SRIDEVI DATLA versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. on 2 March 2021

282

SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2021] 13 S.C.R.282

[2021] 13 S.C.R.

SRIDEVI DATLA

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v.

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.(Civil Appeal No. 3136 of 2020)

MARCH 02, 2021

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[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]

Limitation Act, 1963: Applicability to Special laws – Held:Where period of limitation are prescribed under special laws,appeals that exceed the period granted in the special laws can beCentertained at the discretion of the tribunal and Limitation act wouldnot apply – National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.

General Clauses Act – Applicability of, to appeals filed underthe NGT Act – Held: s.10 of General Clauses Act stipulates whenthe last date for doing something falls on a public holiday, the actshall be considered as done, if it is done or taken on the next dayDafterwards on which the Court or office is open – This provisionapplies to all Central Acts enacted after the said Act was broughtinto force – Therefore, s.10 applies proprio vigore to all appealsfiled under the NGT Act – National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010: s.16 – Approach of theECourt in considering the application for condonation of delay –The term ‘sufficient cause’ is relative, fact dependant, and has manyhues, largely deriving colour from the facts of each case, and thebehaviour of the litigant who seeks condonation of delay (inapproaching the court) – Appellant pleaded that since theFdocumentation attendant to the clearance granted to the ProjectApplicant was voluminous, and expert as well as professional legaladvice of the kind necessary to approach the NGT was not availablein the State of Andhra Pradesh, the procuring of relevant documents,and correspondence with counsel in Delhi and drafting of the appeal entailed some delay – In approaching NGT, scientific or technicalGsupport is necessary apart from expert professional legal advice –Rejection of appeal by dismissing application for condonation ofdelay, on the ground that no sufficient cause was shown, waserroneous discretion of NGT – An appeal to the NGT in such mattersis no ordinary matter – The delay in filing the appeal before theHNGT is condoned.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. There can be no dispute that the period oflimitation set out in a special law, which provides for remediesand appeals, has to be construed in its terms and withoutreference to the Limitation Act, if it contains specific provisionsdelineating the time or period within which applications or appealscan be preferred, and confines the consideration of applicationsfor condoning the delay to a specific number of days. Undoubtedly,in such cases, the Limitation Act would be inapplicable. Thereare several previous judgments of this court holding that whereperiods of limitation are prescribed under special laws, appealsthat exceed the period granted and are within the extended periodof limitation in the special law, can be entertained at the discretionof the tribunal, or court concerned and the Limitation Act wouldnot apply upon expiry of such extended period. This court heldthat there is merit in the contention of the Union that theprovisions of the Limitation Act are inapplicable. [Para 18][293-F-G; 294-A-B]

2. The appellant argues that the appeal is to be consideredas having been filed within the extended period of 60 days, sincethe last (of the 60 days) was a Sunday (12.07.2020). The appellantrelied on Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, for this purpose.Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 stipulates that whenthe last date for doing something falls on a public holiday, the act“shall be considered as done..” if it “is done or taken on the nextday afterwards on which the Court or office is open”. This provisionapplies to all Central Acts enacted after the said Act was broughtinto force. It is also noticeable that there is no indication in theNGT Act that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act cannot beapplied. It is therefore, held that the provision applies propriovigore to all appeals filed under the NGT Act. [Paras 19, 20,21][294-C-E; 295-A, C-D]

H.H Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh [1957]SCR 208 – followed.

3. It is evident that the term sufficient cause is relative,fact dependant, and has many hues, largely deriving colour fromthe facts of each case, and the behaviour of the litigant who seekscondonation of delay (in approaching the court). However, what A

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Acan broadly be said to be universally accepted is that in principle,the applicant must display bona fides, should not have beennegligent, and the delay occasioned should not be such thatcondoning it would seriously prejudice the other party. Keepingthese principles in mind, it is relevant to consider whether theNGT’s refusal to exercise discretion, in the facts andBcircumstances of this case, was erroneous. The court is consciousof the fact that exercise of discretion, per se, is a fact dependentone, and considerable latitude should be given to the court ortribunal of the first instance, in the performance of that task.Nevertheless, as decided, cases and judgments have shown thatCthe exercise of discretion does at times, call for appellate scrutinyby this court. This is one such. The appellant pleaded that sincethe documentation attendant to the clearance granted to theProject Applicant was voluminous, and expert as well asprofessional legal advice of the kind necessary to approach theNGT was not available in the State of Andhra Pradesh, theDprocuring of relevant documents, and correspondence withcounsel in Delhi and drafting of the appeal entailed some delay.This court is of the opinion that there is merit in appellantargument. [Paras 27 and 28][297-F-H; 298-A-B]

