DAXABEN versus THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. on 29 July 2022

[2022] 13 S.C.R. 295

DAXABEN

v.

THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1061-1084 of 2022)

JULY 29, 2022

[INDIRA BANERJEE AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 482 – Quashing of FIR– FIR u/s.306 for abetment to commit suicide, entailing punishmentof imprisonment of ten years – Quashed by the High Court on thebasis of a settlement between the complainant and the accused namedin the FIR – On appeal, held: Once an FIR and/or criminal complaintis lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it becomes amatter between the State and the accused – State has a duty to ensurethat law and order is maintained in society and the offender isprosecuted – An informant has no right in law to withdraw thecomplaint of a non- compoundable offence of a grave, serious and/or heinous nature, which impacts society – Offence u/s. 306 ofabetment to commit suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence– s.307 falls in the category of heinous and serious offences andare to be treated as crime against society and not against theindividual alone – On a parity of reasoning, offence u/s. 306 wouldfall in the same category – An FIR u/s. 306 cannot even be quashedon the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, survivingspouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else –Thus, the impugned orders of the High Court set aside – PenalCode, 1860 – s. 306.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The issue whether the criminal miscellaneousapplications filed by the accused under Section 482 Cr.P.C. couldhave been allowed and an FIR under Section 306 IPC for abetmentto commit suicide, entailing punishment of imprisonment of tenyears, could have been quashed on the basis of a settlementbetween the complainant and the accused named in the FIR, isanswered in negative. [Para 25][308-C-D]

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A1.2 Even though, the inherent power of the High Courtunder Section 482 Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedingsis wide, such power has to be exercised with circumspection, inexceptional cases. Jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C is notto be exercised for the asking. In exceptional cases, to preventabuse of the process of the Court, the High Court might inBexercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 quash criminalproceedings. However, interference would only be justified whenthe complaint did not disclose any offence, or was patentlyfrivolous, vexatious or oppressive. [Paras 27, 29][308-F; 309-A-B]

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1.3 Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of abetment tocommit suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course,the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of theCr.P.C. is wide and can even be exercised to quash criminalproceedings relating to non-compoundable offences, to secureDthe ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of Court.Where the victim and offender have compromised disputesessentially civil and personal in nature, the High Court canexercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminalproceedings. In what cases power to quash an FIR or a criminalcomplaint or criminal proceedings upon compromise can beEexercised, would depend on the facts and circumstances of thecase. However, before exercising its power under Section 482Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or criminalproceedings, the High Court has to be circumspect and havedue regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous orFserious crimes, which are not private in nature and have a seriousimpact on society cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromisebetween the offender and the complainant and/or the victim.Crimes like murder, rape, burglary, dacoity and even abetmentto commit suicide are neither private nor civil in nature. Such crimes are against the society. In no circumstances canGprosecution be quashed on compromise, when the offence isserious and grave and falls within the ambit of crime againstsociety. [Paras 37, 38][313-D-G]

1.4 Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating tograve and serious offences only on basis of an agreement withH

the complainant, would set a dangerous precedent, wherecomplaints would be lodged for oblique reasons, with a view toextract money from the accused. Furthermore, financially strongoffenders would go scot free, even in cases of grave and seriousoffences such as murder, rape, bride-burning, etc. by buying offinformants/complainants and settling with them. This wouldrender otiose provisions such as Sections 306, 498- A, 304-Betc. incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with a specific socialpurpose. [Para 39][314-A-B]

1.5 In criminal jurisprudence, the position of the complainantis only that of the informant. Once an FIR and/or criminalcomplaint is lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, itbecomes a matter between the State and the accused. The Statehas a duty to ensure that law and order is maintained in society.It is for the state to prosecute offenders. In case of grave andserious non- compoundable offences which impact society, theinformant and/or complainant only has the right of hearing, to theextent of ensuring that justice is done by conviction andpunishment of the offender. An informant has no right in law towithdraw the complaint of a non- compoundable offence of a grave,serious and/or heinous nature, which impacts society. [Para40][314-C-D]

1.6 In exercise of power under Section 482, the Court doesnot examine the correctness of the allegation in the complaintexcept in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear thatthe allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. [Para49][322-A]

1.7 The criminal proceeding cannot be nipped in the budby exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. only becausethere is a settlement, in this case a monetary settlement, betweenthe accused and the complainant and other relatives of thedeceased to the exclusion of the hapless widow of the deceased.Section 307 IPC falls in the category of heinous and seriousoffences and are to be treated as crime against society and notagainst the individual alone. On a parity of reasoning, offenceunder section 306 IPC would fall in the same category. An FIRunder Section 306 IPC cannot even be quashed on the basis ofany financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, AB

