GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI THROUGH THE SECRETARY, LAND AND BUILDING DEPARTMENT & ANOTHER versus M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LIMITED AND OTHERS on 17 March 2023

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI THROUGH THE SECRETARY,LAND AND BUILDING DEPARTMENT & ANOTHER

v.

M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LIMITED AND OTHERS

Miscellaneous Application No. 414 of 2023

In

(Civil Appeal No. 11857 of 2016)

MARCH 17, 2023

[M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]

Constitution of India : Art. 137 – Review of judgment or ordersby the Supreme Court – Review of the judgments/orders passed bythis Court, on basis of the judgment overruled by a subsequentjudgment – Maintainability of – On facts, land acquisition matters– Based on *Pune Municipal Corporation’s case on the interpretationof s. 24(2) of 2013 Act, several decision passed by this Court –However, the Pune Municipal Corporation’s case subsequentlyoverruled by the Constitution Bench in **Indore DevelopmentAuthority’s case – Constitution Bench specifically observed and heldthat not only the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation’scase is overruled, but all other decisions in which Pune MunicipalCorporation’s case has been followed are also overruled – Filing ofreview petitions, to review and recall the judgments/orders impugnedin the review petitions and to restore the Civil Appeals or SpecialLeave Petitions, for consideration on merits – Held: In view ofdifference of opinion, matter be placed before Hon’ble the ChiefJustice of India. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. 47 r. 1 – Rightto Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s. 24(2) – Supreme CourtRules, 2013 – Or. 47 r. 1.

In the Order of M. R. SHAH, J.

**Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal &Others (2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1 – followed.

*Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand MisirimalSolanki (2014) 3 SCC 183 : [2014] 1 SCR 783; IndoreDevelopment Authority v. Shailendra (dead) throughLrs. & Others (2018) 3 SCC 412 : [2018] 2 SCR 1;

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210SUPREME COURT REPORTS

AMathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Others v. DossibaiN.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 : [1970] 3 SCR830; Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot v.Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Limited (2008) 14SCC 171 : [2008] 13 SCR 421; Board of Control forCricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club (2005) 4 SCCB741 : [2005] 1 SCR 173; Sree Balaji Nagar ResidentialAssn. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC 353 : [2014]7 SCR 799; BSNL v. Union of India (2006) 3 SCC 1 :[2006] 2 SCR 823; Neelima Srivastava v. State of U.P.2021 SCC OnLine SC 610; Kamlesh Verma v. MayawatiC(2013) 8 SCC 320 : [2013] 11 SCR 25; BegharFoundation v. K. S. Puttaswamy (2021) 3 SCC 1; IndoreDevelopment Authority v. Shailendra (2018) 1 SCC 733– referred to.

Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand MisirimalSolanki (2014) 3 SCC 183 : [2014] 1 SCR 783; Indore H

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI THR. THE SECRETARY, LAND AND BUILDINGDEPT. v. M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LTD.

Development Authority v. Shailendra (2018) 1 SCC733; Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (2018)3 SCC 412 : [2018] 2 SCR 1; Indore DevelopmentAuthority v. Shyam Verma (2018) SCC Online SC 3324;Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal and Others v. DossibaiN. B. Jeejeebhoy AIR 1971 SC 2355 : [1970] 3 SCR830; Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot v.Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Limited (2008) 14SCC 171 : [2008] 13 SCR 421; Dr. Subramaniam Swamyv. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 75 :[2014] 1 SCR 308; Rajender Kumar v. Rambhai (2007)15 SCC 513; Beghar Foundation through its Secretaryv. Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Ors. (2021) 3SCC 1; K. S. Puttuswamy v. Union of India (2019) 1SCC 1 : [2018] 8 SCR 1; Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.and Another v. Union of India and Others (2006) 3SCC 1 : [2006] 2 SCR 823; Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawatiand Others (2013) 8 SCC 320 : [2013] 11 SCR 25;The Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. The State of BiharAIR 1955 SC 661 : [1955] SCR 603; BisheshwarPratap Sahi v. Parath Nath AIR 1934 P.C. 213; HariSankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter AIR 1949 FC 106;Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. MarPaulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526 : [1955] SCR520; Y. P. Chawla and Others v. M. P. Tiwari andAnother AIR 1992 SC 1360 : [1992] 2 SCR 440;Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla (2005) 5 SCC 390; Lily Thomasv. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224 : [2000] 3 SCR1081; Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (2006) 4 SCC78 : [2006] 3 SCR 87; Thungabhadra Industries Ltd.v. Government of A.P. AIR 1964 SC 1372 : [1964] 5SCR 174; Union of India v. Mohd. Nayyar Khalil (2000)9 SCC 252; Shanti Devi v. State of Haryana (RP Dy.No. 1249 of 1999) (1999) 5 SCC 703; Usha Bharti v.State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 7 SCC 663 : [2014] 4SCR 1076; State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Justice R. A. Mehta(Retd.) (2013) 3 SCC 1 : [2013] 1 SCR 1; MadanMohan Pathak & Anr. v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC803 : (1978) 2 SCC 50 : [1978] 3 SCR 334; Neelima A

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212SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2023] 6 S.C.R.

ASrivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) SCC online610; Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi (3)(2006) 4 SCC 1 : [2006] 3 SCR 953; Union of India v.Major S. P. Sharma (2014) 6 SCC 351 : [2014] 4 SCR327; Special Courts Bill, 1978, In RE (1979) 1 SCC380 : [1979] 2 SCR 476; State of West Bengal v. KamalBSengupta (2008) 8 SCC 612 : [2008] 10 SCR 4; HariSankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter 1949 FCR 36; ParisonDevi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715 : [1997] 4 Suppl.SCR 470; Nalagarh Dehati Coop. Transport SocietyLtd. v. Beli Ram AIR 1981 HP 1; Gyan ChandraCDwivedi v. 2nd ADJ, Kanpur AIR 1987 All 40;S. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (2022)SCC OnLine SC 1034; Chajju Ram v. Neki AIR 1922P.C 112; Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & IronOres Ltd. & Ors. (2013) 8 SCC 337 : [2013] 2 SCR1045; State of Haryana v. G. D. Goenka TourismDCorporation Corporation Ltd. (2018) 3 SCC 585 –referred to.

G. P. Singh’s “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” –15th Edition.

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GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI THR. THE SECRETARY, LAND AND BUILDINGDEPT. v. M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LTD.

ACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Miscellaneous ApplicationNo. 414 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 11857 of 2016.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2016 in C.A. No.11857of 2016 of the Supreme Court of India.

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Review Petition No. 396 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 11857 of2016, Review Petition No. 397 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8909 of 2016,Review Petition No. 398 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8529 of 2016,Review Petition No. 399 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 11857 of 2016,Review Petition No. 400 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8899 of 2016,CReview Petition No. 401 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8527 of 2016,Review Petition No. 402 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8547 of 2016,Review Petition No. 403 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8952 of 2016,Review Petition No. 404 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 12111 of 2016,Review Petition No. 405 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8935 of 2016,DReview Petition No. 406 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8954 of 2016,Review Petition No. 407 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 9049 of 2016,Review Petition No. 408 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8559 of 2016,Review Petition No. 409 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8511 of 2016,Review Petition No. 410 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8925 of 2016,Review Petition No. 411 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 9214 of 2016,EReview Petition No. 412 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 12114 of 2016,Review Petition No. 413 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 9595 of 2016,Review Petition No. 414 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8898 of 2016,Review Petition No. 415 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 11853 of 2016,Review Petition No. 416 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 4599 of 2016,FReview Petition No. 417 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8921 of 2016,Review Petition No. 418 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8505 of 2016,Review Petition No. 419 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 10206 of 2016,Review Petition No. 420 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8904 of 2016,Review Petition No. 421 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 9719 of 2016,Review Petition No. 422 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 12046 of 2016,GReview Petition No. 423 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8957 of 2016,Review Petition No. 424 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8922 of 2016,Review Petition No. 425 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 8929 of 2016,Review Petition No. 426 of 2023 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.17316 of 2016, Review Petition No. 427 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No.H8545 of 2016, Review Petition No. 428 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 9598

of 2016, Review Petition No. 429 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 11256 of2016, Review Petition No. 430 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 11854 of2016, Review Petition No. 431 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 9597 of 2016,Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 735 of 2018 in Civil Appeal No. 11857 of2016, Miscellaneous Application No. 159 of 2018 in Civil Appeal No.11857 of 2016, Review Petition No. 432 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No.11841 of 2016 and Review Petition (Civil) No. 882 of 2017 in Civil AppealNo. 11846 of 2016.

Tushar Mehta, SG, K.M. Nataraj, ASG, B.K. Satija, DineshChander Yadav, AAGs, Sanjay Poddar, V. Giri, Shyam Divan, NeerajKr. Jain, Vivek Chib, Sr. Advs., Praveen Swarup, Shivam Goel, AnilKumar Goyal, Govind Kumar, Pratesh Goel, Ramaya S. Goel, AjayVikram Singh, Ms. Priyanka Singh, Shekhar Shrotiya, Ms. Qurratulain,Anil Kr. Goyal, Govind Kumar, Pratish Goel, Vishnu B. Saharya, VireshB. Saharya, Akshat Agarwala, M/s. Saharya & Co., Nitin Mishra, A.S.Rishi, Ishwar Chand, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Suresh Kumar Bhan, Ms.Asmita Dwivedi, Ms. Swati Yadav, Dinesh Kumar Garg, Ms. Binu Tamta,Ravi Bharuka, Ankit Agarwal, Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Ms. Arti Singh,Aakashdeep Singh Roda, Ms. Pooja Singh, Basant Pal Singh,Ms. Niharika Ahluwalia, Ms. Sneha Botwe, Ms. Manika Tripathy Pandey,Manish Vashist, Ashutosh Kaushik, Ms. Jasmine Damkewala, T. V. S.Raghavendra Sreyas, Rajiv Kumar Ghawana, Neelaksh Sharma,Ms. Akshita, Siddharth Vasudev, Dinesh K. Garg, Dhananjay Garg,Abhishek Garg, Ishaan Tiwari, Ajit Gaikwar, Amit Malik, Sudeep Singh,Ms. Neelam Singh, Davesh Bhatia, Dr. M. K. Ravi, Ankur Bansal, RajivRaheja, Deepak Vuttsya, Ms. Akriti Chaubey, Anirudh Bakru, AyushPuri, Ms. Anshula Laroiya, Anubhav Ray, T. N. Singh, Vikas K. Singh,Sham Chand, Vikram Singh, Rajshree Singh, Umang Tripathi, Ms. SmitaMaan, Ms. Nina R Nariman, Ms. Diksha Rai, Ankit Agarwal, VivekSharma, Ms. Coral Shah, Ms. Unnati Jhunjhunwala, Ms. KristideepaChoudhury, Ms. Ragini Pandey, R. Jawahar Lal, Siddharth Bawa,Mayank Kshirsagar, N.S. Vasisht, Ms. Jyoti Kataria, Ajay Marwah,Divyanshu Goyal, Ms. Srishti Bhalla, Mayank Kapoor, Alok Gupta, AtulKumar, Amitabh Ranjan, Ms. Archana Kumari, Rajiv Ranjan, RahulPandey, Ms. Sweety Singh, Ms. Anu Sula, Himesh Thakur, Ms. TanyaMittal, Abhinav Shrivastava, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Kanu Agrawal,Sharath Nambiar, B.K. Satija, Anuj Srinivas Udupa, Nakul Chengappa,Ms. Astha Tyagi, Dinesh Chander Trehan, Ms. Neha Tripathi, AshwaniKumar, Ms. Kumud Nijhawan, Anshay Dhatwalia, Ravinder Nain, Puneet AB