Smt. Padmabati Mohapatra v. Union of India (2013)ESCC OnLine NGT 2177; Rambir Narhargir Gosai v.Prabhakar Bhaskar Gadhaway AIR 1955 Nag 300;Save Mon Region Federation v. Union of India (2013)SCC OnLine NGT 2511; H. Dohil ConstructionCompany Private Limited v. Nahar Exports LimitedF(2015) 1 SCC 680 : [2014] 8 SCR 424; BRS SteelsPrivate Limited v. State of Rajasthan (2012) 6 SCC 782: [2012] 5 SCR 583; Jitendra Singh v. Ministry ofEnvironment & Others (2019) SCC OnLine SC 1510;Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India (2019) 15SCC 401 : [2019] 5 SCR 916; Kaushalya Rani v GopalGSingh [1964] 4 SCR 982; Collector of Excise & Customsv. Hongo India (P) Ltd. (2009) 5 SCC 791 : [2009]4 SCR 1197; Union of India v. Popular ConstructionCo. (2001) 8 SCC 470 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 619; PatelBros. v. State of Assam (2017) 2 SCC 350 : [2017] 1HSCR 95; H.H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh

[1957] SCR 208; Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil(1996) 1 SCC 169 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 421; Mohd.Ayub v. State of U.P. (2009) 17 SCC 70 : [2009]15 SCR 1095; G. Ramegowda v. Land AcquisitionOfficer (1988) 2 SCC 142 : [1988] 3 SCR 198; EshaBhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013)12 SCC 649 : [2013] 9 SCR 782; State ofNagaland v. Lipok Ao (2005) 3 SCC 752 : [2005]3 SCR 108; New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. ShantiMisra (1975) 2 SCC 840 : [1976] 2 SCR 266; N.Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 23 :[1998] Suppl. SCR 403; State of Haryana v. ChandraMani (1996) 3 SCC 132 : [1996] 1 SCR 1060;Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma (1996) 10 SCC 634;Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh (2010) 6 SCC 786:[2010] 7 SCR 376; Maniben Devraj Shah v. MunicipalCorpn. of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157 – referredto.

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Case Law Reference

From the Judgment and Order dated 31.07.2020 of the NationalGreen Tribunal, Southern Zone Bench at Chennai in M.A. No. 231 ofC2017 in Appeal Nos. 18 of 2020 (SZ).

K. M. Natrajan, ASG, Ms. Anitha Shenoy, Atmaram Nadkarni,Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv., Ms. Srishti Agnihotri, Ms. Kanika Sood,Ms. Sanjana Grace Thomas, Ms. Anmol Gupta, Gurmeet Singh Makker,Kanu Agrawal, Vatsal Joshi, Arup Banerjee, Varun Verma, MaheshDAgarwal, M. S. Ananth, Anirudh Bhatia, E. C. Agrawala, Advs. for theappearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

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1. The appellant is aggrieved by an order of the National GreenTribunal (hereafter referred to as “the NGT”[1]) and has, therefore,approached this Court under Section 22 of the NGT Act. The NGTrejected her appeal, preferred to it against the environmental clearancefor construction of the Greenfield International Airport, Bhogapuram,FVishakapatnam, which had been sought for by the fifth respondent.

2. The facts are simple: the fifth respondent (hereafter called“the Project Applicant”) proposed the construction of a new Greenfieldinternational airport. As was required by law and extant statutorynotifications, it applied to the Ministry of Environment, Forests andGClimate Change (hereinafter, the “MoEF”) to seek environmentalclearance. The MoEF, after following the prescribed procedure, whichincluded ascertaining the views and objections of the concerned parties,the general public etc, indicated its approval by an order dated 14.08.2017.In terms of Section 19 of the NGT Act, the approval was posted on the H1 Dated 31.07.2020

website of the MoEF on 14.08.2017. Concededly, the Project Applicantpublished the approval in an English daily on 13.09.2017.

