HARBHAJAN SINGH versus STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. on 20 September 2022

HARBHAJAN SINGH

v.

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 735 of 2014)

SEPTEMBER 20, 2022

[HEMANT GUPTA AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]

Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966 – s. 72 – Haryana SikhGurdwara (Management) Act, 2014 – Inter-State Corporation Act.1957 – ss.3, 4 – States Reorganisation Act, 1956 – Whether s. 72 ofthe 1966 Act and ss. 3 and 4 of the 1957 Act, were transitionalprovisions – Held: The 1957 Act is a statute to empower the CentralGovernment to issue directions from time to time so that on accountof creation of separate States, statutory bodies in the new Statescan function smoothly – Central Government could issue directionsin terms of the 1957 Act only to give effect to reorganisation of theStates so that the inter-state entity is able to function and dischargethe statutory mandate in the States so constituted – Such directionswere transitional in nature so that the functioning of inter-Statecorporations is not obstructed or curtailed on account ofreorganisation of the States – Neither the 1956 Act nor the 1966Act nor the 1957 Act has taken away the legislative competence ofthe States to legislate on the subjects which finds mention in List IIof the Seventh Schedule and/or in respect of matters falling in ListIII of the Seventh Schedule in the manner prescribed – Religiousinstitutions – Gurdwara.

Constitution of India: Legislative competence – Whether theHaryana Sikh Gurdwara (Management) Act, 2014 falls within thelegislative competence of the Haryana State Legislature or it fallsin Entry 44 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution –Held: There is no provision in the Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966which confers legislative power upon the Parliament in respect ofthe subjects over which the State has legislative competence in termsof List II – Therefore, the transitional provisions i.e., the 1966 Actor the Inter-State Corporation Act 1957 do not impinge upon thelegislative competence of the State legislature to enact a law on thesubjects mentioned in the List II – Entry 32 deals with unincorporated

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Atrading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies andassociations – In respect of such matters, the competent legislatureis the State – In terms of Entry 44 of List I, the Parliament will havejurisdiction only if the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee(SGPC) under the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 continues to be aninter-State entity – The jurisdiction of the successor States either toBrepeal, modify or enact a new law has not been restricted by the1966 Act – The SGPC became inter-State body corporate not becauseof Entry 44 List I but because of reorganisation of the territories ofthe erstwhile State of Punjab – Therefore, Entry 44 would have noapplicability in respect of legislative competence of the State ofCHaryana to enact the 2014 Act – Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 –Religious institutions – Gurdwara.

Constitution of India: Art. 254(2) – Presidential assent –Whether required for Haryana Sikh Gurdwara (Management) Act,2014 – Held: For entries in concurrent list, assent of the PresidentDwould be necessary if there is an existing statute and the State lawis contrary to some of the provisions of the Central law – Thoughthe Haryana Committee constituted under the 2014 Act is in respectof religious purposes, but the prime intention is of an incorporationof juristic entity to manage the affairs of the Sikhs in the State –Incorporation of such juristic entity more appropriately falls withinEthe domain of Entry 32 of List II and not within Entry 28 of List IIIof Seventh Schedule – Assent of the President is not required forthe validity of 2014 Act.

Constitution of India: Arts. 25 and 26 – Right to freedom ofreligion – Whether Haryana Sikh Gurdwara (Management) Act,F2014 violates fundamental rights of the petitioners under Arts. 25and 26 of the Constitution so as to entitle the petitioners to invokethe jurisdiction under Art.32 of the Constitution – Held: 2014 Actis similar to the 1925 Act, inter alia having similar provisions ofconstituting a committee to manage the affairs under the Act – TheGaffairs of the religious minority in the State i.e., Sikhs is left in thehands of the Sikhs alone in the same manner as was under the1925 Act – Since, the affairs of the Sikh minority in the State are tobe managed by the Sikhs alone, therefore, it cannot be said to beviolative of any of the fundamental rights conferred under Arts. 25and 26 of the Constitution – Writ petition is maintainable on theH

ground that the said writ petitions have been pending before thisCourt for almost 8 years wherein an interim order has been inoperation throughout – Additionally, the questions, being purelylegal, have been examined to give finality to the issues arising inthe two matters.

Dismissing the writ petitions and the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Whether Section 72 of the Punjab Reorganisation -Act, 1966 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Interstate CorporationAct, 1957 were transitional provisions to meet the immediaterequirement of the issues arising out of creation of separateStates?

1.1 The 1957 Act empowers the Central Government toissue directions from time to time so that on account of creationof separate States, such statutory bodies in the new States canfunction smoothly. It defines the “inter-State corporation” as anybody corporate constituted under any of the Acts specified in theSchedule and functioning in two or more States by virtue of Section109 of the 1956 Act. Therefore, in respect of such inter-Statecorporations, the Central Government could issue directions interms of the 1957 Act only to give effect to the reorganisation ofStates so that the inter-state entity is able to function and dischargethe statutory mandate in the States so constituted. Such directionswere transitional in nature so that the functioning of inter-Statecorporations is not obstructed or curtailed on account ofreorganisation of the States. Neither the 1956 Act nor the 1966Act nor the 1957 Act has taken away the legislative competenceof the States to legislate on the subjects which finds mention inList II of the Seventh Schedule and/or in respect of matters fallingin List III of the Seventh Schedule in the manner prescribed.The 1956 Act or the 1966 Act empowers the Central Governmentto issue directions to make the inter-state entity functional, butthe Central Government has not been empowered to legislate inrespect of such inter-State bodies which came to be operationalin one or more States due to the reorganisation of the States.[Paras 32 and 33][1141-F-H; 1142-A-B]

1.2 The power of the Centre to issue directions underSection 72 of the 1966 Act is a transitional provision to ensure A

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Asmooth and continuous functioning of a body corporate so that itis not paralyzed on becoming an inter-State body corporate dueto reorganisation of the erstwhile State of Punjab. The directionscontemplated by Section 72 relates to functioning and operationof such body corporate. A competent State legislature is notdeprived of its power to legislate on the subjects falling within itsBjurisdiction in terms of List II of the Seventh Schedule. The 1966Act does not bar the State Legislature to legislate on the fields ofits legislative competence falling under List II of the SeventhSchedule or even in List III of the Seventh Schedule, subject tothe limitations as are prescribed in the Constitution [ParaC46][1160-A-C]

2. Whether the impugned enactment (Haryana Act of 2014)

falls within the legislative competence of the Haryana StateLegislature or it falls in Entry 44 of List I of the Seventh Scheduleof the Constitution?

D2.1 The SGPC was a Board which was intra-State bodycorporate prior to reorganisation of the State in the year 1966.The reorganisation has rendered the SGPC as an inter-State bodycorporate but the legislative power to legislate on the subject ofincorporation of the Corporations would be within the jurisdictionof the Haryana State Legislature. Entry 32 deals withEunincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and othersocieties and associations. In respect of such unincorporatedtrading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies andassociations, the competent legislature is the State. In terms ofEntry 44 of List I, the Parliament will have jurisdiction only if theFSGPC under the 1925 Act continues to be an inter-State entity.The jurisdiction of the successor States either to repeal, modifyor enact a new law has not been restricted by the 1966 Act, thoughit is a special law within the meaning of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of theConstitution. The SGPC became inter-State body corporate notbecause of Entry 44 List I but because of reorganisation of theGterritories of the erstwhile State of Punjab. Therefore, Entry 44would have no applicability in respect of legislative competenceof the State of Haryana to enact the Haryana Act. [Para 48][1162-E-H; 1163-A]

2.2 The 1966 Act as well as the 1957 Act confer power onHthe Central Government for smooth transition of new States coming into existence as a consequence of the reorganization.There is no provision in the 1966 Act which confers legislativepower upon the Parliament in respect of the subjects over whichthe State has legislative competence in terms of List II. Therefore,the transitional provisions i.e., the 1966 Act or the 1957 Act donot impinge upon the legislative competence of the Statelegislature to enact a law on the subjects mentioned in the ListII. [Para 51][1163-F-G]

3. Whether, the impugned Act falls in List-III (ConcurrentList) Schedule VII, which required the assent of the President ofIndia as per Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, and in theabsence of such assent, void?

3.1 The impugned Haryana Act does not fall in Entry 28 ofList III of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 28 covers Charities andcharitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments andreligious institutions. In view of such Entry being in the concurrentlist, the State can legislate in respect of charities, charitableinstitutions, charitable and religious endowments and religiousinstitutions. The assent of the President would be necessary ifthere is an existing statute and the State law is contrary to someof the provisions of the Central law. The Haryana Committee isthe incorporation of a juristic entity which more appropriatelyfalls within the domain of Entry 32 of List II. Though the HaryanaCommittee is in respect of religious purpose, but the primeintention is of an incorporation of a juristic entity to manage theaffairs of the Sikhs in the State. Thus, Entry 32 is wide enough toinclude incorporation of such statutory entity. [Paras 52 and53][1164-A-D]

3.2 Even if it is assumed that the Haryana Act is infurtherance of Entry 28 of List III, the same cannot be said to bevoid for the reason that it has not been kept reserved for theassent of the President. Such an argument is based upon thereason that the 1925 Act is an inter-State legislation, therefore,the assent of the President is necessary. The 1925 Act wasoriginally an intra-State legislation enacted by the State legislature.It subsequently became an inter-State body only by virtue of the1966 Act. Since the power to legislate conferred on the Statelegislature has not been affected in any manner, therefore, the AB

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AState would have power to legislate both under Entry 28 of ListIII or Entry 32 of List II for the reason that the 1925 Act is not aninter-State body corporate in respect of which the Parliamentincorporated such Board. [Para 54][1164-D-F]

4. Whether any fundamental rights of the petitioners underBArticles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India are violated, so asto entitle the petitioners to invoke the jurisdiction of this Courtunder Article 32 of the Constitution?

4.1 The Haryana Act of 2014 is similar to the 1925 Acthaving similar provisions of constituting a committee to manageCthe affairs under the Act. The Haryana Committee is theCommittee constituted under Section 3 of the Haryana Act forthe management and control of the Gurdwaras and Gurdwaraproperties within the State of Haryana. The Gurdwara propertyin terms of Section 2(f) of the Haryana Act means all movable andimmovable properties of a Gurdwara or any institution which,Dimmediately before the appointed day, vested or was kept indeposit in the name of any Board, Trust, Committee, GurdwaraManagement or was being regulated under the provisions of the1925 Act. The members of the Committee have to be electedfrom the eligible voters who is Amritdhari Sikh, a Sikh, and whoEis eighteen years of age, but not a Patit Sikh and is not aninsolvent, mentally retarded or an insane person. The co-optionis from the members of the community alone. Therefore, theaffairs of the religious minority in the State i.e., Sikhs is left in thehands of the Sikhs alone in the same manner as was under the1925 Act. The Haryana Act also provides for Haryana SikhFGurdwara Judicial Commission in the same manner as is providedunder the 1925 Act. The affairs of the Gurdwara are again requiredto be managed by local Gurdwara Committee. Since the affairs ofthe Sikh minority in the State are to be managed by the Sikhsalone, therefore, it cannot be said to be violative of any of theGfundamental rights conferred under Articles 25 and 26 of theConstitution. [Para 55][1164-H; 1165-A-D]

4.2 The writ petition is maintainable on the ground that thesaid writ petitions have been pending before this Court for almost H

8 years wherein an interim order has been in operationthroughout. Additionally, the questions, being purely legal, havebeen examined to give finality to the issues arising in the twomatters [Para 56][1165-E]

5. In Civil appeal no.6614 of 2022, the appellant wasappointed for five years as Additional Commissioner GurdwaraElections on 29.8.2014. The post of Additional CommissionerGurdwara Elections was under the Haryana Sikh Gurdwaras(Management) Act, 2014. The vires of the aforesaid Act standsupheld by this Court. The appellant has not discharged anyfunctions in view of the stay by this Court. Therefore, theappointment was rescinded. The appellant was appointed for aperiod of five years, even the term for which the appellant wasappointed has come to an end by afflux of time. Therefore, theappellant has no subsisting cause in the present appeal. [Paras59, 60 and 61][1165-H; 1166-A-B]

Sehajdari Sikh Federation Vs. Union of India & Ors.2011 SCC Online P&H 17374; Dayanand Anglo-VedicCollege Managing Committee v. The State of Punjab &Ors. 1971 SCC OnLine P&H 257; Kashmir Singh v.Union of India & Ors. 2002 SCC OnLine P&H 766 –Approved .

Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah & Anr. 2021 SCCOnLine SC 474 – held inapplicable.

Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Unionof India & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 643 : [2006] 2 SCR 740

– Distinguished.

Himachal Pradesh University, Shimla v. PunjabUniversity, Chandigarh & Ors. (1996) 11 SCC 411;Kashmir Singh v. Union of India & Ors. (2008) 7 SCC259 : [2008] 8 SCR 464; D.A.V. College, Etc. Etc. v.State of Punjab & Ors. (1971) 2 SCC 269: [1971]Suppl. SCR 677 – relied on.

Smt. Swaran Lata v. Union of India & Ors. (1979) 3SCC 165 : [1979] 2 SCR 953; Jagtar Singh v. State ofPunjab (1972) 1 SCC 171; Maa Vaishno Devi Mahila A

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AMahavidyalaya v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2013)2 SCC 617 : [2012] 13 SCR 810; Nazir Ahmad v. TheKing-Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253 (2); State of Kerala &Ors. v. Kerala Rare Earth and Minerals Limited & Ors.(2016) 6 SCC 323:[2016] 5 SCR 515 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

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(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)EWithWrit Petition (Civil) No. 1116 of 2019 and civil appeal no. 6614 of2022.

K. M. Nataraj, ASG, Anil Grover, Gaurav Liberhan, Ajay Bansal,AAGs, V. Giri, Rakesh Dwivedi, Ms. V. Mohana, Ranjit Kumar, ShyamFDivan, Sr. Advs., Sanchar Anand, Ms. Suveni Bhagat, Ms. Astha Prasad,Shrirang B. Varma, Ritesh Khatri, Gagan Gupta, Ms. Shirin Khajuria,Ms. Tanisha Samanta, Chetan Joshi, Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Anirudh Bakhru,Rajat Nair, Anuj Srinivas Udupa, Nakul Chengappa K.K., A. K. Sharma,Chitransh Sharma, Vinayak Sharma, Siddharth Batra, Ms. Archna Yadav,GMs. Shivani Chawla, Chinmay Dubey, Hemant Gupta, Deepak Thukral,Sanjay Kumar Visen, Rahul Khurana, Suresh Kumar Bhan, AdithDeshmukh, Ms. Payal Gupta, Sandeep Joshi, Alok Sharma, UdayadityaBanerjee, Ajay Pal, R. K. Rathore, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Sharad KumarSinghania, Vatsal Joshi, Bhuvan Kapoor, Varun Chugh, Arun Kumar,Ms. Visaka Murty, G. S. Makkar, Sanchar Anand, Brij Kant Mishra,H

Hitesh Kumar Sharma, Akhileshwar Jha, Ms. Kaveri Upadhyaya, Ms.Niharika Dwivedi, S. K. Rajora, Dr. Vipin Gupta, Abhinav Mukerji, Ms.Bihu Sharma, Akshay C. Shrivastava, Ms. Pratishtha Vij, Gaurav Yadava,Ms. Veena Bansal, Jasbir Singh Malik, Ms. Usha Nandini V., VishwaPal Singh, Mrs. Kamaldeep Gulati, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Ms. UttaraBabbar, Tushar Bakshi, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Deepak Goel, Advs.for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by HEMANT GUPTA, J.

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 735 OF 2014 AND WRITPETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1116 OF 2019

1. The above writ petitions are preferred challenging the HaryanaSikh Gurdwara (Management) Act, 2014[1], creating a separate juristicentity for the management of historical Gurdwaras in the State of Haryanamentioned in Schedule I; Gurdwaras having income of more than Rs.20lakhs in Schedule II and the Gurdwaras having income of less than Rs.20lakhs in Schedule III.

2. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Haryana SikhGurdwara Management Bill, 2014 (Bill No. 28-III A of 2014) providesthat the Bill is an earnest effort to provide a legal procedure by whichthe Gurdwaras, owing to their origin and habitual use, regarded by theHaryana Sikhs as essentially pious places of worship, may be broughteffectively and permanently under the exclusive control of the Sikhs ofHaryana for their proper use, administration, control and financialmanagement reforms to make it consistent with the religious views ofthe said community. It was pointed out that the Sikh Gurdwaras in theState are being governed by the provisions of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act,1925[2] and the rules and regulations made thereunder, but in view of thedemands of the Sikhs in the State of Haryana which were examined bytwo committees, it was decided to introduce the Bill in terms of powersconferred under Article 246 read with Schedule VII, List II, Entry 32 ofthe Constitution of India, as also in pursuance of Section 72 of the PunjabReorganisation Act, 1966[3]. It is thereafter, the Haryana Act was enactedwhich came into force on 14.7.2014.

1 For short, the ‘Haryana Act’

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A3. The first writ petition has been filed by a resident of Haryanaand an elected representative of Shiromani Gurdwara PrabandhakCommittee[4] from Kurukshetra. The ground of challenge is that theHaryana Act is against the constitutional provisions, the statutoryprovisions of the 1966 Act and is also divisive in its intention to createdissentions amongst the followers of the Sikh religion. The writ petitionBwas subsequently amended to challenge the Haryana Act on the groundof infringement of fundamental rights conferred on the petitioner underPart III of the Constitution. The second writ petition has been preferredby the SGPC challenging the Haryana Act on almost similar grounds.

4. The State of Haryana and Haryana Sikh Gurdwara ManagingCCommittee[5] filed a counter affidavit controverting the stand of thepetitioner whereas respondent No. 3 – SGPC in the first writ petitionsupported the petitioner and, in fact, filed an independent writ petition tochallenge the Haryana Act. The Union of India in its reply asserted thatwhile excluding the jurisdiction of the 1925 Act by the Haryana Act, itDamounts to winding up of the Board constituted under the 1925 Actwhose functions necessarily fall under Entry 44 of List I. Therefore, thecontention that the State of Haryana had the jurisdiction to pass theimpugned Haryana Act in terms of Entry 32 of List II of Schedule VIIappears to be misplaced. It is the stand of the Union that only Parliamenthas the exclusive power to enact law on the said subject. There is noEjustification for the Haryana State Legislature to have passed a law onthe same subject matter, taking away the jurisdiction of the Boardconstituted under the 1925 Act.

5. It is submitted that the 1925 Act was enacted to provide forbetter administration of certain Sikh Gurdwaras and for enquiries intoFmatters and settlement of disputes connected therewith. The 1925 Actreceived the assent of the Governor General on 28.7.1925 and waspublished in the Punjab Gazette on 7.8.1925 and thereafter it came intoforce on 1.11.1925. The 1925 Act extends to the territories whichimmediately before 1.11.1956 were comprised in the State of PunjabGand Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU). It is pointed outthat the management of every notified Sikh Gurdwara is required to beadministered by the Committee constituted thereof, the Board and theCommission in accordance with the provisions of the Act. SGPC is the 4 For short, the ‘SGPC’H5 For short, the ‘Haryana Committee’

Board so constituted under Section 43. The Board consists of 170 electedmembers; the Head Ministers of the Darbar Sahib, Amritsar; Sri AkalTakhat Sahib, Amritsar; Sri Takhat Keshgarh Sahib, Anandpur; Sri TakhatPatna Sahib, Patna; Sri Hazur Sahib, Nanded; and Sri Takhat DamdamaSahib, Talwandi Sabo, Bathinda, Punjab and 15 members who areresidents in India, of whom not more than 5 shall be residents of Punjab,co-opted by the other members of the Board. The jurisdictional area ofthe Act has been divided into 120 constituencies as there are 50 pluralconstituencies, each returning 2 members for the election of 170members. Furthermore, the 1925 Act envisages a scheme for theadministration and management of the property, endowments, funds andincome of the Gurdwaras as described in Section 85(1). For every suchnotified Sikh Gurdwara other than a Gurdwara specified in Section 85, aCommittee shall be constituted after it has been declared to be a SikhGurdwara consisting of 5 members as provided under Section 87. TheGurdwaras covered by the 1925 Act are spread over the present Statesof Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Union Territory of Chandigarhand are being administered by the SGPC.

6. It has also been mentioned that the States Reorganisation Act,1956[6] increased the area of Punjab by inclusion of State of PEPSU.However, the existing State of Punjab was thereafter reorganized onlinguistic basis in 1966 when the 1966 Act was enacted. The relevantprovisions of the 1966 Act read thus:

“72(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided by the foregoingprovisions of this Part, where any body corporate constituted undera Central Act, State Act or Provincial Act for the existing State ofPunjab or any part thereof serves the needs of the successorStates or has, by virtue of the provisions of Part II, become aninter-State body corporate, then, the body corporate shall, on andfrom the appointed day continue to function and operate in thoseareas in respect of which it was functioning and operatingimmediately before that day, subject to such directions as mayfrom time to time be issued by the Central Government, until otherprovision is made by law in respect of the said body corporate.

(2) Any direction issued by the Central Government under sub-section (1) in respect of any such body corporate may include adirection that any law by which the said body corporate is governed AB

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Ashall, in its application to that body corporate, have effect, subjectto such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in thedirection.

(3) For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that the provisionsof this section shall apply also to the Punjab University constitutedBunder the Punjab University Act, 1947, the Punjab AgriculturalUniversity constituted under the Punjab Agricultural UniversityAct, 1961, and the Board constituted under the provisions of PartIII of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925.

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C88. The provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effectedany change in the territories to which any law in force immediatelybefore the appointed day extends or applies, and territorialreferences in any such law to the State of Punjab shall untilotherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competentauthority be construed as meaning the territories within that StateDimmediately before the appointed day.

89. For the purpose of facilitating the application in relation to theState of Punjab or Haryana or to the Union Territory of HimachalPradesh or Chandigarh of any law made before the appointedday, the appropriate Government may, before the expiration ofEtwo years from that day, by order, make such adaptations andmodifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment,as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon every such lawshall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications somade until altered, repealed or amended by a competentFLegislature or other competent authority.

Explanation- In this section, the expression “appropriateGovernment” means- (a)as respects any law relating to a matter enumerated in theUnion List, the Central Government; and G(b)as respects any other law-

i)in its application to a State, the State Government,and

ii)in its application to a Union Territory, the CentralGovernment.

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90. (1) Notwithstanding that no provision or insufficient provisionhas been made under section 89 for the adaptation of a law madebefore the appointed day, any court, tribunal or authority, requiredor empowered to enforce such law may, for the purpose offacilitating its application in relation to the State of Punjab orHaryana, or to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh orChandigarh construe the law in such manner, without affectingthe substance, as may be necessary or proper in regard to thematter before the court, tribunal or authority.

(2) Any reference to the High Court of Punjab in any law shallunless the context otherwise requires be construed, on and fromthe appointed day, as a reference to the High Court of Punjab andHaryana.”

7. It is stated that in terms of the provisions of Section 109 of the1956 Act, the Inter-State Corporation Act, 1957[7] was enacted. The standof the Union is that as per Section 3 of the 1957 Act, the StateGovernments were enabled to frame the scheme in respect of any inter-State Corporation functioning within the State, but the scheme had to beforwarded to the Central Government. The Central Government afterconsulting the State Government concerned may either approve thescheme with or without modifications and give effect to the scheme soapproved under Section 4 of the 1957 Act. The Central Government hadthe power to include any body corporate constituted for a State forfunctioning in two or more States of the Schedule. The 1925 Act cameto be incorporated in the Schedule in the 1957 Act vide notification dated26.7.1972. Thus, it is the stand of the Union that only Central Governmentcould give directions with regard to functioning and operation of an inter-state body corporate i.e., SGPC.

8. Section 109 of the 1956 Act reads thus:

“109. General provision as to statutory corporations-(1) Save asotherwise expressly provided by the foregoing provisions of thisPart, where any body corporate has been constituted under aCentral Act, State Act or Provincial Act for an existing State or toa new State, then, notwithstanding such transfer, the body corporateshall, as from the appointed day, continue to function and operatein those areas in respect of which it was functioning and operating

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immediately before that day, subject to such direction as may fromtime to time be issued by the Central Government, until otherprovisions is made by law in respect of the said body corporate.

(2) Any directions issued by the Central Government under sub-section (1) in respect of any such body corporate shall include adirection that any law by which the said body corporate is governedshall in its application to that body corporate have effect subjectto such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in thedirection.”