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ASharma, Nishit Agarwal, Ms. Kaniska Mittal, Rajiv K. Garg, AshishGarg, T.L. Garg, Ms. Bhavana Moolchandni, Hitesh Kr. Sharma, S.K.Rajora, Akhileshwar Jha, Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Rakesh Kumar, Akhil Sachar,Ms. Sunanda Tulsyan, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The following decisions of the Court were passed:

BORDER

M. R. SHAH, J.

1. As common question of law and facts arise in this group ofapplications/petitions, all these applications/petitions are decided anddisposed of together by this common order.

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2. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and inthe facts and circumstances of the case, the delay caused in filing therespective review/recall applications is hereby condoned.

3. All these applications under Article 137 of the Constitution ofIndia r/w Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) have beenDpreferred by the Government of NCT of Delhi and Delhi DevelopmentAuthority to review and recall the orders passed in the respective CivilAppeals in dismissing/disposing off the same and to restore the same totheir original files to consider the same on merits.

4. Shri Sanjay Poddar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalfEof the Government of NCT of Delhi and other learned counsel appearingon behalf of the Delhi Development Authority have vehemently submittedthat while dismissing/disposing off all the respective Civil Appeals andholding and/or confirming the judgments of the respective High Courtsdeclaring that the acquisition of the lands in question have lapsed in viewof Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency inFLand Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafterreferred to as the ‘2013 Act’), reliance was placed on the decision ofthis Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation v. HarakchandMisirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183. It is the case on behalf of theapplicants that the decision of this Court in the case of Pune MunicipalGCorporation (supra), which was relied upon while dismissing/disposingoff all the respective appeals has been specifically overruled by aConstitution Bench of this Court in the case of Indore DevelopmentAuthority v. Manohar Lal & others, (2020) 8 SCC 129. It is submittedon behalf of the respective applicants that by specifically overruling thedecision rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), theHConstitution Bench of this Court has specifically observed and held that not only the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)is overruled, but all other decisions in which Pune MunicipalCorporation (supra) has been followed are also overruled. Heavyreliance is placed upon para 365 of the Constitution Bench of this Courtin the case of Indore Development Authority (supra).

4.1 It is further submitted on behalf of the applicants that thisCourt in the earlier decision in the case of Indore Development Authorityv. Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. & Others, (2018) 3 SCC 412,while holding that the decision in the case of Pune MunicipalCorporation (supra) and other decisions following the view taken inPune Municipal Corporation (supra) are per incuriam, it was observedthat the decisions rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal Corporation(supra) are open to be reviewed in appropriate cases on the basis of thesaid decision. It is submitted that pursuant to the liberty reserved in thesaid decision, the present applications/petitions have been preferred.

4.2 It is further submitted that power to review flows from Article137 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that once the law hasbeen laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case ofIndore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal & Others (supra)and specifically overruling the decision in the case of Pune MunicipalCorporation (supra) which was the basis to dispose of/dismiss therespective appeals, the principle of res judicata shall not be applicableon the question of law.

4.3 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respectiveapplicants have also submitted that as such the judgment and order passedby this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) hasbeen subsequently recalled by a three Judge Bench of this Court videorder dated 16.07.2020 passed in Civil Appeal No. 877/2014. It issubmitted that in that view of the matter also, the orders passed in therespective civil appeals dismissing/disposing off the same relying uponthe decision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) arealso required to be reviewed/recalled.

4.4 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respectiveapplicants have also relied upon some of the subsequent orders passedby this Court recalling similar orders dismissing/disposing off the civilappeals in which the decision in the case of Pune MunicipalCorporation (supra) was relied upon and the respective proceedingsare ordered to be restored to their original file in which the effect of the A

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Asubsequent judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench in the case ofIndore Development Authority (supra) Pune Municipal Corporation(supra) is under consideration. Reliance is placed on the order passedby this Court dated 15.02.2022 in Miscellaneous Application Diary No.21678/2020.

B4.5 Shri Sanjay Poddar, learned Senior Advocate appearing onbehalf of the applicants has relied upon the decision of this Court in thecase of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Others v. Dossibai N.B.Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613 in support of his submissions that asheld by this Court that the decision on question of law where the law isaltered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate asCres judicata.

4.6 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of AssistantCommissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot v. Saurashtra Kutch StockExchange Limited, (2008) 14 SCC 171, it is submitted that as observedand held by this Court a judicial decision acts retrospectively. It isDsubmitted that it is further observed that if a subsequent decision altersthe earlier one, the later decision does not make new law. It only discoversthe correct principle of law which has to be applied retrospectively. It issubmitted that it is further observed that to put it differently, even wherean earlier decision of the court operated for quite some time, the decisionErendered later on would have retrospective effect clarifying the legalposition which was earlier not correctly understood.

4.7 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing forthe respective applicants that in the present case, in many cases, thepossession of the lands in question has been handed over to the DDA/Fapplicants which are to be used for the public purpose. It is contendedthat because of the wrong interpretation of law in the case of PuneMunicipal Corporation (supra), the acquisitions have been held to belapsed. It is submitted that therefore in view of the subsequent decisionof the Constitution Bench in the case of Indore Development Authority(supra) clarifying the law and specifically overruling the decision of thisGCourt rendered in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra),there shall not be any lapse of acquisition under the provisions of the2013 Act. It is submitted that if the impugned orders passed in therespective Civil Appeals are not reviewed/recalled, in that case, theapplicants/public authorities have to suffer and they will have to handoverHthe possession of the lands in question back to the original landowners and thereby the lands in question shall not be used for the public purposefor which they are acquired. It is contended that as observed and heldby this Court in the case of Board of Control for Cricket in India v.Netaji Cricket Club (2005) 4 SCC 741, a mistake on the part of theCourt may also call for a review of the order. It is submitted that in theaforesaid decision it is further observed and held by this Court that thewords “sufficient reason” in order 47 Rule 1 CPC are wide enough toinclude a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate.It is further observed that an application for review may be necessitatedby way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit.

4.8 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaiddecisions, it is prayed to allow the present applications and review/recallthe earlier orders passed in the respective Civil Appeals dismissing/disposing off the same, relying upon the decision in the case of PuneMunicipal Corporation (supra), which has been subsequently overruledby a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority (supra) and thereafter to decide and disposeof the same in light of the subsequent decision rendered by the ConstitutionBench in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra). It issubmitted that no prejudice shall be caused to the respective respondentsif the matters are heard afresh on merits and the respective respondents/landowners will be heard on merits on all points.

5. All these review applications are opposed by Shri Shyam Divan,Sri V. Giri, Shri Neeraj Kumar Jain, Shri Vivek Chib, learned SeniorAdvocates and other counsel appearing for the respective respondents.

5.1 It is vehemently submitted on behalf of the respectiverespondents that the applicants have admittedly filed the instant reviewapplications seeking review of the orders passed by this Court based ona subsequent decision. It is submitted that change in law in view of thesubsequent decision of the Court cannot be a ground for review. It issubmitted that even if the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the caseof Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal (supra) hasoverruled the decision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation(supra), the settled position inter parties may not be affected.

5.2 It is further submitted that even otherwise the judgment inIndore Development Authority (supra) may be construed to beprospective in its operation and cannot reopen claims/cases which havealready attained finality.

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A5.3 It is submitted that the law operational at the time when theDelhi High Court delivered the judgment in the present matter (CivilAppeal No. 8529/2016) was that laid down in the case of Pune MunicipalCorporation (supra).

5.4 It is contended that even before the date on which the judgmentBof the Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority v. ManoharLal (supra) was delivered, the matter had attained finality and rights ofthe respective respondents over the subject lands were crystallised.

5.5 It is urged that so far as the reliance placed upon para 365 ofthe decision in the case of Indore Development Authority v. ManoharCLal (supra) is concerned, the Constitution Bench was only concernedwith the correctness of the law laid down in the case of Pune MunicipalCorporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. Stateof Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC 353. That the Constitution Bench wasnot considering the appeals in relation to Pune Municipal Corporation(supra) or Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. (supra), or for thatDmatter a review of the decision in the aforesaid cases or any other casefor that matter. Therefore, the Constitution Bench could not have anddid not intend to reverse or review the judgments, as an expression ofadjudication by this Court either in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)or Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. (supra) or any other judgmentEof the competent Court that has followed the aforesaid judgments. Thatthe effect of overruling of the judgment could only be to address theprecedential value of the judgments so overruled but cannot set at naughtthe decree that has been passed in that regard. It is submitted that byoverruling a decision, the overruled judgment will lose its precedentialvalue and nothing more than that. Reliance is placed on the decision ofFthis Court in the case of BSNL v. Union of India (2006) 3 SCC 1.That in the said decision, it is observed that the overruling would notaffect the binding nature of a decision between the parties to the lis.

5.5.1 Shri Divan, learned Senior Advocate has also relied uponthe recent decision of this Court in the case of Neelima Srivastava v.GState of U.P. (2021 SCC OnLine SC 610) in support of his submissionthat as held by this Court that mere overruling of the principles by asubsequent judgment will not dilute the binding effect of the decisioninter-parties. It is urged that therefore para 365 of the Constitution Benchjudgment in Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal (supra)Hdoes not aid the review petitioners.

