theRespondent No. 2 for a certain period. However, the overall concernexpressed by this Court in Upkar Singh, about the misuse of successivecomplaints by the same party, where the second complaint is clearlypropped up to materially improve on the earlier one, resonates with us.

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AWe regret to say that the same thing which this Court had categoricallyprohibited in Upkar Singh has happened in the present case.

6. The grave implications of allowing such misuse may beunderstood better in light of the following exposition by this Court inAmitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI & anr., (2013) 6 SCC 348:B

“37. This Court has consistently laid down the law on the issueinterpreting the Code, that a second FIR in respect of an offenceor different offences committed in the course of the sametransaction is not only impermissible but it violates Article 21 ofthe Constitution. In T.T. Antony [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCCC(Cri) 1048] , this Court has categorically held that registration ofsecond FIR (which is not a cross-case) is violative of Article 21of the Constitution…” (emphasis supplied)

Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees that the right to life andliberty shall not be taken away except by due process of law. PermittingDmultiple complaints by the same party in respect of the same incident,whether it involves a cognizable or private complaint offence, will leadto the accused being entangled in numerous criminal proceedings. Assuch, he would be forced to keep surrendering his liberty and precioustime before the police and the Courts, as and when required in eachcase. As this Court has held in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (supra),Esuch an absurd and mischievous interpretation of the provisions of theCrPC will not stand the test of constitutional scrutiny, and thereforecannot be adopted by us.

7. The implications of such successive FIRs on an individual’srights under Article 21 of the Constitution has been elaborated further inFT.T. Antony (supra):

“27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizensunder Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansivepower of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to bestruck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-Gsection (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to makefurther investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral anddocumentary) and forward a further report or reports to theMagistrate. In Narang case [Ram Lal Narang v. State (DelhiAdmn.), (1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however,Hobserved that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, thesweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting acitizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect ofthe same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences,consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after”filing the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC…

Thus, it is incumbent upon this Court to preserve this delicatebalance between the power to investigate offences under the CrPC,and the fundamental right of the individual to be free from frivolous andrepetitive criminal prosecutions forced upon him by the might of theState. If the Respondent No. 2 was aggrieved by lack of speedyinvestigation in the earlier case filed by him, the appropriate remedywould have been to apply to the Magistrate under Section 155(2), CrPCfor directions to the police in this regard. Filing a private complaint withoutany prelude, after a gap of six years from the date of giving informationto the police, smacks of mala fide on the part of Respondent No. 2.

8. It is also crucial to note that, in the fresh complaint case institutedby him, Respondent No. 2 seems to have deliberately suppressed thematerial fact that a charge sheet was already filed in relation to thesame incident, against him and his wife, pursuant to NCR No.160/2012(Crime No. 283/2017) filed by Appellant No.1’s son. No reference tothis charge sheet is found in the private complaint, or in the statementsunder Section 200, CrPC filed by Respondent No. 2 and his wife. Infact, both the private complaint and the statement filed on behalf of hiswife, merely state that the police officials have informed them thatinvestigation is ongoing pursuant to their NCR No.158/2012. The wife’sstatement additionally even states that no action has been taken so farby the police. It is the litigant’s bounden duty to make a full and truedisclosure of facts. It is a matter of trite law, and yet bears repetition,that suppression of material facts before a court amounts to abuse ofthe process of the court, and shall be dealt with a heavy hand (RamDhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2012) 5 SCC 536; K.D.Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2008) 12 SCC 481).

9. It is also pertinent to note that as on 5.08.2012, Appellant No.1was a 76-year-old man; Appellant No.2 was suffering from epilepticseizures; and Appellant No. 4 was of unsound mind. There is no equity A

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Ain allowing them to be dragged into criminal proceedings pertaining to apetty offence, instituted 6 years after the alleged incident. The sword ofDamocles cannot be allowed to forever hang on their heads, fallingunpredictably at the whims of a litigant seeking to harass and persecuteat will. We gain strength in our conclusions from Article 21 of theConstitution, which encapsulates the right to a speedy trial. This rightBhas been interpreted to include not only the actual trial before the Court,but also the preceding stages of inquiry and police investigation as well(Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355; AbdulRehman Antulay & ors. v. R.S. Nayak & anr., (1992) 1 SCC 225).

10. The sum of the above circumstances and precedents leads usCto what we see as an inevitable conclusion. That Respondent No. 2’sinstitution of the fresh complaint case in 2018 under Section 200 CrPCwas a concerted effort to mislead the Magistrate with the oblique motiveof harassing the Appellants with a frivolous and vexatious case againstthem. That the same was a counter-blast to the charge sheet datedD17.09.2017 filed against Respondent No. 2 and his wife in the caseregistered by the Appellant. The history of ill-will and malice betweenthe parties leads further credence to Respondent No.2’s motivations fortying up the Appellants in frivolous and harrowing criminal litigation, longyears after the alleged incident. Respondent No.2’s conduct in filing adelayed complaint case, suppressing material facts, and utilising freshEproceedings to materially improve on his earlier version, in totality, amountsto gross abuse of the process of court.

