GEETA DEVI versus STATE OF U.P. & ORS. on 18 January 2022

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 06.12.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature atAllahabad, Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2019 bywhich the High Court has dismissed the said appeal preferred by thevictim of the offence, which was filed against the judgment and orderdated 13.09.2019 passed by the learned Special Court, acquitting therespondent accused under Sections 354, 504, 506 of the IPC, Section3(1)(x) and 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the victim – original appellant haspreferred the present appeal.

2. That the learned Special Court/Trial Court convicted respondentNos.2 to 4 – accused for the offences punishable under Sections 452,323/34 and 325/34 of the Indian Penal Code, however, acquitted themfor the offences punishable under Sections 354, 504, 506 of the IPC,Section 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and the ScheduledTribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Feeling aggrieved anddissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Special A

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ACourt acquitting the respondents – accused for the aforesaid offences,the victim preferred an appeal before the High Court by way of CriminalAppeal No.2356 of 2019 and by the impugned one page/paragraphjudgment and order, the High Court has dismissed the said appeal, whichis the subject matter of the present appeal before this Court.

B3. We have heard Shri T.V. George, learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the appellant, Shri Adarsh Upadhyay, learned counsel appearingon behalf of the State – Respondent No.1 and Shri Shahid Anwar, learnedcounsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.2 to 4 – accused.

4. Number of submissions have been made by the learned counselCappearing on behalf of the respective parties. However, for the reasonsstated hereinbelow we propose to remand the matter to the High Courtand hence we refrain from dealing with any of the submissions made bythe learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties onmerits as any observation made by this Court may affect either theprosecution or the defence.D

5. We have gone through the judgment and order passed by theHigh Court dismissing the appeal preferred by the victim – appellant. Asalready noted, the impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt as such is one page/paragraph order. After observingin paragraph3 that “I have gone through the judgment of the learned Trial CourtEcarefully” thereafter without further elaborate re-appreciation of theentire evidence on record the High Court has dismissed the appeal byobserving in paragraph 4 as under: - “4. Trial Court has considered the statement of P.W.-2 carefullyand has found that the testimony of P.W.-2 cannot be relied on forFoffence under Sections 354, 504, 506 IPC, 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(xi)S.C./S.T. Act. There is no corroboration to the testimony of P.W.-2 when the trial Court itself has found the testimony of P.W.2doubtful. There is no ground to interfere with the well consideredjudgment of trial Court and, therefore, I find this appeal withoutGmerit and substance. The appeal is thus, dismissed.”

6. We are constrained to observe that this is not the manner inwhich the High Court should have dealt with the appeal against an orderof acquittal which as such is a first appeal against the order of acquittal.The High Court has only made general observations on the deposition ofthe witness examined. However, there is no re-appreciation of the entireH

evidence in detail which exercise ought to have been made by the HighCourt while dealing with the judgment and order of acquittal. The HighCourt ought to have re-appreciated the entire evidence on record as itwas dealing with a first appeal. Being the first appellate court, the HighCourt was required to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record andalso the reasoning given by the learned Trial Court. How to deal withand decide an appeal in the case of an acquittal passed by the learnedTrial Court is dealt with in the case of Umedbhai Jadavbhai Vs. TheState of Gujarat (1978) 1 SCC 228. It was observed therein and heldby this Court that once the appeal is entertained against the order ofacquittal, the High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidenceindependently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Courtwould give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if thesame were arrived at after a proper appreciation of the evidence. Againstan order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court the High Court would bejustified on re-appreciation of the entire evidence independently and cometo its own conclusion that acquittal is perverse and manifestly erroneous.

6.1 How to deal with, decide and dispose of the criminal appealagainst an acquittal under Section 378 Cr.PC has been elaborately dealtwith by this Court and after considering the earlier catena of decisionsof this Court in the case of Guru Dutt Pathak Vs. State of UttarPradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 116, in paragraphs 15 to 20 it has been observedas under: -

15. In Babu v. State of Kerala [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010)9 SCC 189, this Court has reiterated the principles to be followedin an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. In paras12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 196-199)

“12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelinesfor the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order ofacquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court shouldnot ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case wheretwo views are possible, though the view of the appellate courtmay be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgmentof acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entireevidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whetherthe views of the trial court were perverse or otherwiseunsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whetherin arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take AB

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into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken intoconsideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law.Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be asubject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide BalakRam v. State of U.P. [Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3SCC 219], Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar [ShambhooMissir v. State of Bihar, (1990) 4 SCC 17] , ShailendraPratap v. State of U.P. [Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.,(2003) 1 SCC 761], Narendra Singh v. State ofM.P. [Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC699], Budh Singh v. State of U.P. [Budh Singh v. State ofU.P., (2006) 9 SCC 731], State of U.P. v. Ram VeerSingh [State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh, (2007) 13 SCC102], S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy [S. RamaKrishna v. S. Rami Reddy, (2008) 5 SCC 535], Arulveluv. State [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206], PerlaSomasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. [Perla SomasekharaReddy v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98] and RamSingh v. State of H.P. [Ram Singh v. State of H.P., (2010) 2SCC 445)

13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor [Sheo Swarup v.King Emperor, 1934 SCC OnLine PC 42], the Privy Councilobserved as under: (SCC OnLine PC)

‘… the High Court should and will always give properweight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views ofthe trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) thepresumption of innocence in favour of the accused, apresumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he hasbeen acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to thebenefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate courtin disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who hadthe advantage of seeing the witnesses.’

