RAJENDRA BAJORIA AND OTHERS versus HEMANT KUMAR JALAN AND OTHERS on 21 September 2021

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals challenge the judgment and order passed by theDivision Bench of the High Court of Calcutta dated 14[th] September2018, thereby allowing the appeals being APO Nos. 491 and 520 of A

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A2017 filed by the respondents-defendants, challenging the order passedby the Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta dated 22[nd] September2017. Vide the said order dated 22[nd] September 2017, the Single Judgehad dismissed G.A. Nos.1688 and 1571 of 2017 filed by the originaldefendants, seeking dismissal of the suit, alternatively for rejection ofthe plaint as well as for revocation of the leave granted under Clause 12Bof the Letters Patent in the instant suit being C.S. No.79 of 2017.

3. A partnership firm namely ‘Soorajmull Nagarmull’ (hereinafterreferred to as, ‘the partnership firm’) was constituted under a Deed ofPartnership dated 6[th] December 1943. Baijnath Jalan, Mohanlal Jalan,Babulal Jalan, Sewbhagwan Jalan, Keshabdeo Jalan, Nandkishore Jalan,CDeokinandan Jalan, Chiranjilal Bajoria and Kishorilal Jalan were thepartners in the partnership firm. It is not in dispute that none of thepartners are alive. Plaintiff Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are the sons of Late ChiranjilalBajoria, who died on 31[st] December 1981. Plaintiff Nos. 4 and 5 are thesons of Late Deokinandan Jalan, who died on 12[th] July 1997. PlaintiffDNo. 6 is the son of Late Mohanlal Jalan, who died on 1[st] May 1982. Thedefendants are the legal heirs of the other original partners in thepartnership firm.

4. A civil suit being C.S. No. 79 of 2017 came to be filed by theplaintiffs before the Calcutta High Court seeking, inter alia, the followingEreliefs:-

“(a)Decree for declaration that the plaintiffs along with thedefendants are entitled to the assets and properties of thefirm “Soorajmull Nagarmull” as the heirs of the originalpartners of the reconstituted firm under the partnership deedFdated 6[th] December, 1943, in the share of the said originalpartners as mentioned in paragraph 3 above; (b)Decree for declaration that the plaintiffs along with thedefendants are consequently entitled to represent the firmin all proceedings before the concerned authorities of theGState of Bihar for the acquisition of its Bhagalpur land;

(c) Decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendantNo.1 or any of the other defendants from in any mannerrepresenting or holding themselves out to be the authorisedrepresentative of the firm or the repository of all its authority,moneys assets and properties or from seeking to representH

the firm in its dealings and transactions in respect of any ofits assets and properties including the acquisition proceedingof the firm’s Bhagalpur land or from receiving any monieson behalf of the firm, whether on account of compensationfor its Bhagalpur land or otherwise; (d)Decree for mandatory injunction directing the defendantNo. 1 to disclose full particulars of all assets and propertiesof the firm, full particulars of all its dealings and transactionsincluding any dealing or transaction concerning any assetor property of the firm, and full accounts of the firm for thepurpose of its dissolution; (e)Decree for the dissolution of the firm Soorajmull Nagarmulland for the winding up of its affairs upon realising the assetsand properties of the firm, collecting all moneys due to thefirm, applying the same in paying the debts of the firm, ifany, in paying the capital contributed by any partner andthereafter by dividing the residue amongst the heirs of theoriginal partners in the shares to which they were entitledto the profits of the firm in terms of the Partnership Deeddated 6[th] December, 1943.”

5. In the said suit, the defendants filed two applications beingG.A. Nos. 1688 and 1571 of 2017, inter alia, seeking dismissal of thesuit, or in the alternative, rejection of the plaint on the ground that theplaint does not disclose any cause of action, and the relief as claimed inthe plaint could not be granted. It was also urged on behalf of thedefendants that the suit was filed beyond the period of limitation, and assuch, was also liable to be rejected on the said ground. The Single Judgevide judgment and order dated 22[nd] September 2017, dismissed the saidapplications. Insofar as the ground with regard to limitation is concerned,the Single Judge found that the issue of limitation was a mixed questionof fact and law and did not consider the prayer of the defendants on thatground. Being aggrieved thereby, the original defendants filed appealsbeing APO Nos. 491 and 520 of 2017 before the Division Bench of theHigh Court. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugnedjudgment and order dated 14[th] September 2018 held that the reliefs, asclaimed in the plaint, could not be granted, and therefore, while allowingthe appeals, rejected the plaint being C.S. No. 79 of 2017. It, however,observed that, as provided under Order VII Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure A

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ACode (hereinafter referred to as the “CPC”), the order of rejection ofthe plaint shall not of its own force preclude the plaintiffs from presentinga fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action. Being aggrievedthereby, the present appeals.