Role of the Lower Judiciary in Preventing Abuse of CourtProcess:

F11. We find it imperative to observe that this is a case that shouldnot have been allowed to reach as far as this Court. The justicedispensation machinery in India is plagued with backlogs, with 70% ofthe pendency before the subordinate courts being on the criminal side.[1]A significant factor in this backlog is the vast mass of frivolous litigationinstituted year after year by litigants with an intent to use the courts ofGjustice for their own mischievous ends. Curtailing such vexatious litigationis, thus, a crucial step towards a more effective justice system – a stepthat cannot be taken without the active involvement of the lower judiciary,especially in criminal proceedings.

1 Roshni Sinha‘Examining pendency of cases in the Judiciary’, PRS India (August 8,H2019).

12. Immediately after the criminal justice system is set in motion,its course is almost entirely dependent on the judicial application of mindby the Magistrate. When a police complaint is filed on the commissionof a cognizable offence under Section 154 CrPC, the Magistrate decidesif the charge against the accused person is made out before the trialbegins. Separate procedure is prescribed if the complaint under Section200 CrPC is filed. The aforesaid provisions make it abundantly clearthat the Magistrate carries the stream of criminal proceeding forwardafter it is set in motion by the informant/complainant. Consequently, andautomatically, the Magistrate also carries the responsibility for ensuringthis stream does not carry forward in cases where it should not.

13. The aforesaid powers bestowed on the Magistrate have graverepercussions on individual citizens’ life and liberty. Thus, these powersalso confer great responsibility on the shoulders of the Magistrate – andmust be exercised with great caution, and after suitable judicial applicationof mind. Observations in a similar vein were made by this Court in PepsiFoods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749:

“28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a seriousmatter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter ofcourse. It is not that the complainant has to bring only twowitnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have thecriminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistratesummoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mindto the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has toexamine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and theevidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and wouldthat be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing chargehome to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silentspectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence beforesummoning of the accused.The Magistrate has to carefullyscrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himselfput questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answersto find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise andthen examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or”any of the accused.

This Court, thus, clearly emphasised that the power to issue asummoning order is a matter of grave importance, and that the Magistrate A

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Amust only allow criminal law to take its course after satisfying himselfthat there is a real case to be made.

14. Similarly, the power conferred on the Magistrate under Section202, CrPC to postpone the issue of process pursuant to a private complaintalso provides an important avenue for filtering out of frivolous complaintsBthat must be fully exercised. A four-Judge Bench of this Court haseloquently expounded on this in Chandra Deo Singh v. ProkashChandra Bose & Anr., AIR 1963 SC 1430:

“7. …No doubt, one of the objects behind the provisions of Section202 CrPC is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully theCallegations made in the complaint with a view to prevent a personnamed therein as accused from being called upon to face anobviously frivolous complaint. But there is also another object behindthis provision and it is to find out what material there is to supportthe allegations made in the complaint. It is the bounden duty ofthe Magistrate while making an enquiry to elicit all facts not merelyDwith a view to protect the interests of an absent accused person,but also with a view to bring to book a person or persons againstwhom grave allegations are made. Whether the complaint isfrivolous or not has, at that stage, necessarily to be determined onthe basis of the material placed before him by the complainant...”

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Thus, it is clear that, on receipt of a private complaint, theMagistrate must first, scrutinise it to examine if the allegations made inthe private complaint, inter alia, smack of an instance of frivolouslitigation; and second, examine and elicit the material that supports theFcase of the complainant.

15. It is said that every trial is a voyage of discovery in which thetruth is the quest. In India, typically, the Judge is not actively involved in‘fact-finding’ owing to the adversarial nature of our justice system.However, Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 by providing theGJudge with the power to order production of material and put forthquestions of any form at any time, marks the influence of inquisitorialprocesses in our legal system. This wide-ranging power furtherdemonstrates the central role played by the Magistrate in the quest forjustice and truth in criminal proceedings, and must be judiciously employedto stem the flow of frivolous litigation.H

16. All of this leads to one inescapable conclusion. That the TrialJudge has a duty under the Constitution and the CrPC, to identify anddispose of frivolous litigation at an early stage by exercising, substantiallyand to the fullest extent, the powers conferred on him. This Court hasearlier emphasised on the high degree of responsibility shouldered bythe trial Judges in All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India,(1992) 1 SCC 119. Ranganath Misra CJ (as he was then) writing forhimself and two others stated:

“42. The trial Judge is the kingpin in the hierarchical system ofadministration of justice. He directly comes in contact with thelitigant during the proceedings in Court. On him lies the responsibilityof building up of the case appropriately and on his understandingof the matter the cause of justice is first answered. The personality,knowledge, judicial restraint, capacity to maintain dignity are theadditional aspects which go into making the Court’s functioningsuccessful.”

