RITU MAHESHWARI versus M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB on 5 May 2022

[2022] 3 S.C.R. 597

RITU MAHESHWARI

v.

M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB

(Civil Appeal Nos. 3616-3618 of 2022)

MAY 05, 2022

[UDAY UMESH LALIT, CJI, S. RAVINDRA BHAT ANDPAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.]

Administrative law: Scheme of allotment of plot – Terminationof – When regulations or schemes, or policies change, applicantsfor their benefits have no inherent right to be considered under theold policy; rather the consideration has to be under the new regime,unless the latter contains an express stipulation to the contrary –Writ petitioner-club did not challenge the closure of the scheme ofallotment in which it was applicant; rather its case was that Noida’somission to consider its application for allotment was arbitrary –Once the club accepted the closure of the scheme and did notchallenge it, there was no question of its agitating any right orgrievance regarding non-consideration of its application – The clubdoes not deny that there were other registrants, similarlycircumstanced, who did not secure any allotment – They presumablywere treated in the same manner as the club was – In thecircumstance, the club could not without establishing anydiscrimination, merely on the strength of closure of the scheme, allegearbitrariness.

Equity: Failure to disclose relevant facts before court –Entitlement to equitable relief – Held: The club was allotted a plotin 2014 in new scheme – The club, had an obligation to disclose it,during the pendency of writ proceedings in which club hadchallenged termination of old scheme – This fact was material, giventhat the jurisdiction invoked was equitable and discretionary –Whether the grievance was justified and well founded, given thatstate agencies develop and allot such industrial units at prices whichare reasonable, and that an applicant subsequently succeeded insecuring a plot, are relevant facts, which a court should be appraisedof – The failure by the club, to do so, disentitled it to any relief.

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598SUPREME COURT REPORTS

AAllowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The club’s grievance was that its application wasnot considered – its representatives were not interviewed. Noidapointed out that it closed or terminated the scheme. In the writproceeding, the club did not challenge the closure of the scheme;Brather its case was that Noida’s omission to consider itsapplication for allotment was arbitrary. Once the club acceptedthe closure of the scheme and did not challenge it, there was noquestion of its agitating any right or grievance regarding non-consideration of its application. The club does not deny that therewere other registrants, similarly circumstanced, who did notCsecure any allotment. They presumably were treated in the samemanner as the club was. In the circumstance, the club could notwithout establishing any discrimination, merely on the strengthof closure of the scheme, allege arbitrariness. It is well establishedthat when a policy decision like the closure or termination of aDbenefit available to a class of persons, is not challenged, theconsequence of such closure (which is the impact on the pendencyof those wishing to be considered) cannot ordinarily be subjectmatter of a grievance. What the club had was a right to beconsidered for allotment of the plots its applied for, so long asthe old scheme subsisted. An applicant or registrant of a schemeEhas no right to insist that they should be provided allotment undera scheme. In the absence of any ambiguity- in the law, and thescheme, the writ petitioner club could not have insisted that afterthe closure of the old scheme (which went unchallenged by it),nevertheless, it had a right to allotment. In holding otherwise, Fand proceeding to direct Noida to consider the club’s applicationsthe impugned judgment erred in law. [Paras 17, 18, 19][606-G-H; 607-A-C, C-D; 608-B-D]

Delhi Development Authority v. Pushpendra KumarJain [1994] Suppl. 3 SCR 770; The Bihar State HousingGBoard & Ors. v. Radha Ballabh Health Care andResearch Institute (P) Ltd. (2019) 10 SCC483 : [2019]12 SCR 444 – relied on.