6. We have heard Shri Gopal Jain, learned Senior CounselBappearing on behalf of the appellants, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned SeniorCounsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1, and Shri K.V.Viswanathan and Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned Senior Counselappearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2, 3, 7 to 9, 11, 12 and 16 to21.

C7. Shri Gopal Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf ofthe appellants, submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court ofCalcutta has grossly erred in allowing the appeals and reversing thewell-reasoned judgment and order passed by the Single Judge of theHigh Court of Calcutta. Shri Jain submitted that the Single Judge, afterreading the averments in the plaint, had rightly come to the conclusionDthat the plaint discloses cause of action, and as such, could not be rejectedunder Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. He submitted that the Division Bench,in the impugned judgment and order, has almost conducted a mini-trial tofind out as to whether the relief as claimed in the plaint could be grantedor not. He submitted that such an exercise is impermissible whileEconsidering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The learnedSenior Counsel, relying on the judgment of this Court in the case ofDahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead ThroughLegal Representatives and Others[1], submitted that the power conferredon the court to terminate a civil action is a drastic one. He submitted thatsuch a power cannot be routinely exercised. The learned Senior CounselFsubmitted that for finding out as to whether the cause of action exists ornot, it is necessary to read the averments made in the plaint in theirentirety and not in piecemeal. Shri Jain, therefore, submitted that theimpugned judgment and order is not sustainable and is liable to be setaside.G8. Dr. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of therespondent No.1, submitted that if the averments made in the plaint wereread in juxtaposition with the provisions of Sections 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (hereinafter referred to as “the saidAct”) read with clauses in the Partnership Deed dated 6[th] DecemberH1 (2020) 7 SCC 366

1943, it would reveal that none of the reliefs, as claimed in the plaint,could be granted. He submitted that as per Section 40 of the said Act, afirm can be dissolved only with the consent of all the partners or inaccordance with the contract between the partners. He submitted that,though under Section 42 of the said Act, a firm could be dissolved on thedeath of a partner, however, this is subjected to a contract between thepartners. He submitted that, a perusal of clause 4 of the PartnershipDeed dated 6[th] December 1943 would show that it specifically providesthat upon the death of any partner, the partnership shall not beautomatically dissolved. As such, the submission in that regard is withoutmerit. He submitted that Section 44 of the said Act provides that thedissolution of the firm could be maintained on the ground specified therein,only if the suit is at the instance of the partners. He submitted thatadmittedly the plaintiffs were not the partners, and as such, the suit attheir instance was not tenable. The learned Senior Counsel relies on thejudgments of this Court in the cases of T. Arivandandam v. T.V.Satyapal and Another[2 ]and Pearlite Liners (P) Ltd. v. ManoramaSirsi[3], in support of his submission, that if the reliefs, as sought in theplaint, cannot be granted, then the only option available to the Court is toreject the plaint.

9. Shri Viswanathan and Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learnedSenior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 2, 3, 7 to 9, 11,12 and 16 to 21, also made similar submissions.

10. It will be relevant to refer to Sections 40, 42, 43 and 44 of thesaid Act:- “40. Dissolution by agreement.—A firm may be dissolved withthe consent of all the partners or in accordance with a contractbetween the partners.

41. …….

42. Dissolution on the happening of certain contingencies.—Subject to contract between the partners a firm is dissolved—

(a) if constituted for a fixed term, by the expiry of the term; (b)if constituted to carry out one or more adventures orundertakings, by the completion thereof; 2 (1977) 4 SCC 467

3 (2004) 3 SCC 172

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A(c)by the death of a partner; and

(d) by the adjudication of a partner as an insolvent.

43. Dissolution by notice of partnership at will.—Where thepartnership is at will, the firm may be dissolved by any partnerBgiving notice in writing to all the other partners of his intention todissolve the firm.

(2) The firm is dissolved as from the date mentioned in thenotice as the date of dissolution or, if no date is so mentioned, asfrom the date of the communication of the notice.

