CHARAN SINGH @ CHARANJIT SINGH versus THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND on 20 April 2023

1. The appellant, who was husband of the deceased, has filed theDpresent appeal challenging his conviction and sentence under sections304B, 498A and 201 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). TheTrial Court had sentenced the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonmentfor 10 years under Section 304B, 2 years under Section 498A and 2years under Section 201 IPC. However, the High Court of Uttarakhandat Nainital had reduced the sentence of the appellant under Section 304BEIPC from ten years to seven years.

2. The appellant and deceased Chhilo Kaur got married in theyear 1993. The deceased was residing in her matrimonial home. On24.6.1995 at 6.15 p.m. father of the deceased, Pratap Singh (PW-1)filed complaint with the P.S. Jaspur stating that his daughter Chhilo KaurFwas married to the appellant about two years ago. In the marriage, hehad given sufficient dowry as per his status. Two months after themarriage, his daughter came to her parental home and told the complainant(PW-1) that her in-laws are asking her to bring a motorcycle as thesame was not given in dowry. The complainant pacified his daughterGstating that at present he is not capable of giving motorcycle, however,whenever he is in a position to do so, he will certainly give and sent hisdaughter back to her matrimonial home. Thereafter, whenever hisdaughter came to the parental home, she used to talk about the demandof motorcycle and subsequently after about one year of marriage, thedemand for land was also made. Every time he used to pacify his daughterH

and sent her back. On the previous day i.e. on 23.6.1995, one JagirSingh of village Bhogpur Dam, where his daughter lived after marriagewith the appellant came to complainant and told him that his daughter,Chhilo Kaur has been murdered by her in-laws. On getting the information,the complainant along with his wife came to village Bhogpur Dam on24.6.1995 and were shocked to know that on 22.6.1995 in the morningat about 8.00 a.m., his daughter was beaten up and strangulated to deathby her husband Charan Singh, (the appellant herein), brother-in-law,Gurmeet Singh (accused no.2) and mother-in-law Santo Kaur (accusedno.3). They had cremated the dead body without even informing thecomplainant. She was killed on account of non-fulfilment of demand ofmotorbike and land in dowry. The matter was investigated and chargesheetwas filed against Charan Singh, Gurmeet Singh and Santo Kaur.

3. The prosecution examined six witnesses and defence examinedone witness. The Trial Court, after evaluating the evidence, convictedCharan Singh (appellant), Gurmeet Singh and Santo Kaur under Sections304B, 498A and 201 IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorousimprisonment for ten years u/s 304B IPC, rigorous imprisonment fortwo years u/s 498A IPC and rigorous imprisonment for two years u/s201 IPC. In appeal filed by the convicts before the High Court, theconviction and sentence of Gurmeet Singh (brother-in-law) and SantoKaur (mother-in-law) under Section 304B, 498A and 201 IPC were setaside and they were acquitted of the charges, whereas the conviction ofthe appellant was upheld. However, the sentence of rigorous imprisonmentof ten years under Section 304B IPC, awarded to the appellant wasreduced to seven years. It is the aforesaid judgment of the High Courtwhich is under challenge in the present appeal.

4. Mr. Shubhranshu Padhi, learned counsel who was requested toassist the Court as an amicus curiae on account of absence of the counselwho filed the appeal, submitted that the conviction and sentence of theappellant cannot be legally sustained either under Sections 304B or 498AIPC. The pre-requisites for raising presumption under Section 304B IPCis that soon before the death, the deceased had been subjected to crueltyor harassment for or in connection with any demand of dowry. Thepresumption in regard to dowry death can be raised in terms of Section113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, ‘IEA’) only if it isshown that soon before death, such woman had been subjected to crueltyor harassment for, or in connection with the demand of dowry.