5.6 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing forthe respective respondents that even otherwise none of the conditionsenumerated under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and Order 47 of the SupremeCourt Rules are satisfied. That the review petitions are filed under Article137 of the Constitution r/w Order 47 of the Supreme Court Rules. ThatArticle 137 states that “subject to the provisions of any law made byParliament or any rules made under Article 145”, this Court shall havepower to review its decision. It is submitted that Order 47 of the SupremeCourt Rules states that “no application for review will be entertained ina civil proceeding except on the ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1CPC. That Order 47 Rule 1 CPC states that a review petition may bepreferred on the following grounds, (a) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of thepetitioner or could not be produced by him, OR

(b) order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparenton the face of the record, OR

(c) for any other sufficient reason.

It is submitted that in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati(2013) 8 SCC 320, this Court has reiterated the law on review jurisdictionand it is observed and held that unless the aforesaid grounds are madeout, the review petition shall not be maintainable.

5.7 It is further submitted that even otherwise overruling of anearlier decision cannot be a ground for review. It is contended that thesole ground raised in the present cases is that the decision in the case ofPune Municipal Corporation (supra) has been held to be per incuriamin the earlier decision of Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra(dead) through Lrs. (supra) and it is contended by the review petitionersthat as per the judgment in Indore Development Authority v.Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. (supra), the decisions rendered onthe basis of the Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) were open toreview in appropriate cases based on the said decision. It is submittedthat the explanation to Order 47 of the Code states that the fact that thedecision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court isbased has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of asuperior court in any other case, shall not be aground for the review ofsuch judgment. It is submitted that a Constitution Bench of this Court in AB

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Athe case of Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy (2021) 3 SCC 1has observed that change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of acoordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground forreview.

5.8 Learned counsel for the respective respondents have submittedBthat in some of the cases, similar review petitions post Constitution Benchdecision in the case of Indore Development Authority v. ManoharLal (supra) have been dismissed. It is submitted that merely becausethe judgment in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) hasbeen recalled subsequently may not be a ground to review and/or recallthe orders passed in the present cases and that too after such a longCdelay. It is submitted that the order of recall does not in any mannerafford any additional impetus to the applicants to seek a review of thejudgment in the present cases.

5.9 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaiddecisions, it is prayed to dismiss the review applications.D

6. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length.

At the outset, it is required to be noted that in all these cases, therespective Civil Appeals have been dismissed/disposed of, confirmingthe orders passed by the respective High Courts, relying upon the decisionEof this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra).However, it is required to be noted that in Indore Development Authorityv. Shailendra, (2018) 1 SCC 733, correctness of the decision in thecase of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was doubted. The matterwas placed before the three Judge Bench. By a majority decision, thedecision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was heldFto be per incuriam. While holding so and overruling the decision inSree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. (supra) and other decisionsfollowing the said decision to the extent they were in conflict with thethree Judge Bench decision, this Court also observed that the decisionsrendered on the basis of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) areGopen to be reviewed in appropriate cases on the basis of the said decision.That is how, the applicants have preferred the present review applicationsin view of the observations and liberty reserved in para 217 in the caseof Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (dead) through Lrs.(supra). The matter does not rest there. Thereafter, a reference wasmade to the five Judge Bench of this Court. A Constitution Bench of thisH

Court in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal(supra) thereafter has specifically overruled the decision in the case ofPune Municipal Corporation (supra). In para 365, it is observed andheld as under:

“365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune MunicipalCorpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand MisirimalSolanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 is hereby overruled and all otherdecisions in which Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune MunicipalCorpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree BalajiNagar Residential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn.v. State of T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353 cannot be said to be layingdown good law, is overruled and other decisions following thesame are also overruled. In Indore Development Authority v.Shailendra [Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra,(2018) 3 SCC 412, the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section24(2) and whether “or” has to be read as “nor” or as “and” wasnot placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannotprevail, in the light of the discussion in the present judgment.”

Thus, the Constitution Bench of this Court in the aforesaid decisionhas not only observed that the decision rendered in Pune MunicipalCorporation (supra) is overruled but has also specifically observed thatall other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) hasbeen followed, are also overruled. I have to give some meaning to thesaid observations. Thus, in view of the above specific observations madeby the Constitution Bench of this Court, the objections, as above, raisedon behalf of the respective respondents are to be overruled. None of thesubmissions/decisions relied upon on behalf of the respective respondentsshall be of any assistance to the respondents, though there cannot beany dispute with respect to the proposition of law laid down in the reliedupon judgments/decisions on the review jurisdiction, more particularly,in view of the observations made in para 217 in the earlier decision ofthis Court in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra(dead) through Lrs. (supra) and the observations made in para 365 inthe subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority v. Manohar Lal (supra), reproducedhereinabove.

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A7. It is also required to be noted that in similar set of facts andcircumstances, this Court had condoned the delay and reviewed/recalledthe similar order in which the decision in the case of Pune MunicipalCorporation (supra) was relied upon. It may be true that in some cases,the review applications have been dismissed. However, considering theorders passed in rejecting review applications, it appears that attentionBof the Court to paras 365 and 366 of the decision of the ConstitutionBench in Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal (supra) andpara 217 of the earlier decision in the case of Indore DevelopmentAuthority v. Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. (supra) were not broughtto the notice of the Court.C

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8. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the respectiverespondents that the case does not fall under Order 47 CPC and that thesubsequent overruling cannot be a ground to review the earlier order(s)is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that here is a peculiarcase where the earlier decision in the case of Pune MunicipalDCorporation (supra), upon which reliance has been placed earlier, wasitself doubted in the subsequent decision in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority (supra) and that the matter was referred tothe Constitution Bench and thereafter the Constitution Bench has declaredthe law as above, more particularly paras 365 and 366 of the judgmentin the case of Indore Development Authority (supra). It is also requiredEto be noted that in most of the cases solely relying upon the earlierdecision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and thoughthe possession of the lands in question have been taken over and inmany cases it might have been utilised/used by the beneficiary authorities,orders are passed declaring the deemed lapse of acquisition. The resultantFeffect would be to return the possession of the land/s which might havebeen used by the beneficiary authorities. Therefore also in the largerpublic interest, the review applications are required to be allowed andthe respective appeals are required to be considered and decided afresh.Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, these are thecases where the review applications are to be allowed and the appropriateGpublic authorities are to be given an opportunity to put forward theircase afresh, which shall be in the larger public interest.

9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, all thesereview/recall applications are allowed. The orders passed in therespective Civil Appeals are hereby recalled and the respective CivilH

Appeals are hereby ordered to be restored to their original file. Let thesaid Civil Appeals be considered in accordance with law and on theirown merits and in light of the decision in the case of Indore DevelopmentAuthority v. Manohar Lal (supra). All the defences and/or contentionswhich may be available to the respective parties are kept open includingthe possession and neither I have entered into the questions on meritsnor expressed anything on merits in favour of either of the parties.

10. In view of the order passed in the review applications, nofurther order is required to be passed in Contempt Petition (Civil) No.735/2018 in Civil Appeal No. 11857/2016, which stands disposed of.

JUDGMENT

NAGARATHNA, J.

I have had the advantage of reading the judgment proposed byHis Lordship M.R. Shah, J. in these review petitions. However, I amunable to agree with the reasoning as well as the conclusions arrived atby him.

2. In these batch of cases, the issue revolves around in my viewthe very maintainability of these review petitions both on the ground ofdelay and on a consideration of Article 137 of the Constitution of Indiaas well as Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (forshort, “S.C. Rules - 2013”) and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of CivilProcedure, 1908 (‘CPC’ for short). The aforesaid provisions arerespectively extracted as under for immediate reference:

“Article 137 of the Constitution of India:

‘137. Review of judgments or orders by the SupremeCourt. -Subject to the provisions of any law made byParliament or any rules made under Article 145, the SupremeCourt shall have power to review any judgment pronounced ororder made by it.’

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Order XLVII Rule 1 of Supreme Court Rules, 2013:

‘Order XLVII Rule 1- The Court may review its judgmentor order, but no application for review will be entertained in acivil proceeding except on the ground mentioned in Order A

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XLVII Rule 1 of the Code, and in a criminal proceeding excepton the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record.

The application for review shall be accompanied by acertificate of the Advocate on Record certifying that it is thefirst application for review and is based on the groundsadmissible under the Rules.’

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‘Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC-

1. Application for review of judgment. —

(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved —

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, butfrom which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter orevidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not withinhis knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time whenthe decree was passed or order made, or on account of somemistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for anyother sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decreepassed or order made against him, may apply for a review ofjudgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may applyfor a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appealby some other party except where the ground of such appeal iscommon to the applicant and the appellant, or when, beingrespondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case onwhich he applies for the review.

Explanation – The fact that the decision on a question oflaw on which the judgment of the Court is based has beenreversed or modified by the subsequent decision of asuperior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground forthe review of such judgment.”

(Emphasis by me)

3. Before applying the said provisions to these review petitions, itis necessary to give a brief factual background to these cases.

4. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, “L.A. Act, 1894”) was apre-Independence legislation applicable to acquisition of land on theprinciple of eminent domain. The same was repealed and substitutedby the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (‘L.A. Act, 2013’ for thesake of convenience). L.A. Act, 2013 came into effect from 01.01.2014.Section 24 with particular reference to Section 24 (2) of L.A. Act,2013, is relevant for the purpose of these review petitions. The saidprovision reads as under:

“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shallbe deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.–(1)Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case ofland acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land AcquisitionAct, 1894,—

(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land AcquisitionAct has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating tothe determination of compensation shall apply; or

(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, thensuch proceedings shall continue under the provisions of thesaid Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not beenrepealed.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1), in caseof land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land AcquisitionAct, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11has been made five years or more prior to the commencement ofthis Act but the physical possession of the land has not been takenor the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shallbe deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it sochooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afreshin accordance with the provisions of this Act:

Provided that where an award has been made and compensationin respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited inthe account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specifiedin the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said LandAcquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance AB

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Awith the provisions of this Act.”