14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently beenfollowed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State [TulsiramKanu v. State, AIR 1954 SC 1 : 1954 Cri LJ 225] , BalbirSingh v. State of Punjab [Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab,AIR 1957 SC 216 : 1957 Cri LJ 481] , M.G. Agarwal v. Stateof Maharashtra [M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 235] , KheduMohton v. State of Bihar [Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar,(1970) 2 SCC 450 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 479] , Sambasivan v. Stateof Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] , Bhagwan Singh v. State ofM.P. [Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2002) 4 SCC 85 :2002 SCC (Cri) 736] and State of Goa v. SanjayThakran [State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC755 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162] .)

15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [Chandrappav. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415] , this Court reiteratedthe legal position as under : (SCC p. 432, para 42)

‘42. … (1) An appellate court has full power to review,reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the orderof acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,restriction or condition on exercise of such power and anappellate court on the evidence before it may reach its ownconclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compellingreasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strongcircumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”,etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellatecourt in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies aremore in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasisethe reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittalthan to curtail the power of the court to review the evidenceand to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that incase of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of theaccused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available tohim under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudencethat every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless heis proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, theaccused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of hisinnocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthenedby the trial court.

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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basisof the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturbthe finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’

16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. [Ghurey Lal v. Stateof U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60] , thisCourt reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate courtin dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquittedthe accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittalbolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate courtmust give due weight and consideration to the decision of thetrial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage ofwatching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a betterposition to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh [State ofRajasthan v. Naresh, (2009) 9 SCC 368 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)1069] , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of thisCourt and laid down that : (SCC p. 374, para 20)

‘20. … An order of acquittal should not be lightly interferedwith even if the Court believes that there is some evidencepointing out the finger towards the accused.”

18. In State of U.P. v. Banne [State of U.P. v. Banne,(2009) 4 SCC 271 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 260] , this Court gavecertain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would bejustified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the HighCourt. The circumstances include : (Banne case [State ofU.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 260] ,SCC p. 286, para 28)

‘28. … (i) The High Court’s decision is based on totallyerroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;

(ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidenceand documents on record;

(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing withthe evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriageof justice;

(iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust andunreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the recordof the case;

(v) This Court must always give proper weight andconsideration to the findings of the High Court;

(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interferingwith a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Courthave recorded an order of acquittal.’

A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapalv. State [Dhanapal v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 401 : (2010) 1SCC (Cri) 336] .

19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to theeffect that in exceptional cases where there are compellingcircumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to beperverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order ofacquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind thepresumption of innocence of the accused and further that thetrial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence.Interference in a routine manner where the other view ispossible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons forinterference

16. When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held tobe perverse has been dealt with and considered in para 20 of theaforesaid decision, which reads as under : (Babu case [Babu v.State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] ,SCC p. 199)

“20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be heldto be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoringor excluding relevant material or by taking into considerationirrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be saidto be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if thefinding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the viceof irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. DelhiAdmn. [Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131] , Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [Excise &Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath &Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] , Triveni Rubber &Plastics v. CCE [Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, 1994Supp (3) SCC 665] , Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [Gaya A

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Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501], Arulvelu v.State [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC(Cri) 288] and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State ofA.P. [Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009)10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372] )”

It is further observed, after following the decision of thisCourt in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [KuldeepSingh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S)429], that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidenceor thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable personwould act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there issome evidence on record which is acceptable and which couldbe relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverseand the findings would not be interfered with.

17. In the decision of this Court in Vijay Mohan Singh v. Stateof Karnataka [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka,(2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] , this Court again hadan occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC and theinterference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. ThisCourt considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under: (VijayMohan Singh case, SCC pp. 447-49)

“31. An identical question came to be considered beforethis Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v.State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108] .In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered withthe order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court onreappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, theHigh Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider thereasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting theaccused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Courtobserved and held in para 10 as under : (SCC p. 233)

‘10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against theorder of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciatethe entire evidence independently and come to its ownconclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give dueimportance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. Thisrule will not be applicable in the present case where theSessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of avery material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstancesof the case.’