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A5. If the evidence led by the prosecution is examined, no case forconviction under Section 304B or 498A IPC can possibly be made outas none of the witnesses have stated that there was any harassment orcruelty to the deceased or demand of dowry immediately before herdeath. The marriage took place in the year 1993, the deceased died on22.6.1995. None of the family members of the deceased including herBfather, maternal grandmother or the maternal uncle have stated anythingabout the harassment of the deceased immediately before her death inconnection with demand of dowry. In fact, the maternal grandmotherand two maternal uncles who were living at distance of about one farlangfrom the village of the deceased were even present at the time of herCcremation. They did not raise any issue either by lodging a complaint tothe police or otherwise. In fact, it was admitted by the maternalgrandmother and the uncles of the deceased that after the cremation,with the intervention of the panchayat, they had collected all the dowryarticles. It was further submitted that intimation was also given to theDfather of the deceased who in fact was living at a distance of about 290kms. However, the cremation could not be delayed on account of waitingfor the arrival of the father of the deceased.

6. It was further argued that one material witness, Jagir Singh,who was named by the complainant in the FIR, has not been producedEby the prosecution in evidence. He is the person who according to thecomplainant is a resident of village Bhogpur Dam, where the deceasedused to live in her matrimonial home. He had informed the complainantabout the death of his daughter. Why this material witness was withheldby the prosecution? As per the statement of the I.O. Babban Singh, whoappeared as PW-6, during investigation the statement of Jagir SinghFwas recorded. Once the ingredients of Sections 304B, 498A IPC andSection 113B of IEA are not made out, no presumption of dowry deathcan be raised. In support of the arguments, reliance was placed onBaijnath v. State of M.P[1]. It was further argued that the allegationsagainst the appellant, his brother and mother were same. However,Gagainst acquittal of his brother and mother, no appeal has been preferredby the State and death of the wife of the appellant was not unnatural asshe was suffering from fits. In her cross-examination, the maternalgrandmother admitted that the deceased had fits.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submitted thatit is a case in which a young woman was killed by her in-laws in lust fordowry. The marriage was merely two years old and the death wasunnatural. The deceased was cremated without even informing herparents. The maternal grandmother and the two uncles who were presentat the time of cremation had seen injury marks on the body of the deceasedand also the broken tooth. They could not lodge the complaint as theywere threatened. The death occurred in the matrimonial home, henceonus lies heavily on the appellant to dislodge the presumption. There issufficient material on record in the form of statements of witnessesproduced by the prosecution that there was repeated demand for dowryby the appellant. There is no error in the judgment of the High Court.Sufficient indulgence has already been shown by the High Court byreducing the sentence of the appellant from ten years to minimum sevenyears as provided under Section 304B of the IPC.

8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevantrecord.

9. The marriage of the appellant with the deceased was solemnisedin the year 1993. She died on 22.6.1995. FIR was registered on thecomplaint of the father of the deceased on 24.6.1995 against CharanSingh, the appellant herein, brother-in-law, Gurmeet Singh and mother-in-law Santo Kaur. However, in appeal filed by the convicts before theHigh Court, brother-in-law, Gurmeet Singh and mother-in-law, Santo Kaurwere acquitted whereas the conviction of the appellant was upheld. Thesentence awarded to the appellant under Section 304B IPC was reducedfrom ten years rigorous imprisonment to seven years rigorousimprisonment. The sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment eachawarded under Section 498A and Section 201 IPC was affirmed.

10. The conviction of the appellant is under Sections 304B and498A IPC raising presumption regarding dowry death within seven yearsof marriage. To appreciate the arguments raised by the learned counselfor the parties, a perusal of Section 304B and 498A IPC and Section113B of the Indian Evidence Act would be required. The same areextracted hereinbelow:- “304B. Dowry death .— (1) Where the death of a woman iscaused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise thanunder normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage A

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and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected tocruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of herhusband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, suchdeath shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relativeshall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shallhave the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry ProhibitionAct, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished withimprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven yearsbut which may extend to imprisonment for life.

498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a womansubjecting her to cruelty — Whoever, being the husband orthe relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman tocruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which mayextend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means —

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely todrive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury ordanger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) ofthe woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is witha view to coercing her or any person related to her to meetany unlawful demand for any property or valuable security oris on account of failure by her or any person related to her tomeet such demand.

113B. Presumption as to dowry death.— When the questionis whether a person has committed the dowry death of a womanand it is shown that soon before her death such woman had beensubjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or inconnection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presumethat such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “dowry death”shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of Indian PenalCode (45 of 1860)”.

