GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI versus RAVINDER KUMAR JAIN & ORS. on 18 May 2023

1. Challenge in the present appeal is to the order passed by theHigh Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) No.6912 of 2014 vide which the writpetition filed by the respondent no.1 invoking Section 24(2) of the Rightto Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as“the 2013 Act”) was allowed and it was held that the acquisition inquestion had lapsed for the reason that neither the possession of the landwas taken nor the compensation therefor was paid.

2. The argument raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalfof the appellant is that the original owner of the land challenged theacquisition by filing W.P.(C) No.1229 of 1986 which was dismissed fornon-prosecution on 09.12.2004. The respondent No.1 claimed that he

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Ahad purchased the land in question from the original owner in terms ofthe no objection certificate granted to him under Section 8 of the DelhiLands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as“the 1972 Act”), vide sale deed dated 18.06.2023. The respondent No.1also filed writ petition challenging the acquisition, after the purchase ofthe land, bearing W.P.(C) No.3701 of 2008, which was dismissed onB22.10.2008 leaving it open to the respondent no.1 to file review/recall ofthe order dated 09.12.2004, vide which the writ petition filed by theoriginal owner, challenging the acquisition of land, was dismissed. It wassubmitted that the aforesaid application was also dismissed. Referringto the judgment of this Court in Shiv Kumar and Ors. v. Union ofCIndia and Ors.[1], it was submitted that a subsequent buyer of the landafter the process of acquisition is complete does not have any locus toinvoke Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, to claim that the acquisition inquestion has lapsed. Hence, the writ petition itself being not maintainabledeserves to be dismissed. The order passed by the High Court be setaside.D

3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of therespondent no.1 submitted that it is a case where neither the compensationhas been paid nor the possession of the land has been taken. Therespondent no.1 has already constructed his house on the land in questionand living there for more than a decade. He is assessed to house tax,Ewhich is being paid regularly. At this stage, disturbing his possession willbe quite harsh as he would be deprived of shelter on his head. He furthersubmitted that the sale deed in the case was registered after duepermission from the authorities under the provisions of the 1972 Act.Hence, at this stage, he should not be deprived of his possession. TheFappeal be dismissed.

4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paperbook.

5. The basic facts which are not in dispute are that the process ofacquisition of land in question started with the issuance of notification ofGSection 4 of the 1894 Act on 25.11.1980. Subsequently, notification underSection 6 was issued on 27.05.1985. The owner of the land at that stagechallenged the acquisition by filing W.P.(C) No.1229 of 1986. Awardunder Section 11 of the 1894 Act was announced by the Land Acquisition H1 2019 (10) SCC 229

Collector on 05.06.1987. The writ petition was dismissed for non-prosecution on 09.12.2004. The High Court also recorded that the issueraised in the petition is otherwise also covered by various judgments.

6. The respondent no.1, Ravinder Kumar Jain had purchased theland in question vide registered sale deed dated 18.06.2003. The factthat he had knowledge about the acquisition of land, is evident from twofacts. Firstly, that it was sought to be pointed out by the learned counselappearing on behalf of the respondent no. 1 that he had obtainedpermission from the competent authority in terms of the provisions ofthe 1972 Act for transfer of the land, which had already been acquired.Though, in para 13 of the sale deed a vague averment has been made inthat regard, however, no such certificate was produced. Even productionthereof may not be of any help to the respondent no. 1. Secondly, thewrit petition was filed by the respondent no. 1 bearing W.P.(C) No.3701of 2008 challenging the acquisition proceedings. The same was dismissedas withdrawn on 22.10.2008 with liberty to the petitioner therein to availof the remedy of review/ recall of the order dated 09.12.2004 vide whichthe writ petition filed by the predecessor in interest of the respondentno.1, challenging the acquisition, was dismissed for non-prosecution. Itis the admitted position that an application filed by the respondent No.1for reviewing/ recalling was dismissed.

7. As regards the locus of a subsequent purchaser to invoke Section24(2) of the 2013 Act to claim that the acquisition had lapsed, the law iswell settled. The three Judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Kumar (supra)while deciding the point in law has held as follows:

“18. Even otherwise, proviso to Section 24(2) does notrecognise a purchaser after Section 4 notification inasmuchas it provides that where an award has been made, and thecompensation in respect of a majority of landholdings hasnot been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then,all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisitionissued under the 1894 Act, shall be entitled to compensationunder the provisions of the 2013 Act. The proviso makes itclear that in case of compensation concerning the majorityof landholdings has not been deposited, then recordedowner(s) at the time of issuance of notification under Section4 of the 1894 Act shall have the right to receive thecompensation. Purchasers after Section 4 notification have AB

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not been given the right to receive the higher compensationunder the provisions contained in the 2013 Act.