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Aparents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else. It isclarified that it was not necessary for this Court to examine thequestion whether the FIR in this case discloses any offence underSection 306 IPC, since the High Court, in exercise of its powerunder Section 482 CrPC, quashed the proceedings on the soleground that the disputes between the accused and the informantBhad been compromised. The impugned orders of the High Courtare set aside. [Paras 50, 51][322-B-E]

M. Arjunan v. State, Represented by its Inspector ofPolice (2019) 3 SCC 315; Ude Singh & Ors. v. State ofHaryana (2019) 17 SCC 301 : [2019] 9 SCR 703;CRamesh Kumar v. State of Chhatisgarh (2001) 9 SCC618 : [2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 247; S.S. Chheena v. VijayKumar Mahajan and Another (2010) 12 SCC 190 :[2010] 9 SCR 1111; New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.Krishna Kumar Pandey (2019) SCC Online 1786; StateDof Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Ors.(2011) 14 SCC 770 : [2011] 15 SCR 540; MonicaKumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P. (2008) 8 SCC 781 : [2008]9 SCR 943; Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna KumarAIR 1990 SC 494 : (1990) Supp SCC 686 : [1989]Suppl. SCR 165; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.ERam Kishan Rohtagi and Others (1983) 1 SCC 1 :[1983] 1 SCR 884; State of Andhra Pradesh v.Gourieshetty Mahesh (2010) 11 SCC 226 : [2010]8 SCR 423; Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand(2013) 11 SCC 673; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.FSambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692 :[1988] 2 SCR 930; Inder Mohan Goswami v. State ofUttaranchal (2007) 12 SCC 1 : [2007] 10 SCR 847;State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 :[1980] 1 SCR 1071; Kapil Agarwal & Ors. v. SanjaySharma & Others (2021) 5 SCC 524; Gian Singh v.GState of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 : [2012]8 SCR 753; Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014)9 SCC 466 : [2014] 4 SCR 1012; State of Maharashtrav. Vikram Anantrai Doshi (2014) 15 SC 29 : [2013]12 SCR 563; CBI v. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389

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DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

: [2015] 10 SCR 277; State of Tamil Nadu v. R. VasanthiStanley (2016) 1 SCC 376 : [2015] 9 SCR 772;Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbathbhai BhimsinhbhaiKarmur and Others v. State of Gujrat and Another(2017) 9 SCC 641 : [2017] 10 SCR 12; State of MadhyaPradesh v. Laxmi Narayan & Ors. (2019) 5 SCC 688 :[2019] 2 SCR 864; Arun Singh and Others v. State ofUttar Pradesh Through its Secretary and Another (2020)3 SCC 736 : [2020] 3 SCR 707 – referred to.

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Case Law Reference

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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal AppealNos. 1061-1084 of 2022.

BFrom the Judgment and Order dated 20.10.2020 of the High Courtof Gujarat at Ahmedabad in R/Criminal Misc Application Nos.5600, 5107,5004, 5108, 5165, 5159, 5161, 5524, 5166, 5162 and 5739 of 2020 andOrder dated 29.07.2021 in R/Criminal Misc Application Nos.10845, 10846,10847, 10848, 10849, 10850, 10851, 10852, 10853, 10855, 10856 and10858 of 2021.CPriank Adhyaru, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs. for theAppellant.

Anitha Shenoy, Maninder Singh, Sr. Advs., Ms. DeepanwitaPriyanka, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Vivek Mathur, Ms. Aarti KrupaDKumar, Ms. Ayushma Awasthi, Vaibhav Joshi, Ankur Mathur, Ivan,Ms. Mohini Priya, Ms. Chitrangda Rastravara, Prabhas Bajaj, PranavSaigal, Ajay Sabarwal, Manvendra Singh, Gp. Capt. Karan Singh Bhati,Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by EINDIRA BANERJEE, J.

Leave granted.

2. These Appeals are against the impugned final judgment andorder dated 20[th] October 2020 passed by the High Court of Gujarat atAhmedabad allowing the Criminal Revisional Applications under SectionF482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Cr.P.C), being R/CriminalMisc. Application Nos. 5026 of 2020, 5600 of 2020, 5107 of 2020, 5004of 2020, 5108 of 2020, 5165 of 2020, 5159 of 2020, 5161 of 2020, 5524 of2020, 5166 of 2020, 5162 of 2020, 5739 of 2020 and quashing the FIRbeing C.R. No. I-11209016200112 dated 1[st] March 2020 registered withGHimmatnagar ‘A’ Division Police Station, District Sabarkantha, and alsothe order dated 29[th] July 2021 passed by the High Court dismissing theCriminal Miscellaneous Applications filed by the Appellant, registeredas R/Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 10845 of 2021, 10846 of 2021,10847 of 2021, 10848 of 2021, 10849 of 2021, 10850 of 2021, 10851 of2021, 10852 of 2021, 10853 of 2021, 10855 of 2021, 10856 of 2021,H

10858 of 2021 for recalling the said common final order dated 20[th] October2020.