2. The High Court had directed that the club’s applicationsshould be considered “in accordance with law”. Noida proceededHto comply with that direction, and reinstate those applications- and, furthermore, consider them in accordance with the existingscheme. The High Court, in contempt proceedings, has takenexception to this course of action in an entirely unnecessary andunwarranted manner. Once the legality of closure of the oldscheme was undisputed, there was no manner of right inheringwith the club, to insist that its claim for any plot had to beconsidered. If at all, it ought to have applied under subsequentschemes, and waited like other applicants (of that scheme),Noida’s interpretation of the High Court’s judgment (to consider)in this context, was quite correct. Neither did Noida, in itsannouncement while closing the old scheme nor in any conditionof the 2013 or later scheme, stipulate that old scheme applicantswould be dealt with according to the terms of that (i.e. 2010)scheme. This meant that Noida had to consider the club’sapplications, in accordance with terms of the prevailing scheme.It did so, and incurred – quite unjustifiably- the wrath of the HighCourt in contempt proceedings. When regulations or schemes,or policies change, applicants for their benefits have no inherentright to be considered under the old policy; rather theconsideration has to be under the new regime, unless the lattercontains an express stipulation to the contrary. [Para 20][608-D-H]

Usman Gani Khatri of Bombay v. Cantonment Board[1992] 3 SCR 1; Howrah Municipal Corpn. & Ors. v.Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. & Ors. [2003] Suppl. 6 SCR1212 – relied on.

3. The club could not have claimed that its application hadto be dealt with in terms of the old scheme, which had ended in2012. The direction of the High Court, could only have meantthat the applications had to be revived, and dealt with the schemeprevailing as on the date of its consideration, i.e. after 31.07.2019.The interpretation placed by the High Court, that there wereexisting plots, which could have been dealt with under the oldscheme is entirely misplaced. In such events, given that thelegality of closure of the old scheme attained finality, there wasno question of any land or plot being attached or belonging as itwere to an old scheme. If any land or plot, or industrial unit werein fact “left-over” it was always up to the development authority ABC

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Aor agency (here Noida) to determine how they are to be dealtwith. The directions issued in contempt proceedings, which aresubject matter of another appeal, are accordingly held erroneous.[Para 21][610-B-E]

4. The club was allotted a plot, in 2014; it paid substantialBamounts. The area of that plot is 4000 square metres. Now, whileit is true that this fact could not have been disclosed to the HighCourt, when filing the writ petition (in 2013), the club, had anobligation to disclose it, during the pendency of writ proceedings.This fact was material, given that the jurisdiction invoked isequitable and discretionary. Furthermore, whether the grievanceCwas justified and well founded, given that state agencies developand allot such industrial units at prices which are reasonable, andthat an applicant subsequently succeeded in securing a plot, arerelevant facts, which a court should be appraised of. The failure bythe club, to do so, disentitled it to any relief. [Para 22][610-E-G]

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Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 3616-3618 of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.02.2020. 24.08.2020 andF28.08.2020 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in ContemptApplication (Civil) No. 8214 of 2019.

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 3619-3620 of 2022.

GK. V. Viswanathan, Sr. Adv., Anil Kaushik, Ms. Shashi Sharma,Ms. Arunima Dwivedi, Advs. for the Appellant.

Salman Khurshid, Sr. Adv., Utkarsh Sharma, Ms. Lubna Naaz,Kunal Beri, Advs. for the Respondent.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