5. Sub-Section 2 of Section 24 of L.A. Act, 2013 was a subjectmatter of consideration and interpretation in the case of Pune MunicipalCorporation vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (2014) 3 SCC 183(Pune Municipal Corporation) and Indore Development Authorityvs. Manoharlal (2020) 8 SCC 129 (Indore Development Authority).

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6. A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pune MunicipalCorporation interpreted Section 24 of L.A. Act, 2013. In one of thecases, namely, Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra (2018)1 SCC 733, the matter was referred to a Three-Judge Bench videCorder dated 07.12.2017. In Indore Development Authority vs.Shailendra (2018) 3 SCC 412, the Three-Judge Bench took a viewthat the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation did not considerseveral aspects relating to the interpretation of Section 24 of the L.A.Act, 2013 Act. Pune Municipal Corporation was a judgment by aBench of coordinate strength of three Judges. Two of the three learnedDJudges in Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra opined primafacie that the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation appears to beper incuriam while Shantanagoudar J. dissented on one point.Consequently, the Bench ordered that the matters could be listed beforethe appropriate Bench subject to the orders of Hon’ble the Chief JusticeEof India. Later, in Indore Development Authority vs. Shyam Verma(2018) SCC Online SC 3324, this Court considered it appropriate toagain place the matter before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India to referthe issues to be resolved by a Larger Bench. There were other casesalso touching upon the same controversy which were referred to a LargerBench and ultimately, in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal,Fa five-Judge Bench was constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice ofIndia, which, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, framedthe following questions for consideration:

“4.1. (1) What is the meaning of the expression “paid”/”tender”in Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparencyin Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013(“the 2013 Act”) and Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 (“the 1894 Act”)? Whether non-deposit of compensation incourt under Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act results into lapse ofacquisition under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. What are theconsequences of non-deposit in court especially when G

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compensation has been tendered and refused under Section 31(1)of the 1894 Act and Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act? Whethersuch persons after refusal can take advantage of their wrong/conduct?

4.1. (2) Whether the word “or” should be read as conjunctive ordisjunctive in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act?

4.1. (3) What is the true effect of the proviso, does it form part ofsub-section (2) or main Section 24 of the 2013 Act?

4.1. (4) What is mode of taking possession under the LandAcquisition Act and true meaning of expression ‘the physicalpossession of the land has not been taken’ occurring in Section24(2) of the 2013 Act?

4.1. (5) Whether the period covered by an interim order of acourt concerning land acquisition proceedings ought to be excludedfor the purpose of applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act?

4.1. (6) Whether Section 24 of the 2013 Act revives barred andstale claims?

5. In addition, question of per incuriam and other incidentalquestions also to be gone into.”

7. As the L.A. Act, 2013 has repealed the L.A. Act 1894, Section24 of L.A. Act, 2013 begins with a non-obstante clause and overrides allother provisions of L.A. Act, 2013. Section 24 of L.A. Act, 2013 is inthe nature of a saving clause.

8. Submissions were made before the Five-Judge Bench that thisCourt should overrule the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation andother judgments which have followed the said dictum. After analysingSection 24(1)(a) and Section 24 (1)(b) of the L.A. Act, 2013 at paragraph366 of Indore Development Authority, it has been observed as under:

“366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer thequestions as under:

366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case theaward is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencementof the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensationhas to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

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366.2. In case the award has been passed within the windowperiod of five years excluding the period covered by an interimorder of the court, then proceedings shall continue as providedunder Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act asif it has not been repealed.

366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possessionand compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”. Thedeemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction ofauthorities for five years or more prior to commencement ofthe said Act, the possession of land has not been taken norcompensation has been paid. In other words, in casepossession has been taken, compensation has not been paidthen there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid,possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2)of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation incourt. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in theproviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited withrespect to majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries(landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisitionunder Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled tocompensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013Act. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest underSection 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit ofcompensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of landacquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect tothe majority of holdings for five years or more, compensationunder the 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as onthe date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 ofthe 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensationas provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not opento him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2)due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court.The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount underSection 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for highercompensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedingshad lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to betreated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act andas contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquestreport/memorandum. Once award has been passed on takingpossession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests inState there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapseunder Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemedlapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities havefailed due to their inaction to take possession and paycompensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act cameinto force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with theauthority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistenceof interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in thecomputation of five years.

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to newcause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedingsof land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pendingon the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e., 1-1-2014. Itdoes not revive stale and time-barred claims and does notreopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to questionthe legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedingsor mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead ofcourt to invalidate acquisition.”

9. However, while doing so in para 365, it was observed as under:

“365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune MunicipalCorpn. is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which PuneMunicipal Corpn. has been followed, are also overruled. Thedecision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. cannot be saidto be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisionsfollowing the same are also overruled. In Indore DevelopmentAuthority vs. Shailendra, the aspect with respect to the proviso AB

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Ato Section 24(2) and whether “or” has to be read as “nor” or as“and” was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decisiontoo cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the presentjudgment.”

10. Subsequent to the aforesaid judgment passed in IndoreBDevelopment Authority by the Five-Judge Bench and having regardto the fact that Pune Municipal Corporation and all other judgmentsfollowing Pune Municipal Corporation have now been overruled, thereview petitioners, who are either the acquiring body/State or thebeneficiary have preferred these review petitions.

C11. The object and purpose of filing these review petitions is toseek review of the judgment impugned in the review petitions and forre- hearing of the Special Leave Petitions or the Civil Appeals, as thecase may be, which were disposed of in terms of Pune MunicipalCorporation, in light of the latest pronouncement of this Court in IndoreDevelopment Authority.D

12. According to Sri Sanjay Poddar, learned senior counsel andother learned counsel appearing for the review petitioners, on aninterpretation of para 365 of Indore Development Authority, it is clearthat not only the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation is overruledbut all other judgments following the said decision also stand overruled.EConsequently, the judgements passed by this Court following the dictumin Pune Municipal Corporation are subject to review and hence thesereview petitions have been filed.

13. The main plea of the review petitioners is to recall thejudgments/orders impugned in the review petitions and to restore theFCivil Appeals or Special Leave Petitions, as the case may be, on the fileof this Court and to rehear the same and to dispose them in terms of thelatest dictum of the Larger Bench of this Court in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority.

14. Learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the petitionersGrelied upon Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal and Others vs. DossibaiN.B. Jeejeebhoy AIR 1971 SC 2355; and Assistant Commissioner,Income Tax, Rajkot vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Limited(2008) 14 SCC 171; in support of their submissions that when a questionof law is altered by a subsequent decision, the earlier decision does notoperate as res judicata. Further, that a decision rendered later on wouldH

have a retrospective effect clarifying the legal position which was earliernot accordingly understood.

15. Per contra, learned senior counsel Sriyuth V. Giri, ShyamDivan, Neeraj Kumar Jain, Vivek Chib and other learned counsel havevehemently objected to the very maintainability of the review petitions.This is by contending that having regard to the scope of review as providedunder Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC and particularly, the Explanation thereto,these review petitions are not at all maintainable. In other words, it istheir contention that despite what has been stated in paragraph 365 ofIndore Development Authority, in view of the bar contained in theExplanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, the review petitions are notmaintainable and the review petitions have to be dismissed in limine. Inother words, it is contended that the purport of what has been opined inparagraph 365 is to denude the judgment passed in Pune MunicipalCorporation and all other judgments or orders following Pune MunicipalCorporation of their precedential authority and effect. This implies thatthe said judgment cannot be cited as a precedent in future in view of thesubsequent law being laid down by the Larger Bench in IndoreDevelopment Authority by overruling the judgment in Pune MunicipalCorporation. However, the judgment themselves do not get effacedand they are binding on the parties to the said cases although they canno longer be cited as a precedent. Heavy reliance has been placed onthe Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC to contend that when adecision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court hasbeen reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of the superiorCourt, it shall not be a ground for review of such judgment. Thus, thecontention on behalf of the respondents is that the judgment in PuneMunicipal Corporation and all other judgments following the aforesaidjudgment, having been overruled, would cease to be a precedent forfuture cases. It is submitted that merely because the Larger Bench ofthis Court in Indore Development Authority has laid down the newlaw by a different interpretation being given to Sub-Section (2) of Section24 of L.A. Act, 2013, it cannot give rise to a review of the judgmentpassed in Pune Municipal Corporation and all other judgments followingPune Municipal Corporation.

16. Learned senior counsel for the respondents further submittedthat there is delay in filing the review petitions.

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A17. Learned senior counsel, Sri Shyam Divan, appearing for oneof the respondents, placed reliance on the two judgments of this Court:

(i) Dr. Subramaniam Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu andOrs. (2014) 5 SCC 75, with particular reference to para52 thereof to contend that having regard to the ExplanationBto Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, even an erroneous decisioncannot be a ground for the Court to undertake review, asthe first and foremost requirement of entertaining a reviewpetition is that the order, of which review is sought, suffersfrom an error apparent on the face of the order and inabsence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/Corder cannot be disturbed. Rajender Kumar vs. Rambhai(2007) 15 SCC 513, also alludes to the same principle.

(ii) Further, in Beghar Foundation through its Secretary vs.Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Ors. (2021) 3 SCC1, while considering the review petitions filed against theDfinal judgment and order passed in Justice K.S.Puttuswamy vs. Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 1(Aadhaar – 5 J.), it was observed that there was no casefor review of the said judgment. It was further observedthat, “change in the law or subsequent decisions/Ejudgment of a Larger Bench by itself cannot be regardedas ground for relief.” The review petitions were,accordingly, dismissed by the majority of the Judges on theBench (4:1), while Dr. D.Y.Chandrachud, J. expressed hisdissenting opinion in the said case.

F(iii)Reliance was also placed on Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.and Another vs. Union of India and Others (2006) 3SCC 1 and Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and Others(2013) 8 SCC 320 in support of their submissions.

18. By way of reply, learned senior counsel and learned counselGfor the review petitioners sought refuge under the expression “for anyother sufficient reason” in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC to contend that inview of the changed circumstances, inasmuch as the dictum in PuneMunicipal Corporation is overruled by the Larger Bench of this Courtand all other judgments following the judgment in Pune MunicipalCorporation have also been overruled, there is good ground to reviewHand reopen all previous judgments passed on the basis of the overruled judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation. Hence, these review petitionsare maintainable and ought to be allowed. In this regard, learned counselfor the review petitioners placed reliance on The Bengal ImmunityCompany Ltd. vs. The State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661.