3. The Appellant is the wife of late Shaileshkumar ChimanbhaiPatel, hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”, who is stated to havecommitted suicide on 1[st] March 2020 by consuming poison in his office.

4. One Pinakin Kantibhai Patel, claiming to be a cousin of thedeceased, as also an Accountant working for the deceased, lodged anFIR being C.R. No. I-11209016200112 dated 1[st] March 2020 withHimmatnagar Police Station, District Sabarkantha, naming 12 accusedpersons, being the applicants in the Criminal Miscellaneous Applicationsin the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC, referred to above,alleging that they had committed offence under Section 306 of the IndianPenal Code, 1860 (IPC) of abetting the commission of suicide by thedeceased.

5. As per the FIR, the deceased left a hand-written note, thecontents whereof are as hereunder:- “With due respect, I am to state that I, ShaileshkumarChimanlal Patel, Proprietor of Jigar Transport, state that Ihave been cheated. The names and statement are as under

1. As per the instructions of Anil Mathur, I have paid amountsas under: Anil Mathur, RTO, Jodhpur, Service Ratanpur RTOCheck Post, Anil Mathur, Rs.600000/-, Pramod DadhichiRs.10,00,000/-, Sunil Mathur, Rs.300000/-, Niharika MathurRs.800000/-, Malvika Mathur Rs.300000/-, Niru MathurRs.700000/-, Dolly Mathur Rs.300000/-. The accounts ofabove amounts are not cleared and they have not returnedthe amounts.

2. Karni Bhavarsha serving in RTO, Mandar Border, andRajkuar G. serving in RTO had launched company and amountis given in their RP Powertech company and total amountcomes to Rs.3723200/-.

3. Vijaysinh Bhati who has committed most cheating and fraudwith me. I am in credit of Rs.14700000 (Rupees one croreforty seven lakhs only). From this person. I am also in creditof Rs.1,50,000/- from Chandravirsinh Bhati and in credit ofRs.10,00,000 from Padam Bhati. They have taken my CRETA

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Acar bearing RT No.6797 and they are not giving my car back.It is requested to do needful.”

6. The FIR records :-

“There is signature in English. The name Patel ShaileshkumarChimanlal is written in gujarati under the signature. TheBnames of Padam Bhati, Chandravirsinh Bhati, Dolly Mathur,Niru Mathur, Malvika Mathur, Niharika Mathur, Sunil Mathur,Pramod Dadhichi, Anil Mathur, PK Powertech, KamalpalMineral Pvt. Ltd., Leena Computerized Ledger Statements areaffixed with staple pin. These words are written in theChandwriting of Shaileshkumar. I know the handwriting. I hadgiven this chit to Apurvabhai in the office. He had read overthe said chit. He told me that this is suicide note ofShaileshkumar.

The name Pramod Dhidhasi is written in the suicide note butDthe real name is Pramod Dadhichi. That money was given toall persons through Bank except Vijaysinh. Kamalpal MineralsPvt. Limited of Vijaysinh was given Rs.18,52,000/.”

7. In the FIR, it was alleged that the deceased had been makingphone calls to the accused persons calling upon them to return his money,Ebut they did not do so. The accused had cheated the deceased ofRs.2,35,73,200/-. The deceased was in acute financial crunch and,therefore, constrained to take his own life.

8. Section 306 of the IPC reads:

“306. Abetment of suicide. -If any person commits suicide,Fwhoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall bepunished with imprisonment of either description for a termwhich may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable tofine.”

9. As argued by Ms. Shenoy, learned Senior Counsel appearingGon behalf of the Respondents, what is required to constitute allegedabetment of suicide under Section 306 of the IPC is that there must bean allegation of either direct or indirect act of incitement to the commissionof the offence of suicide.

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10. Ms. Shenoy cited M. Arjunan v. State, Represented by itsInspector of Police[1], where this Court held:- “7. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section306 IPC are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accusedto aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide.The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased byusing abusive language will not, by itself, constitute theabetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable ofsuggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigatethe deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients ofinstigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied theaccused cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC.”

11. Ms. Shenoy also cited Ude Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana[2],where this Court held:

16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be aproof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commissionof suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question ofcause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offenceof abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involvingmultifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour andresponses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetmentof suicide, the Court would be looking for cogent andconvincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commissionof suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassmentof the deceased by another person would not suffice unlessthere be such action on the part of the accused which compelsthe person to commit suicide; and such an offending actionought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether aperson has abetted in the commission of suicide by anotheror not, could only be gathered from the facts andcircumstances of each case.