1. Special leave granted, in both petitions. With consent of counselfor parties, the appeals were heard finally. The two appeals arise out ofjudgments of the Allahabad High Court. The first is dated 31.07.2019[1];the same appeal impugns an order dismissing the review petition filedagainst the first impugned judgment, dated 13.04.2021. The second appealis directed against three orders (dated 12.02.2020, 24.08.2020 and28.08.2020) issued in contempt proceedings[2], initiated by the respondent,against the appellant.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant (hereafterreferred to as “Noida”), published a scheme in 2010 (hereafter “the oldscheme”) for allotment of industrial plots larger than 2000 sq. meters, inPhases II and III of the industrial area in Noida. The scheme wasadvertised. Application forms for registration of the available plots wereavailable with a designated bank upon payment of ` 5,000/. The indicativeprice for plots measuring up to 4000sq. mtr. in Phase II was ` 5550/- persq. mtr. and in Phase III for ` 5750/- per sq mtr. Under the terms of thescheme as spelt out by the brochure, apart from individuals, partnershipfirms were also eligible to apply for allotment. The applicants were tosubmit a processing fee of ` 20,000/- and registration money of ` 8lakhs for Phase II plots and ` 10 lakhs for Phase III plots. Apart fromthese conditions, applicants had to furnish a project report, backgrounddetail of promoters, audited accounts and balance sheets and otherrelevant details. Allotment was to be made (per clause 2 (h) (i)) on thebasis of interviews of registered applicants, by a screening committee,about the details of the project. The scheme was expressly open ended;therefore, under clause 2(i) in Appendix 1 to the scheme Noida couldclose it any time.

3. It is the common case of the parties that the club applied to theNoida Authority for two plots. Apparently, Noida decided to terminatethe scheme, based upon its assessment of the feasibility of the scheme,in its meeting on 05.07.2012. This decision was published and madeknown to all concerned including the club through the public domain on12.07.2012. Thereafter, Noida sought to refund the amount deposited bythe club to it.

1 In Writ-C No.-56046 of 2013

2 Contempt Application (Civil) No. 8214 of 2019

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A4. The club was aggrieved and approached the Allahabad HighCourt by filing the writ petition[3] contending that according to itsinformation, Noida received 95 applications of which 65 were rejectedand 15 allotments were made. The club urged that it fulfilled allrequirements of the scheme and paid processing fee, registration amount,had lodged documents required to be furnished. Therefore, it claimedBthat its application deserved to be considered. It also contended that theclub was an export house and operating from rented premises, sorely inneed of a large facility and was unable to afford commercial rentalspaces. It was urged that the Noida disregarded the terms and conditionsof its scheme for allotment in that the non-consideration in respect of theCplots under the scheme so far as the petitioner club was concerned wasutterly arbitrary. The club claimed several directions including directionto cancel allotments already made and a mandatory direction to considerthe petitioner club’s application for allotment.

5. Noida had resisted the petition, arguing that once the schemeDwas discontinued, the club had no basis to claim allotment. It was alsourged that the club was aware of the fact that the scheme could bediscontinued at any time, a power which Noida had resorted to, validly.Therefore, it was urged that even if some plots were available, the writpetitioner could not lay claim for allotment of any of them.E6. During the pendency of writ petition before the High Court,Noida, launched another scheme (Scheme Code : NOIDA/IP/2013-14/OES/01 – hereafter called “the 2013 Scheme”) the club applied underthis scheme as well on 9[th] November, 2013. This matured into an allotmenton 17.07.2014- when Noida allotted a plot of 4000 sq. mtr, (tentativelysized plot) @ Rs. 8060/- per sq. mtr. The total premium claimed byFNoida was ` 3,46,58,000/-. The club had, by 01.12.2016 deposited` 1,91,83,700/- towards this allotment; it sought by letter dated 04.09.2016of change in the allotment to M/s. Maria Exim Pvt. Ltd. This requestwas followed up with the affidavit dated 27.12.2016. This subsequentallotment of a plot under the later scheme was however, not disclosed toGthe High Court, before which the complaint of arbitrary non-allotmentunder the old scheme was pending.

7. The High Court by its first impugned judgment[4] was of theopinion that Noida’s failure to call the club’s representative for interview, 3 Writ-C No.-56046 of 2013H4 Dated 31.07.2019 in Writ-C No. 56046 of 2013

was not supported by any reason and that its candidature was neverconsidered for allotment. In support of this conclusion the High Courtreasoned that candidature or the applications which were registered andwere complete in all manner could not have been ignored. In view ofthis reasoning, the Noida was directed to consider the petitioner’s twoapplications under the scheme by permitting the club to re-deposit theregistration amount of ` 8 lakhs each in respect of its two applicationswith Noida within a period of one month and on deposit of such registrationamount, the two applications (Application Nos. 284 and 285) were torevive. Noida was directed to consider those applications in accordancewith law for the purposes of allotment of the un-allotted remaining plotsin Phase – II and III. The High Court held in its judgment that Noida didnot dispute that some plots remained unallotted in the scheme. Accordingto the High Court, there were total of 12 such plots.