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9. The relevant provisions of the 1957 Act read thus:

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“2. Definition - In this Act, “inter-State corporation” means anybody corporate constituted under any of the Acts specified in theSchedule and functioning in two or more States by virtue of section109 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, [or of any otherenactment relating to reorganisation of States].

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3. Power of State Governments to frame schemes. – If it appearsto the Government of a State in any part of which an inter-Statecorporation is functioning that the inter-State corporation shouldbe reconstituted and reorganized as, one or more inter-Statecorporations or that it should be dissolved, the State GovernmentEmay frame a scheme for such reconstitution and reorganisationor such dissolution, as the case may be, including proposalsregarding the transfer of the assets, rights and liabilities of theinter-State corporation to any other corporations or StateGovernments and the transfer or re-employment of employees ofthe inter-State corporation and forward the scheme to the CentralFGovernment.

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4. Reorganisation of certain inter-State corporations.-(1) On receiptof a scheme forwarded to it under section 3, the CentralGovernment may, after consulting the State Governmentsconcerned, approve the scheme with or without modifications andGgive effect to the scheme so approved by making such order as itthinks fit.

(2) An order made under sub-section (1) may provide for all ofany of the following matters, namely:- xx xx H

(b) the reconstitution and reorganisation in any manner whatsoeverof the inter-state corporation including the constitution, wherenecessary of new corporation;

(c) the area in respect of which the reconstituted corporation ornew corporation shall function and operate;

(d) the transfer, in whole or in part, of the assets, rights and liabilitiesof the inter-State corporation (including the rights and liabilitiesunder any contract made by it) to any other corporations or StateGovernments and the terms and conditions of such transfer; xxxx xx

5. Power of Central Government to add to the Schedule. – TheCentral Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,specify in the Schedule any Act under which a body corporateconstituted for a State is functioning in two or more States byvirtue of section 109 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, or ofany other enactment for the reorganisation of States, and on theissue of such notification, the Schedule shall be deemed to beamended by the inclusion of the said Act therein.”

10. The State of Himachal Pradesh, respondent No. 6, took astand that the 1925 Act is applicable only for those areas which areincluded in Himachal Pradesh under the 1966 Act. The single memberconstituency of the said areas of Himachal Pradesh has 23987 voters.Therefore, there had been no issue either about conducting of electionfor SGPC or managing of Gurdwaras under the existing legislation i.e.,the 1925 Act and the Rules made thereunder. Thus, the State of HimachalPradesh is not contesting the petition.

11. In the reply filed on behalf of the State of Punjab dated24.8.2014, it has been averred that the power to make law in respect ofSGPC as an inter-State body corporate has been reserved to the CentralGovernment only. The relevant extract reads thus:

“The power to make law in respect of the SGPC as an Inter-State Body Corporate has been reserved to the CentralGovernment only and there is no provision in law for bifurcationof the said Inter-State Body Corporate or replacement thereof byenacting a State legislation.

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AThus in light of the above submissions, it is clear that SGPC isfirmly rooted as an inter-state body corporate and only Parliamentis empowered to legislate regarding inter-state corporations asper Entry 44 of List-I of Schedule 7 to the Constitution of India.The enactment of the Haryana Sikh Gurdwara (Management)Act, 2014 in purported exercise of legislative competence underBEntry 32 of List-II of Schedule 7 is wholly unconstitutional andtrespasses into a field exclusively reserved for Parliamentarylegislation, in view of the Statutory Provisions referred above.”

12. A reference has been made to a Full Bench judgment of Punjaband Haryana High Court in Sehajdhari Sikh Federation v. Union ofCIndia & Ors.[8] in the counter affidavit. It was however pointed out thatthe aforesaid judgment was the subject matter of challenge in an appealbefore this Court.

13. In the alternative, it was submitted that the legislativecompetence was to be traced to Entry 28 of List-III of Schedule VII.DTherefore, in the absence of assent of the President in terms of Article254, the Haryana Act is directly in conflict with the existing law.

14. However, after the amendment of the first writ petition, anadditional affidavit was filed by the State of Punjab on 22.11.2019. Itwas stated that after the affidavits were filed at the initial stage, thereEhave been subsequent developments when the Parliament enacted SikhGurdwara (Amendment) Act, 2016, amending Sections 49 and 92 of the1925 Act with retrospective effect from 8.10.2003. It is pointed out thatchallenge to the said amendment carried out by the Parliament is thesubject matter of challenge in Writ Petition No. 11978 of 2017 which isFpending consideration before the High Court. It was averred that themodification by the Central Government in terms of Section 72(1) of the1966 Act is in relation to functioning and operating of the body corporatei.e., SGPC. However, such power cannot be extended to amend thestatute or issuance of notifications from time to time. The relevant extractfrom the additional affidavit reads thus:G“10. The Central Government has done so in exercise of its powersof modification under Section 72(1) of the Punjab Re-organisationAct, 1966. While Section 72(1) of the Punjab Re-organisationAct, 1966 does indeed empower the Central Government to modify, H8 2012 (1) ILR Punjab and Haryana 347 : 2011 SCC OnLine P&H 17374

such power is confined to directions by the Central Governmentin relation to “the functioning and operating” of such bodycorporate i.e. the Respondent No. 3. That such power is limitedto the functioning and operation of the SGPC, cannot extend toamending the statute or that the issuance of such notificationsfrom time to time do not change the legislative character of theSikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 (from a State legislation) to that of aParliamentary Legislation was conclusively held by the Hon’bleFull Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the matterof Sehajdari Sikh Federation Vs. Union of India (CWP 17771 of2003 decided on 20[th] December 2011) (2012 (1) ILR (P&H) 347).As stated earlier the appeal from the above judgment being Civilappeal 9334/2013 came to be disposed as infructuous in view ofParliament enacting the Sikh Gurdwara (Amendment) Act, 2016which in turn now is subject matter of challenge before the Hon’bleHigh Court of Punjab and Haryana.

11. The present Respondent reiterates that State Legislationpertaining to the administration of Gurudwaras within a State (suchas the Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1925 pertaining to Gurudwaras inthe State of Punjab) is strictly within the dominion of the State,the power to enact or amend such State Legislation cannot beusurped by Parliament and the contentions of the Petitioner and/or the Respondent no. 3 in this regard are denied as misconceived.

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13. There is a distinction between the Central Government’s powerto issue directions (for the above limited purpose) and thecompetence of Parliament to legislate. The existence of one doesnot imply the existence of the other. The Petitioner and /or theRespondent cannot contend that merely because the CentralGovernment has the power to pass directions, Parliament has thesole power to legislate.

14. Furthermore, from a bare reading of the language of Section72, even such limited power of the Central Government to issuedirections would cease to exist when appropriate legislation ispassed by competent legislature in this regard.

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A19. It is reiterated that State has the power to enact necessarylegislation as regards “religious and other societies andassociation”- (List 2-Entry 32) and the Petitioner and/orRespondent no. 3’s misplaced reliance on the provisions of Section72 of the Punjab Reorganization Act 1966, and any perceivedomnibus power of Parliament to legislate /amend such statues,Bespecially in the light of the Sikh Gurudwara (Amendment) Act2016, is misplaced.

20. In view of the above, it is most respectfully submitted that thisHon’ble Court may kindly pass appropriate order upholding thelegislative competence of the State Legislature to enact/amendClegislation in relation to gurdwaras in their respective States.”

15. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the petitionersubmitted that the Haryana Act is practically similar to the 1925 Actexcept some contextual changes. The stand of the writ petitionerHarbhajan Singh is that Section 72(1) of the 1966 Act provides thatDwhere any body corporate constituted for the existing State of Punjab orany part thereof by any Act of Centre, State or Province becomes anInter-State Corporation by virtue of Part II of the 1956 Act, then it shallcontinue to operate in those areas in respect of which it was functioningand operating immediately before that day, subject to such directions asEmay be issued by the Central Government, until other provision ismade by law in respect of it. Section 72(3) clarifies that this Sectionshall apply to, inter alia, the Board constituted under Part III of the1925 Act. While Part II (Sections 3-8) of the 1966 Act deals withreorganisation of the State of Punjab, Part VII (Sections 67-77) dealswith State Electricity Board and State Warehouse Corporation whichFprovides that these are to continue, subject to Section 67 and directionsof the Central Government, but Section 67(4) enables the Governmentof any of the successor States to constitute their own State ElectricityBoard and State Warehouse Corporation. Section 69 makes similarprovisions for the Punjab State Financial Corporation and empowers theGStates of Punjab and Haryana to constitute their own State FinancialCorporation with the approval of Central Government. Section 70provides a distinct procedure for co-operative societies specified in theFifteenth Schedule of the 1966 Act which become a multi-unit cooperativesociety by inserting Section 5D in the Multi-Unit Cooperative SocietyAct, 1942. Further, Section 73 deals with seven other corporations whichH

are to continue until otherwise provided for “in any law” or “in anyagreement among the successor States” or “in any direction issued bythe Central Government”. Section 89 of the 1966 Act permits adaptationsin laws by the appropriate Government until the laws are altered, repealedor amended by the competent legislature or the competent authority.Explanation thereto provides that “appropriate Government” means theCentral Government in relation to matters enumerated in the Union List.For rest, it is the State Government.

16. It is also submitted that Article 246 read with Entry 32 List IIof the Seventh Schedule and Section 72 of the 1966 Act cannot conferpower on the Haryana Legislative Assembly to make the impugned law.The law is thus void, being outside the legislative competence of theHaryana Legislative Assembly. It is also averred that the impugned lawviolates Article 26 of the Constitution of India as it purports to take outspecified Gurdwaras and the management of their properties from thecontrol of the Board under the 1925 Act.

17. It is argued that the States Reorganisation Act is a specialkind of legislation enacted under Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Constitution.The Parliament alone is empowered to make such a law. The State ofHaryana can act only in accordance with the 1957 Act if it desiresreconstitution, reorganisation or dissolution of the Board constituted underthe 1925 Act. The only method prescribed under the Act to do so is toframe a scheme including proposals regarding transfer of assets of theBoard to any other corporation of its own, and thereafter forward thesame to the Central Government. The Central Government then underSection 4 of the 1957 Act is required to pass an order approving thescheme with such modifications as it may deem fit, after consulting theother State Governments. It is also submitted that where a specialprocedure has been prescribed for doing a particular thing in a particularmanner, it must be done in that manner and not otherwise. Reference ismade to Privy Council judgment in Nazir Ahmad v. The King-Emperor[9].The said principle is again echoed in State of Kerala & Ors. v. KeralaRare Earth and Minerals Limited & Ors.[10]. Various other judgmentshave been referred to by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi but there is no necessityto quote them as the principle is well settled and established for manydecades.

9 AIR 1936 PC 253(2)10 (2016) 6 SCC 323

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A18. It is submitted that the source of enactment of the HaryanaAct is Section 72 of the 1966 Act read with Entry 32, List II of the VIISchedule. It is stated that Section 72 deals with body corporatesconstituted under the Central Act, State Act or Provincial Act for theexisting State of Punjab. Such body corporate which has become aninter-state body corporate is mandated to continue to function and operateBin those areas in respect of which it was functioning and operatingimmediately before that day. The Central Government is empoweredunder Section 72(1) to issue directions from time to time “until otherprovision is made by law”. The State of Haryana is thus not competentto make a law in respect of a body corporate which has become anCinter-state body corporate. It is argued that the 1957 Act is a special lawmade by the Parliament and not only Section 72 of the 1966 Act has tobe read along with the provisions of the 1957 Act, but the entire 1966Act would have to be construed consistently with the provisions of the1957 Act. The principle of generalia specialibus non derogant,(General things do not derogate from the special things) would applyDin the event of any inconsistency or ambiguity. It is also submitted thatinter-state corporations or multi-state corporations would be covered byEntry 44 of List I. Reference is made to a recent judgment of this Courtin Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah & Anr.[11].

19. It is averred that the Haryana Act is not creating a society orEa corporation at State level but it seeks to curtail the jurisdiction of the1925 Act, therefore, it is not an enactment with reference to Entry 32List II. It is also contended that in fact, the Haryana Act adverselyimpacts the unity of management of religious place of worship and takesaway the management of the Gurdwaras from the control of SGPC,Fthus, breaching the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 26. Hence,the argument is that the Haryana Act violates the mandate of Articles25 and 26 of the Constitution.