17. Frivolous litigation should not become the order of the day inIndia. From misusing the Public Interest Litigation jurisdiction of theIndian courts to abusing the criminal procedure for harassing theiradversaries, the justice delivery system should not be used as a tool tofulfil personal vendetta. The Indian judiciary has taken cognizance ofthis issue. In 2014, this Court elucidated as follows, the plight of a litigantcaught in the cobweb of frivolous proceedings in Subrata Roy Saharav. Union of India, (2014) 8 SCC 470:

“191…One needs to keep in mind, that in the process of litigation,there is an innocent sufferer on the other side, of everyirresponsible and senseless claim. He suffers long drawn anxiousperiods of nervousness and restlessness, whilst the litigation ispending, without any fault on his part. He pays for the litigation,from out of his savings (or out of his borrowings), worrying thatthe other side may trick him into defeat, for no fault of his. Hespends invaluable time briefing counsel and preparing them forhis claim. Time which he should have spent at work, or with hisfamily, is lost, for no fault of his...”

While the Court’s ruling pertained to civil proceedings, theseobservations ring true for the criminal justice machinery as well. Wenote, with regret, that 7 years hence, and there has still been no reductionin such plight. A falsely accused person not only suffers monetary A

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Adamages but is exposed to disrepute and stigma from society. Whilerunning from pillar to post to find a lawyer to represent his case andarranging finances to defend himself before the court of law, he loses apart of himself.

18. As aforesaid, the trial courts and the Magistrates have anBimportant role in curbing this injustice. They are the first lines of defencefor both the integrity of the criminal justice system, and the harassed anddistraught litigant. We are of the considered opinion that the trial courtshave the power to not merely decide on acquittal or conviction of theaccused person after the trial, but also the duty to nip frivolous litigationsin the bud even before they reach the stage of trial by discharging theCaccused in fit cases. This would not only save judicial time that comes atthe cost of public money, but would also protect the right to liberty thatevery person is entitled to under Article 21 of the Constitution. In thiscontext, the trial Judges have as much, if not more, responsibility insafeguarding the fundamental rights of the citizens of India as the highestDcourt of this land.

19. As recorded by us above, the present controversy poses atypical example of frivolous litigants abusing court process to achievetheir mischievous ends. In the case before us, the Magistrate was awareof the significant delay in the filing of private complaint by RespondentENo. 2, and of the material improvements from the earlier NCR No. 158/2012 which were made in the private complaint. It was incumbent onthe Magistrate to examine any possibility of abuse of process of thecourt, make further enquiries, and dismiss the frivolous complaint at theoutset after judicial application of mind.

F20. However, this was not done – the Magistrate issued processagainst the Appellants by order dated 4.04.2019, and this controversyhas now reached this Court for disposal.

21. It is a settled canon of law that this Court has inherent powersto prevent the abuse of its own processes, that this Court shall not sufferGa litigant utilising the institution of justice for unjust means. Thus, it wouldbe only proper for this Court to deny any relief to a litigant who attemptsto pollute the stream of justice by coming to it with his unclean hands.Similarly, a litigant pursuing frivolous and vexatious proceedings cannotclaim unlimited right upon court time and public money to achieve hisends.H

22. This Court’s inherent powers under Article 142 of theConstitution to do ‘complete justice’ empowers us to give preference toequity and a justice-oriented approach over the strict rigours of procedurallaw (State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (Whitewasher), (2014) 8 SCC883). This Court has used this inherent power to quash criminalproceedings where the proceedings are instituted with an oblique motive,or on manufactured evidence (Monica Kumar (Dr.) & anr. v. State ofUttar Pradesh, (2008) 8 SCC 781). Other decisions have held thatinherent powers of High Courts provided in Section 482, CrPC may beutilised to quash criminal proceedings instituted after great delay, or withvengeful or malafide motives. (Sirajul & ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh,(2015) 9 SCC 201; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SCC604). Thus, it is the constitutional duty of this Court to quash criminalproceedings that were instituted by misleading the court and abusing itsprocesses of law, only with a view to harass the hapless litigants.

23. In this Court’s quest for complete justice, and to bring peacebetween the parties, who are fighting various litigations since 2006, weexercise our powers under Article 142 to quash all the litigations betweenthe parties arising out of this incident.

Our Conclusions:

24. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 28.09.2020in Miscellaneous Petition No. 2561 of 2020 is set aside.

25. The proceedings in Complaint Case No.2943/2018, includingthe order of summons against the Appellants dated 4.04.2019 be quashed.

26. Further, proceedings pursuant to NCR No. 158/2012 dated5.08.2012 filed by Respondent No. 2 also be quashed, in order to foreclosefurther frivolous litigation.

27. Any other criminal cases between the parties initiated by themin relation to the incident dated 5.08.2012, including the criminalproceedings arising from NCR No.160/2012 (Crime No. 283/2017)instituted by the Appellants, are quashed in exercise of our powers underArticle 142 of the Constitution, in the interests of giving quietus to thesecriminal proceedings arising out of a petty incident 9 years ago.

28. The Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

Kalpana K. Tripathy

Appeal allowed.

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