8. Noida first filed an application for clarification contending thatno plots were available under the old scheme and that 27 plots wereavailable under the old scheme, under which 15 were initially allotted.Later all plots were allotted by the end of 2014 under the 2013 scheme.That application (Civil Misc. Modification/Clarification Application No.17/2020) was dismissed on 01.10.2020. Noida therefore preferred areview proceeding. The High Court by its second impugned order dated13.04.2021 rejected the Review Petition. The original impugned orderdated 31.07.2019 and the rejection of the Review Petition by judgmentand order dated 13.04.2021 are the subject matter of a common appealarising from one Special Leave Petition.[5]

9. The club complained of non-compliance with the originaljudgment and initiated contempt proceedings. In the contemptproceedings, notice was issued and on 12.02.2020 the High Courtrecorded that the club’s application was deemed eligible and was takenon record. By order dated 12.02.2020 the High Court clarified that incase the main judgment was not complied in the letter and spirit the“opposite party” i.e. the Chief Executive Officer of Noida was to bepresent in Court. Accordingly, on the next date when the said officialwas present (i.e. on 24.08.2020) the Court noted that the writ petitionerwas supplied a list of plots for exercising his option regarding two plotspursuant to the two applications filed by the petitioner and which werecovered by the new scheme issued in January, 2020. Furthermore, the A

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ACourt recorded that the new plots were allotted only in accordance withthe new scheme and that two other applicants had been allotted thoseplots. The court therefore expressed its dissatisfaction and stated thatthird party rights was being sought to be created to complicate the issueto suit Noida’s purposes. These two orders i.e. 12.02.2020 and 24.08.2020as well as the subsequent order dated 28.08.2020 (which had partlyBcorrected the earlier order of 24.08.2020) are the subject matter of thecivil appeal arising out of another common Special Leave Petition,[6] bythe Chief Executive Officer of Noida on its behalf.

Contentions of parties

C10. It is urged by Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel,that the impugned judgment dated 31.07.2019 was passed on the basisof a wrong factual statement by one Shri N.K. Singh, an Officer onSpecial Duty (OSD) of NOIDA in his affidavit dated 10.03.2019 to theeffect that eight plots remained unallotted in the earlier scheme, whichstatement has caused grave prejudice to NOIDA. It is contended thatDthis officer not only made misleading statements on affidavit, but alsofacilitated the transfer of the plot, allotted to the club, to another entity.Learned senior counsel for Noida contended that these acts wereunauthorized. It was urged that Noida, had before the High Courtspecifically stated that a show-cause notice dated 12.06.2020 was issuedEagainst the concerned employee i.e. OSD Shri N.K. Singh for makingthe incorrect statement in his affidavit & recommended disciplinary actionagainst the concerned employee to the Government of Uttar Pradesh.Counsel urged that the High Court erred in observing that it is evidentthat the affidavit filed in support of the review application lacked necessarypleadings in respect of the exercise of due diligence by NOIDA. It wasFfurther urged that Noida had specifically stated that of 15 allotmentswere made, by the time the impugned judgment was delivered, therewere in fact no plots under the old scheme. Counsel submitted thatwhenever a scheme is discontinued, the land available with Noida isnever kept aside but is utilized in other, newer schemes. Therefore, thereGwere in fact no unallotted plots; they had been utilized in subsequentschemes. It is submitted that NOIDA keeps on carving new plots andsubsequently allots them under different schemes. It had furnished thelist of new plots available and not the plots which were available initiallyand all the 27 plots were allotted by 2014 in different schemes.