20. The SGPC challenged the Haryana Act, inter alia, on theground that the legislature of the State of Haryana has taken away theGright of administration of Gurdwaras and its properties situated in theState of Haryana from SGPC and handed it over to the HaryanaCommittee. It is the stand of SGPC that it is running various charitableactivities in the State of Haryana i.e., schools, colleges, hospitals andother religious institutions and also managing the Gurdwaras situated in H11 2021 SCC OnLine SC 474

the State of Haryana. SGPC thus has a fundamental right under Article26 to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitablepurposes. It was stated as under:

“5. Under the Act of 1925, the SGPC became a legal institution ofthe Sikhs for managing the Sikh Gurdwaras. It became thesupreme body of the Sikhs which was directly elected by theSikhs to manage their religious affairs for themselves. It came tobe appropriately and rightly as a government within the governmentor a mini parliament of the Sikhs. It’s working achievement andcontribution of the last almost hundred years clearly display, thatthe SGPC has played a significant role in the affairs of the Sikhs,and the Sikh community has great reverence for its efforts andcontributions made for raising religious ands social issuesconcerning the community, not only in India, but all over the world,even dehorsit’s statutory enactment, i.e. Act of 1925.

6. …The Haryana Sikh Gurdwaras (Management) Act, 2014 inits objects and reasons specifically states that the Act of 2014 hasbeen enacted for managing religious affairs including managementof Sikh Gurdwaras in the territorial jurisdiction of the State ofHaryana. It provides for division of property vested with the Board-SGPC under the act of 1925 and thus, infringes Article 26 of theConstitution of India….

7. It is submitted that Article 26(d) of the Constitution uses theexpression “in accordance with law”, it is trite to submit that theword ‘law’ encompasses an Act and it has to be a valid piece oflegislation. This Hon’ble Court has held in the context of Article26 that in matters of administration of property belonging to thereligious denomination or section thereof, the secular authoritiescan regulate the same in accordance with the law laid down bythe competent legislature. Although, only clause (d) of Article 26uses the expression in accordance with law, however, the sameexpression has to be read into all the clauses of Article 26, since,it cannot be the case that state can meddle in the fundamentalrights of freedom to manage religious affairs etc., without enactinga valid piece of legislation, thus, violation of fundamental rightsunder Article 26, as available to the SGPC and its elected members.

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A9. It is also submitted that this Hon’ble Court has held in contextof various Articles of the Constitution that the law must be a validlaw. Article 25(2) of the Constitution permits the state for makingany law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, politicalor other secular activities, which may be associated with religiouspractice, and the similar logic as stated hereinabove in regard toBvalidity of law on the touchstone of competence of legislaturewould be applicable on all fours in regard to provisions of Article25(2) as well. Further, this logic would be applicable even toprovisions of Article 13 as well.”

21. It is contended that the State of Haryana relies upon Entry 32,CList II of the Seventh Schedule, whereas, the SGPC under the 1925 Actis an inter-state body corporate covered by Entry 44 of List I. The twoentries read thus:

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22. Since the object of SGPC is not confined to one State, therefore,Haryana State legislature is not competent to enact law. In respect ofEntry 32, it is stated that it refers to only those corporations which arebased within the territories of a particular state whereas the inter-stateFcorporations covered under Entry 44 of List I are excluded from theoperation of Entry 32 of List II. The 1957 Act is a special statute regulatinginter-state corporations and it has been enacted under Articles 2 and 3of the Constitution of India read with Entry 44 of List I of the SeventhSchedule, therefore, legislature of Haryana could not have enacted theGHaryana Act in violation of the 1957 Act. Reference was made to ajudgment of this Court reported as Maa Vaishno Devi MahilaMahavidyalaya v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.[12]. Thus, it is arguedthat the provisions of Section 72(1) read with Section 72(3) of the 1966

Act specifically deal with inter-state corporate body like SGPC, and thelegislature for the State of Haryana has made an incompetent Act. Inview of Section 88 of the 1966 Act, the 1925 Act which was applicableprior to the appointed day continued to function and operate in the Statesof Punjab, Haryana, parts of Himachal Pradesh and U.T. Chandigarh.

23. The argument on behalf of the State of Haryana or on behalfof the Haryana Committee is that this Court vide its order dated 29.3.2022while holding the maintainability of the present writ petition before thisCourt held that two aspects need to be examined; first, whether anyfundamental right of the petitioner is invaded or violated and, second,unless and until violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner isfound, this Court need not go into the question of vires of the impugnedAct.

24. Reliance is placed upon a Full Bench judgment of the Punjaband Haryana High Court reported as Dayanand Anglo-Vedic CollegeManaging Committee v. The State of Punjab & Ors.[13] to contendthat Panjab University, an inter-State body corporate by virtue of Section72 of the 1966 Act was to continue its functions and operations subjectto the directions issued by the Central Government. The directions couldbe issued for a limited period i.e., until other provision was made by lawin respect of Panjab University. Reliance is also placed upon HimachalPradesh University, Shimla v. Punjab University, Chandigarh &Ors.[14 ]wherein this Court held that the institutions and properties whichwere situated in Himachal Pradesh of the Panjab University, being aninter-state corporation, were succeeded by the University of thesuccessor State insofar as its functioning and operation at Shimla wasconcerned. It is, thus, sought to be contended that the irretrievableconclusion is that the 1956 Act was only a transitional provision. It issubmitted as under:

“1. The Impugned Act is pari materia to the Sikh Gurdwara Act,1925. As per Chapter-II – ‘The Committee’ of the ImpugnedAct, a committee by the name of Haryana Sikh GurdwaraCommittee (Respondent No. 5) has been established for the propermanagement and control of the Sikh Gurdwaras situated injurisdiction of the State of Haryana. As per Section 4 –

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A‘Composition of Committee’, the committee consists of 40members who are elected from various wards from the State ofHaryana. This scheme grants the Impugned Act a democraticframework as every person is given a fair say in the managementof religious affairs.

B2. The Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 was passed by theParliament under Article 3 of the Constitution of India tofacilitate reorganisation of the existing State of Punjab and formatters connected therewith. Section 72 of the 1966 Act wasenacted to make general provisions for such bodies corporate forwhich no provision had been made in other parts of the Act.C

3. Section 72(1) starts with the words “Save as otherwiseexpressly provided by the foregoing provisions of this Part”.It further specifically mentions that the Central Government hasthe power to issue directions qua the corporation “until otherprovision is made by law in respect of the said body corporate”.DSection 72(3) specifically provides that the provision of this sectionshall apply to the “Board constituted under the provisions ofPart III of the Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925.”

4. The Inter-State Corporation Act, 1957 was enacted as perSection 109 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 as a transitionalEprovision for the purpose of reconstitution/dissolution/reorganisation of certain corporations functioning in two or moreStates. The statement of purpose of the 1957 Act is “this wasonly intended to be a transition provision”.

25. Reference is also made to five-Judges Bench judgment of theFPunjab and Haryana High Court in Kashmir Singh v. Union of India& Ors.[15] which was affirmed by this Court in a judgment reported asKashmir Singh v. Union of India & Ors.[16] to contend that the Statelegislature is competent to enact a law in respect of the 1925 Act whenthe State of Punjab nominated members to the Judicial Commissionconstituted under the 1925 Act.G

26. The 1925 Act is a State Act. It was enacted by PunjabProvincial Council. The State of Punjab has amended this 1925 Act 15 2002 SCC OnLine P&H 766 : ILR (2003) 1 P&H 345. For short, Kashmir Singh - IH16 (2008) 7 SCC 259. For short, Kashmir Singh - II

thirty times from the date of its passing in 1925 upto 1966. Entry 32 ofList II specifically includes the power of the State Legislature to makelaws in relation to incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations,other than those specified in List I. The State is competent to framelaws in respect of universities, unincorporated trading, literary, scientific“religiousand other societies” and associations. This express powerhas not been conferred on the Parliament under Entry 44, List I. It isalso contended that the Haryana Act is not covered by Entry 28 of ListIII i.e., charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religiousendowments and religious institutions. It is contended that endowmentsare in essence properties, whether movable or immovable, designated tobe used for a specific purpose which would fall within Entry 28 of ListIII of the Seventh Schedule but the corporations are legal entities thatcan sue and be sued which are covered by Entry 32 of List II.

27. The State of Punjab in its written submissions has assertedthat it is an undisputed fact that the 1925 Act is an act of State legislature.It was enacted for the administration of certain Sikh Gurdwaras withinthe State of Punjab as it then existed and thereafter various amendmentshave been made to it by the Punjab Legislature. It is only due to Section72 of the 1966 Act that the Board under the 1925 Act became an inter-state corporation, which was only a temporary measure until law is madeby the competent legislature. It was asserted as follows:

“3. From the date of enactment of the Constitution of India, theState of Punjab adopted the 1925 Act and since then the PunjabLegislative Assembly has been making amendments to the 1925Act. It was only after the 1966 Act was passed, the power toissue direction was granted to the Central Government by thevirtue of Section 72 of the 1966 Act. The power to makeamendment was temporarily shifted to the Parliament till the timethe Successor States came up with their own laws.

4. It is essential to note that shift of power was only transitional innature, and the Central Government was given the power to merelyissue directions. The Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana HighCourt while deciding CWP No. 17771/2003 vide judgment dated20.12.2011 in the matter of Sehajdari Sikh Federation Vs. Unionof India 2012 (1) ILR (P&H) 347 negated the power of theCentral Government to amend the Sikh Gurudwaras Act 1925, byway of notification.

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5. It is stated that the 1925 Act was indisputably conceived as aState Act. The Respondent No.3-SGPC is a creation of Section40 of the 1925 Act. Section 40 inter alia read with the preamble ofthe 1925 Act provides that Respondent No. 3 is a Board constitutedfor the better administration of certain/notified SikhGurudwaras and for enquiries into matters and settlement ofdisputes connected therewith. Section 42(3) grants on to theRespondent No.3 the status of a “body corporate”.

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6. After the passing of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (inshort “1956 Act”) and the 1966 Act, the Central Government hasby notification from time to time “modified” the provisions ofSection 85 (Constitution of committees of management of certaingurdwaras) of the 1925 Act to amend/add such list of notifiedSikh Gurudwaras whose management would be supervised bythe Respondent No.3.

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7. The Central Government has done so in exercise of its powersDof modification under Section 72(1) of the 1966 Act. While Section72(1) of the 1966 Act does indeed empower the CentralGovernment to modify, such power is confined to directions bythe Central Government in relation to “the functioning andoperating” of such body corporate i.e. the Respondent No.3. ThatEsuch power is limited to the functioning and operation ofthe SGPC, cannot extend to amending the statute or thatthe issuance of such notifications from time to time do notchange the legislative character of the 1925 Act (from aState legislation) to that of a Parliamentary Legislation. Thisposition was conclusively settled by the Hon’ble Full Bench ofFthe Punjab and Haryana High Court in the matter of SehajdariSikh Federation case (Supra).

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8. The present Respondent reiterates that State Legislationpertaining to the administration of Gurudwaras within a State(such as the Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1925 pertaining toGurudwaras in the State of Punjab) is strictly within thedominion of the State, the power to enact or amend suchState Legislation cannot be usurped by Parliament andthe contentions of the Petitioner and/or the Respondent No.3in this regard are not maintainable.

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9. Section 72 of the 1966 Act cannot be read against a StateGovernment in the manner in which the Petitioner and/or theRespondent No.3 are now proceeding to do so. The power of theCentral Government in terms of Section 72 is limited to the passingof directions relating to the functioning and operating of RespondentNo.3.

10. Furthermore, from a bare reading of the language of Section72, even such limited power of the Central Government to issuedirections would cease to exist when appropriate legislation ispassed by competent legislature in this regard.

11. Moreover amending/enacting the legislation pertaining to theadministration of Gurudwaras within a State (such as the SikhGurudwaras Act, 1925 pertaining to the Gurudwaras in the Stateof Punjab) is within the legislative domain of the State and suchpower to enact or amend such State Legislation cannot be usurpedby the Parliament. It is submitted that State has the power toenact necessary legislation as regards “religious and other societiesand association” (List-2, Entry 32) and the petitioner and/orRespondent No.3’s misplaced reliance on the provisions of Section72 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 and any perceivedomnibus power of Parliament to legislate/amend such statutes ismisplaced.