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44. Dissolution by the Court.—At the suit of a partner, theCourt may dissolve a firm on any of following grounds, namely:—

(a) that a partner has become of unsound mind, in whichcase the suit may be brought as well by the next friendof the partner who has become of unsound mind as byany other partner; D

(b) that a partner, other than the partner suing, has becomein any way permanently incapable of performing hisduties as partner;

(c) that a partner, other than the partner suing, is guilty ofconduct which is likely to affect prejudicially the carryingon of the business, regard being had to the nature of thebusiness; E

(d) that a partner, other than the partner suing, willfully orFpersistently commits breach of agreements relating tothe management of the affairs of the firm or the conductof its business, or otherwise so conducts himself inmatters relating to the business that it is not reasonablypracticable for the other partners to carry on the businessin partnership with him; G

(e) that a partner, other than the partner, suing, has in anyway transferred the whole of his interest in the firm to athird party, or has allowed his share to be charged underthe provisions of Rule 49 of Order XXI of the FirstSchedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of H

1908), or has allowed it to be sold in the recovery ofarrears of land revenue or of any dues recoverable asarrears of land revenue due by the partner; (f)that the business of the firm cannot be carried on saveat a loss; or (g)on any other ground which renders it just and equitablethat the firm should be dissolved.”

11. It will also be relevant to refer to Clauses 4, 6 and 7 of thePartnership Deed dated 6[th] December 1943:

“4. That upon the death of any partner the partnership shall not beautomatically dissolved but the surviving partners may admit thelegal representative of the deceased unto the partnership by mutualconsent.

5. ……

6. In case of death of any partner or retirement during thecontinuance of the partnership shall be deemed to exist only uptoto the end of the accounting period of the year during which thedeath or retirement occurs and the estate of the deceased partneror the retiring partner shall be entitled to receive and be responsiblefor all profits and losses of the partnership up to the end of theaccounting period as the case may be.

7. This Indenture further witnesseth that the said parties heretohereby mutually covenant and agree that they will carry on thesaid business in partnership until dissolution under and inaccordance with the provisions and stipulation hereinabefore statedor contained in the said Indenture dated the 1[st] day of September,1938 so far as the same respectively are now subsisting andcapable of taking and are applicable to the altered circumstanceshereinbefore appearing And any dispute in relation to the saidpartnership shall be decided by Arbitration according to theprovisions of the Indian Arbitration and for that purpose each ofthe disputing parties may nominate one Arbitrator Provided.However that none of the parties hereto shall at any time beentitled to apply to any Court of law for the dissolution of thepartnership or for appointment of a Receiver over the partnershipor! any portion of its assets.”

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A12. From the perusal of the plaint, it could be gathered that thecase of the plaintiffs is that in spite of demise of the three original partnersof the partnership firm, through whom the plaintiffs were claiming, thedefendants have been carrying on the business of the partnership firm.It is their case that the accounts of the partnership firm have not beenfinalized and that the share of the profits of the partnership firm has notBbeen paid to them. It is also the case of the plaintiffs that the defendantsare seeking to represent the partnership firm to the exclusion of theplaintiffs and that the defendants are siphoning off funds of the partnershipfirm. It is their case that they along with the defendants are entitled tothe assets and properties of the partnership firm as legal heirs of theCoriginal partners of the partnership firm, reconstituted under thePartnership Deed dated 6[th] December 1943.

13. No doubt that, it is rightly contended on behalf of the plaintiffsthat, only on the basis of the averments made in the plaint, it could beascertained as to whether a cause of action is made out or not. It isDequally true that for finding out the same, the entire pleadings in theplaint will have to be read and that too, at their face value. At this stage,the defence taken by the defendants cannot be looked into.

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in thecase of T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Another (supra):

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“5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning thepetitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedlyand unrepentently resorted to. From the statement of the factsfound in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain thatthe suit now pending before the First Munsif’s Court, Bangalore,Fis a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints.The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful— not formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestlyvexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing aclear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order7, Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the groundGmentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting hascreated the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud atthe first hearing by examining the party searchingly underOrder 10, CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsiblelaw suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examiningHthe party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot

down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourcefulenough to meet such men, (Cr. XI) and must be triggered againstthem. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised whatGeorge Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of MahatmaGandhi:

“It is dangerous to be too good.”

15. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that reading ofthe averments made in the plaint should not only be formal but alsomeaningful. It has been held that if clever drafting has created the illusionof a cause of action, and a meaningful reading thereof would show thatthe pleadings are manifestly vexatious and meritless, in the sense of notdisclosing a clear right to sue, then the court should exercise its powerunder Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. It has been held that such a suit has tobe nipped in the bud at the first hearing itself.