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19. The 2013 Act presupposes that a person is required to berehabilitated and resettled. Such a person who has purchasedafter Section 4 notification as sale deed is void under the1894 Act, cannot claim rehabilitation and resettlement as perpolicy envisaged under the 2013 Act, as his land has not beenacquired, but he has purchased a property which has alreadybeen acquired by the State Government, he cannot claim evenhigher compensation, as per proviso to Section 24(2) underthe 2013 Act. An original landowner cannot be deprived ofhigher value under the 2013 Act, which higher compensationwas not so contemplated when the void transaction of salehad been entered, and right is conferred under the proviso toSection 24(2) on recorded owners under the 1894 Act. Wehave come across instances in which after notifications underSection 4 were issued and, the property was purchased atthrowaway prices by the builders and unscrupulous persons,such purchases are void and confer no right even to claimhigher compensation under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act asit is to be given to the owner as mentioned in the notification.

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E20. Given that, the transaction of sale, effected after Section4 notification, is void, is ineffective to transfer the land, suchincumbents cannot invoke the provisions of Section 24. Asthe sale transaction did not clothe them with the title whenthe purchase was made; they cannot claim “possession” andchallenge the acquisition as having lapsed under Section 24Fby questioning the legality or regularity of proceedings oftaking over of possession under the 1894 Act. It would beunfair and profoundly unjust and against the policy of thelaw to permit such a person to claim resettlement or claim theland back as envisaged under the 2013 Act. When he has notGbeen deprived of his livelihood but is a purchaser under avoid transaction, the outcome of exploitative tactics playedupon poor farmers who were unable to defend themselves.

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21. Thus, under the provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act,challenge to acquisition proceeding of the taking over ofpossession under the 1894 Act cannot be made, based on a H

void transaction nor declaration can be sought under Section24(2) by such incumbents to obtain the land. The declarationthat acquisition has lapsed under the 2013 Act is to get theproperty back whereas, the transaction once void, is alwaysa void transaction, as no title can be acquired in the land assuch no such declaration can be sought. It would not be legal,just and equitable to give the land back to purchaser as landwas not capable of being sold which was in process ofacquisition under the 1894 Act. The 2013 Act does not conferany right on purchaser whose sale is ab initio void. Suchvoid transactions are not validated under the 2013 Act. Norights are conferred by the provisions contained in the 2013Act on such a purchaser as against the State.

22. “Void is, ab initio,” a nullity, is inoperative, and a personcannot claim the land or declaration once no title has beenconferred upon him to claim that the land should be givenback to him. A person cannot enforce and ripe fruits basedon a void transaction to start claiming title and possession ofthe land by seeking a declaration under Section 24 of the2013 Act; it will amount to conferment of benefit nevercontemplated by the law. The question is, who can claimdeclaration/rights under Section 24(2) for the restoration ofland or lapse of acquisition. It cannot be by a person with notitle in the land. The provision of the 2013 Act cannot be saidto be enabling or authorising a purchaser after Section 4 toquestion proceeding taken under the Act of 1894 of takingpossession as held in U.P. Jal Nigam [U.P. Jal Nigam v. KalraProperties (P) Ltd., (1996) 3 SCC 124] which is followed inM. Venkatesh [M. Venkatesh v. BDA, (2015) 17 SCC 1 : (2017)5 SCC (Civ) 387] and other decisions and consequently claimdeclaration under Section 24 of the 2013 Act. What cannotbe done directly cannot be permitted in an indirect method.

23. The provisions of the 2013 Act aimed at the acquisition ofland with least disturbance to the landowners and otheraffected families and to provide just and fair compensationto affected families whose land has been acquired or proposedto be acquired or are affected and to make adequateprovisions for such affected persons for their rehabilitation AB

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and resettlement. The provisions of the 2013 Act aim at oustingall inter-meddlers from the fray by ensuring payment in thebank account of landholders under Section 77 of the Act.

24. The intendment of the 2013 Act is to benefit farmers, etc.Subsequent purchasers cannot be said to be landownersentitled to restoration of land and cannot be termed to beaffected persons within the provisions of the 2013 Act. It isnot open to them to claim that the proceedings have lapsedunder Section 24(2).”

26. In Manav Dharam Trust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. ManavDharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] ,even the provisions of the Act of 2013 have not been takeninto consideration, which prohibits such transactions inparticular provisions of Section 11, including the proviso toSection 24(2). Apart from that, it was not legally permissibleto a Division Bench to ignore the decisions of the larger Benchcomprising of three Judges and of coordinate Bench. Theywere not per incuriam and were relevant for deciding the issueof taking possession under the 1894 Act, at the instance ofpurchaser. In case it wanted to depart from the view takenearlier, it ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench.It has been ignored that when a purchase is void, then nodeclaration can be sought on the ground that the landacquisition under the 2013 Act has lapsed due to illegality/irregularity of proceedings of taking possession under the1894 Act. No declaration can be sought by a purchaser underSection 24 that acquisition has lapsed, effect of which wouldbe to get back the land. They cannot seek declaration thatacquisition made under the 1894 Act has lapsed by thechallenge to the proceedings of taking possession under the1894 Act. Such right was not available after the purchase in2000 and no such right has been provided to the purchasersunder the 2013 Act also. Granting a right to questionacquisition would be against the public policy and the lawwhich prohibits such transactions; it cannot be given effectto under the guise of subsequent legislation containing similarprovisions. Subsequent legislation does not confer any newright to a person based on such void transaction; instead, it includes a provision prohibiting such transactions withoutpermission of the Collector as provided in Section 11(4).