12. Reliance on Entry No.44 of List I to the 7[th] Schedule whichpertains to “incorporation, regulation and winding up ofcorporations” cannot be placed as there is no legislation at hand,which deals with the incorporation, regulation or the winding upof the Respondent No.3 [even assuming without admitting thatthe Respondent No.3 is a corporation envisaged under Entry 44List 1, which it is not].

13. The Respondent No.3 is a creation of and continues to oweits legal position, existence and functioning to Section 39-42 of the1925 Act which is a State Legislation enacted by a State Legislaturein terms of the Entry 32 of List II and not by the Parliament.Entry 4 List 1 does not even relate to or mention such “Inter StateCorporations”. Rather it pertains to the “incorporation,regulation and winding up of corporations”.

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A28. In the light of arguments addressed and/or submitted, we findthe following questions arise for consideration:

(i) Whether any fundamental rights of the petitioners underArticles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India are violated,so as to entitle the petitioners to invoke the jurisdiction ofBthis Court under Article 32 of the Constitution?

(ii) Whether Section 72 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966and Sections 3 and 4 of the Inter-State Corporation Act,1957 were transitional provisions to meet the immediaterequirement of the issues arising out of creation of separateCStates?

(iii) Whether the impugned enactment (Haryana Act) fallswithin the legislative competence of the Haryana StateLegislature or does it fall under Entry 44 of List I of theSeventh Schedule of the Constitution?

D(iv)Whether the Impugned Act falls in List-III (Concurrent List)of Schedule VII, which required the assent of the Presidentof India as per Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India,and in the absence of such assent, void?

29. We will take up Question Nos. (ii), (iii), and (iv) first andEthereafter advert to Question No. (i).

-Question No. (ii) Whether Section 72 of the PunjabReorganisation Act, 1966 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Inter-stateCorporation Act, 1957 were transitional provisions to meet theimmediate requirement of the issues arising out of creation ofFseparate States?

30. The writ petitioners, SGPC and the Union have taken one lineof argument that the Haryana State Legislature does not have any powerto legislate in respect of an inter-state corporation which is evident fromthe reading of sub-section (3) of Section 72 of the 1966 Act. In respectGof such inter-state body, it is averred that the Central Government aloneis the competent authority to issue directions in terms of sub-section (1)of Section 72 of the 1966 Act. Alternatively, the right of the State ofHaryana is to frame a scheme in terms of the provisions of Section 3 ofthe 1957 Act and forward it to the Central Government for itsconsideration and approval, with or without modifications. Mr. NatarajH

pointed out that Section 3, as referred to by the learned counsel for theparties, is not factually correct. If an inter-State corporation is requiredto be reconstituted and reorganized as one or more ‘intra-Statecorporations’, or that it has to be dissolved, the State of Haryana wasexpected to frame a scheme for the reconstitution and reorganization tohave intra-State management of Gurdwaras in the State of Haryana.

31. The State of Haryana, Haryana Committee and State of Punjabhave taken one stand and argued that power to legislate the impugnedHaryana Act is not with the parliament but with the State, i.e., State ofHaryana. It was argued that the 1957 Act was enacted in pursuance ofSection 109 of the 1956 Act which is also mentioned in the Preamble ofthe said Act, and was intended to be a transitional provision as mentionedin the Statement of Objects and Reasons when the Bill leading to theenactment of 1957 Act was introduced. Section 109 of the 1956 Act isto the effect that where any body corporate has been constituted undera Central Act, State Act or Provincial Act for an existing State, thewhole or any part of which is by virtue of Part II transferred to anyexisting State or to a new State, then, from the appointed day, continueto function and operate in those areas in respect of which it wasfunctioning and operating immediately before that day. Such functioningis subject to such direction as may from time to time be issued by theCentral Government, until other provision is made by law in respect ofsuch body corporate.

32. The 1957 Act is a statute to empower the Central Governmentto issue directions from time to time so that on account of creation ofseparate States, such statutory bodies in the new States can functionsmoothly. It defines the “inter-State corporation” as any body corporateconstituted under any of the Acts specified in the Schedule and functioningin two or more States by virtue of Section 109 of the 1956 Act. Asmentioned above, the 1925 Act came to be inserted in the Schedule inthe year 1972. Therefore, in respect of such inter-State corporations,the Central Government could issue directions in terms of the 1957 Actonly to give effect to the reorganisation of States so that the inter-stateentity is able to function and discharge the statutory mandate in theStates so constituted. Such directions were transitional in nature so thatthe functioning of inter-State corporations is not obstructed or curtailedon account of reorganisation of the States. Neither the 1956 Act nor the1966 Act nor the 1957 Act has taken away the legislative competence AB

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Aof the States to legislate on the subjects which finds mention in List II ofthe Seventh Schedule and/or in respect of matters falling in List III ofthe Seventh Schedule in the manner prescribed.

33. The 1956 Act or the 1966 Act empowers the CentralGovernment to issue directions to make the inter-state entity functional,Bbut the Central Government has not been empowered to legislate inrespect of such inter-State bodies which came to be operational in one or more States due to the reorganisation of the States.

34. The issue has been examined firstly by this Court in a judgmentreported as Smt. Swaran Lata v. Union of India & Ors.[17] wherein, inCrespect of Union Territory of Chandigarh, the question arose as to whetherthe post of a Principal, Government Central Crafts Institute for Womenwas a deputation post and required to be filled up by the ChandigarhAdministration only by an officer on deputation, or could it also be filledup by appointment of a suitable candidate by advertising the post throughthe Union Public Service Commission. The argument was raised that inDterms of Section 84 of the 1966 Act, the post in question, admittedlyunder the control of the Administrator, Chandigarh Administration, standscircumscribed by the terms of the directions issued by the CentralGovernment under Section 84 of the Act. This Court relied upon JagtarSingh v. State of Punjab[18] to hold that the instructions issued underESection 84 of the 1966 Act were supplemental, incidental or consequentialprovisions under the reorganisation of the States. Such instructions arebinding on the State Governments of Punjab and Haryana as also on theChandigarh Administration. This Court in Swaran Lata thus held asunder:

F“35. These instructions were in conformity with the earlier decisionof the Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs conveyedby the letter of the Chief Secretary to the Government of erstwhileState of Punjab dated August 9, 1966 stating that the Governmenthad set up a committee headed by Sri v. Shankar, ICS. for thefinalisation of the proposals of the Departmental Committees inGregard to the allocation of the personnel to the reorganised Statesof Punjab and Haryana and the Union territory of Chandigarh. Inregard to the Union territory of Chandigarh, the decision of theGovernment of India was in these terms:

17 (1979) 3 SCC 165H18 (1972) 1 SCC 171

“It may be presumed that personnel for the Union territory ofChandigarh will be provided on deputation by the two Statesof Punjab and Haryana.”

The aforesaid instructions issued under Section 84 of the Act weresupplemental, incidental or consequential provisions for thereorganisation of the States. The instructions were binding on theState Governments of Punjab and Haryana as also on theChandigarh Administration in the matter of integration of services:Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1972) 1 SCC 171].

37. It seems to us that for a proper determination of the question,it is necessary first of all to formulate as clearly as possible theprecise nature and the effect of the directions issued by the CentralGovernment under Section 84 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act,1966, which reads:

“84. Power of Central Government to give directions.—The Central Government may give such directions to the StateGovernments of Punjab and Haryana and to the Administratorsof the Union Territories of Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarhas may appear to it to be necessary for the purpose of givingeffect to the foregoing provisions of this Part and the StateGovernments and the Administrators shall comply with suchdirections.”

The use of the words “for the purpose of giving effect to theforegoing provisions of this part” clearly curtails the ambit of thesection. The directions that the Central Government issuesunder the section are only for a limited purpose i.e. for theimplementation of the scheme for the reorganisation ofservices. When the process relating to integration of servicesas envisaged by the supplemental, incidental or consequentialprovisions for reorganisation of services under a law madeby the Parliament in exercise of its power under Articles 2, 3and 4 of the Constitution is completed, such an incidentalprovision like Section 84 necessarily ceases to have effect.”

35. The directions from the Central Government are only for alimited purpose i.e., for implementation of the scheme for reorganisationof the services. It was held that when the process relating to integration A

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Aof services in exercise of powers of the Parliament under Articles 2, 3and 4 of the Constitution is completed, such an incidental provision likeSection 84 necessarily ceases to have effect. It may be noticed thatthe question of directions arose in respect of filling up of the post ofPrincipal vide advertisement published by the Union Public ServiceCommission on 1.2.1975. Since there were no statutory rules framedBin respect of Chandigarh Administration in terms of proviso to Article309, it was held that directions of the Central Government are binding,Chandigarh being a Union Territory. Though the said judgment is inrespect of Section 84 of the 1966 Act, but ratio of the said judgment isapplicable in respect of inter-state entities covered by Section 72 ofCthe 1966 Act as well.

36. This Court in a judgment reported as D.A.V. College, Etc.Etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors.[19] was examining 14 writ petitions filedby many colleges managed and administered by Dayanand Anglo VedicCollege (D.A.V. College) Trust. The challenge was against certainDprovisions of the Guru Nanak University, Amritsar, Act 1969 (Act no 21of 1969). In pursuance of the provisions of the Act, a notification dated16.3.1970 was published specifying the districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur,Jullundur and Kapurthala in the State of Punjab as the areas in whichthe Guru Nanak University, Amritsar shall exercise its powers anddischarge its duties. This Court held that the impugned statute does notEaffect the fundamental rights of the petitioners, therefore, the questionof legislative competence or deciding the validity of Section 5 of the1969 Act did not arise. This Court held as under:

“49. This being the legal position in our view when once animpugned law does not affect the fundamental rights of theFpetitioners as in this case we have founded it to be so, it is notnecessary to go into the question of legislative competence or todecide on the validity of Section 5.

50. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the notificationunder which the colleges have been affiliated to the UniversitiesGis legally valid and from the date specified therein petitionerscolleges cease to be affiliated to the Punjab University. In theresult these petitions are allowed to the extent that clause 2(1)(a)and clause 17 of Chapter V of the statutes are struck down as affecting the fundamental rights of the petitioners, but in thecircumstances without costs.”

37. After the aforesaid judgment, the petitioners filed a writ petitionbefore the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dayanand Anglo-VedicCollege Managing Committee challenging the Act on the ground oflack of territorial nexus since the Panjab University is located atChandigarh, outside the territory of Punjab. It may be noticed at thisstage that the Panjab University and the Board constituted under the1925 Act falls under sub-section (3) of Section 72 of the 1966 Act. Itwas held that the power of Central Government to issue directions wasfor a limited period i.e., till other provision was made by law in respect ofPanjab University. It was held as under:

“4..........................On the appointed day and immediately beforethat, various colleges were affiliated to that University which weresituate in, the successor States of Punjab and Haryana, UnionTerritory of Chandigarh and the Union Territory of HimachalPradesh, to which certain areas of the Punjab had been transferred.It was, therefore, provided in section 72 that the Panjab Universitywas to continue to function and operate in those areas in respectof which it was functioning and operating immediately before theappointed day in order not to deprive the successor States of theeducational facilities immediately on the re-organisation of theerstwhile State of Punjab. The continuity of the Punjab Universitywas desirable in the interest of the successor States but the PanjabUniversity was to serve those successor States only till they madeany other provision for appropriate education in their own territoriesunder Entry 11 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to theConstitution. Till any successor State took action by law in thisbehalf, the Panjab University was to continue its functions andoperations subject to the directions issued by the CentralGovernment. The power of the Central Government to issuedirections was for a limited period, that is, till other provisionwas made by law in respect of the Panjab University. If thesuccessor States desired the Panjab University to continue asbefore in their territories, there was no necessity for them to makeany provision by enacting a law on the subject but in order toavoid conflict amongst the successor States over the functioningof the Panjab University, the power to issue directions with A

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Aregard to the said University was rightly given to the CentralGovernment, so that the University should continue to functionand operate fairly and justly in the areas in which it wasoperating and functioning before the appointed day. In myview if it was intended that other provision by law was also tobe made by the Central Government, the Parliament wouldBhave clearly stated so in section 72 instead of saying “untilother provision is made by law in respect of the said bodycorporate.” For the issuance of the directions, the authorityis expressly mentioned as the Central Government but theParliament has not been mentioned as the Legislature to enactCthe law making other provision. While interpreting section 72,we have not to confine ourselves only to the Act but to all suchbodies corporate which were intra State prior to the appointedday and because of the re-organisation of the erstwhile State ofPunjab became inter-State bodies corporate on and after theappointed day. The first part of sub-section (1) of section 72 clearlyDpoints out that the Parliament was making the provision in section72 with regard to the bodies corporate which had been constitutedunder a Central Act, State Act or Provincial Act and that is whythe legislative authority for making a law in respect of these bodiescorporate was not specified. It may be for the reason that withEregard to the bodies corporate constituted under a CentralAct, the Parliament was the appropriate Legislature to makethe law while with regard to the Corporations constituted underany State Act or a Provincial Act, the State Legislature was tobe the appropriate Legislature. Education including Universitiesis a State subject as per entry 11 in List II of the Seventh ScheduleFto the Constitution and the Panjab University was incorporatedunder a Panjab Act. Till the re-organisation of the erstwhile Stateof Punjab, it continued to function according to the provisions ofthe said Act. It cannot be imagined that with regard to all inter-State bodies corporate which were constituted under any State orGProvincial Act, the jurisdiction to make any other provision by lawwas taken over by the Parliament itself. These bodies corporatewere and are to function and operate for the people of a particularState and have to cater to their needs. Their needs are expressedby their elected representatives and, therefore. It cannot beassumed that the Parliament wanted to deprive the successor H

States of an important field of their legislation with regard toeducation which is absolutely necessary for the development andprogress of any State.