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19. Having regard to the rival submissions made, I find that thebone of contention between the parties is with regard to the maintainabilityof these review petitions bearing in mind the scope and purport of OrderXLVII Rule 1 CPC and particularly, the Explanation thereto. In otherwords, the point for consideration is, whether, the judgment passed inPune Municipal Corporation and all other judgments following thesaid dictum, which have been overruled, could be reviewed by entertainingthese review petitions and the said orders be recalled and the said casesbe reheard and decided in light of Indore Development Authority.

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20. At the outset, it is observed that this is not a case where thequestion involved is, whether, the judgment in Pune MunicipalCorporation calls for a review or reconsideration. It has already beenreconsidered by this Court, by the Larger Bench in IndoreDevelopment Authority. The pertinent question involved in this case is,whether, the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation having beenoverruled and all other judgments following Pune Municipal Corporationhaving been overruled in Indore Development Authority, would callfor review of all those judgments despite having attained finality betweenthe parties. In other words, whether, on the basis of a subsequent decision,on a pure question of law, the earlier decisions arrived at, on the basisof law as it was, could now be recalled at the instance of one of theparties to the earlier decisions.

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21. The specimen judgment/Orders sought to be reviewed in theinstant cases, namely, Civil Appeals and SLPs, read as under:

Finstant cases, namely, Civil Appeals and SLPs, read as under:“1.Leave granted.2.The issue, in principle, is covered against the appellants byjudgments in Civil Appeal No. 8477of 2016 arising out ofSpecial Leave Petition (C) No. 8467 of 2015 and CivilGAppeal No. 5811 of 2015 arising out of Special LeavePetition (C) No. 21545 of 2015. The appeals filed by therequisitioning authority, namely the Delhi DevelopmentAuthority, have already been dismissed by this Court.

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A3.These appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

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A3.These appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

4. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, theappellants are given a period of one year to exercise itsliberty granted under Section 24(2) of the Right to FairCompensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,BRehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 for initiation ofthe acquisition proceedings afresh.

5. We make it clear that in case no fresh acquisitionproceedings are initiated within the said period of oneyear from today by issuing a Notification under SectionC11 of the Act, the appellants, if in possession, shallreturn the physical possession of the land to theoriginal land owner.

Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. No costs.”

(Emphasis by me)

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22. The order dated 01/07/2016 in SLP (C) CC No. 11422 of2016 and 11005 of 2016 is as under:

“Delay Condoned Dismissed.”

23. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “decision” as “aEdetermination arrived at after consideration of facts, and in legal context,law”; an “opinion” is defined as “the statement by a Judge or Court ofthe decision reached in regard to a cause tried or argued before them,expounding the law as applied to the case, and detailing the reasonsupon which the judgment is based”. It explains the difference betweena “decision” and “opinion” as follows:F

“‘Decision’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘opinion’. Adecision of the court is its judgment; the opinion is the reasonsgiven for that judgment, or the expression of the views of theJudge.”

G24. This Court while considering the difference between the twoexpressions, namely, “decision” and “opinion” or view of law statedthat, “it is necessary to bear in mind that the principles in regard tothe highest Court departing from its binding precedent are differentfrom the grounds on which a ftnal judgment between the partiescan be reconsidered.”H

25. When a review application is filed by an aggrieved party, thesame can be dismissed ex parte without issuing notice to the other sideon the ground that there is no sufficient ground to call upon the oppositeparty to show cause as to why review should not be granted. If notice isissued to the other side, then, after hearing both sides, it is necessary toconsider whether the review petition ought to be allowed or rejected. Itis at that stage the maintainability of the review petition would also haveto be considered such as if there is a bar to the very maintainability ofthe review petition having regard to the scope to Order XLVII Rule 1CPC. Then, the review petition has to be dismissed at that stage itself.But, if the Court is convinced that there is ground for reviewing the orderor judgment impugned, then the review petition has to be allowed byrecalling the orders sought to be reviewed. Thereafter, the matter has tobe reheard on merits by the Court. After rehearing the case, the Courtmay either confirm the original order or modify it. An order madesubsequently whether reversing, confirming or modifying the earlier orderwould be superseding the original one. Therefore, it is at the stage priorto rehearing the matter on merits that the maintainability of the reviewpetition has to be ascertained i.e., whether the grounds for seeking reviewenunciated in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC are made out or not.

26. Article 137 of the Constitution of India speaks about thereview of judgments or orders passed by the Supreme Court of India. Itstates that subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament orany Rule made under Article 145 of the Constitution of India, the SupremeCourt shall have the power to review any judgment pronounced or ordermade by it. However, the power of the Supreme Court of India to reviewits judgment or order is subject to (i) the provisions of any law made bythe Parliament, or (ii) any Rule made under Article 145 of the Constitutionof India.

27. Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the S.C. Rules, 2013 made byvirtue of Article 145 of the Constitution of India states that, in any civilcase, review lies on any of the grounds stated under Order XLVII Rule1 CPC. Thus, the scope and power to review a judgment or order by theSupreme Court is restricted to the contours of Order XLVII Rule 1CPC. Further, though the power to review is conferred by the Constitutionand is therefore a Constitutional power, that power is circumscribed bythe CPC and S.C. Rules, 2013 which have been extracted above. OrderXLVII Rule 1 CPC states that an aggrieved person - ABCD

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Ai)due to discovery of new and important matter or evidencewhich, after exercise of due diligence was not within theknowledge of the person aggrieved or the person seekingreview could not be produced by him at the time when thedecree was passed or order made, or Bii)due to a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record,or

iii)on account of any other sufficient reason, may seek review of a judgment or order of this Court.

C28. Thus, it is noted that any person considering himself aggrievedcan seek review of the judgment or order only on the aforesaid threegrounds and none other. In the instance case, according to petitioners’counsel, the first and second grounds for review do not apply. Learnedsenior counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the third ground. Thethird ground is “on account of any other sufficient reason”. The saidDexpression may mean that the reason must be sufficient to the Court towhich the application for review is made.

29. In the present batch of cases, serious arguments have beenadvanced on both sides on, what I consider, the maintainability of thesereview petitions revolving around the Explanation to Order XLVII RuleE1 CPC. Hence, in my view, the recalling of the judgments passed followingthe judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation, which is no doubt,overruled, will have to be reconsidered in light of Order XLVII Rule 1CPC.

30. On a consideration of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, it is notedFthat there are three main grounds referred to above on which a reviewof a decree or order could be sought by an aggrieved person. Muchemphasis has been laid by the learned senior counsel for the reviewpetitioners herein, on the expression “sufficient reason” so as to contendthat since Pune Municipal Corporation was decided contrary to theintent and purport of Section 24(2) of L.A. Act, 2013 and the same hasGbeen overruled by a Larger Bench comprising of five Judges in IndoreDevelopment Authority, there is sufficient reason to review alljudgments passed by this Court following Pune Municipal Corporation.Hence, the present review petitions have been filed although there maybe a delay in doing so.

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31. It was further contended that having regard to paragraph 365of the judgment in Indore Development Authority, the dictum in PuneMunicipal Corporation as well as all decisions following PuneMunicipal Corporation have been expressly overruled. Therefore, thereis sufficient reason to review and recall all those erroneous decisions inlight of the subsequent decision in Indore Development Authority.Hence, the review petitions have been filed.

32. While considering the aforesaid submission, it is also necessaryto bear in mind the arguments advanced by learned senior counsel andcounsel on behalf of the respondents as they have drawn our particularattention to the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. It wascontended that the said Explanation clearly bars a review of a judgmenton the ground that a subsequent decision has been rendered by a superiorCourt, i.e. a Larger Bench of five Judges in the instant case, reversingor overruling the earlier decision. It was contended that when such adecision is on a pure question of law, it is not a ground for review of thejudgments which have been overruled by the Larger Bench. It wasfurther submitted that the overruled judgments are still binding on theparties to the said judgments and have attained finality and in view of theExplanation, they cannot be reopened or reviewed.

33. Applying the Explanation to the facts of the present case, itwas contended that in Indore Development Authority, the judgmentin Pune Municipal Corporation was overruled on a pure question oflaw and further, all other judgments following Pune MunicipalCorporation also stood overruled. But the overruling of the decision inPune Municipal Corporation by a subsequent decision of a LargerBench of five Judges in Indore Development Authority is not a groundfor review and recall of the very decision in Pune Municipal Corporationand all other decisions following Pune Municipal Corporation. It wassubmitted that the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC bars thereview petition being entertained in the instant cases. Hence, in thesecases, the review petitions may have to be rejected/dismissed.

34. The expression “any other sufficient reason” which is a groundfor review and which is the sheet anchor of the petitioner’s review petitionhas not been defined in the Code. However, the judgments of the

(i) Privy Council in Chajju Ram vs. Neki AIR 1922 P.C.112; Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi vs. Parath Nath AIR 1934P.C. 213; A

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A(ii)Federal Court in Hari Sankar Pal vs. Anath Nath MitterAIR 1949 FC 106, and,

(iii) This Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. MostRev. Mar Paulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526 haveheld that words must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds,Bat least analogous to those specified in the Rule”.

35. In Chajju Ram vs. Neki (supra), the Privy Council held thatthere cannot be a review on the ground that the judgment proceeded onan incorrect exposition of law. Further, the Court has no jurisdiction toorder a review because it was of the opinion that a different conclusionCof law should have been arrived at. It was also observed that if a decisionis erroneous in law that is not a ground for ordering review. If a courthas decided a point erroneously, the error could not be one apparent onthe face of the record or even analogous to it. Therefore, subsequentevents or the fact that the Court took a different view in a subsequentcase is not a sufficient reason for granting review (vide Explanation toDOrder XLVII Rule 1 CPC).

36. Although, the expression “for any other sufficient reason” inOrder XLVII Rule 1 CPC is wide enough to take within its scope andambit many circumstances or situations which do not fall in the earlierpart of the Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC which are the two grounds (i) andE(ii) referred to above, in my view, the Explanation to the said provisioncarves out an exception to the expression “for any other sufficient reason”as a ground for review of a judgment in ground (iii).