27. Thus, we have to follow the decisions including that oflarger Bench mentioned above, laying down the law on thesubject, which still holds the field and were wronglydistinguished. The binding value of the decisions of largerand coordinate Benches have been ignored while decidingManav Dharam Trust case [State (NCT of Delhi) v. ManavDharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] ,it was not open to it to take a different view. The decision inManav Dharam Trust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav DharamTrust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] is perincuriam in light of this decision of this Court in MamleshwarPrasad v. Kanhaiya Lal [Mamleshwar Prasad v. KanhaiyaLal, (1975) 2 SCC 232] , A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [A.R.Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri)372] , State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. [State ofU.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139] , B.Shama Rao v. State (UT of Pondicherry) [B. Shama Rao v.State (UT of Pondicherry), AIR 1967 SC 1480] , MCD v.Gurnam Kaur [MCD v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101] ,State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [State of M.P. v.Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639 : (2011) 3 SCC(Civ) 875 : AIR 2011 SC 1989] , Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd.v. State of Orissa [Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State ofOrissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 38] and SantLal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd. [SantLal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd.,(2010) 13 SCC 336 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 904]

28. We hold that Division Bench in Manav Dharam Trust [State(NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 :(2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] does not lay down the law correctly.Given the several binding precedents which are available andthe provisions of the 2013 Act, we cannot follow the decisionin Manav Dharam Trust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. ManavDharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611]and overrule it. Shri S.N. Bhatt, learned counsel submittedthat in case this Court does not agree with the Manav Dharam ABC

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ATrust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust, (2017) 6SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] , the case may be referredto the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India under the provisionsof Order 6 Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. He hasrelied upon the decision of this Court in Vineeta Sharma v.Rakesh Sharma [Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2019)B6 SCC 162 : (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 171] in which, in view of theconflict of opinion of two Division Bench judgments [Prakashv. Phulavati, (2016) 2 SCC 36 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 549] ,[Danamma v. Amar, (2018) 3 SCC 343 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ)385] of this Court as to the interpretation of Section 6 of theCHindu Succession Act, 1956 the matter was referred to theHon’ble the Chief Justice of India, for constituting anappropriate Bench. However, in the instant case, the issue isdifferent, whether we have to follow the decision in ManavDharam Trust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust,(2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] or the earlierDdecisions of this Court mentioned above. It is apparent thatthe decisions of the three-Judge Bench are binding on us,and in view of other consistent decisions of this Court, wehave to follow them. It is not appropriate to refer the case tolarger Bench under Order 6 Rule 2 of the Supreme CourtERules. We find no fault in the judgments laying down the lawthat the purchase after Section 4 notification is void as againstthe State. We are not impressed with the submission raised onbehalf of the purchasers to refer the matter for the constitutionof a larger Bench to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. Whendecisions of larger Bench and other Division Bench areFavailable, the case cannot be referred to a larger Bench.”

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(emphasis supplied)

8. The earlier judgment of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v.Manav Dharma Trust[2 ]was held to be not laying down good law.

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9. Subsequent thereto, Constitution Bench of this Court in IndoreDevelopment Authority v. Manoharlal and Others[3] had reiteratedthe same legal position that a subsequent buyer of the property after 2 (2017) 6 SCC 751H3 2020 SCC OnLine SC 316

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issuance of the notification under Section 4 the 1894 Act has no locus toinvoke Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Reference can be made to therelevant paragraph of the judgement.

“340. …….. The beneficiaries i.e. landowners contemplatedunder the proviso to Section 24(2), are the ones who were sorecorded as beneficiaries as on the date of issuance ofnotification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. The provision isnot meant to be invoked on the basis of void transactions,and by the persons who have purchased on the basis of powerof attorney or otherwise, they cannot claim the benefit underSection 24 as is apparent from the proviso to Section 24(2)and the decision in Shiv Kumar v. Union of India”.

10. In the case in hand it is the admitted position on record thatnotification under Section 4 of 1894 Act was issued on 25.11.1980 andthe sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 1 was registered on18.6.2003. Rather it is evident from the affidavit filed by the LandAcquisition Collector in the High Court that the respondent no.1 purchasedthe land from Behl Brothers vide registered sale deed dated 18.06.2003,who had purchased the same from M/s. Ansal Housing and Estates (P)Ltd. vide sale deed dated 09.06.1981, which itself was after the issuanceof notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act on 25.11.1980. Hence,the respondent will not have right to invoke jurisdiction of the High Courtto claim that the acquisition in question had lapsed in view of Section24(2) of the 2013 Act.

11. For the aforementioned reasons, the appeal is allowed. Theimpugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ petitionfiled by the respondent No.1 in the High Court is dismissed.

Divya Pandey

Appeal allowed.

(Assisted by : Roopanshi Virang, LCRA)

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