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Every State can make laws with regard to education anduniversities within its State and can control and regulate theirfunctions and operations therein irrespective of the location of theseat of the University. What has to be seen is that the subject-matter of the legislation falls within the jurisdiction of the StateLegislature and if that be so, it can affect all persons and institutionswithin the State to which it may be applied. In my opinion, therefore,the mere fact that the Panjab University is located at Chandigarh,which is outside the territory of the Punjab State, does not debarthe Punjab State Legislature from enacting a law affecting thefunctions and operations of the Panjab University within its ownterritory.

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6.....................It is, therefore, submitted that while enacting section72 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, the Parliament intended toamend entry 11 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to theConstitution by taking Panjab University out of the said List andto vest the power of legislation with regard thereto in theParliament, thereby impliedly amending Articles 245 and 246 ofthe Constitution. In view of what I have said above, this submissionhas no force. The Parliament did not specify the law as meaningthe law made by it. All that it said was “until other provision ismade by law in respect of the body corporate”. I haveinterpreted the word “law” in that sentence to mean the lawmade by the appropriate Legislature, that is, with regard to thebodies corporate constituted under any Central Act or quawhich legislation is to be made on a subject enumerated in ListI of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the law had to bemade by the Parliament, but in respect of a body corporateconstituted under a State or a Provincial Act, wherein the subjectof legislation was to be found in List II of the Seventh Scheduleto the Constitution, the appropriate Legislature to make thelaw is to be the State Legislature............................. The power A

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Ato issue directions with regard to the Panjab University whichwas given to the Central Government by section 72 was essentiallyfor a limited period, that is, till the Legislature of the appropriateState made a provision with regard to the functioning and operationof the Panjab University within its own area. It cannot, therefore,be said that section 72 of the Punjab Re-organisation ActBeffectuated an amendment of Articles 245 and 246 and entry 11in List II of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution with regard tothe Panjab University. It is not only the Panjab University that isgoverned by section 72 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, butmany other bodies corporate constituted under any Central, StateCor Provincial Act, which were intra State in operation before theappointed day and became inter-State bodies corporate becauseof the re-organisation.”

38. Before the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High CourtDin Sehajdhari Sikh Federation, the issue was about the validity of thenotification dated 8.10.2003 inserting a proviso to Sections 49 and 92 ofthe 1925 Act to the effect that no person shall be registered as an electorwho trims or shaves his beard or keshas, smokes, and takes alcoholicdrinks. The High Court held that in terms of Section 72 of the 1966 Act,Ethe Central Government cannot issue a direction which has the effect ofmodifying the statute i.e., the 1925 Act. The High Court thus struckdown the notification holding that Section 72 of the 1966 Act empowersthe Central Government to issue directions pertaining to functioning andoperation of an inter-State body corporate (the Board i.e., SGPC) in theareas where it was functioning or operating immediately before 1[st]FNovember, 1966; any tangible material or a fact-finding enquiryestablished the factum of such obstruction or difficulty; the cases(s) ofsuch obstruction or difficulty originated out of the ‘law’, namely, the1925 Act under which the Board was established; and the obstruction ordifficulty, if any, acknowledged by the Central Government could beGremoved by ‘modifying’ the 1925 Act or an ‘amendment’ in that Actwas necessitated. It was held that Section 72(2) of the 1966 Act doesnot empower the Central Government to modify Central Act, State Act,Provincial Act so as to amend such Acts. Consequently, the notificationdated 8.10.2003 was quashed. However, certain findings returned bythe Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in respect ofH

scope of Section 72 of the 1966 Act are relevant for the purposes of thepresent writ petition which read as under:

“67. The scope of supplemental, incidental and consequentialprovisions has been authoritatively resolved in Mangal Singhlaying down that Articles 2 & 3 empower the Parliament to formnew States conforming to the “democratic pattern envisaged bythe Constitution”, and that the power, which the Parliament mayexercise by law, is supplemental, incidental or consequential tothe admission, establishment or formation of a State ascontemplated by the Constitution and ‘is not a power to overridethe Constitutional scheme’. The democratic polity engrafted andintegrated in our Constitutional scheme, postulates a separateLegislative Assembly and/or Council, representation in Parliament,a High Court & subordinate Judiciary, and its own ConsolidatedFund etc. for every State. It is thus obligatory on the Parliamentwhile forming a new State by exercise of law, to add suchsupplemental, incidental and consequential provisions in theReorganization Act that all the ingredients of a ‘State’ as perceivedby the Constitution are brought into existence.

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70. We find it wholly illogical to say that an action taken by theExecutive as a delegate under the re-organization law becomes apart of the Constitution. Since a re-organization law itself is thecreation of the Constitution, an administrative or quasi-judicialaction taken thereunder cannot be equated even to a degree withany provision of the Constitution. The converse propositionpropounded on behalf of the contesting respondents must berejected also for the reason that it attempts to dilute the supremacyof our Constitution.

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75. The unambiguous object of the 1966 Act is firstly to : reorganizethe erstwhile State of Punjab; form the new States of Punjab,Haryana and Union Territory of Chandigarh; transfer certain areasof Punjab to Himacal Pradesh and establish a democratic set-upin the newly formed States comprising representation in theirrespective Legislatures and delimitation of the constituencies; acommon High Court; authorization of expenditure and distribution A

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of revenues and apportionment of assets and liabilities etc. Part-VU relates “to certain Corporations” whereas Part-VIII dealswith the management of Bhakra-Nangal-Beas Projects andallocation of members of All India Services & other Services.Lastly. Part-X of the Act enlists legal and miscellaneous provisions.The 1966 Act is thus a complete code in itself which is in conformitywith the Constitutional scheme and includes supplemental, incidentaland consequential provisions to resolve all the foreseen orunforeseen issues that may arise due to the re-organization oferstwhile State of Punjab.

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82. It appears to us that the power under Section 72 cannot beinvoked to issue directions or cause ‘exceptions’ or to ‘modify’those Central, Provincial or State Acts which are alien to PartVII and have no bearing on giving effect to the re-organisationalscheme propounded by the 1966 Act. Section 72 is only oneamongst several other components of Part VII. While the otherprovisions (of Part VII) like Sections 67 to 71 deal with specificBoards, Corporation(s) and institution(s), Section 72 is an omnibusprovision to regulate the ‘functioning’ and ‘operation’ of theremainder, who either serve the needs of the successor States orhave become inter-State body corporates. The legal boundaries,wide or restricted, determined for exercising the powers underSection 72 shall mutatis-mutandis apply to the other provisionsof Part VII also.

83. Section 72 comprises four parts and is essentially a‘consequential’ provision added by Parliament to deal with thoseunspecified juristic entities who were in service of the needs ofthe successor States or after the re-organization of the State ofPunjab had acquired the status of inter-State body corporate(s).

84. Sub-Section (1) of Section 72 begins with the phrase ‘save asotherwise expressly provided by the foregoing provisions of thisPart’. The aforesaid phrase in our considered view is in the natureof an ‘exception’ to the extent it excludes the class of body-corporates expressly dealt with under Sections 67 to 71 of PartVII, from the purview of Section 72. Subject to that ‘exception’and if Section 72(1) is dissected into parts for its betterunderstanding, it reveals that:—

(i) when a body corporate constituted under a Central Act, StateAct or Provincial Act for the existing State of Punjab or for anypart thereof,

(ii) serves the needs of the successor States or by virtue ofreorganization of the State of Punjab becomes an inter-State bodycorporate as on the appointed day i.e. 1 st November, 1966,

(iii) such body corporate shall continue to function and operate inthe original areas of its operation though these areas have becometerritory of the successor States,

(iv) but the ‘functioning’ and ‘operation’ of the’said body corporatein the areas of the successor States shall be subject to:— (a) suchdirections as may, from time to time, be issued by the CentralGovernment; and (b) until other provision is made by law in respectof the said body corporate, xx xxxx

87. On the same analogy, sub-Section (2) of Section 72 cannot beassigned a different purpose or meaning, hence we hold that thenature, scope and sweep of the power entrusted to the CentralGovernment to cause ‘exception’ or ‘modification’ in a CentralAct, State Act or Provincial Act resembles the power exercisableby it under Section 67(2) and is subject to the same limitations.Any attempt, if made to widen the scope of Section 72(2) beyondthat, will not only be violent to the elementary principles of statutoryinterpretation briefly noticed in para 85, but will also amount totranscending the delegated legislative powers. We say so also forthe reason that the legislative object behind Section 67(2) or sub-Section (2) of Section 72 is to ensure that the functioning of abody corporate is not paralysed on its becoming an inter-Statebody corporate due to re-organization of the erstwhile State ofPunjab. The scope of the directions issueable under sub-Section(2) of Section 72 is restricted to the applicability of the ‘law’governing the body corporate, hence the aforesaid direction mastrelate to the ‘functioning’ or ‘operation’ of such body corporate.It has to be held, as a necessary corollary thereto, that no directioncan be issued by the Central Government under Section 72(2)unless it pertains to the ‘law’ applicable to the body corporate onthe appointed day when it acquired the legal character of an inter- A

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State body corporate. The wordage of sub-Section (2) especiallythe word ‘may’ leaves no room to doubt that it is an enablingprovision only and nowhere does it expect the Central Governmentto issue directions, even if not so required.

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95. It appears convincing that if the Parliament intended to conferpower on the Central Government to ‘amend’ a Statue or if itcould do so, there was no impediment for it to have made a specificprovision to that effect. The Parliament while making provision toadapt laws under Section 89 of the 1966 Act has authorized theappropriate Government(s) to make such adaptations andmodifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment,as may be necessary within a period of two years from theappointed day till such law is altered, repealed or amended by acompetent Legislature or by other competent authority. The phrase‘amendment’ has been referred to in Sections 70 & 86 withreference to the legislative powers of the State Legislature andthe Pari iament, respectively. The Parliament has thus used theexpressions ‘amendment’ or ‘modification’ frequently but distinctly.It is also a well-established rule of construction of a Statute thatwhen the Legislature uses two different words at different places,they carry different meanings as the Legislature seldom overlapsor uses superfluous words. The Court shall always proceed onthe premise that the Legislature has inserted every expression fora purpose and the legislative intention is that none of the provisionsof the Statute is found redundant. If the Parliament’s intentionwhile using the phrase ‘modification’ were to confer the power of‘amendment’ it would have inserted the latter phrase in Section72 to avoid any ambiguity. The word “modification” in Section 72.therefore, cannot be construed analogous to the word ‘amendment’which finds mention in Sections 70 & 86 of the 1966 Act.