31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v.State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] ,the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by thelearned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciationof the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court didnot record its conclusion on the question whether the approachof the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patentlyillegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable.Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting theaccused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trialcourt, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed bythe learned trial court was perverse and suffered frominfirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order ofconviction passed by the High Court. While confirming theorder of conviction passed by the High Court, this Courtobserved in para 8 as under : (SCC p. 416)

‘8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertainwhether the High Court has conformed to the aforementionedprinciples. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceededin the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh BabulalDoshi v. State of Gujarat [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. Stateof Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972] viz. firstrecording its conclusion on the question whether the approachof the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patentlyillegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable,which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittalthough the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgmentduly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then willthis non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgmentunder appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, theapproach of the court which is considering the validity of thejudgment of an appellate court which has reversed the orderof acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself A

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if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidencewas patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it aredemonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of theappellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold thatthe trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case,there is obviously no reason why the appellate court’s judgmentshould be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comesto the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does notsuffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that theinterference by the appellate court in the order of acquittalwas not justified; then in such a case the judgment of theappellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonableviews, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand.Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed toexamine the judgment of the trial court in this case.’

31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State ofKerala [K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala,(1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 410] , after observing thatthough there is some substance in the grievance of the learnedcounsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Courthas not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge foraccording an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set asidethe order of conviction passed by the High Court after havingfound that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording theorder of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived atby the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects wasunsustainable. This Court further observed that as the SessionsJudge was not justified in discarding the relevant/materialevidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court,therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence andrecord its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidenceof the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by thetrial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesseswere not at all sound. This Court also observed that as theevaluation of the evidence made by the trial court wasmanifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the HighCourt to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by thelearned Sessions Judge.

31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653] , in para 5, this Court observedand held as under : (AIR pp. 809-10)

‘5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for theappellant that the judgment of the trial court being one ofacquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mereappreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecutionunless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trialJudge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say thatunless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPCcame to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal underappeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.

It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to theHigh Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to reviewthe entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course,keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumptionof innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthenedby the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court whichhad the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesseswhose evidence has been recorded in its presence.

It is also well-settled that the court of appeal has as widepowers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against anorder of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an orderof conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption ofinnocence with which the accused person starts in the trialcourt continues even up to the appellate stage and that theappellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of thetrial court which recorded the order of acquittal.

If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping thoseprinciples in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, thejudgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in thisconnection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, SurajpalSingh v. State [Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC1207] ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [Wilayat Khan v. Stateof U.P., 1951 SCC 898] ) In our opinion, there is no substancein the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the HighCourt was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence andcoming to its own conclusions.’

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31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. [K. GopalReddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri)305] , this Court has observed that where the trial court allowsitself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthyevidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidencewhich is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the HighCourt to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administrationof justice be brought to ridicule.”

18. In Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State ofGujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108] , in para 10, itis observed and held as under : (SCC p. 233)

“10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against theorder of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciatethe entire evidence independently and come to its ownconclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give dueimportance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the samewere arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. Thisrule will not be applicable in the present case where theSessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of avery material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstancesof the case.”

19. In Atley v. State of U.P. [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653] , this Court has observed and held asunder : (AIR pp. 809-10, para 5)

“5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for theappellant that the judgment of the trial court being one ofacquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mereappreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecutionunless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trialJudge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say thatunless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPCcame to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal underappeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.

It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to theHigh Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to reviewthe entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course,keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthenedby the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court whichhad the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesseswhose evidence has been recorded in its presence.

It is also well-settled that the court of appeal has as widepowers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against anorder of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an orderof conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption ofinnocence with which the accused person starts in the trialcourt continues even up to the appellate stage and that theappellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of thetrial court which recorded the order of acquittal.

If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping thoseprinciples in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, thejudgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in thisconnection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, SurajpalSingh v. State [Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC 1207]; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [Wilayat Khan v. State ofU.P., 1951 SCC 898] ) In our opinion, there is no substance inthe contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the HighCourt was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence andcoming to its own conclusions.”

20. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. [K. Gopal Reddy v. Stateof A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305] , this Court hasobserved that where the trial court allows itself to be beset withfanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasonsand takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it isthe obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest ofjustice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.”

7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaiddecisions of this Court to the facts of the case on hand and whileconsidering the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court,we find the same is unsustainable. On perusal of the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High Court, we find that decision of the HighCourt is totally erroneous as it has ignored the settled legal position. Asobserved hereinabove, the High Court has not at all discussed and/or re-appreciated the entire evidence on record. In fact, the High Court hasonly made the general observations on the deposition of the witnesses A

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Aexamined. However, there is no re-appreciation of entire evidence onrecord in detail, which ought to have been done by the High Court, beinga first appellate court. Under the circumstances on the aforesaid groundalone, impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court deservesto be quashed and set aside and the same is to be remanded back to theHigh Court to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and onBits own merits being mindful of the observations made hereinabove.

8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above andwithout expressing anything on the merits of the case, the present appealis allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Courtin Criminal Appeal No.2356 of 2019 is hereby quashed and set aside.CThe appeal before the High Court is ordered to be restored to its originalfile. The High Court to decide and dispose of the appeal in accordancewith law and on its own merits, bearing in mind the observations madehereinabove. The High Court is requested to decide and dispose of theappeal on merits at the earliest.

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Devika Gujral

Appeal allowed.

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