CHARAN SINGH @ CHARANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OFUTTARAKHAND [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

11. The interpretation of Sections 304B and 498A IPC came upfor consideration in Baijnath’s case (supra). The opinion was summedup in paras 25 to 27 thereof, which are extracted below:- “25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by Section304-B of the Code, the ingredients thereof are:

(i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodilyinjury or by any cause other than in normalcircumstances, and

(ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and

(iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to crueltyor harassment by her husband or any relative of thehusband for, or in connection with, any demand fordowry.

The offence under Section 498-A of the Code is attracted quathe husband or his relative if she is subjected to cruelty. TheExplanation to this Section exposits “cruelty” as:

(i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likelyto drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause graveinjury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mentalor physical), or

(ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment iswith a view to coercing her or any person related to herto meet any unlawful demand for any property orvaluable security or is on account of failure by her orany person related to her to meet such demand.

26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husbandor his relative for or in connection with any demand for anyproperty or valuable security as a demand for dowry or inconnection therewith is the common constituent of both theoffences.

27. The expression “dowry” is ordained to have the same meaningas in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression“cruelty”, as explained, contains in its expanse, apart from theconduct of the tormentor, the consequences precipitated therebyqua the lady subjected thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or A

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harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in connectionwith any demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the gravamen of thetwo offences.

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12. As the aforesaid case was also pertaining to dowry death,presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act was alsoBdiscussed in detail in paras 29 to 31 of the aforesaid judgment. The sameare extracted below:- “29. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proofof cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connectionwith any demand for dowry by the person charged with theCoffence. The presumption as to dowry death thus would getactivated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased ladyhad been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connectionwith any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in thereasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislativelymandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordainedDpresumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by theperson charged therewith.

30. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicatethe burden of the prosecution to unassailably substantiate theingredients of the two offences by direct and convincing evidenceEso as to avail the presumption engrafted in Section 113-B of theAct against the accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by thehusband or his relative or the person charged is thus the sine quanon to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person chargedwithin the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate byFcogent, coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, theperson accused of either of the above referred offences cannotbe held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to coverup the shortfall in proof.

31. The legislative primature of relieving the prosecution of therigour of the proof of the often practically inaccessible recessesof life within the guarded confines of a matrimonial home and ofreplenishing the consequential void, by according a presumptionagainst the person charged, cannot be overeased to gloss overand condone its failure to prove credibly, the basic facts enumeratedin the sections involved, lest justice is the casualty”.

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13. A conjoint reading of Section 304B IPC and Section 113B ofthe Indian Evidence Act with reference to the presumption raised wasdiscussed in para 32 of the aforesaid judgment, which is extracted below:-

“32. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport ofSection 304-B of the Code and Section 113-B of the Act havepropounded that the presumption is contingent on the fact that theprosecution first spell out the ingredients of the offence of Section304-B as in Shindo v. State of Punjab [Shindo v. State ofPunjab, (2011) 11 SCC 517 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 394] and echoedin Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rajeev Kumar v. Stateof Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 640 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 346] . Inthe latter pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of theessential ingredients of dowry death under Section 304-B of theCode is that the accused must have subjected the woman to crueltyin connection with demand for dowry soon before her death andthat this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyondreasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that theaccused has committed the offence of dowry death under Section113-B of the Act. It referred to with approval, the earlier decisionof this Court in K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao [K.Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, (2003) 1 SCC 217 : 2003SCC (Cri) 271] to the effect that to attract the provision of Section304-B of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offencewhich is required to be established is that “soon before her death”she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection withthe demand for dowry”.

14. With reference to the legal position as referred to above, thematter is now required to be examined as to whether the case in handfalls in the category where the presumption can be raised against theappellant relieving the prosecution from proving its case and putting theonus on the accused/appellant.

15. The date of death of the deceased is 22.6.1995. She wascremated on the same day. The stand taken by the appellant was thatthe parents of the deceased were informed who were living about 290kms. away. However, they could not reach on time. It was furthersubmitted that the maternal grandmother and two maternal uncles whowere living at a distance of about one furlong from the matrimonialresidence of the deceased when she died were present at the time of A

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Acremation. They neither raised any issue nor did they inform the police.Rather on the intervention of the panchayat, they had taken all the dowryarticles.