11. It was argued that the club did not challenge the closure of the2009-2010 scheme. It rather claimed that Noida acted arbitrarily in notcalling its representative for interview, and possible allotment. In fact allregistrants were aware that Noida could, in terms of the said scheme,terminate it and refund the amounts received, for any reason. That optionwas in fact exercised. Counsel highlighted that the scheme was in forcebarely for two years and very few people were interviewed and grantedplots. Since the writ petitioner could not lay claim for a plot, but only aright to be considered, in an extant scheme, the first impugned judgmentis erroneous as it proceeds to hold that the club had some right to allotmentof a plot.

12. It was urged that the operative direction of the High Court,was only to reinstate the club’s applications, and consider them forallotment in accordance with law. Since the cancellation of the old schemeor its closure was not adversely commented, the only manner in whichthe directions could reasonably be complied with, was to consider theapplications under the subsequent- extant scheme. In the scheme –framed in 2020, no applicant can expect allotment on the basis ofinterview. Allotment of plots is based on the result of draw of lots. Theclub was considered, but was unsuccessful in the draw of lots. Therefore,the High Court went wrong in holding that the club was entitled to beconsidered in accordance with the old scheme which was not in existence.

13. Learned senior counsel argued that the club was disentitled todiscretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, because it didnot disclose the full and true facts. It was contended that the club wasallotted a 4000 square meter plot, in 2014, for which it made part paymentsas well. However, this fact was suppressed from the High Court. Counselcontended that Noida, at the time of conducting its due diligence, recentlydiscovered this fact. Furthermore, it was submitted that this suppressionwas intentional, and appears to have been facilitated by the said Mr.N.K. Singh.

14. Mr. Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel for the club,urged that the impugned judgment as well as the judgment of the HighCourt in review should not be disturbed. It was submitted that NOIDAgave no reason for the closure of the scheme; its affidavit before theHigh Court did not provide any reason why the club’s application wasoverlooked or why its representative was not called for interview like inthe case of other applicants. This was arbitrary conduct which called A

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Afor an adverse order. To this extent, the High Court’s order isunexceptionable.

15. It was urged on behalf of the club that the charge of thepressing information, is unwarranted. Learned counsel urged that Noidadid not point to any rule or guideline which required the club to discloseBthat it had applied under any other scheme before, it applied and wasallotted a plot in the scheme framed in 2013-14. In the circumstances,the question of denying relief to it under Article 226 did not arise. It wasfurther argued that the impugned judgment dated 31.07.2019, had to beand was understood by the High Court in contempt proceedings, to meanthat the club’s application had to be processed in accordance with theCscheme as it existed, in 2009-10 when in fact an application had beenmade and entertained. In other words, the club’s application had to betreated and considered in accordance with the old scheme. This meantnaturally that its representative had been called for interview and theapplication evaluated accordingly. Instead, the Noida chose to unilaterallyDtreat the application as one under the extant policy of 2020. In terms ofthe latter, allotment is to be made not on the basis of interview but on thebasis of the draw of lots. Mr. Khurshid submitted that this was not theintent or tenor of the impugned judgment. In the circumstances, thecontempt proceedings drawn for willful non-compliance were maintainableand the directions issued by the High Court, completely justified.E

Analysis and Conclusions

16. The terms of the old scheme were noticed in an earlier part ofthe judgment. Other terms included stipulated that rates indicated weresubject to change by Noida [clause 2 (d)]; the area of the plot could beFvaried [clause 2 (e)]. Clause 2 (i) read as follows:

“This scheme is an open-ended scheme. However, NOIDAreserves the right to close the scheme at any point of timewithout any notice and without assigning any reasons.”