16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abettedcommission of suicide by another, the consideration wouldbe if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the actof suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in thedecisions above-referred, instigation means to goad, urge1 (2019) 3 SCC 3152 (2019) 17 SCC 301

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Aforward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If thepersons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive andthe action of accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected toinduce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, itmay not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment ofsuicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts andBby his continuous course of conduct creates a situation whichleads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commitsuicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing theself-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventuallyCdraws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be heldguilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on thepart of the accused in such cases would be examined withreference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and ifthe acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accusedintended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger,Da particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment ofsuicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoyingthe deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted orwas provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment ofsuicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of humanEbehaviour, each case is required to be examined on its ownfacts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors havingbearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and thedeceased.”

12. Ms. Shenoy referred to Ramesh Kumar v. State ofFChhatisgarh[3], where this Court defined ‘instigate’ as under:- “Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite orencourage to do an act.”

13. In S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Another.[4],cited on behalf of the Respondent, this Court observed:-G

“25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a personor intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positiveact on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of thelegislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clearthat in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there hasto be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires anactive act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicideseeing no option and that act must have been intended to push thedeceased into such a position that he committed suicide.”

14. The proposition of law enunciated and/or re-enunciated in thejudgments cited above are well settled. Whether the acts alleged wouldconstitute an offence, would depend upon the facts and circumstancesof the case. Each case has to be judged on its own merits.

15. In this case, however, it appears that the High Court did noteven address to itself, the question of whether the allegations in the FIRconstituted an offence under Section 306 IPC or not. The FIR wasquashed in view of a settlement between the accused named in the FIRand the complainant.

16. It is not necessary for this Court to go into the question ofwhether there was any direct or indirect act of incitement to the offenceof abetment of suicide, since the High Court has not gone into thatquestion. Suffice it to mention that even an indirect act of incitement tothe commission of suicide would constitute the offence of abetment ofsuicide under Section 306 of the IPC.

17. In Court, it was submitted that the parties had amicably resolvedtheir disputes. In support of such submission, affidavits of Settlement ofDisputes, signed by the complainant and other family members of thedeceased were placed on record.

18. The High Court held:

“9. Since now, the dispute with reference to the impugnedFIR is settled and resolved by and between parties which isconfirmed by the original complainant through their learnedadvocate, the trial would be futile and any further continuationof proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law.Therefore, the impugned FIR is required to be quashed andset aside.

10. Resultantly, the applications are allowed. The impugnedFIR being No. C.R.No. I-11209016200112 of 2020 registered A

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with Himmatnagar ‘A’ Division Police Station, DistrictSabarkantha and all other consequential proceedings arisingout of said FIR are hereby quashed and set aside qua theapplicants.”

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19. By the common order dated 29[th] July 2021, also impugned inBthese appeals, the prayer of the Appellant for recalling the order dated20[th] October 2020 was declined. The High Court held:- “22. …However, as discussed herein above, this Court haspassed an order dated 20.10.2020 after considering thesettlement arrived at between the original first informant, whois cousin brother of the deceased and was working as anAccountant of the firm of the deceased. Further, investigatingagency has verified about the genuineness of the settlementarrived at between the parties. It is not in dispute that thepresent applicant is a third party – as stated in ParagraphNo.1 of the application and, hence, so far as the FIR inquestion is concerned, she is merely a witness in the FIR.Therefore, when this Court has passed an order after givingan opportunity of hearing, the original first informant –cousin brother of the deceased, the order dated 20.10.2020passed by this Court is not required to be recalled whileexercising power under Section 482 of the Code.

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23. At this stage, it is once again required to be noted that theapplicant has stated in the memo of application at Page No.9that the respondent No.3 – original first informant haspocketed hefty amount from an individual original accusedand is totally out of picture post allowing of the quashingpetition and is not in contact with the present applicant. Thus,it appears that after settling the dispute by the respondentNo.3 – original first informant with the original accused, hehas not given/paid the said amount to the applicant, however,for the reasons, it is always open for the applicant to fileappropriate proceeding against the respondent No.3 –original first informant. Therefore, the present application,which is filed for recalling the order, is not maintainable, andin the facts of the present case, this Court is not inclined toexercise the powers under Section 482 of the Code forrecalling of the order dated 20.10.2020.

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24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, all these applicationsare dismissed.”