16. The cruelty or harassment has to be soon before the death. Inhis evidence, Pratap Singh (PW-1), father of the deceased stated thatBtwo months after the marriage his daughter came to the parental homestating that the appellant was demanding motorcycle, however, she wassent back. Thereafter, she again came and apprised him that the demandof motorcycle was being pressed by the appellant. Besides motorcycle,land was also demanded. There is nothing in the statement that any suchdemand was raised immediately before the death as the incidents soughtCto be referred to are quite old. He admitted in his cross examination thatat the time of funeral, his mother-in-law and two brothers-in-law werepresent. However, they were threatened not to lodge the complaint.Balbir Singh (PW-2), maternal uncle of the deceased, merely stated thatat the time of marriage sufficient dowry was given by the father of theDdeceased. However, later he heard that the appellant had demanded themotorcycle. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he was living atthe distance of about one furlong from the house of the appellant. Nodowry was demanded at the time of marriage of the deceased. He didnot state that the deceased ever shared with him about the demand ofdowry or any harassment on account of non-fulfilment thereof thoughEhe was living close to the matrimonial house of the deceased.

17. Beero Bai (PW-3), the maternal grandmother of the deceased,stated that her house is located at a distance of about one mile from thehouse of the appellant. She used to go to the house of the deceased. Thedeceased was being treated badly. She was not allowed to go to herFparental house. The deceased informed her that the appellant used toask her to bring motorcycle from her maternal grandmother. After thedeath of her husband in February 1995, the appellant asked the deceasedto get land from her maternal grandmother. On a demand made to her,she replied in negative. However, in her cross-examination, she statedGthat the land was not demanded from her. Even in her statement, thereis nothing to suggest that soon before the death, any cruelty or harassmentwas made to the deceased, either by the appellant or his family members.All what is stated is regarding the demand. There are no details of anycruelty or harassment, though this witness was living about a kilometrefrom the house of the deceased and is her maternal grandmother.H

18. Joginder Singh (PW-4) is another witness produced by theprosecution, who is maternal uncle of the deceased. He was declaredhostile.

19. Rajindra Singh (PW-5), Sub Inspector was a formal witnesswho had only registered the FIR and arrested the accused.

20. Babban Singh (PW-6), Circle Officer, Faridpur was theInvestigating Officer. In his examination-in-chief, he admitted that herecorded the statement of Jagir Singh. He is the person who, as per thecomplaint made to the police, had informed the father of the deceasedabout the death of his daughter. However, he was not produced inevidence.

21. In the aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution, none of thewitnesses stated about the cruelty or harassment to the deceased by theappellant or any of his family members on account of demand of dowrysoon before the death or otherwise. Rather harassment has not beennarrated by anyone. It is only certain oral averments regarding demandof motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. Theaforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the pre-requisitesto invoke presumption under Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of theIndian Evidence Act. Even the ingredients of Section 498A IPC are notmade out for the same reason as there is no evidence of cruelty andharassment to the deceased soon before her death.

22. Defence had produced Gurmej Singh as DW-1, who was headof the village at the time of incident. He stated that the information aboutthe death was given to the parents of the deceased and other familymembers. He stated that belongings of the deceased were handed overto her maternal grandmother and uncle after cremation. His statementis in line with the admission made by Biro Bai (PW-3), maternalgrandmother, Balbir Singh (PW-2). Meaning thereby that there was nosuspicion regarding the death of the deceased.

23. On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by theprosecution, we are of the considered view that the pre-requisites toraise presumption under Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of theIndian Evidence Act having not been fulfilled, the conviction of theappellant cannot be justified. Mere death of the deceased being unnaturalin the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be A

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Asufficient to convict the accused under Section 304B and 498A IPC.The cause of death as such is not known.

24. For the reasons mentioned above, in our opinion, the convictionand sentence of the appellant under Section 304B, 498A and 201 IPCcannot be legally sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed. TheBimpugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The bail bonds standcancelled.

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Nidhi Jain(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

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