3. The appellant preferred her appeal to the NGT on 13.11.2017.Along with the appeal, she preferred an application for condonation ofdelay in approaching the NGT, given the stipulation of Section 19 thatthe appeal had to be preferred within 30 days from the date ofcommunication of the order impugned. She explained that since theclearance and related documents were voluminous and the matterrequired some technical expertise, requiring the papers to be forwardedto experts and lawyers in Delhi, and the inter se communication delay,the NGT needed to condone the delay, in the interests of justice. Afterconsidering the submissions made by the appellant as well as the ProjectApplicant, which opposed the application for condonation of delay, theNGT, by its impugned order, rejected the appellant’s application andconsequently the appeal as well.

4. The appellant’s arguments before this Court are mainly twofold:that the requirement of Section 16 is to “communicate the order to theconcerned parties as well as the public and that a meaningfulinterpretation should be given to the provision”. It was emphasisedin this context that communication means not merely the publication onthe Central Government’s website, but also dissemination of the newsor the decision to the affected parties. Learned senior counsel for theappellant – Ms. Anitha Shenoy, in this context, relied upon the termscontained in the environmental clearance/approval given by the MoEF,especially those which obliged the Project Applicant to intimate thedecision in dailies having local circulation in the vernacular. She alsorelied upon the stipulations in the environmental clearance (“EC”) whichprescribed that the successful project applicant had to, in continuation toso publishing the decision or intimation in local newspapers, also ensurethat the decision was forwarded to local communities through thePanchayats etc. for dissemination.

5. It was pointed out that the object of these conditions should beconstrued as part of a larger scheme of the Act to communicate everydecision. The appellant argued that if a contrary interpretation were tobe accepted, the appeal given by the statute would be meaningless asmost often, large projects which involve either displacement of peopleor which affect habitats and have the tendency to damage or at leastcause significant adverse impact upon the environment would not be AB

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Aconsidered on its merits by the NGT since people and neighbourhoodscannot be presumed to have knowledge of deliberations in New Delhi.

6. It was also argued on behalf of the appellant that in thecircumstances of the present case, at least the appeal could not be saidto be time barred. It was argued that the date for reckoning (limitation)Bis from 14.08.2017, when the MoEF uploaded the decision on its website.The ninety-day period within which appeal was to be filed, expired on12.11.2017, which was a Sunday. It was submitted that under Section 10of the General Clauses Act, if any period prescribed ends on a Sundayor a day on which the Court or the Tribunal does not function, the nextday should be considered as the terminus quo in point of time.CConsequently, it was submitted that the appeal should be considered aswithin time and should have been entertained on merits.

7. Lastly, it was argued that the NGT’s opinion that sufficientcause was not shown while seeking condonation of delay is erroneous.Learned counsel highlighted that any proposal as well as clearancesDwhere voluminous documentation is involved, or if any individual or entityis aggrieved, or adversely affected, the only remedy provided is by wayof an appeal. To substantiate the grounds of appeal, it would be essentialthat in many instances, expert advice is obtained based on which thegrounds of appeal can be prepared and urged. If the issue were to beEconsidered in this perspective, the explanation provided by the appellantin her application seeking condonation of delay could not be consideredunreasonable and in fact amounts to sufficient cause. Learned counselrelied upon a previous order of the NGT in Smt. Padmabati Mohapatrav. Union of India[2]. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of theNagpur High Court, reported as Rambir Narhargir Gosai v. PrabhakarFBhaskar Gadhaway.[3]

8. On behalf of the Union of India, the ASG, Mr. K.M. Natrajargued that the impugned order does not require to be disturbed. Hepointed out that the impugned order had noticed that the appellant madeno complaint that the MoEF had put up the decision to grant environmentalGclearance on its website on 14.08.2017 or that having uploaded thedecision it could not be viewed publicly in an uninterrupted manner. Hefurther submitted that the finding that the first date when the decisionwas communicated by the MoEF on its website is determinative for the 2 2013 SCC OnLine NGT 2177H3 AIR 1955 Nag 300

2 2013 SCC OnLine NGT 2177H3 AIR 1955 Nag 300

purpose of reckoning limitation rather than any other later point in time.It was further emphasised on behalf of the UOI that the need to publishenvironmental clearances under the Environment Impact Notification2006, framed under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 is now knownto all. The proposal of the Project Applicant clearly fell within the sweepof the Environment Impact Notification in Item No.7(a) to the Schedule(to the notification).