20. In the aforesaid judgment, the High Court referred to an orderdated 6[th] December 2019 passed by a three Judge Bench of this Courtin Crl. Appeal No.1852 of 2019 (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.Krishna Kumar Pandey[5]) where this Court held that in a revision arisingout of conviction, the High Court could not have sealed the right of theemployer to take disciplinary action against the accused for misconductin accordance with the Service Rules.

21. In Krishna Kumar Pandey (supra) this Court referred withapproval, to the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. DavinderPal Singh Bhullar and Ors.[6] where this Court held that the High Courtwas not denuded of inherent power to recall a judgment and/or orderwhich was without jurisdiction, or in violation of principles of naturaljustice, or passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to a partyaffected by the order or where an order was obtained by abusing theprocess of Court which would really amount to its being withoutjurisdiction. Inherent powers can be exercised to recall such orders.

22. The High Court rightly found, in effect, that it had the inherentpower to recall a judgment and/or order which was without jurisdictionor a judgment and/or order passed without hearing a person prejudiciallyaffected by the judgment and/or order. The High Court, however, fell inerror in not recalling the order dated 20[th] October 2020. The High Courtdid not address to itself, the question of whether it had jurisdiction toquash a criminal complaint under Section 306 of the IPC, which is agrave non-compoundable offence, entailing imprisonment of ten years,on the basis of a settlement between the parties.

23. The High Court erred in declining the prayer of the Appellantfor recalling its order dated 20[th] October 2020, passed without hearingthe wife of the deceased only because the original informant/complainant,a cousin brother and an employee of the deceased had been heard.Hearing a cousin-cum-employee of the deceased cannot and does notdispense with the requirement to give the wife of the deceased a hearing.The wife of the deceased would have greater interest than cousins and 5 2019 SCC Online 1786

6 (2011) 14 SCC 770

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Aemployees in prosecuting accused persons charged with the offence ofabetting the suicide of her husband.

24. Be that as it may, since the initial order dated 20[th] October2020 is also under challenge in these appeals, it is really not necessaryfor this Court to delve deeper into the question of whether a final orderBpassed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. quashing an FIR could have, atall, been recalled by the High Court, in the absence of any specificprovision in the Cr.P.C. for recall and/or review of such order. The HighCourt has, in effect, held that in exceptional circumstances, such orderscan be recalled, in exercise of the inherent power of the High Court, toprevent injustice.C

25. The only question in this appeal is whether the CriminalMiscellaneous Applications filed by the accused under Section 482 ofthe Cr.P.C. could have been allowed and an FIR under Section 306 ofthe IPC for abetment to commit suicide, entailing punishment ofimprisonment of ten years, could have been quashed on the basis of aDsettlement between the complainant and the accused named in the FIR.The answer to the aforesaid question cannot, but be in the negative.

26. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C provides :—

“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing inEthis Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powersof the High Court to make such orders as may be necessaryto give effect to any order under this Code, or to preventabuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure theends of justice.”

F27. Even though, the inherent power of the High Court underSection 482 of the Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings is wide,such power has to be exercised with circumspection, in exceptional cases.Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is not to be exercised forthe asking.

28. In Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P.[7], this Court held thatGinherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C has to be exercisedsparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise isjustified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.

H7 (2008) 8 SCC 781

29. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process of theCourt, the High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers underSection 482 quash criminal proceedings. However, interference wouldonly be justified when the complaint did not disclose any offence, or waspatently frivolous, vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court in Mrs.Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar[8].

30. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagiand Others.[9], a three-Judge Bench of this Court held:

“6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code isthe ad verbatim copy of Section 561-A of the old Code. Thisprovision confers a separate and independent power on theHigh Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in caseswhere grave and substantial injustice has been done or wherethe process of the court has been seriously abused. It is notmerely a revisional power meant to be exercised against theorders passed by subordinate courts. It was under this sectionthat in the old Code, the High Courts used to quash theproceedings or expunge uncalled for remarks againstwitnesses or other persons or subordinate courts. Thus, thescope, ambit and range of Section 561-A (which is now Section482) is quite different from the powers conferred by the presentCode under the provisions of Section 397. It may be that insome cases there may be overlapping but such cases wouldbe few and far between. It is well settled that the inherentpowers under Section 482 of the present Code can beexercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigantand not where a specific remedy is provided by the statute.Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to beexercised sparingly. If these considerations are kept in mind,there will be no inconsistency between Sections 482 and397(2) of the present Code.

7. The limits of the power under Section 482 were clearlydefined by this Court in Raj Kapoor v. State [(1980) 1 SCC43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72] where Krishna Iyer, J. observed asfollows : [SCC para 10, p. 47 : SCC (Cri) p. 76]

8 AIR 1990 SC 494 : 1990 Supp SCC 686

9 (1983) 1 SCC 1

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“Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of lawwhen a specific provision is made : easy resort to inherentpower is not right except under compelling circumstances.Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherentpower should not invade areas set apart for specific powerunder the same Code.”