96. Our understanding of Section 72(2), as stated above, alsoappears to be consistent with the view taken by the Full Bench inDayanand Anglo-Vedic College Managing Committeeobserving that “… if it was intended that other provision by lawwas also to be made by the Central Government, the Parliamentwould have clearly stated so in Section 72 instead of saying “untilother provision is made by law in respect of the said body corporate…” It may be for the reason that with regard to thebodies corporate constituted under a Central Act, the Parliamentwas the appropriate legislature to make the law while with regardto the Coiporations constituted under any State Act or a ProvincialAct the State Legislature was to be the appropriate Legislature.”

97. Adverting to sub-Section (3) of Section 72, the scope andobject whereof is also disputed by counsel for the parties, it maybe seen that sub-Section (3) has three significant constituents,namely, (a) it is meant to remove doubts; (b) it is declaratory innature; and (c) it actually declares that Section 72 shall apply toPanjab University. Punjab Agriculture University and the Boardconstituted under Part III of the Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925. Sub-Section (3) does not occupy a new field nor does it vest the CentralGovernment with any additional power to issue directions. It merelyremoves doubts and brings both the above-mentioned Universitiesand the Board within the ambit of Section 72(1)&(2) whereunderthe Central Government is competent to issue directions in relationto their functioning and the area of their operation, they being theinter-State body corporates.

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CONCLUSIONS:

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(v) We hold that Section 72 of the 1966 Act empowers the CentralGovernment to issue directions pertaining to the ‘functioning’ and‘operation’ of an inter-State body corporate in the areas where itwas functioning and operating immediately before the appointedday. These directions may include that the ‘Law’ governing theaffairs of the body-corporate before it became an inter-State bodycorporate, shall continue to apply to it for the purpose of its‘functioning’ or ‘operation’ in those areas which have gone out ofjurisdictional control of the State under whose law such body-corporate was constituted.

(vi) The power exercisable by the Central Government under sub-Section (2) of Section 72 of the 1966 Act to ‘modify’ the CentralAct, State Act or Provincial Act does not include the power to A

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A‘amend’ such Acts. The power to ‘modify’ a Statute delegatedunder Section 72 docs not authorize to change any essentiallegislative features or the policy built into such Statute. TheParliament while empowering the Central Government to ‘modify’an Act under Section 72(2) neither intended nor could it delegatethe power to ‘repeal’ or ‘amend’ an Act, for such a power underBthe Constitutional scheme is exercisable by the Legislature alone.The delegated legislative power cannot run parallel to the principallegislation and must exercise its power within the framework ofthe Statute.

(vii) Section 72 of the 1966 Act is an enabling provision and thepower to cause ‘exception’ or ‘modification’ in a Central Act,State Act or Provincial Act is not unguided, unfettered or unbridledand is subject to the inherent limitations to be read into the phrasethat the “bodycorporate shall continue to function and operate inthose areas in respect of which it was functioning and operatingimmediately before the appointed day.”

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(viii) The directions issued by the Central Government underSection 72 though shall amount to ‘law’ within the meaning ofArticle 13(3)(a) of the Constitution but they do not partake thecharacter of a Parliamentary legislation.”

E39. In the counter affidavit filed, it has been mentioned that theappeal against the above order passed by the Full Bench of the Punjaband Haryana High Court was pending consideration. The said Civil AppealNo. 9334 of 2013 came to be decided on 15.9.2016. During the pendencyof the appeal, the Parliament passed the Sikh Gurdwara (Amendment)Act, 2016 with a view to amend the 1925 Act retrospectively w.e.f.F8.10.2003, i.e., the date of notification quashed by the High Court. ThisCourt disposed of the appeal by observing as under:

“7. We find merit in the submission of Mr. Ganguli. The HighCourt has, as seen earlier, specifically left the issue open for theconsideration of the appropriate legislature whether or not anyGamendment is called for in the 1925 Act. The Parliament hasaccordingly brought the amending Act referred to earlier andamended the 1925 Act retrospectively w.e.f. 08.10.2003 i.e. thedate when the notification impugned in the writ petition was issued.The result is that, for all intents and purposes, the amendmentHmade by the amending Act, 2016 shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from the said date. That being the case, thequashing of notification dated 08.10.2003 by the High Court isrendered inconsequential in the light of the subsequentparliamentary legislation by which the purpose which thenotification sought to be achieve has been achieved by thelegislative measure taken by the Parliament….”

40. A reference was made to a judgment reported as HimachalPradesh University, Shimla wherein the State of Himachal Pradeshenacted the Himachal Pradesh University Act, 1970. Section 8 of thesaid Act provides for vesting of assets of the Panjab University in theState of Himachal Pradesh to the Himachal Pradesh University. ThisCourt held that the appellant University failed to establish the secondcondition for the applicability of Section 8 of the Act that suit premiseswere belonging to two institutions and forming part and parcel of theirassets at Shimla. It is not a case that the Act framed by the State ofHimachal Pradesh was found to be lacking in legislative competencebut the scope of the statute was not found to be in respect of the assetsof the Panjab University located in the State of Himachal Pradesh.

41. Another judgment which is referred to is MullaperiyarEnvironmental Protection Forum v. Union of India & Ors.[20] whereMullaperiyar Dam was an inter-State body of the State of Kerala andTamil Nadu. The question raised was whether the water level could beallowed to be increased in such dam to 142 feet or not. The State ofKerala opposed the increase of the water level beyond 136 feet whereasthe State of Tamil Nadu sought increase in the water level to 142 feet.Section 108 of the 1956 Act deals with irrigation, power or multipurposeprojects. The said provision contemplates that if any agreement is notreached between the States, the decision would be taken by the CentralGovernment. An argument was raised that Section 108 of the 1956 Actis invalid as it affects the right of the State in terms of Entry 17 of List II.This Court held as under:

“21. … The new State owes its very existence to the law madeby Parliament. It would be incongruous to say that the provisionin an Act which gives birth to a State is ultra vires a legislativeentry which the State may operate after it has come into existence.The power of the State to enact laws in List II of the Seventh A

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ASchedule are subject to parliamentary legislation under Articles 3and 4. The State cannot claim to have legislative powers oversuch waters which are the subject of an inter-State agreementwhich is continued by a parliamentary enactment, namely, theStates Organisation Act, enacted under Articles 3 and 4 of theConstitution. The effect of Section 108 is that the agreementBbetween the predecessor States relating to irrigation and powergeneration, etc. would continue. There is a statutory recognitionof the contractual rights and liabilities of the new States whichcannot be affected unilaterally by any of the party States eitherby legislation or executive action. The power of Parliament toCmake law under Articles 3 and 4 is plenary and traverses over alllegislative subjects as are necessary for effectuating a properreorganisation of the States. We are unable to accept the contentionas to the invalidity of Section 108 of the Act.”

42. The said judgment is in respect of irrigation or water projectsDwherein the issues were to be decided between the two states byagreement, which is not an issue in the present proceedings. Section 108of the 1956 Act itself contemplated that if disputes are not settled, theCentral Government would decide. Thus, the issue raised and decided isquite distinct from the issue arising in the present case.

E43. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Kashmir Singh-Iwas dealing with the appointment of the member of Sikh GurdwaraJudicial Commission vide notification dated 4.7.1989. The CentralGovernment had issued a notification dated 19.10.1978 nominating theState of Punjab in consultation with the State of Haryana for the purposesof exercising its powers under the 1966 Act. The five-Judges Bench ofFthe High Court dealing with the legality of the notification also dealt withthe scope of Section 72 of the 1966 Act. The majority of the Bench heldthat the Board is an inter-State body corporate and the CentralGovernment can give directions with regard to its functioning andoperation. Since the successor State neither adopted nor repealed norGmade any provisions with regard to the 1925 Act, the Central Governmentwould be competent to give directions and the Board shall operateaccordingly in the successor States. It was held as under:

“57...................A reading of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) ofSection 72 of the Act of 1966 would leave no one in doubt that theHBoard is an inter-State body corporate and the Central Government can give directions with regard to its functioning and operation.Inasmuch as the successor States have neither adopted norrepealed nor made any provisions with regard to the Act of 1925or for the Board, in particular, the Central Government, till suchtime provisions are so made, would be competent to issuedirections and the Board shall operate in successorStates................

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66. ….............It is significant to note that till such time otherprovisions were made, that may cater for needs of the successorStates, by and large, Central Government was to issue directions.The territories of the successor States having been defined, ifprovisions vesting power with the Central Government were notto be made, it would have resulted into chaos as no successorState could have issued directions in the territories not specifiedin the said State. These were certainly supplemental, incidentaland consequential provisions so that there was smooth functioningof all the bodies and laws in the respective successor States tillsuch time proper arrangements were made for each successorState to issue directions within their own territory. Provisions ofSection 72 also appear to be supplemental, incidental andconsequential, covered under Part VII of the Act itself. Thisinter-State body Corporation under the directions of the CentralGovernment was to function and operate in the areas in respectof which it was functioning and operating immediately before theappointed day untill other provision was made by law, as has beenspecifically provided in sub-section (1) of Section 72 itself. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 72 are nothing but elaboration orclarification if the doubts, might still persist with regard to directionsthat can be issued under sub-section (1) of Section 72. ............... …

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clearly suggests that the provisions contained therein are tomake necessary supplemental, incidental and consequentialprovisions in relation to reorganisation of the State of Punjab.All measures taken thereunder, unless specifically said otherwise,like the Board for Bhakra Nangal and Beas Projects, are temporaryin nature. The words ‘until otherwise provided by competentlegislature or other competent authority’ which find mention inSection 88 also escaped notice of the Hon’ble Full Bench. Theprovisions of Part II which deal with reorganisation and creationof successor States, do not effect any change in the territories towhich any law in force immediately before the appointed dayextends or applies. It clearly means and is accepted position at allends that the existing laws by virtue of provisions contained inSection 88 would automatically apply. The position in relation toAct, of 1925 is no different. But this provision is once againnot an all time measure inasmuch as a competent legislature,which necessarily means legislature of successor State as well,would be well within its power and competent enough toprovide otherwise then the existing laws. If that be so and ina given case, the successor State may, in its wisdom, sayotherwise, i.e., the Act of 1925 would not apply to the saidState, as mentioned above, the Board would no more be aninter-state body corporate. The power to legislate in that casewould not be with the Central Government under Entry 44List-I (Union List) 7th Schedule. The provisions contained inSection 89, vesting power and jurisdiction with the appropriateGovernment, would necessarily include successor States to repealor amend any law made before the appointed day, once again, itappears, escaped notice of the Hon’ble Full Bench in arriving atthe conclusion, referred to above. We have already held whiledetermining question No. IV that in construing the provisions of aStatute the courts should be slow to adopt a construction whichtends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective.There is no need to elaborate as we have already discussed insufficient details that the courts have necessarily to give meaningto all parts of the provisions of the Act and to make whole of iteffective and operative.

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70. ...............…We may also mention here that the finding by theFull Bench that continuation of directions to be given by the CentralGovernment by virtue of Entry 44 in the Union List, the Boardbeing an inter-State body corporate by virtue of Section 72of the Act of 1966, also can not sustain as, in our view, if theStates might adapt, modify or repeal the Act of 1925, theBoard, which is an inter-State body corporate, shall no moreremain an inter-State body corporate and its position shallrevert to that what it was under the Act of 1925, namely, bodycorporate.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

44. The aforesaid majority opinion was upheld by this Court in ajudgment reported as Kashmir Singh-II wherein, it was held as under:

“72. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in view of the situationalchange, a meaning which could be attributed in the year 1925cannot be given the same meaning today. For the aforementionedpurpose, Sections 40 and 70 of the Act must be read together.Therefore, a holistic reading of the entire Act would be necessary.So read, the opinion of the majority appeals to us. By reason ofsuch an interpretation, the apprehension that the State would beendowed with the arbitrary power is wiped off.”

45. A perusal of the judgments in Kashmir Singh-I and KashmirSingh-II would show that the successor States might adopt, modify orrepeal the 1925 Act. The Board, an inter-State body corporate, shallthen no longer remain an inter-State body corporate and the positionwas to revert to what it was under the 1925 Act i.e., body corporatesimplicitor. It was held that Section 72(1) is not intended to be a measurefor all times to come and that successor States are competent to makeother provisions by law in respect of such body corporates. The objectof the 1966 Act was to make necessary, supplemental, incidental andconsequential provisions in relation to reorganisation of the State ofPunjab. It was also held that the competent legislature, which necessarilymeans legislature of the successor State would be well within its powerand competence to provide otherwise than the existing laws. Therefore,the successor State may, in its wisdom, could say that the 1925 Actwould not apply to the said State.