16. It will also be apposite to refer to the following observationsof this Court in the case of Pearlite Liners (P) Ltd. (supra):

“10. The question arises as to whether in the background of thefacts already stated, such reliefs can be granted to the plaintiff.Unless there is a term to the contrary in the contract of service, atransfer order is a normal incidence of service. Further, it is to beconsidered that if the plaintiff does not comply with the transferorder, it may ultimately lead to termination of service. Therefore,a declaration that the transfer order is illegal and void, in factamounts to imposing the plaintiff on the defendant in spite of thefact that the plaintiff allegedly does not obey order of her superiorsin the management of the defendant Company. Such a relief cannotbe granted. Next relief sought in the plaint is for a declaration thatshe continues to be in service of the defendant Company. Such adeclaration again amounts to enforcing a contract of personalservice which is barred under the law. The third relief sought bythe plaintiff is a permanent injunction to restrain the defendantfrom holding an enquiry against her. If the management feels thatthe plaintiff is not complying with its directions it has a right todecide to hold an enquiry against her. The management cannot berestrained from exercising its discretion in this behalf. Ultimately,this relief, if granted, would indirectly mean that the court isassisting the plaintiff in continuing with her employment with the A

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Adefendant Company, which is nothing but enforcing a contract ofpersonal service. Thus, none of the reliefs sought in the plaintcan be granted to the plaintiff under the law. The questionthen arises as to whether such a suit should be allowed tocontinue and go for trial. The answer in our view is clear,that is, such a suit should be thrown out at the threshold.BWhy should a suit which is bound to be dismissed for wantof jurisdiction of a court to grant the reliefs prayed for, betried at all? Accordingly, we hold that the trial court was absolutelyright in rejecting the plaint and the lower appellate court rightlyaffirmed the decision of the trial court in this behalf. The HighCCourt was clearly in error in passing the impugned judgmentwhereby the suit was restored and remanded to the trial court forbeing decided on merits. The judgment of the High Court is herebyset aside and the judgments of the courts below, that is, the trialcourt and the lower appellate court are restored. The plaint in thesuit stands rejected.”D

17. It could thus be seen that the court has to find out as to whetherin the background of the facts, the relief, as claimed in the plaint, can begranted to the plaintiff. It has been held that if the court finds that noneof the reliefs sought in the plaint can be granted to the plaintiff under theElaw, the question then arises is as to whether such a suit is to be allowedto continue and go for trial. This Court answered the said question byholding that such a suit should be thrown out at the threshold. This Court,therefore, upheld the order passed by the trial court of rejecting the suitand that of the appellate court, thereby affirming the decision of the trial Fcourt. This Court set aside the order passed by the High Court, whereinthe High Court had set aside the concurrent orders of the trial court andthe appellate court and had restored and remanded the suit for trial tothe trial court.

18. Therefore, the question that will have to be considered is as toGwhether the reliefs as claimed in the plaint by the plaintiffs could begranted or not. We do not propose to do that exercise, inasmuch as theDivision Bench of the High Court has elaborately considered the issueas to whether, applying the provisions of the said Act read with theaforesaid clauses in the Partnership Deed, the reliefs, as claimed in theplaint, could be granted or not. The relevant discussion by the High CourtHreads thus:

“(31) Let us take the prayers one by one. The first prayer is for adeclaration that the plaintiffs and the defendants are entitled tothe assets and properties of the said firm as the legal heirs of theoriginal partners. It is trite law that the partners of a firm areentitled only to the profits of the firm and upon dissolution of thefirm they are entitled to the surplus of the sale proceeds of theassets and properties of the firm, if any, after meeting the liabilitiesof the firm, in the share agreed upon in the partnership deed.

The partners do not have any right, title or interest in respect ofthe assets and properties of a firm so long as the firm is carryingon business. Hence, the plaintiffs as legal heirs of some of theoriginal partners cannot maintain any claim in respect of the assetsand properties of the said firm. Their prayer for declaration of co-ownership of the assets and properties of the said firm is notmaintainable in law.

The second prayer in the plaint is for a declaration that the plaintiffsalong with the defendants are entitled to represent the firm in allproceedings before the concerned authorities of the State of Biharfor the acquisition of its Bhagalpur land. The framing of this prayershows that this is a consequential relief claimed by the plaintiffswhich can only be granted if the first prayer is allowed. Since, inour opinion, prayer (a) of the plaint cannot be granted in law,prayer (b) also cannot be granted. Prayer (c) is also a consequentialrelief. Only if the plaintiffs were entitled to claim prayer (a), theycould claim prayer (c). We are not on whether or not the plaintiffswill succeed in obtaining prayer (a). According to us, the plaintiffsare not even entitled to pray for the first relief indicated above asthe same cannot be granted under the law of the land. Consequently,prayer (c) also cannot be granted.