9. It was submitted on behalf of the UOI that in terms of theEnvironment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006, the clearance hadto be published within seven days from the date of uploading. Thepublication of Environment Clearance dated 14.08.2017 was done on21.08.2017. Thus, the appellant’s plea that she came to know of theenvironmental clearance on 24.08.2017 is baseless. The learned ASGrelied upon a decision of the NGT in Save Mon Region Federation v.Union of India[4] in this regard.

10. Learned ASG lastly argued that by virtue of Section 33 of theAct, the provisions of all other laws stand overridden and consequently,the question of extending the period of limitation by reference to Section5 of the Limitation Act would not arise. He further urged that the periodof limitation prescribed is actually 30 days for the filing of an appeal, andthat further period of 60 days is only by way of acceptance of applicationfor condonation of delay. Thus, no appeal is maintainable after the expiryof 90 days. It is pointed out that in the present case, the 90 day period infact ended a day prior to the filing of the appeal; it was, therefore, clearlytime-barred.

11. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel appearing for theProject Applicant supported the submissions of the Union and arguedthat the concerned Project Applicant, i.e. M/s Bhogapuram InternationalAirport Corporation Ltd., has been conceived in public interest and inreplacement of the existing Vishakhapatnam Airport which is primarilya defence airport. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Courtin H. Dohil Construction Company Private Limited v. Nahar ExportsLimited[5] to the effect that any aggrieved litigant should be vigilant in theexercise of his rights and that he cannot claim the exercise of discretionfor condoning any delay as a matter of right. Reliance was also placedupon the decision in BRS Steels Private Limited v. State of Rajasthan[6].

4 2013 SCC OnLine NGT 2511

5 (2015) 1SCC 680

6 (2012) 6 SCC 782

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AIn this regard, it was submitted that the appeal before this Court whichpurports to be under Section 22 of the Act is confined to the groundsspecified under Section 100 of the CPC, which is only if the Court issatisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.

12. Lastly, it was submitted by learned senior counsel that theBNGT Act correctly surmised in the circumstances of the case that theappellant had adopted a casual approach and did not believe the contentsof the application for condonation of delay. Learned counsel in this contextargued that the appellant is an interested person in the sense that herlands had been notified for acquisition and was therefore notuninformed or incapable of receiving appropriate legal advice.CAnalysis and Findings13. The relevant provision of the Act, i.e. Section 16[7] reads asfollows:

“16. Tribunal to have appellate jurisdiction. -Any personDaggrieved by,- (a) an order or decision, made, on or after the commencementof the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the appellateauthority under section 28 of the Water (Prevention andControl of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974);E(b) an order passed, on or after the commencement of theNational Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the State Governmentunder section 29 of the Water (Prevention and Control ofPollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974);

(c) directions issued, on or after the commencement of theFNational Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by a Board, under section33A of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,1974 (6 of 1974);

(d) an order or decision made, on or after the commencementof the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the appellateGauthority under section 13 of the Water (Prevention andControl of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 (36 of 1977); (e) an order or decision made, on or after the commencementof the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the State H7 Of the NGT Act Government or other authority under section 2 of the Forest(Conservation) Act, 1980 (69 of 1980); (f) an order or decision, made, on or after the commencementof the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the AppellateAuthority under section 31 of the Air (Prevention and Controlof Pollution) Act, 1981 (14 of 1981); (g) any direction issued, on or after the commencement of theNational Green Tribunal Act, 2010, under section 5 of theEnvironment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986); (h) an order made, on or after the commencement of theNational Green Tribunal Act, 2010, granting environmentalclearance in the area in which any industries, operations orprocesses or class of industries, operations and processesshall not be carried out or shall be carried out subject tocertain safeguards under the Environment (Protection) Act,1986 (29 of 1986);

(i) an order made, on or after the commencement of theNational Green Tribunal Act, 2010, refusing to grantenvironmental clearance for carrying out any activity oroperation or process under the Environment (Protection) Act,1986 (29 of 1986); (j) any determination of benefit sharing or order made, on orafter the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act,2010, by the National Biodiversity Authority or a StateBiodiversity Board under the provisions of the BiologicalDiversity Act, 2002 (18 of 2003), may, within a period of thirtydays from the date on which the order or decision or directionor determination is communicated to him, prefer an appeal tothe Tribunal; Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that theappellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing theappeal within the said period, allow it to be filed under thissection within a further period not exceeding sixty days.”