The Explanation being in the nature of an exception is to be readoutside the scope of the expression “for any other sufficient reason” inFOrder XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In other words, if, on a question of law, adecision of a Court is reversed by a subsequent decision of a superiorCourt (Larger Bench in the instant case) and the same is reopened onthe basis of the said subsequent decision there would be no finality ofjudgments of the Court even between the parties thereto. It is, hence,Gobserved that even an erroneous judgment or order is binding on theparties thereto even if subsequently that very judgment is reversed in asubsequent decision of a superior Court. Otherwise, there would be chaosand no finality of any decision of a Court which is against public policy.Judgments rendered by a Court of competent jurisdiction as per theprevailing law are binding on the parties to the said judgment. MerelyHbecause that judgment is subsequently overruled by a subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, the same shall not be a ground forreview of such judgment.

37. In this context, the object and purpose of the Explanation toOrder XLVII Rule 1 CPC cannot be lost sight of and it needs to beemphasised. In my view, the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC isin the nature of an exception to the expression “for any other sufficientreason”. This would mean that if, in the mind of a Court there is asufficient reason for the review of a judgment, it cannot be on theground/reason covered in the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.Thus, the circumstances mentioned in the Explanation would be anexception and is outside the scope and ambit of “for any other sufficientreason”.

38. An Explanation is at times appended to a Section to explain theobject and content as well as the meaning of words contained in theSection. An Explanation may be added to include something within or toexclude something from the ambit of the main enactment or theconnotation of some words occurring in it. Even a negative Explanationwhich excludes certain types or a category from the ambit of the Sectionmay have the effect of showing that the category leaving aside theexcepted types is included within it. An Explanation can also be added toserve as a proviso to the main Section vide Y.P. Chawla and Othersvs. M.P. Tiwari and another AIR 1992 SC 1360. When an Explanationis in the nature of a proviso, it is used to remove special cases from thegeneral provision and provide for them especially. Sometimes anExplanation is added to clarify a doubtful point of law as in the instantcase the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC has been inserted bythe amendment made in the year 1976. [Source: G.P. Singh’s“Principles of Statutory Interpretation” – 15[th ]Edition].

39. It is also in the nature of an exception intended to restrain theenacting clause to particular cases. The Explanation in the instant casebeing in the nature of a proviso is a qualifying or excepting provision towhat is stated in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC which state the grounds forseeking a review. Hence, the object and intendment of the proviso mustbe given its full effect. The object and purpose of the Explanation can berelated to the following three maxims:

(i) Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa (No manshould be vexed twice for the same cause); AB

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A(ii)Interest reipublicae ut sit ftnis litium (It is in the interestof the State that there should be an end to a litigation);and

(iii) Res judicata pro veritate occipitur (A judicial decisionmust be accepted as correct).BThese maxims would indicate that there must be an end to litigationotherwise the rights of persons would be in an endless confusion andjustice would suffer.

40. At the same time, there are a line of decisions which haveheld that exercising power of review for “for any other sufficient reason”Cmust be analogous to the two reasons mentioned in the provision therein,namely, –

1) who from the discovery of new and important matter orevidence, which after the exercise of due diligence, wasnot within his knowledge or could not be produced by himDat the time when the decree was passed or order was made;or

2) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the faceof the record.

41. The Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC states that theEfact that a decision on a question of law on which the judgment of theCourt is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decisionof a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for thereview of such judgment. Thus, the bar is for a Court to review itsjudgment, when a Court superior to it has subsequently reversed orFmodified a judgment on a question of law. As far as this Court isconcerned, a superior Court would mean a Larger Bench of this Courtwhich would pass a judgment or order contrary to the judgments soughtto be reviewed.

42. However, in taxation matters, the position is slightly different.GIn Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. Union of India (2006) 3 SCC 1,it was observed that overruling of a decision takes place in a subsequentlis where the precedential value of the decision is called in question.That in our judicial system, it is open to a Court of superior jurisdiction orstrength before which a decision of a Bench of lower strength is cited toact as an authority to overrule such a decision. But this overruling wouldH

not operate to upset the binding nature of the decision on the parties toan earlier lis. In that lis, the principle of res judicata would continue tooperate. But in tax cases relating to a subsequent year involving thesame issue as an earlier year, the Court can differ from the view expressedif the case is distinguishable or per incuriam.

43. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners relied upon thefollowing judgments in their arguments as well as reply arguments:

(a) Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal vs. Dossibai N.B.Jeejeebhoy (supra) was a question related to jurisdiction ofa Court which cannot be deemed to have been finallydetermined by an erroneous decision of the court. It wasobserved that if by an erroneous interpretation of the statutethe court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question wouldnot, operate as res judicata. Similarly, by an erroneousdecision if the court assumes jurisdiction which it does notpossess under the statute, the question cannot operate asres judicata between the parties, whether the cause of actionin the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise, becauseif those decisions are considered as conclusive, it will assumethe status of a special rule of law applicable to the partiesrelating to the jurisdiction of the court in derogation of therule declared by the Legislature. Reliance on the said decisionis placed as the controversy involved therein, was in thecontext of the doctrine of res judicata, wherein, it wasobserved that the previous decision on a matter in issue aloneis res judicata. When it is said that a previous decision isres judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has beenadjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contestbetween the same parties. It was further observed that aprevious decision on a matter in issue is a compositedecision: the decision on law cannot be dissociated fromthe decision on facts on which the right is founded. A decisionon an issue of law will be a res judicata in a subsequentproceeding between the same parties, if the cause of actionof the subsequent proceeding is the same as in the previousproceeding, but not when the cause of action is different,nor when the law has since the earlier decision been alteredby a competent authority, nor when the decision relates to A

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the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, norwhen the earlier decision declares valid a transaction whichis prohibited by law. Therefore, if a subsequent proceedingis initiated between the parties in these cases, then thedecision arrived at in terms of the impugned judgment inthese review petitions would be binding on the parties. Thisdoes not mean that a decision rendered between the partiesin Pune Municipal Corporation or decision following PuneMunicipal Corporation can be reviewed or recalled by filingreview petitions on the ground that subsequently in IndoreDevelopment Authority, Pune Municipal Corporation hasbeen overruled and sought to be contended by the learnedcounsel for the petitioners. The same would be contrary tothe Explanation in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

(b) Similarly, reliance was placed on Assistant Commissioner,Income Tax, Rajkot vs. Saurashtra Kutch StockExchange Limited (supra). A judgment which waspronounced earlier by a superior Court and holding the field,was not noticed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal,subsequently, while deciding a matter. Hence, it was observedthat there was a mistake apparent from the record as therewas non-consideration of a binding decision of superior Courtby the said Tribunal. Hence, the same could be rectifiedunder Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The above decision is also not applicable in the instantcase for the reason that when Pune Municipal Corporationwas decided there was no judgment of Indore DevelopmentAuthority. The decision of the Larger Bench in IndoreDevelopment Authority is not prior to but subsequent tothe judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation. The judgmentand decision in Pune Municipal Corporation dated08.02.2018 held the field till the judgment in IndoreDevelopment Authority which was pronounced on06.03.2020. Therefore, the judgment in Indore DevelopmentAuthority being a subsequent decision cannot give rise toreview and recall of the decision in Pune MunicipalCorporation as well as other judgments following theaforesaid case, on the basis that judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation has been overruled in the subsequent case,namely, Indore Development Authority.

(c) In Shakuntla Devi vs. Kamla (2005) 5 SCC 390, adeclaratory decree was granted on the basis of law as itstood then i.e. the date when the declaratory decree waspassed. But by the time the second declaratory decree waspassed between the same parties in a subsequent suit, thisCourt had declared the law under Section 14 of the HinduSuccession Act, 1956 holding that the estate of women getsenlarged in terms of the said provision. Since the law on thedate of the second declaratory decree was contrary to theearlier declaration of law made by this Court, the earlierdecree in the first suit would not operate as res judicataeven between the same parties when the second suit on adifferent cause of action between the same parties is beingconsidered. Thus, in the above circumstances, the principleof res judicata would not apply. It is in the context of theprinciple of res judicata, it was observed by this Court thatif the earlier declaratory decree which is sought to be madethe basis of res judicata, is delivered by a Court withoutjurisdiction or is contrary to the existing law at the time andthe issue comes up for reconsideration, such earlier declaratorydecree cannot be held to be res judicata in a subsequentcase unless, of course, protected by any special enactment.Therefore, it was held in the said case that if a subsequentsuit is based on an earlier declaratory decree and such decreeis contrary to the law prevailing at the time of the considerationof the second suit as to its legality or is a decree granted bya Court which had no jurisdiction to grant such decree,principles of res judicata under Section 11 CPC will not beattracted. It is then open to the defendant in the second suitto establish that the declaratory decree relied upon by theplaintiff granted in the earlier suit is not based on good lawor that the Court granting such decree did not have thejurisdiction to grant such decree. In the aforesaid case, thesecond suit was filed for possession of the suit propertieson the basis of a declaratory decree obtained earlier in thefirst suit which was not found to be a lawful decree as per A

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the law prevailing at the time when the second suit wasconsidered.

Issues

The aforesaid decision does not apply to the presentcase as herein, review petitions have been filed seekingreview of the judgments passed by this Court on the basis ofthe decision in Pune Municipal Corporation which has beensubsequently overruled by this Court in Indore DevelopmentAuthority on a pure question of law and the review petitionsare hit by the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Thisis not a case where a subsequent fresh petition has beenfiled before the High Court seeking reliefs based on thejudgment of this Court in Pune Municipal Corporation. Itis necessary to emphasise that these review petitions havebeen filed before this Court to review the judgments/orderspassed by this Court on the basis of the judgment in PuneMunicipal Corporation which has been overruled by asubsequent judgment in Indore Development Authority. Inmy view, these review petitions are not maintainable in viewof the bar contained in the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule1 CPC.

(d) Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has relied uponthe expression “sufficient reason” found in Order XLVIIRule 1 CPC being a ground for review in these cases. Inthis regard, he placed reliance on Board of Control forCricket in India vs. Netaji Cricket Club, wherein it wasobserved that an application for review would also bemaintainable if there exists sufficient reason thereof. Whatwould constitute sufficient reason would depend on the factsand circumstances of the case. In the said case, reliancewas placed on a judgment of the Privy Council in MoranMar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar PouloseAthanasius (supra), dealing with the limitations in theapplication of review and it was observed that the expression“any other sufficient reason” must mean “a reason sufficienton grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule.”