Prayers (d) and (e) both pertain to dissolution of the firm. Prayer(e) is for a decree of dissolution and for winding up of the affairsof the firm. Prayer (d) is for full accounts of the firm for thepurpose of its dissolution (emphasis is ours). However, it is settledlaw that only the partners of a firm can seek dissolution of thefirm. Admittedly, the plaintiffs are not partners of the said firm.Sec. 39 of the Partnership Act provides that the dissolution ofpartnership between all the partners of a firm is called ‘thedissolution of the firm’. Sec. 40 provides that a firm may be ABC

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dissolved with the consent of all the partners or in accordancewith a contract between the partners. Sec. 41 provides forcompulsory dissolution of a firm. Sec. 42 stipulates that happeningof certain contingencies will cause dissolution of a firm but this issubject to contract between the partners. A partnership-at-willmay be dissolved by any partner giving notice in writing to theother partners of his intention to dissolve the firm, as provided inSec. 43 of the Act. Sec. 44 empowers the Court to dissolve a firmon the grounds mentioned therein on a suit of a partner.

Thus, it is clear that it is only a partner of a firm who can seekdissolution of the firm. The dissolution of a firm cannot be orderedby the court at the instance of a non-partner. Hence, the plaintiffsare not entitled to claim dissolution of the said firm. Consequently,they are also not entitled to pray for accounts for the purpose ofdissolution of the firm.

(32) What should the Court do if it finds that even taking theaverments in the plaint at face value, not one of the reliefs claimedin the plaint can be granted? Should the Court send the parties totrial? We think not. It will be an exercise in futility. It will be awaste of time, money and energy for both the plaintiffs and thedefendants as well as unnecessary consumption of Court’s time.It will not be fair to compel the defendants to go through theordinarily long drawn process of trial of a suit at huge expense,not to speak of the anxiety and un-peace of mind caused by alitigation hanging over one’s head like the Damocles’s sword. Nopurpose will be served by allowing the suit to proceed to trialsince the prayers as framed cannot be allowed on the basis of thepleadings in the plaint. The plaintiffs have not prayed for leave toamend the plaint. When the court is of the view just by readingthe plaint alone and assuming the averments made in the plaint tobe correct that none of the reliefs claimed can be granted in lawsince the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim such reliefs, the Courtshould reject the plaint as disclosing no cause of action. The reliefsclaimed in a plaint flow from and are the culmination of the causeof action pleaded in the plaint. The cause of action pleaded andthe prayers made in a plaint are inextricably intertwined. In thepresent case, the cause of action pleaded and the reliefs claimedare not recognized by the law of the land. Such a suit should notbe kept alive to go to trial…..”

19. We are in complete agreement with the findings of the HighCourt. Insofar as the reliance placed by Shri Jain on the judgment of thisCourt in the case of Dahiben (supra),to which one of us (L. NageswaraRao, J.) was a member, is concerned, in our view, the said judgmentrather than supporting the case of the plaintiffs, would support the caseof the defendants. Paragraphs 23.3, 23.4, 23.5 and 23.6 in the case ofDahiben (supra) read thus:

“23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in asuit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitationunder Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff tounnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case,it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so thatfurther judicial time is not wasted.

23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [AzharHussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followedin Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998SCC OnLineGuj281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823] this Court held that thewhole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is toensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to proveabortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of thecourt, in the following words : (SCC p. 324, para 12)

“12. … The whole purpose of conferment of such powers isto ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound toprove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time ofthe court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The swordof Damocles need not be kept hanging over his headunnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinarycivil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject aplaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.”

23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil actionis, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.

23.6. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court todetermine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action byscrutinising the averments in the plaint [Liverpool & LondonS.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] ,read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whetherthe suit is barred by any law.”

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A20. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the powerconferred on the court to terminate a civil action is a drastic one, and theconditions enumerated under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC are required tobe strictly adhered to. However, under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, theduty is cast upon the court to determine whether the plaint discloses acause of action, by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read inBconjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barredby any law. This Court has held that the underlying object of Order VIIRule 11 of CPC is that when a plaint does not disclose a cause of action,the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract theproceedings. It has been held that in such a case, it will be necessary toCput an end to the sham litigation so that further judicial time is not wasted.

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21. We are in agreement with the Division Bench of the CalcuttaHigh Court which, upon an elaborate scrutiny of the averments made inthe plaint, the reliefs claimed therein, the provisions of the said Act andthe clauses of the Partnership Deed, came to the conclusion that theDreliefs as sought in the plaint, cannot be granted.

22. The appeals are found to be without merit, and as such, aredismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. Nocosts.

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Ankit Gyan

Appeals dismissed.

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