OM PRAKASH versus SURESH KUMAR on 30 January 2020

[2020] 1 S.C.R. 565

OM PRAKASH

v.

SURESH KUMAR

(Civil Appeal Nos. 833-834 of 2020)

JANUARY 30, 2020

[A. M. KHANWILKAR, HEMANT GUPTA AND

DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]

Rent Control and Eviction:

Non-residential tenancy – Eviction proceedings – RentController directed eviction holding that there was bonafiderequirement of suit premises for the purpose of reconstruction –Appellate court confirmed the order of Rent Controller – In revision,the tenant urged that it was ready and willing to hand-over thepossession of suit premises subject to the land-lord agreeing to re-induct him as tenant in equivalent area occupied by him – HighCourt on the statement of the counsel for the land-lord that theland-lord was not averse to the offer so made by the tenant, disposedof the revision directing that the tenant would be re-inducted –Land-lord changed his advocate and filed review petition assertingthat he had never instructed his counsel to make any statementregarding re-induction – Review petition dismissed – Appeal toSupreme Court – Held: The statement regarding re-induction of thetenant made by the counsel for land-lord before High Court isunequivocal – Land-lord now cannot be allowed to resile from thestatement and is obliged to abide by the same – In order to providesame area as in the old building, in the facts of the case, to docomplete justice, the Court reached an arrangement regarding thearea, location, floor and entrance to the tenanted premises after re-induction – However, while doing so the tenant was deprived ofsome area – Land-lord is directed to pay compensation/damagesfor the said loss to the tenant.

Partly allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. From the tenor of the statement of the counselof the Land-lord, made before the High Court on behalf of the

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Aappellant (Land-lord), it is obvious that it is an unequivocalstatement made by the counsel engaged by the appellant (land-lord) to espouse his (appellant’s) cause before the High Court.It is not the case of the appellant that he had expressly instructedhis counsel not to make such a statement. Further, the statementwas in respect of the commitment of the appellant qua the subjectBmatter of the proceedings in which the counsel was engaged andinstructed to appear. Not only that, right from the beginning andeven before this Court, an attempt was made by the parties toexplore possibility of working out an amicable solution, as isevident from the order dated 9.1.2017 before the respondentCwas put to notice of these appeals, and more particularly, dated14.11.2017. Therefore, the appellant cannot now be allowed toresile from the statement made before the High Court, whichthe High Court justly declined to undo in the reviewpetition filed by the appellant for that purpose. [Paras 9 and 10][574-B-E]D

2. The appellant is obliged to abide by the unequivocalstatement made before the Court to re-induct the respondent-tenant in the newly constructed building and to provide him samearea which was being used by him earlier. Considering the above,the appellant cannot be permitted to extricate himself from theEobligation flowing from the impression given to the Court (beforethe High Court and again before this Court) and need to be boundby the same. [Para 12] [577-D-E]

3. Even before this Court, the appellant, advisedly, showedwillingness to explore possibility of settlement. It is obvious thatFthe delivery of possession of the suit premises, then in possessionof the respondent, was expedited and made over to the appellantonly after intervention of this Court, which indulgence was shownbecause the appellant had expressed inclination to spare portionof premises for the respondent. Only after this Court intervened,Gthe appellant could take the construction of proposed buildingforward and completed it on 19.6.2018. In terms of the orderdated 14.11.2017 of this Court, it was made absolutely clear thatthe appellant will not put the newly constructed premises to usewithout seeking prior permission of this Court. That permissionis yet to be given to the appellant. [Para 11] [576-H; 577-A-C]H

4. However, from the subsequent affidavits filed before thisCourt, it is obvious that the entire ground floor cannot be givento the respondent. Initially, the appellant had given an offer toaccommodate the respondent on the upper floor, but it is noticedthat the staircase going towards the upper floors (namely, firstand second floor) in the newly constructed building passes throughthe ground floor itself. The same is erected at the rear sidewithin the building (being triplex house). The photographsproduced before the Court, however, depict that an opening (exitdoor) is provided on the rear side of the building, on the groundfloor, which opens towards the plot (which the appellant hadtransferred in favour of his son during the pendency of theseappeals. Thus, it is possible to provide access to the upper floorsfrom the rear side of the building, which also opens on the roador portion of the plot. [Para 13] [577-F-H]

5. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the counsel forthe appellant without prejudice, gave offer to provide portion ofthe marked ground floor premises to the respondent,admeasuring 2.25 meters x 7.57 meters by carving out a passagewithin the ground floor providing access for upper floors throughthe staircase from the front door of the newly constructed building.This offer has been turned down by the respondent, firstly becausethe area of the premises will get reduced to just about 17.0325square meters instead of the original area, admeasuring 36.53square meters. Moreover, the premises, as offered, would beunusable for carrying on the business as cloth merchanttherefrom. [Paras 14 and 15] [578-B-C; 579-A-B]

6. The appellant must provide the entire front portion ofthe ground floor premises, measuring 3.73 meters (width) x 7.57meters (length) by putting up a brick wall separating the back endof the ground floor premises, where the staircase has been erectedas is shown in the plan. The appellant shall provide access to thefirst and second floors from the rear side of the building whereexit door and staircase has already been erected. This is themost equitable arrangement that can be provided in the factsituation of the present case, to do complete justice to the parties.

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AHowever, while doing so, as the respondent-tenant will bedeprived of almost 8.2939 square meters of the original area (36.53square meters – 28.2361 square meters), the appellant mustcompensate the respondent commensurately for the said loss ofarea by paying amount quantified at Rs.73,898.649 rounded offto Rs.74,000/- [i.e. equivalent to prevailing circle rate (Rs.8910/B- per square meter) for the concerned locality, by way ofcompensation/damages. [Para 16] [579-C-F]

7. Such arrangement would result in compliance of thestatement made on behalf of the appellant before the High Courtand which was made the basis to dispose of the respondent’sCrevision petition and at the same time, minimise the loss of areato be made over to the respondent-tenant and optimize the utilityof the premises to be used by him for non-residential purposeafter re-induction and also adequately compensate him for theloss of area. [Para 17] [579-G; 580-A]

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8. This arrangement is in lieu of the liability of the appellantto pay a sum of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) per dayfrom 1.12.2017 towards damages for delayed re-induction of therespondent as directed by the High Court, which, if given effectto, would be substantial amount. To do substantial and completeEjustice to the parties, the impugned decree has been modified tothe above extent. [Para 18] [580-B]

9. Until payment of Rs. 74,000/- is made, the appellant shalldesist from using the first and second floor premises for anypurpose. The Chief Administrative Officer, District Court, isFappointed as receiver in respect of the newly constructed buildingto ensure proper implementation of the above terms and submitcompliance report to this Court. [Paras 19 (ii) and (iii)]

10. For determination of monthly rent upon re-induction ofthe respondent in the suit premises, the parties shall file a jointGapplication before the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller shalldecide the same expeditiously. [Para 19 (v)] [581-B-C]

Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. BalwanSingh & Ors. (2015) 7 SCC 373 : [2015] 4 SCR 616

– distinguished.

Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & Anr. v. Raju Reddiar &Anr. (1997) 9 SCC 736 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 915– referred to.

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Case Law Reference

[2015] 4 SCR 616distinguishedPara 5

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[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 915referred toPara 11

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 833-834 of 2020.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.05.2016 of the High Courtof Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in C.R. No. 227 of 2015 and Orderdated 24.08.2016 in Review Petition No. 65 of 2016.

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M. C. Dhingra, Gaurav Dhingra, Ms. Kandra Indira, Abhishek,Ms. Deepthi Raj, Advs. for the Appellant.

Ms. Sharmila Upadhyay, Sarvjit Pratap Singh, Advs. for theDRespondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.

1. Leave granted.

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2. These appeals are directed against the judgments and ordersdated 12.5.2016 in Civil Revision No. 227/2015 and 24.8.2016 in ReviewPetition No. 65/2016 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh atShimla (for short, ‘the High Court’).