8. Another important consideration which is to be kept inmind is as to when the High Court acting under the provisionsof Section 482 should exercise the inherent power insofar asquashing of criminal proceedings are concerned. This matterwas gone into in greater detail in Smt. Nagawwa v. VeerannaShivalingappa Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri)507 : 1976 Supp SCR 123 : 1976 Cri LJ 1533] where thescope of Sections 202 and 204 of the present Code wasconsidered and while laying down the guidelines and thegrounds on which proceedings could be quashed this Courtobserved as follows : [SCC para 5, p. 741 : SCC (Cri) pp.511-12]

“Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases anorder of the Magistrate issuing process against the accusedcan be quashed or set aside:

(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or thestatements of the witnesses recorded in support of the sametaken at their face value make out absolutely no caseagainst the accused or the complaint does not disclose theessential ingredients of an offence which is alleged againstthe accused;

(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patentlyabsurd and inherently improbable so that no prudentperson can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficientground for proceeding against the accused;

(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate inissuing process is capricious and arbitrary having beenbased either on no evidence or on materials which arewholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legaldefects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of acomplaint by legally competent authority and the like.

The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative andprovide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencieswhere the High Court can quash proceedings.”

9. Same view was taken in a later decision of this Courtin Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar [(1977) 1 SCC505 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 132 : (1977) 2 SCR 357 : 1977 Cri LJ1146] where Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observedas follows : [SCC para 2, p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133]

“It is now settled law that where the allegations set out inthe complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute anyoffence, it is competent to the High Court exercising itsinherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure to quash the order passed by theMagistrate taking cognizance of the offence.

10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings againstan accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on theface of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same,no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that takingthe allegations and the complaint as they are, without addingor subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then theHigh Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings inexercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”

31. As held by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v.Gourieshetty Mahesh[10], the High Court, while exercising jurisdictionunder Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, would not ordinarily embark upon anenquiry into whether the evidence is reliable or not or whether there isreasonable possibility that the accusation would not be sustained.

32. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand[11], this Courtheld:—

“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 ofthe Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to 10 (2010) 11 SCC 22611 (2013) 11 SCC 673

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Abe used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventingabuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure endsof justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offenceor not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein.Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are presentor not has to be judged by the High Court. …”

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33. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. SambhajiraoChandrojirao Angre[12], a three-Judge Bench of this Court summarizedthe law with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings under Section482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court held:—

C“7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecutionat the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be appliedby the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegationsas made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for thecourt to take into consideration any special features whichappear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedientDand in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution tocontinue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot beutilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion ofthe court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowingEa criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while takinginto consideration the special facts of a case also quash theproceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”

34. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal[13], thisCourt observed:—F

“46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is notused as an instrument of harassment or for seeking privatevendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused.On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinionthat it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down anGinflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherentjurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts underSection 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly,carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in theaforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position,the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.”

35. It is a well settled proposition of law that criminal prosecution,if otherwise justified, is not vitiated on account of malafides or vendetta.As said by Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh[14] “if theuse of the power for the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuationor catalysation by malice is not legicidal.”

36. In Kapil Agarwal & Ors. v. Sanjay Sharma & Others[15],this Court observed that Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is designed to achievethe purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted todegenerate into weapons of harassment.

37. Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of abetment to commitsuicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course, the inherentpower of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is wide andcan even be exercised to quash criminal proceedings relating to non-compoundable offences, to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuseof the process of Court. Where the victim and offender havecompromised disputes essentially civil and personal in nature, the HighCourt can exercise its power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quashthe criminal proceedings. In what cases power to quash an FIR or acriminal complaint or criminal proceedings upon compromise can beexercised, would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.

38. However, before exercising its power under Section 482 ofthe Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or criminalproceedings, the High Court, as observed above, has to be circumspectand have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinousor serious crimes, which are not private in nature and have a seriousimpact on society cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromisebetween the offender and the complainant and/or the victim. Crimeslike murder, rape, burglary, dacoity and even abetment to commit suicideare neither private nor civil in nature. Such crimes are against the society.In no circumstances can prosecution be quashed on compromise, whenthe offence is serious and grave and falls within the ambit of crimeagainst society.

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A39. Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to grave andserious offences only on basis of an agreement with the complainant,would set a dangerous precedent, where complaints would be lodgedfor oblique reasons, with a view to extract money from the accused.Furthermore, financially strong offenders would go scot free, even incases of grave and serious offences such as murder, rape, bride- burning,Betc. by buying off informants/complainants and settling with them. Thiswould render otiose provisions such as Sections 306, 498-A, 304-B etc.incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with a specific social purpose.