In Netaji Cricket Club (supra), this Court recognisedthat there was a mistake on the part of this Court which DEPT. v. M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LTD. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]

would include a mistake in the understanding of the natureof an undertaking given to this Court and therefore, thereview application was entertained by accepting the mistakein the nature and purport of the undertaking given beforethis Court. In the aforesaid factual matrix, the review petitionwas entertained.

(e) In the same context, Lily Thomas vs. Union of India (2000)6 SCC 224 could be adverted to wherein it has been heldthat the power to review is not an appeal in disguise but is acreature of statute and not an inherent power. In the saidcase, the question was with regard to the consideration of asubsequent event to mould the relief accordingly. It wasobserved that while exercising its review jurisdiction, theCourt can take into consideration a subsequent event forthe purpose of rectifying its own mistake. A party cannot bemade to suffer on account of an act of the Court which isexpressed in the well-recognised maxim of equity, namely,actus curiae neminem gravabit which means an act of theCourt shall prejudice no man. This maxim is founded uponjustice and good sense or otherwise a man would becompelled to do what he cannot possibly perform, which thelaw does not permit (lex non cogit ad impossibilia). Theabove proposition would fall within the scope of “any othersufficient reason” when there is a mistake of the Court whichhas led to injustice. That is a situation which does not take ina situation covered by the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule1 CPC, which, as already observed, is an exception to OrderXLVII Rule 1 CPC. Hence, the aforesaid judgment doesnot apply to the instance cases.

44. The aforesaid cases turn on their own facts and do not fallwithin the scope of exception which is in the nature of an Explanation.The aforesaid judgments cannot be a precedent in the instant case wherethe review petition has been filed in order to set at naught the impugnedorders following the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation passedby this Court which held the field till it was subsequently overruled inIndore Development Authority. Having regard to the Explanationprovided in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC review in these cases isimpermissible.

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A45. A few judgments of this Court could be referred to at thisstage in support of the view that I wish to take in this case:

a)In Haridas Das vs. Usha Rani Banik (2006) 4 SCC78, it has been observed that one of the parametersprescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC for allowing thereview petition for rehearing the case is “on account ofsome mistake or error apparent on the face of the recordor for any other sufficient reason”. The former part of therule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, andthe later to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect oron which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of thempostulates a rehearing of the dispute because a party hadnot highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhapshave argued them more forcefully and/or cited bindingprecedents to the Court and thereby enjoyed a favourableverdict. It was further observed categorically that an errorapparent on the face of the record for acquiring jurisdictionto review must be such an error which may strike one on amere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning.

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b)In fact, in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs.EGovernment of A.P. AIR 1964 SC 1372: (1964) 5 SCR174, it has been observed that there is a distinction whichis real between a mere erroneous decision and a decisionwhich could be characterised as vitiated by “errorapparent”. A review is by no means an appeal in disguisewhereby an erroneous decision is corrected but lies onlyFfor a patent error without any elaborate argument that onecould point to the error and therefore, a clear case of errorapparent on the face of the record would be made out.

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Reliance could also be placed on Union of India vs. Mohd.Nayyar Khalil (2000) 9 SCC 252, wherein it wasobserved that if an order following a Three-Judge Benchdecision is passed and at that time the Three-Judge Benchdecision had not been upset, even in the future or later ifthe Constitution Bench takes a contrary view, it would bea subsequent judgment which cannot be a ground for reviewin view of the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

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d)Similarly, in Shanti Devi vs. State of Haryana (RP Dy.ANo. 1249 of 1999) in Civil Appeal No. 14608 of 1996 asreported in (1999) 5 SCC 703, this Court held that thecontention that the judgment sought to be reviewed wasoverruled in another case, subsequently, is no reason forreviewing the said decision in view of the Explanation toBOrder XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The said review petition wasdismissed both on the ground of unexplained inordinate delayas well as on merits.

e)In Usha Bharti vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 7 SCC663, it was held that the Supreme Court, in exercise of itspower of review may in an appropriate case reopen thecase and rehear the entire matter but while doing so theCourt must remain conscious of the provisions contained inOrder XLVII Rule 1 CPC as well as the Rules framed bythe Supreme Court. Thus, the expression “for any othersufficient reason” has been intentionally used in OrderXLVII Rule 1 CPC by the Legislature to cater to possibleexceptional cases in which injustice may have been metedout.

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46. The following relevant judgments could also be discussedat this stage:

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46. The following relevant judgments could also be discussedat this stage:

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(a) Reliance could be placed on State of Gujarat & Anr. vs.Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd.) (2013) 3 SCC 1, whereinfollowing several earlier decisions of this Court, it wasobserved that a decision does not lose its authority “merelybecause it was badly argued, inadequately consideredor fallaciously reasoned.”

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(b) In fact, in Madan Mohan Pathak & Anr. vs. Union ofIndia AIR 1978 SC 803; (1978) 2 SCC 50, a Seven-Judge Bench of this Court considered the question whetherParliament enacting an Act consequent upon the judgmentof the Calcutta High Court would unsettle the binding effectof the said judgment. In that case, the appeal filed againstthe judgment of the Calcutta High Court was not pressedbefore this Court and the said judgment was allowed tobecome final. This Court held that there was nothing in the G

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Act passed subsequent to the judgment of the Calcutta HighCourt which had nullified the effect of the same or whichcould unsettle the judgment or take away the bindingcharacter of the same. In the circumstances, it was heldthat Life Insurance Corporation which was a party in thatcase was liable to make the payment of cash bonus for theyear 1975-1976 to its Class III and IV employees inaccordance with the said judgment of the Calcutta HighCourt as it was not absolved of the obligations imposed bythe said judgment despite the Parliament passing an Actsubsequent thereto on the ground that the judgment of theCalcutta High Court was binding on the parties thereto.

(c) Further, in Neelima Srivastava vs. State of Uttar Pradesh(2021) SCC online 610, reference was made toSecretary, State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi (3) (2006)4 SCC 1 (“Uma Devi 3”), in which the Constitution Benchhad stated, “it is also clarifted that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in this decision, orin which directions running counter to what we haveheld herein, will stand denuded of its status asprecedent.” It was observed in Neelima Srivastava thatthe import of the aforesaid observations was that earlierdecisions running counter to the principles settled in thedecision of Uma Devi could not be treated as a precedent.This does not mean that the judgment of a competent Courtdelivered prior to the decision in Uma Devi which attainedfinality and is binding inter-se between the parties need notbe implemented. It was further observed that, “mereoverruling of the principles, on which the earlierjudgment was passed, by a subsequent judgment ofhigher forum will not have the effect of uprooting theftnal adjudication between the parties and set it atnaught.”

Moreover, it was held that there is a distinction betweenoverruling of a principle and reversal of a judgment. Thejudgment between the parties has to be assailed andovercome in a manner known to or recognised by law by ahigher forum. Mere overruling of principles by a subsequent GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI THR. THE SECRETARY, LAND AND BUILDINGDEPT. v. M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LTD. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]

judgment will not dilute the binding effect of the decision onparties to the judgment overruled. It was held thatobservation at paragraph 54 of Uma Devi case does notabsolve the parties in other cases to comply with thedirections issued prior to the judgment in Uma Devi’scase.

(d) Reference can also be made to Union of India vs. MajorS.P. Sharma (2014) 6 SCC 351, in which it was statedthat “a decision rendered by a competent Court cannotbe challenged in collateral proceedings for the reasonthat if it is permitted to do so there would be confusionand chaos and the ftnality of the proceeding would ceaseto have any meaning”. It was further observed that it isnot permissible in law for the parties to reopen concludedjudgments of the Court as the same may not only tantamountto an abuse of the process of the Court but would have afar-reaching adverse effect on the administration of justice.

(e) When reconsideration of a judgment of this Court is sought,there are two limitations which have been observed – onejurisdictional and the other self-imposed. The same has beenexplained in Natural Resources Allocation, in Re:Special reference no. 1 of 2012, speaking through D.K.Jain, J., as under:

“The first limitation is that a decision of this Court couldbe reviewed only under Article 137 or a curative petitionand in no other way. Once a lis between parties is decided,the operative decree can only be opened in review.Overruling the judgment— as a precedent—does not reopenthe decree.

The second limitation, a self-imposed rule of judicialdiscipline, was that overruling the opinion of the Court on alegal issue does not constitute sitting in appeal, but is doneonly in exceptional circumstances, such as when the earlierdecision is per incuriam or is delivered in the absence ofrelevant or material facts or if it is manifestly wrong andcapable of causing public mischief.”

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It was further observed that “in fact, the overruling of a principleof law is not an outcome of appellate jurisdiction but a consequenceof its inherent power. This inherent power can be exercised as longas a previous decree vis-à-vis a lis inter partes is not affected”.

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(f) Further, a Seven-Judge Bench of this Court speaking throughChandrachud, C.J. in Special Courts Bill, 1978, In RE(1979) 1 SCC 380, observed that it is always open to thisCourt to re- examine the question already decided by it andto overrule, if necessary, the view earlier taken by it. Butinsofar as all other Courts in the territory of India areconcerned, they ought to be bound by the view expressedby this Court even in the exercise of its advisory jurisdictionunder Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India.

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Although the principle of stare decisis is not applicableto this Court, on the strength of Article 137 of theConstitution of India, this Court, in a subsequent judgment,can overrule a previous judgment but the same would notunsettle the dictum in the judgment overruled inter partes.Further, the overruled judgment which has held the field isbound to be followed in all other cases till the subsequentjudgment overruling the earlier judgment is passed.

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In State of West Bengal vs. Kamal Sengupta (2008)8 SCC 612, Section 22(3) of the Administrative TribunalAct, 1985 came up for consideration in the context of thepower of review. While dealing with the said question, itwas held that a Tribunal established under the aforesaidAct is entitled to review its order or decision if either of thegrounds enumerated in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC wasavailable. In that case, the question, whether, the subsequentcontra judgment by the same or a superior Court on a pointof law can be treated as an error apparent on the face ofthe record for the purpose of review of an earlier judgment,was considered as there was a divergence of opinion amongthe High Courts on the said question. It was observed thatin view of there being a dichotomy of opinion on the issue,the Law Commission took cognizance of the same andsuggested an amendment to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPCwhich led to the insertion of the Explanation after Order F

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XLVII Rule 2 CPC. The following cases were referred toin the aforesaid judgment:

(i) Hari Sankar Pal vs. Anath Nath Mitter 1949 FCR 36,a Five-Judge Bench decision of the Federal Court wasalluded to, wherein it was observed that if a decision iserroneous in law, the same is certainly no ground forordering review. Moreover, if the case had been decidederroneously, the error could not be construed as being oneapparent on the face of the record justifying the Court toexercise its power of review under Order XLVII Rule 1CPC.