14. Environmental disputes are complicated and entail expertisein diverse fields (such as ecology, chemistry, biology, economics,administration, management, law etc.) for their determination in an A

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Aeffective and speedy fashion, that is not possible within the regular judicialand administrative set up in India. In other words, environmental disputesrelating to forests, biodiversity, air and water are complicated in nature;resolving and expeditiously disposing of these cases is not possible withouta separate special court. Environmental courts or tribunals have been along-standing demand for other reasons too. For effective preventionBand control of environmental protection, there was an urgent need for aseparate environmental court or tribunal to adjudicate without muchdelay. India is a party to the United Nations Conference on the HumanEnvironment (known as the Stockholm Conference), 1972 where it madecommitments relating to safeguarding of natural resources and developingCinternational law, and to provide compensation to victims of pollution andother environmental degradation. India is also a signatory to the RioDeclaration adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environmentand Development at Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Rio Declaration statesthat participating states must make suitable environmental legislationregarding effective access to the people, to judicial and administrativeDproceedings, including remedies. The Law Commission’s 186[th] reportrecommended that the Union government should establish and constituteseparate Environmental Courts in each state, to deal with complex,specialised issues concerning the environment. It was in this backgroundthat Parliament enacted the NGT Act. The Act amends various otherEenactments and adds provisions to them, for appeal before the NGT.These are incorporated in Section 33-B of The Water (Prevention andControl of Pollution) Act, 1974; Section 13-A of The Water (Preventionand Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977; Section 2-A of The Forest(Conservation) Act, 1980; Section 31-B of The Air (Prevention andControl of Pollution) Act, 1981; Section 5-A in the EnvironmentF(Protection) Act, 1986 and Section 52-A in the Biological Diversity Act,2002.

15. In Jitendra Singh v. Ministry of Environment & Others[8]the narrow, but important question considered was whether a state couldalienate publicly available resources like ponds. This court held that thatGsuch transfer or alienation was impermissible. In Hanuman LaxmanAroskar v. Union of India[9] this court held that the NGT is under anobligation to consider issues as an expert body, and apply the principle ofsustainable development, in adjudicating environmental issues, especially 8 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1510H9 (2019) 15 SCC 401

while considering the validity of grant of clearance to large projectsunder the Environment Protection Act. It was held that the NGT Act:

“provides for the constitution of a tribunal consisting both ofjudicial and expert members. The mix of judicial and technicalmembers envisaged by the statute is for the reason that theTribunal is called upon to consider questions which involvethe application and assessment of science and its interfacewith the environment.”

16. The court noted that to be a member of the NGT, the individualhad to possess specified academic qualifications, including a master’sdegree in science with a doctorate in engineering or technology, withprescribed experience in certain domains. To be an administrativemember, the individual should possess fifteen years’ administrativeexperience including experience of five years in dealing withenvironmental matters in the Central or State Government or in a reputednational or state level institution. The court proceeded to hold in HanumanLaxman Aroskar (supra), that the grant of environmental clearance toa greenfield airport in Goa did not receive proper merits review by theNGT.

17. Having regard to these decisions, and given the nature ofjurisdiction which the NGT has been invested with, the substantialquestions of law that arise in the present case, are whether the approachto the issue of limitation by the NGT was correct, and whether on acorrect interpretation of law, the appeal under Section 16 was filed withinthe 90 days period, in the facts of this case.