17. The club’s grievance was that its application was not consideredG– its representatives were not interviewed. Noida pointed out that itclosed or terminated the scheme. In the writ proceeding, the club did notchallenge the closure of the scheme; rather its case was that Noida’somission to consider its application for allotment was arbitrary. Once theclub accepted the closure of the scheme and did not challenge it, therewas no question of its agitating any right or grievance regarding non-H

consideration of its application. The club does not deny that there wereother registrants, similarly circumstanced, who did not secure anyallotment. They presumably were treated in the same manner as theclub was. In the circumstance, the club could not without establishingany discrimination, merely on the strength of closure of the scheme,allege arbitrariness. It is well established that when a policy decision likethe closure or termination of a benefit available to a class of persons, isnot challenged, the consequence of such closure (which is the impact onthe pendency of those wishing to be considered) cannot ordinarily besubject matter of a grievance. What the club had was a right to beconsidered for allotment of the plots its applied for, so long as theold scheme subsisted.

18. In the opinion of this court, an applicant or registrant of ascheme has no right to insist that they should be provided allotment undera scheme. Much depends on the terms of the scheme. In DelhiDevelopment Authority vs. Pushpendra Kumar Jain[7]this court hadenunciated the applicable principle as follows:

“8. Now coming to the other ground, we are unable to findany legal basis for holding that the respondent obtained avested right to allotment on the drawl of lots. Since D.D.A. isa public authority and because the number of applicants arealways more than the number of flats available, the system ofdrawing of lots is being resorted to with a view to identify theallottee. It is only a mode, a method, a process to identify theallottee, i.e., it is a process of selection. It is not allotment byitself. Mere identification or selection of the allottee does notclothe the person selected with a legal right to allotment atthe price prevailing on the date of drawl of lots. The schemeevolved by the appellant does not say so either expressly orby necessary implication. On the contrary, Clause (14) thereofsays that “the estimated prices mentioned in the brochure areillustrative and are subject to revision/modification dependingupon the exigencies of lay out, cost of construction etc.”

In The Bihar State Housing Board & Ors. v Radha BallabhHealth Care and Research Institute (P) Ltd[8]this court again reiteratedthe same position:

7 1994 (Supp3) SCR 770

8 2019 (10) SCC483

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A‘‘…the Respondent does not get any right of allotment of aplot merely because it has applied for allotment earlier. Theresponse to an advertisement does not lead to any obligationon the Appellant to allot any plot. Admittedly, there was noallotment in pursuance of the offer submitted by theRespondent. Mere fact that the Respondent had applied forBallotment of a plot does not confer any legal or equitableright to seek allotment of any plot.”

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19. In the absence of any ambiguity- in the law, and the scheme,the writ petitioner club, in this court’s opinion could not have insisted thatCafter the closure of the old scheme (which went unchallenged by it),nevertheless, it had a right to allotment. In holding otherwise, andproceeding to direct Noida to consider the club’s applications the impugnedjudgment erred in law.

20. The High Court had directed that the club’s applications shouldDbe considered “in accordance with law”. Noida proceeded to complywith that direction, and reinstate those applications- and, furthermore,consider them in accordance with the existing scheme. The High Court,in contempt proceedings, has taken exception to this course of action- inthis court’s opinion, in an entirely unnecessary and unwarranted manner.EAs held earlier, once the legality of closure of the old scheme wasundisputed, there was no manner of right inhering with the club, to insistthat its claim for any plot had to be considered. If at all, it ought to haveapplied under subsequent schemes, and waited like other applicants (ofthat scheme), Noida’s interpretation of the High Court’s judgment (toconsider) in this context, was quite correct. Neither did Noida, in itsFannouncement while closing the old scheme nor in any condition of the2013 or later scheme, stipulate that old scheme applicants would bedealt with according to the terms of that (i.e. 2010) scheme. This meantthat Noida had to consider the club’s applications, in accordance withterms of the prevailing scheme. It did so, and incurred – quite unjustifiably-Gthe wrath of the High Court in contempt proceedings. There is authorityfor the proposition that when regulations or schemes, or policies change,applicants for their benefits have no inherent right to be considered underthe old policy; rather the consideration has to be under the new regime,unless the latter contains an express stipulation to the contrary.