40. In Criminal Jurisprudence, the position of the complainant isonly that of the informant. Once an FIR and/or criminal complaint isClodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it becomes a matterbetween the State and the accused. The State has a duty to ensure thatlaw and order is maintained in society. It is for the state to prosecuteoffenders. In case of grave and serious non-compoundable offenceswhich impact society, the informant and/or complainant only has theDright of hearing, to the extent of ensuring that justice is done by convictionand punishment of the offender. An informant has no right in law towithdraw the complaint of a non-compoundable offence of a grave,serious and/or heinous nature, which impacts society.

41. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab[16], this Court discussed theEcircumstances in which the High Court quashes criminal proceedings incase of a non-compoundable offence, when there is a settlement betweenthe parties and enunciated the following principles:-

58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceedinghaving regard to the fact that the dispute between the offenderFand the victim has been settled although the offences are notcompoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation ofcriminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justicein the case demands that the dispute between the parties isput to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends ofjustice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimesGare acts which have harmful effect on the public and consistin wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doeronly because he and the victim have settled the disputeamicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet H16 (2012) 10 SCC 303

certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with orwithout the permission of the court. In respect of seriousoffences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences ofmental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitudeunder special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Actor the offences committed by public servants while workingin that capacity, the settlement between the offender and thevictim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certainoffences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civilflavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial,financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offencesarising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc.or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victimand the offender and the victim have settled all disputesbetween them amicably, irrespective of the fact that suchoffences have not been made compoundable, the High Courtmay within the framework of its inherent power, quash thecriminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it issatisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardlyany likelihood of the offender being convicted and by notquashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualtyand ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list isillustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on itsown facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed”.

42. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab[17], this Court held thatin case of heinous and serious offences, which are generally to be treatedas crime against society, it is the duty of the State to punish the offender.Hence, even when there is a settlement, the view of the offender andvictim will not prevail since it is in the interest of society that the offendershould be punished to deter others from committing a similar crime.

43. In State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi[18], thisCourt held:- “26. ... availing of money from a nationalised bank in themanner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly expositsfiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modusoperandi as narrated in the charge-sheet cannot be put in 17 (2014) 9 SCC 466

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the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is asocial wrong and it has immense societal impact. It is anaccepted principle of handling of finance that whenever thereis manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to availof these kinds of benefits it cannot be regarded as a casehaving overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil character.The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a hazard in thefinancial interest of the society. The gravity of the offencecreates a dent in the economic spine of the nation. ...”

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44. In CBI v. Maninder Singh[19], this Court held:- C“17. … In economic offences the Court must not only keep inview that money has been paid to the bank which has beendefrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case ofsimple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offencewith which we are concerned was well planned and wascommitted with a deliberate design with an eye on personalDprofit regardless of consequence to the society at large. Toquash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accusedhas settled the amount with the bank would be a misplacedsympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offendersare not allowed to continue, the entire community isEaggrieved.”

45. In State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Vasanthi Stanley[20], this Court held:- “14. … Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither tobe considered nor accepted in economic offences. TheFsubmission assiduously presented on gender leaves usunimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offenceand it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. Trueit is, there are certain provisions in CrPC relating to exerciseof jurisdiction under Section 437, etc. therein but thatGaltogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committinga murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgeryof documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on theground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral inthis case. We say no more on this score.

15. … A grave criminal offence or serious economic offenceor for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to createa dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to bequashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or theprinciple that when the matter has been settled it should bequashed to avoid the load on the system. …”

46. In Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbathbhai BhimsinhbhaiKarmur and Others v. State of Gujrat and Another[21], a three-JudgeBench of this Court quoted Narinder Singh (supra), Vikram AnantraiDoshi (supra), CBI v. Maninder Singh (supra), R. Vasanthi Stanley(supra) and held:- “16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedentson the subject, may be summarised in the followingpropositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the HighCourt to prevent an abuse of the process of any court orto secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confernew powers. It only recognises and preserves powers whichinhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Courtto quash a first information report or a criminal proceedingon the ground that a settlement has been arrived at betweenthe offender and the victim is not the same as the invocationof jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.While compounding an offence, the power of the court isgoverned by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash underSection 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceedingor complaint should be quashed in exercise of itsjurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must A