Applicability of General Clauses Act

18. There can be no dispute that the period of limitation set out ina special law, which provides for remedies and appeals, has to beconstrued in its terms and without reference to the Limitation Act, if itcontains specific provisions delineating the time or period within whichapplications or appeals can be preferred, and confines the considerationof applications for condoning the delay to a specific number of days.Undoubtedly, in such cases, the Limitation Act would be inapplicable.[10]

10 That provision is as follows:

29. Savings.—(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the IndianContract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or applicationa period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions A

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AThere are several previous judgments of this court holding that whereperiods of limitation are prescribed under special laws, appeals thatexceed the period granted and are within the extended period of limitationin the special law, can be entertained at the discretion of the tribunal, orcourt concerned and the Limitation Act would not apply upon expiry ofsuch extended period.[11] This court holds that there is merit in theBcontention of the Union that the provisions of the Limitation Act areinapplicable. This is, however, not dispositive of the issue; the next questionis whether there is merit in the appellant’s argument that the NGT shouldhave considered the issue of whether the appeal was filed within theextended period prescribed under the proviso to Section 16, i.e. withinCsixty days after the expiration of the initial 30 day period, required in themain provision.

19. The appellant argues that since there is no indication to thecontrary; the appeal is to be considered as having been filed within theextended period of 60 days, since the last (of the 60 days) was a SundayD(12.07.2020). The appellant relied on Section 10 of the General ClausesAct, for this purpose. The respondents, notably the Union, opposed thisargument.

20. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897[12] stipulates thatwhen the last date for doing something falls on a public holiday, the actE“shall be considered as done..” if it “is done or taken on the nextday afterwards on which the Court or office is open”. This provision

of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule andfor the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appealor application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24(inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expresslyFexcluded by such special or local law.”11 Kaushalya Rani v Gopal Singh 1964 (4) SCR 982; Collector of Excise & Customs v.Hongo India (P) Ltd. (2009) 5 SCC 791; Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.(2001) 8 SCC 470; Patel Bros. v. State of Assam (2017) 2 SCC 35012 “10. Computation of time.— (1) Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made afterthe commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be doneGor taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if theCourt or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act orproceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on thenext day afterwards on which the Court or office is open:Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding towhich the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, applies.

(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and Regulations made on orHafter the fourteenth day of January, 1887.”

SRIDEVI DATLA v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

applies to all Central Acts enacted after the said Act was brought intoforce. The scope of this provision was considered by this Court in H.H.Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh[13]by a four judge Bench,which explained the object of Section 10 and held as under:

“5. … Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for theperformance of an act in a court or office, and that periodexpires on a holiday, then according to the section the actshould be considered to have been done within that period, ifit is done on the next day on which the court or office isopen. For that section to apply, therefore, all that is requisiteis that there should be a period prescribed, and that periodshould expire on a holiday.”

21. Other decisions[14 ]have followed the same reasoning. It is alsonoticeable that there is no indication in the NGT Act that Section 10 ofthe General Clauses Act cannot be applied. It is therefore, held that theprovision applies proprio vigore to all appeals filed under the NGT Act.

Approach of the court in considering the application forcondonation of delay

22. What constitutes “sufficient cause” in terms of Section 16of the NGT Act? While it is unexceptionable for the Project Applicant toargue that the Limitation Act is per se inapplicable to proceedings underthe NGT Act, given that the basic, and outer period of limitation for filingan appeal have been enacted, nevertheless, what constitutes sufficientcause, is left to the discretion of the tribunal. Here, the court discerns asurfeit of authority on what the term denotes, and the general approachof the court, in dealing with delay.

23. In G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer[15], speakingfor this court, Venkatachaliah, J summarized the position in the followingterms:

“14. The contours of the area of discretion of the courts inthe matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are setout in a number of pronouncements of this Court.

13 1957 SCR 208.

14 Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil (1996) 1 SCC 169; Mohd. Ayub v. State of U.P.,(2009) 17 SCC 70.

15 (1988) 2 SCC 142

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ASee Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361 : (1962)2 SCR 762] , Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR1969 SC 575 : (1969) 1 SCR 1006], Concord of IndiaInsurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979SCC (Cri) 996 : (1979) 3 SCR 694], Mata Din v. A.Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : (1970) 2 SCR 90]Band Collector (LA) v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107 : 1989 SCC(Tax) 172], etc. There is, it is true, no general principle savingthe party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence,deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the partof the party or its counsel there is no reason why the oppositeCside should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each casewill have to be considered on the particularities of its ownspecial facts. However, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ inSection 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advancesubstantial justice and generally delays in preferring appealsare required to be condoned in the interest of justice whereDno gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of thedelay.”