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A46. The consistent view of the three Full Benches of the HighCourt and of this Court is that the power of the Centre to issue directionsunder Section 72 of the 1966 Act is a transitional provision. Therefore,we have no hesitation to hold that the power of the Centre to issuedirections under Section 72 of the 1966 Act is indeed a transitional provisionto ensure smooth and continuous functioning of a body corporate so thatBit is not paralyzed on becoming an inter-State body corporate due toreorganisation of the erstwhile State of Punjab. The directionscontemplated by Section 72 relates to functioning and operation of suchbody corporate. A competent State legislature is not deprived of its powerto legislate on the subjects falling within its jurisdiction in terms of List IICof the Seventh Schedule. The 1966 Act does not bar the State Legislatureto legislate on the fields of its legislative competence falling under List IIof the Seventh Schedule or even in List III of the Seventh Schedule,subject to the limitations as are prescribed in the Constitution.

-Question No. (iii) Whether the impugned enactment (HaryanaDAct) falls within the legislative competence of the Haryana StateLegislature or it falls in Entry 44 of List I of the Seventh Scheduleof the Constitution?

47. The primary reliance of the writ petitioner is on the judgmentof this Court reported as Rajendra N. Shah. The issue before thisECourt in the said judgment was whether the Constitution 97[th] Amendmentintroducing Part IX-B, which was found to be non est by the GujaratHigh Court for want of ratification by half of the States under the provisoto Article 368(2), is sustainable. This Court upheld the view of the HighCourt and observed as under:F“23. So far as co-operative societies are concerned, it can beseen that it is entirely a matter for the States to legislate upon,being the last subject matter mentioned in Entry 32 List II. At thisstage, it is important to note that Entry 43 of List I, which dealswith incorporation, regulation and winding up of tradingcorporations including banking, insurance and financialGcorporations expressly excludes co-operative societies from itsambit. Entry 44 List I, which is wider than Entry 43 in that it is notlimited to trading corporations, speaks of corporations with objectsnot confined to one State. This Court has therefore held, on areading of these entries, that when it comes to Multi State Co-Hoperative Societies with objects not confined to one state, the

legislative power would be that of the Union of India which iscontained in Entry 44 List I. Thus, in Daman Singh v. State ofPunjab, (1985) 2 SCC 670, this Court laid down:—

“7. …. … According to Mr. Ramamurthi the express exclusionof cooperative societies in Entry 43 of List I and the expressinclusion of cooperative societies in Entry 32 of List IIseparately and apart from but along with corporations otherthan those specified in List I and universities, clearly indicatedthat the constitutional scheme was designed to treat cooperativesocieties as institutions distinct from corporations. On the otherhand one would think that the very mention of cooperativesocieties both in Entry 43 of List I and Entry 32 of List II alongwith other corporations gave an indication that the Constitutionmakers were of the view that cooperative societies were ofthe same genus as other corporations and all were corporations.In fact the very express exclusion of cooperative societies from Entry 43 of List I is indicative of the view that but for such exclusion, cooperative societies would be comprehended withinthe meaning of expression “corporations”.

26. It may thus be seen that there is no overlap whatsoever so faras the subject ‘co-operative societies’ is concerned. Co-operativesocieties as a subject matter belongs wholly and exclusively tothe State legislatures to legislate upon, whereas multi-Statecooperative societies i.e., co-operative societies having objectsnot confined to one state alone, is exclusively within the ken ofParliament. This being the case, it may safely be concluded, onthe facts of this case, that there is no overlap and hence, no needto apply the federal supremacy principle as laid down by thejudgments of this court. What we are therefore left with is theexclusive power to make laws, so far as co-operative societiesare concerned, with the State Legislatures, which is contained inArticle 246(3) read with Entry 32 of List II. In fact, in K.Damodarasamy Naidu & Bros. v. State of T.N., (2000) 1 SCC521, this court held:

“21. Parliament, when exercising the powers to amend theConstitution under Article 368, cannot and does not amendState Acts. There is no other provision in the Constitution whichso permits and there is no judgment of this Court that so A

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holds. The power to make laws for the States in respect ofmatters listed in List II in the Seventh Schedule is exclusivelythat of the State Legislatures. …..”

(Emphasis supplied)

81. The judgment of the High Court is upheld except to the extentBthat it strikes down the entirety of Part IXB of the Constitution ofIndia. As held by us above, it is declared that Part IXB of theConstitution of India is operative only insofar as it concerns multi-State cooperative societies both within the various States and inthe Union territories of India. The appeals are accordingly disposedCof.”

48. The said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the presentcase though it deals with Entry 44 of List I and Entry 32 of List II. TheCourt was dealing with the legality of the Constitutional Amendmentand found that it is entirely for the States to legislate in respect ofDcooperative societies falling in Entry 32 of List II. It is only multi-Statecooperative societies which fall within the power of the Parliament tolegislate in terms of Entry 44. The amendment made by Parliament inrespect of co-operative societies was not with the approval of half ofthe States. The said judgment has no applicability to the facts of thepresent case as the Haryana Act does not have any extra-territorialEjurisdiction that it is not applicable to more than one State. The SGPCwas a Board which was intra-State body corporate prior to reorganisationof the State in the year 1966. The reorganisation has rendered the SGPCas an inter-State body corporate but the legislative power to legislate onthe subject of incorporation of the Corporations would be within theFjurisdiction of the Haryana State Legislature. Entry 32 deals withunincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societiesand associations. In respect of such unincorporated trading, literary,scientific, religious and other societies and associations, the competentlegislature is the State. In terms of Entry 44 of List I, the Parliament willhave jurisdiction only if the SGPC under the 1925 Act continues to be anGinter-State entity. The jurisdiction of the successor States either to repeal,modify or enact a new law has not been restricted by the 1966 Act,though it is a special law within the meaning of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of theConstitution. The SGPC became inter-State body corporate not becauseof Entry 44 List I but because of reorganisation of the territories of theHerstwhile State of Punjab. Therefore, Entry 44 would have no applicability in respect of legislative competence of the State of Haryana to enactthe Haryana Act.

49. The argument of Mr. Shyam Divan and Mr. Ranjit Kumar,learned senior counsels for the State of Haryana and Haryana Committeerespectively, is that the source of power of enactment of the HaryanaAct is Entry 32, List II of the Seventh Schedule. In exercise of suchpower, a statutory body is sought to be created; whereas, Entry 28 ofList III deals with charities and charitable institutions, charitable andreligious endowments and religious institutions. Therefore, any law dealingwith charities, charitable institutions and endowments falls within ListIII. Such law contemplated by List III is a regulatory law to regulate thefunctioning of charitable institutions or charitable and religiousendowments and religious institutions. Whereas, incorporation of astatutory body falls in Entry 32 of List II, as also unincorporated religiousand other societies. Therefore, the Haryana Act falls within the legislativecompetence of the State.

50. The argument of Mr. Nataraj is that under Section 3 of the1957 Act, which deals with inter-State bodies, the State Government isrequired to frame a scheme as SGPC under the 1925 Act is sought to bereconstituted and reorganized being inter-State corporation. Such schemeis required to be forwarded to the Central Government. It is thus theCentral Government who is competent to modify the scheme so framed.Therefore, it is contended that the SGPC under the 1925 Act being aninter-State corporation can be dealt with only in the manner provided inthe 1957 Act.

51. The 1966 Act as well as the 1957 Act confer power on theCentral Government for smooth transition of new States coming intoexistence as a consequence of the reorganization. There is no provisionin the 1966 Act which confers legislative power upon the Parliament inrespect of the subjects over which the State has legislative competencein terms of List II. Therefore, the transitional provisions i.e., the 1966Act or the 1957 Act do not impinge upon the legislative competence ofthe State legislature to enact a law on the subjects mentioned in the ListII.

Question No. (iv)- Whether, the impugned Act falls in List-III(Concurrent List) Schedule VII, which required the assent of thePresident of India as per Article 254(2) of the Constitution ofIndia, and in the absence of such assent, void?

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A52. The said question does not arise for consideration as theimpugned Haryana Act does not fall in Entry 28 of List III of the SeventhSchedule. Such Entry reads thus:

“28. Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religiousendowments and religious institutions.”B

53. In view of such Entry being in the concurrent list, the Statecan legislate in respect of charities, charitable institutions, charitable andreligious endowments and religious institutions. The assent of thePresident would be necessary if there is an existing statute and the Statelaw is contrary to some of the provisions of the Central law. The HaryanaCCommittee is the incorporation of a juristic entity which moreappropriately falls within the domain of Entry 32 of List II. Though theHaryana Committee is in respect of religious purpose, but the primeintention is of an incorporation of a juristic entity to manage the affairsof the Sikhs in the State. Thus, Entry 32 is wide enough to includeincorporation of such statutory entity.D

54. Alternatively, even if it is assumed that the Haryana Act is infurtherance of Entry 28 of List III, the same cannot be said to be voidfor the reason that it has not been kept reserved for the assent of thePresident. Such an argument is based upon the reason that the 1925 Actis an inter-State legislation, therefore, the assent of the President isEnecessary. As stated before, the 1925 Act was originally an intra-Statelegislation enacted by the State legislature. It subsequently became aninter-State body only by virtue of the 1966 Act. Since the power tolegislate conferred on the State legislature has not been affected in anymanner, therefore, the State would have power to legislate both underFEntry 28 of List III or Entry 32 of List II for the reason that the 1925 Actis not an inter-State body corporate in respect of which the Parliamentincorporated such Board. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the saidargument.

-Question No. (i) Whether any fundamental rights of theGpetitioners under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of Indiaare violated, so as to entitle the petitioners to invoke the jurisdictionof this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution?

55. It is not disputed that the Haryana Act is similar to the 1925Act having similar provisions of constituting a committee to manage theaffairs under the Act. The Haryana Committee is the CommitteeH

constituted under Section 3 of the Haryana Act for the management andcontrol of the Gurdwaras and Gurdwara properties within the State ofHaryana. The Gurdwara property in terms of Section 2(f) of the HaryanaAct means all movable and immovable properties of a Gurdwara or anyinstitution which, immediately before the appointed day, vested or waskept in deposit in the name of any Board, Trust, Committee, GurdwaraManagement or was being regulated under the provisions of the 1925Act. The members of the Committee have to be elected from the eligiblevoters who is Amritdhari Sikh, a Sikh, and who is eighteen years of age,but not a Patit Sikh and is not an insolvent, mentally retarded or aninsane person. The co-option is from the members of the communityalone. Therefore, the affairs of the religious minority in the State i.e.,Sikhs is left in the hands of the Sikhs alone in the same manner as wasunder the 1925 Act. The Haryana Act also provides for Haryana SikhGurdwara Judicial Commission in the same manner as is provided underthe 1925 Act. The affairs of the Gurdwara are again required to bemanaged by local Gurdwara Committee. Since the affairs of the Sikhminority in the State are to be managed by the Sikhs alone, therefore, itcannot be said to be violative of any of the fundamental rights conferredunder Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

56. The question as to whether the writ petition is maintainable isanswered in the affirmative, inter-alia on the ground that the said writpetitions have been pending before this Court for almost 8 years whereinan interim order has been in operation throughout. Additionally, thequestions, being purely legal, have been examined to give finality to theissues arising in the two matters.

57. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the writpetitions. The same are dismissed.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6614 OF 2022

58. The challenge in the present appeal is to an order dated8.3.2018 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The challengeis to the notification dated 6.3.2018 whereby the notification dated29.8.2014 appointing the appellant as Additional Commissioner GurdwaraElections was rescinded.

59. The appellant was appointed for five years as AdditionalCommissioner Gurdwara Elections on 29.8.2014. The post of AdditionalCommissioner Gurdwara Elections was under the Haryana Sikh AB

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AGurdwaras (Management) Act, 2014. The vires of the aforesaid Actstands upheld by this Court.

60. The appellant has not discharged any functions in view of thestay by this Court. Therefore, the appointment was rescinded. Theappellant was appointed for a period of five years, even the term forBwhich the appellant was appointed has come to an end by afflux of time.

61. Therefore, the appellant has no subsisting cause in the presentappeal. The appeal is, thus, dismissed.

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(Assisted by : Preetam Bharti, LCRA)

Writ petitions and appeal dismissed.

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