(ii) Reliance was also placed on Parison Devi vs. Sumitri Devi(1997) 8 SCC 715 and it was observed that there is aclear distinction between an erroneous decision and an errorapparent on the face of the record. While the first can becorrected by the higher forum, the latter only can becorrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A reviewpetition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be“an appeal in disguise”.

(iii) In Nalagarh Dehati Coop. Transport Society Ltd. vs.Beli Ram AIR 1981 HP 1, a Full Bench of the HimachalPradesh High Court considered the Explanation and heldthat a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court or aLarger Bench of the same Court taking a contrary view onthe point covered by the judgment does not amount to amistake or error apparent on the face of the record of thejudgment sought to be reviewed.

(iv) Reference was also made to Gyan Chandra Dwivedi vs.2[nd ]ADJ, Kanpur AIR 1987 All 40, in which it wasobserved that almost all the High Courts except KeralaHigh Court were unanimous in their opinion of the fact thatif a point of law in a judgment has been altered by asubsequent decision of the superior Court in another case,the same could not afford a valid ground for the review ofthe judgment.

(v) Further, with reference to Netaji Cricket Club (supra), onwhich reliance has been placed by the review petitioners, it A

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was observed that the consideration of the exercise ofreview jurisdiction in that case, based on a subsequent eventwas confined to purely the facts of the said case involvinga controversy between rival Cricket Associations. Hence,it was opined that the decision in Netaji Cricket Club couldnot be applied as a general ratio.

While delineating the principles from the aforesaidjudgments, inter alia, the following principles relevant tothe instant cases are reiterated:

i) the expression “any other sufficient reason” appearingin Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC has to be interpreted inlight of other grounds specified in the said provision.

ii) an erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in theguise of exercise of power of review.

(h) In a recent judgement dated 18.08.2022 in Civil AppealsNos. 5503-5504 of 2022 arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 9602-9603 of 2022 along with Civil Appeal No. 5505 of 2022arising out of SLP (C) No. 11290 of 2022, a Three-JudgeBench of this Court in the case of S. Madhusudhan Reddyvs. V. Narayana Reddy (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1034had made specific reference to the aforementioned casesof Chajju Ram vs. Neki AIR 1922 P.C 112 and MoranMar Basselios Catholics vs. Most Rev. Mar PauloseAthanasius (supra) wherein the words “any othersufficient reason appearing in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC”was defined to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds atleast analogous to those specified in the Rule.” In makingreference to these cases, the Three-Judge Bench reiteratedthat an essential principle for exercising review jurisdictionunder Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is that the review will bemaintainable for “any other sufficient reason”, and hasnarrowed the scope of this ground to mean a reasonsufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specifiedin the rule.

(i) In the aforesaid case Union of India vs. SandurManganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors. (2013) 8 SCC 337has also been adverted to wherein this Court delineated on some of the grounds as to when the review will not bemaintainable as under: - A

“(i)A repetition of old and overruled argument is notenough to reopen concluded adjudications,

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import, B

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with theoriginal hearing of the case,

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error,manifest on the face of the order, undermines itssoundness or results in miscarriage of justice, C

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguisewhereby an erroneous decision is re-heard andcorrected but lies only for patent error,

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subjectcannot be a ground for review, D

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record shouldnot be an error which has to be fished out andsearched,

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully withinEthe domain of the appellate court, it cannot bepermitted to be advanced in the review petition, and

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same reliefsought at the time of arguing the main matter hadbeen negatived.”

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47. In fact, in State of Haryana vs. G.D. Goenka TourismCorporation Corporation Ltd. (2018) 3 SCC 585, this Court directedthat pending a final decision on making a reference to a Larger Benchon the interpretation of Section 24 of the L.A. Act, 2013, the High Courtsought not to deal with any case relating to the said interpretation.Therefore, between 21.02.2018 till the date of pronouncement of thejudgment by the Larger Bench in Indore Development Authority i.e.,06.03.2020, the High Courts were requested not to deal with cases arisingunder Section 24(2) of the L.A. Act, 2013, and its applicability toacquisition arising under L.A. Act, 1894, i.e. only insofar as acquisitioninitiated under L.A. Act, 1894. But insofar as cases which were decided G

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Aprior to the aforesaid directions issued by this Court or the High Courtor cases decided even by this Court on the strength of the dictum inPune Municipal Corporation cannot be set at naught between theparties to those cases. The judgment in Pune Municipal Corporationhaving been overruled, it would only lose its value as a precedentsubsequent to the dictum of the Larger Bench in Indore DevelopmentBAuthority and therefore, cannot be cited as a precedent.

48. Hence, in my view, having regard to the scope and ambit ofthe Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, these review petitions arenot maintainable and the judgment and the orders of this Court ought notbe reviewed and the review petitions are liable to be dismissed.C

49. It is also important to bear in mind that in various High Courtsacross the country following the judgment in Pune MunicipalCorporation, Writ Petitions have been disposed of and the said decisionspassed in the said writ petitions or intra court appeals, as the case maybe, may have attained finality and binding on the parties thereto. If theseDreview petitions are allowed and are held to be maintainable there wouldbe hundreds of review petitions which would be filed seeking review ofthe decisions passed by various High Courts in writ petitions followingthe judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation. This would open aPandora’s Box and upset the binding nature of the decisions betweenEthe parties and be contrary to the doctrine of finality in litigation.

50. In Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra (supra), amajority of two Hon’ble Judges in paragraph 217 while opining that, thejudgment rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation and other decisionsfollowing Pune Municipal Corporation are per incuriam observedFthat the “decisions rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal Corporationare open to be reviewed in appropriate cases on the basis of this decision”.However, the Larger Bench in Indore Development Authority did notobserve the above, either in paragraph 365 of the judgment or any otherparagraph. In fact, the reason as to why a Larger Bench of five Judgeswas constituted, was because a majority of 2:1 in Indore DevelopmentGAuthority vs. Shailendra had taken a view that Pune MunicipalCorporation was per incuriam and also the decision in Pune MunicipalCorporation was by a Two-Judge Bench. Therefore, in order to makean authoritative pronouncement on the question of law concerning theinterpretation of Section 24(2) of L.A. Act, 2013 and since there wereHmany orders passed by this Court questioning the correctness of the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation, a Larger Bench of fiveJudges was constituted by Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. Now, theunanimous judgment of the Larger Bench of five Judges holds the field.However, in paragraph 365 of the said judgment or in any other paragraph,there is no observation that on overruling the decision in Pune MunicipalCorporation as well as all decisions following Pune MunicipalCorporation, the overruled decisions have to be reviewed. The saidobservation is conspicuous by its absence obviously for the reason thatsuch a review is impermissible having regard to the Explanation to OrderXLVII Rule 1 CPC which aspect has been elaborately discussed above.In fact, the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC has not been noticedby the two learned Judges constituting the majority in IndoreDevelopment Authority vs. Shailendra.

51. There is another aspect which ought to be considered. That intwo matters i.e., in the very case of Pune Municipal Corporation(decided on 08.02.2018) which has been overruled by IndoreDevelopment Authority (decided on 06.03.2020) by a Bench of threeJudges but the judgment has also been recalled vide Order dated16.07.2020. Similarly, another judgement dated 31.08.2016 passed bythis Court following Pune Municipal Corporation has been recalledby order dated 15.02.2022 by this very Bench. I must be forthright insaying that the recalling of the said Orders/Judgment dated 08.02.2018and 31.08.2016 was done so in the absence of any arguments beingadvanced on the maintainability of review petitions itself as in the presentcases and without taking into consideration the Explanation to OrderXLVII Rule 1 CPC. I find that the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1CPC is a bar to the very maintainability of these review petitions inthese cases. Hence, before hearing the Civil Appeals / Special LeavePetitions on merits, the Orders passed recalling the decision passedearlier would call for reconsideration.

All judgments and orders which have been recalled till datesubsequent to the judgment in Indore Development Authority on thebasis that Pune Municipal Corporation was incorrectly decided arealso not in accordance with law in view of the discussion made above.

52. Having held that the judgments/orders sought to be reviewedby the petitioners is impermissible in law, the ground realities would alsohave to be now taken into consideration on account of the passage oftime. It is noted that Section 24 of the L.A. Act, 2013 is in the nature of ABC

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Aa saving clause which is evident on a reading of the same, including theproviso to Sub-Section 2 of Section 24 of the L.A. Act, 2013. The objectis to save the acquisition as far as possible. Possibly taking a cue fromthe proviso, this Court in the impugned judgments reserved liberty to thepetitioners herein to initiate acquisition proceedings afresh within oneyear in some of the cases failing which the land was to be returned to theBland owners if in possession of the review petitioners herein. Thus, if nofresh acquisition proceedings are initiated within the said period of oneyear by issuing a notification under Section 11 of the L.A. 2013 Act andif the review petitioners herein are in possession of the land, the physicalpossession thereof shall be returned to original land owners.C53. In the circumstances, the only relief that can be granted to thereview petitioners/applicants is to extend the period for initiation ofacquisition under the provisions of L.A. Act, 2013 to a period of oneyear from today. Till then, in those cases where physical possession ofthe land has already been taken over by the acquiring body or has beenDhanded over to the beneficiary the same shall continue to remain withthe acquiring body or the beneficiary, as the case may be.

54. Thus, only a limited relief is being given to the review petitioners/applicants and impugned judgments/orders of this Court are not beingreviewed in the review petitions. There is a delay in filing the same inEcertain cases. This is owing to the passage of time from the date ofpassing the judgments/orders sought to be reviewed and the uncertaintyin the interpretation of Section 24 (2) of L.A. Act, 2013 and due toCovid-19 and one year time being granted to initiate fresh acquisition, inthe impugned order itself. Hence, the said delay is condoned.

F55. Where no such direction has been issued in the impugnedorders and the Special Leave Petitions have been dismissed, the petitionersare at liberty to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act,2013, if so advised.

56. In the result, the review petitions are disposed of in the aboveterms.G

No costs.

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Nidhi Jain(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

Matter be placed before Hon’ble CJI.