24. Much later, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur NafarAcademy[16] this court referred to a large number of previous judgments[17],Eand observed that adoption of a strict standard of proof sometimes failsto protect public justice and it may result in public mischief. Otherdecisions have highlighted that there cannot be a universal formula tojudge whether sufficient cause has, or has not been shown and theexercise is necessarily fact specific; in Improvement Trust v. Ujagar FSingh[18], the court held:

“16. While considering [an] application for condonation ofdelay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to theconclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been madeout or not.”

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17 State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao (2005) 3 SCC 752; New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v.Shanti Misra (1975) 2 SCC 840; N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC123; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132; and Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V.Ayisumma (1996) 10 SCC 634.H18 (2010) 6 SCC 786

25. The court also emphasized that each case has to be balancedon the basis of its facts and the surrounding circumstances in which theparties act and behave.

26. Yet another dimension to the issue was highlighted in ManibenDevraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai[19], where thecourt underlined a distinction between a case where the delay is inordinate,and a case where the delay is of few days and that in the former casethe consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor;in the latter case, no such consideration arises. After noticing that aliberal and justice-oriented approach needs to be taken, it was statedthat the court, equally should be sensitive to the fact that “the successfullitigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgmentunder challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages oflitigation apart from the cost.” The court then held that:

“24. What colour the expression ‘sufficient cause’ would getin the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend onbona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds thatthere has been no negligence on the part of the applicantand the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides,then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, theexplanation given by the applicant is found to be concoctedor he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then itwould be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condonethe delay.”

27. It is evident that the term sufficient cause is relative, factdependant, and has many hues, largely deriving colour from the facts ofeach case, and the behaviour of the litigant who seeks condonation ofdelay (in approaching the court). However, what can broadly be said tobe universally accepted is that in principle, the applicant must displaybona fides, should not have been negligent, and the delay occasionedshould not be such that condoning it would seriously prejudice the otherparty.

28. Keeping these principles in mind, it is relevant to considerwhether the NGT’s refusal to exercise discretion, in the facts andcircumstances of this case, was erroneous. The court is conscious ofthe fact that exercise of discretion, per se, is a fact dependent one, and AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

Aconsiderable latitude should be given to the court or tribunal of the firstinstance, in the performance of that task. Nevertheless, as decided, casesand judgments have shown that the exercise of discretion does at times,call for appellate scrutiny by this court. This is one such. The appellantpleaded that since the documentation attendant to the clearance grantedto the Project Applicant was voluminous, and expert as well asBprofessional legal advice of the kind necessary to approach the NGTwas not available in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the procuring of relevantdocuments, and correspondence with counsel in Delhi and drafting ofthe appeal entailed some delay.

29. This court is of the opinion that there is merit in the appellant’sCargument. The respondents, especially, the project applicant, had urgedthat the appellant is an interested party, and cannot be called a public-spirited citizen, because she had opposed acquisition of land for the airportand therefore, was able to access legal advice at the High Court stage.There is, in our opinion, nothing in the NGT Act which excludes partieswho would be directly affected by a project, that hasDenvironmental repercussions, from accessing the tribunal (NGT).Likewise, characterizing the nature of legal advice that can be accessedfor challenging land acquisition, as similar to a challenge to environmentalclearance which involves application of mind to technical issues in adetailed manner, would be unfair and simplistic. Scientific or technical Esupport – apart from expert professional legal advice is necessary, if theNGT were to be approached. In these circumstances, this court is of theopinion that given the mandate of the NGT Act, the exercise ofdiscretion, as was done in this case, to reject the appeal by dismissingthe application for condonation of delay, on the ground that no sufficientcause was shown, was erroneous and based on a narrow reading of theFlaw. An appeal to the NGT in such matters is no ordinary matter; it hasthe potential of irrevocably changing the environment with the possibilityof likely injury. Application of judicial mind by an independent tribunal insuch cases, at the first appellate stage, is almost a necessity.

30. In view of the foregoing findings, this court is of the opinionthat the impugned order of NGT has to be and is, therefore set aside.GThe delay in filing the appeal before the NGT is hereby condoned; theparties shall now appear and proceed to argue the appeal on its merit,which shall then be disposed in accordance with law. The appeal isallowed. There shall be no order on costs.HDevika GujralAppeal allowed.