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21. In Usman Gani Khatri of Bombay v Cantonment Board[9]this court affirmed the decision of the High Court, which held that oldrules could not be applied, and that new rules were applicable, forconsidering applications for sanction of buildings. It was held that “In any case, the High Court is right in taking the view thatthe building plan can only be sanctioned according to thebuilding regulations prevailing at the time of sanctioning ofsuch building plans. At present the statutory bye-lawspublished on 30.4.1988 are in force and the fresh buildingplans to be submitted by the petitioners, if any, shall now begoverned by these bye-laws and not by any other bye-lawsor schemes which are no longer in force now.

If we consider a reverse case where building regulations areamended more favourably to the builders before sanctioningof building plans already submitted, the builders wouldcertainly claim and get advantage of the regulations amendedto their benefit.”

Likewise, in Howrah Municipal Corpn. & Ors. v Ganges RopeCo. Ltd. & Ors[10]. a similar question arose for consideration. Themunicipal corporation was required to decide an application for sanction,in a time bound manner, by the court. The applicable rules changed. Thecorporation decided the application in the light of the amended rules.This court, negativing the applicant’s contention that it had a right to beconsidered under the old rules, held as follows:

“20. The provisions of the Act, therefore, contemplate anexpress sanction to be granted by the Corporation before anyperson can be allowed to construct or erect a building. Thus,in ordinary course, merely by submission of application forsanction for construction, no vested right is created in favourof any party by statutory operation of the provisions.

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In our considered opinion, by the order of the Courtdated 23.12.1993 observing that the petitioner is ‘notprevented from applying’ for further sanction of additionalfloors above fourth floor and the ‘expectation’ expressed in 9 1992 (3) SCR 1

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Athe subsequent order of the Court dated 24.6.1994, from theCorporation to decide the pending application for sanctionwithin four weeks, no vested right in favour of the respondent- company can be said to have been created to obtain sanctionon the unamended rules, as they existed on the date of theirsecond application.”B

In the light of the above position in law, it is clear that the clubcould not have claimed that its application had to be dealt with in termsof the old scheme, which had ended in 2012. The direction of the HighCourt, could only have meant that the applications had to be revived, anddealt with the scheme prevailing as on the date of its consideration, i.e.Cafter 31.07.2019. The interpretation placed by the High Court, that therewere existing plots, which could have been dealt with under the oldscheme is entirely misplaced. In such events, given that the legality ofclosure of the old scheme attained finality, there was no question of anyland or plot being attached or belonging as it were to an old scheme. IfDany land or plot, or industrial unit were in fact “left-over” it was alwaysup to the development authority or agency (here Noida) to determinehow they are to be dealt with. The directions issued in contemptproceedings, which are subject matter of another appeal, are accordinglyheld erroneous.

E22. As noticed earlier, the club was allotted a plot, in 2014; it paidsubstantial amounts. The area of that plot is 4000 square metres. Now,while it is true that this fact could not have been disclosed to the HighCourt, when filing the writ petition (in 2013), the club, in this court’sopinion, had an obligation to disclose it, during the pendency of writproceedings. This fact was material, given that the jurisdiction invokedFis equitable and discretionary. Furthermore, whether the grievance wasjustified and well founded, given that state agencies develop and allotsuch industrial units at prices which are reasonable, and that an applicantsubsequently succeeded in securing a plot, are relevant facts, which acourt should be appraised of. The failure by the club, to do so, in thisGcourt’s opinion, disentitled it to any relief.

23. For the foregoing reasons, Noida’s appeals are allowed; theimpugned judgment and orders of the High Court are hereby set aside.There shall be no order on costs.

HDevika Gujral