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evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify theexercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has awide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to securethe ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the processof any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or firstinformation report should be quashed on the ground thatthe offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolvesultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case andno exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 andwhile dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled,the High Court must have due regard to the nature andgravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offencesinvolving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rapeand dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though thevictim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute.Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in naturebut have a serious impact upon society. The decision tocontinue with the trial in such cases is founded on theoverriding element of public interest in punishing personsfor serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may becriminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominantelement of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footinginsofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash isconcerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise fromcommercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similartransactions with an essentially civil flavour may inappropriate situations fall for quashing where parties havesettled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminalproceeding if in view of the compromise between thedisputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would causeoppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out inpropositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offencesinvolving the financial and economic well-being of the Statehave implications which lie beyond the domain of a meredispute between private disputants. The High Court wouldbe justified in declining to quash where the offender isinvolved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraudor misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complainedof upon the financial or economic system will weigh in thebalance.”

47. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan & Ors.[22], athree-Judge Bench discussed the earlier judgments of this Court andlaid down the following principles:- “15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisionsof this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it isobserved and held as under:

15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Codeto quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundableoffences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercisedhaving overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character,particularly those arising out of commercial transactions orarising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes andwhen the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongstthemselves; 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutionswhich involved heinous and serious offences of mentaldepravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Suchoffences are not private in nature and have a serious impacton society; 15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for theoffences under the special statutes like the Prevention ofCorruption Act or the offences committed by public servantswhile working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely AB

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on the basis of compromise between the victim and theoffender; 15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc.would fall in the category of heinous and serious offencesand therefore are to be treated as crime against the societyand not against the individual alone, and therefore, thecriminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPCand/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on thesociety cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolvedtheir entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the HighCourt would not rest its decision merely because there is amention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framedunder this provision. It would be open to the High Court toexamine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC isthere for the sake of it or the prosecution has collectedsufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framingthe charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it wouldbe open to the High Court to go by the nature of injurysustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicateparts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, suchan exercise by the High Court would be permissible only afterthe evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Suchexercise is not permissible when the matter is still underinvestigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh[(2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be readharmoniously and to be read as a whole and in thecircumstances stated hereinabove; 15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of theCode to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and donot have a serious impact on society, on the ground that thereis a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender,the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of theaccused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether theaccused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into acompromise, etc.”

48. In Arun Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh Throughits Secretary and Another[23], this Court held:-

“14. In another decision in Narinder Singh v. State ofPunjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] it hasbeen observed that in respect of offence against the society itis the duty to punish the offender. Hence, even where there isa settlement between the offender and victim the same shallnot prevail since it is in interests of the society that offendershould be punished which acts as deterrent for others fromcommitting similar crime. On the other hand, there may beoffences falling in the category where the correctionalobjective of criminal law would have to be given moreweightage than the theory of deterrent punishment. In suchcases, the court may be of the opinion that a settlement betweenthe parties would lead to better relations between them andwould resolve a festering private dispute and thus may exercisepower under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the proceedingsor the complaint or the FIR as the case may be.

15. Bearing in mind the above principles which have beenlaid down, we are of the view that offences for which theappellants have been charged are in fact offences againstsociety and not private in nature. Such offences have seriousimpact upon society and continuance of trial of such cases isfounded on the overriding effect of public interests inpunishing persons for such serious offences. It is neither anoffence arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile,partnership or such similar transactions or has any elementof civil dispute thus it stands on a distinct footing. In suchcases, settlement even if arrived at between the complainantand the accused, the same cannot constitute a valid groundto quash the FIR or the charge-sheet.

16. Thus the High Court cannot be said to be unjustified inrefusing to quash the charge-sheet on the ground ofcompromise between the parties.”

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A49. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., theCourt does not examine the correctness of the allegation in the complaintexcept in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that theallegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence.

50. In our considered opinion, the Criminal Proceeding cannot beBnipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because there is a settlement, in this case a monetary settlement,between the accused and the complainant and other relatives of thedeceased to the exclusion of the hapless widow of the deceased. Asheld by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Laxmi Narayan & Ors.(supra), Section 307 of the IPC falls in the category of heinous andCserious offences and are to be treated as crime against society and notagainst the individual alone. On a parity of reasoning, offence undersection 306 of the IPC would fall in the same category. An FIR underSection 306 of the IPC cannot even be quashed on the basis of anyfinancial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children,Dguardians, care-givers or anyone else. It is clarified that it was notnecessary for this Court to examine the question whether the FIR in thiscase discloses any offence under Section 306 of the IPC, since the HighCourt, in exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC, quashed theproceedings on the sole ground that the disputes between the accusedand the informant had been compromised.E

51. The appeals are allowed. The impugned orders of the HighCourt are set aside. The observations made in this judgment are not tobe construed as any observation on the merits of the contentions of therespective parties.

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Appeals allowed.

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