3. The facts very briefly are that the appellant being owner of thepremises having three rooms with one veranda, admeasuring 36.53square meters situated in Ward No. 6, M.C. Area, near Sabji Mandi, UpMahal, Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh (for short, “the suit premises”),had inducted the father of the respondent as its monthly tenant in theyear 1969 to use it for non-residential purpose and the respondent wasin occupation thereof when the appellant filed eviction proceedings beforethe Rent Controller for possession. The respondent, at the relevanttime, was carrying on business as cloth merchant in the suit premises.The Rent Controller vide order dated 28.11.2013 decreed the suit directingeviction of the respondent from the suit premises on the ground that thesuit premises was required bonafide by the appellant for the purpose of F

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Areconstruction, which could not be carried out without vacating the samefollowed by demolition thereof. That decree was confirmed by theappellate Court, against which civil revision being C.R. No. 227/2015came to be filed before the High Court. During the hearing of the saidpetition, the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant had urged beforethe High Court that the tenant was ready and willing to handoverBpossession of the suit premises subject to the landlord (present appellant)agreeing to re-induct him as tenant in equivalent area occupied by him inthe suit building. In response to the said submission, the learned counselappearing for the present appellant, unequivocally, stated before the HighCourt that the appellant was not averse to the offer so made by theCtenant. That statement has been recorded by the High Court and onthat basis the civil revision came to be disposed of in the followingwords: - “5. Mr. R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate assisted byMs. Anita Pramar, Advocate is not averse to the offer soDmade on behalf of the petitioner-tenant. It is stated at theBar that construction work will be completed within one yearfrom the date i.e. 30[th] October, 2016, when the possession of thedemised premises is to be handed over to the respondent-landlord.Mr. Sharma further submits that the petitioner-tenant willbe re-inducted in equal area in the newly constructedEbuilding within one month i.e. on or before 30[th] November,2017 from the date of completion of the construction worki.e. 31.10.2017. Mr. Sharma also agreed to the fixation of renton re-induction of the petitioner-tenant at the market ratesprevalent in the area where the demised premises situate by theFRent Controller concerned.

6. In view of the above, nothing is left to be adjudicatedupon in this petition on merits. The same, therefore, isdisposed of with a direction to the petitioner-tenant to handover the vacant possession of the demised premises torespondent-landlord on or before 31[st] October, 2016. Heshall pay the use and occupation charges till 31[st] October,2016 at the rates, he is paying at present. On his failure tohand over the vacant possession by the aforesaid date, therespondent-landlord shall have the right to execute theorder of eviction and in that event the petitioner-tenant G

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shall also have no right to claim his re-induction in the newlyconstructed building. There shall be a direction to therespondent-landlord to complete the construction on thespot on or before 31[st] October, 2017. He shall re-inductthe petitioner-tenant in equal area i.e. 36.53 square meters,presently occupied by him in the demised premises withinone month thereafter i.e. by 30[th] November, 2017. On thefailure of the respondent-landlord to compete theconstruction within the stipulated period and re-inductionof the petitioner-tenant in the newly constructedbuilding, he shall be liable to pay the damages at the rate ofRs.1,000/- per day from 1.12.2017 onwards till he is re-inducted as tenant.

7. As regards the rent on re-induction, the parties shall file a jointapplication for the purpose in the Court of learned Rent Controllerat Hamirpur. The application so filed shall be decided by learnedRent Controller, in accordance with law and taking intoconsideration the rates prevalent in the area where the demisedpremises situate, after affording an opportunity of being heard tothe parties on both sides. Pending application(s), if any, shall alsostand disposed of.”

4. The appellant changed his Advocate and then filed reviewpetition before the High Court being Review Petition No. 65/2016,asserting that he had never instructed his counsel to make such statementbefore the Court regarding re-induction of the respondent-tenant in thenewly constructed shops. The said review petition came to be dismissedvide order dated 24.8.2016. Consequently, both these decisions (dated12.5.2016 and 24.8.2016) passed by the High Court are subject matterof challenge in the present appeals.

5. The principal argument of the appellant is that the statementmade by his counsel before the High Court was not binding on him, as itwas made without his instructions. For that, reliance has been placed onthe decision of this Court in Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Societyvs. Balwan Singh & Ors.[1].

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A6. When the special leave petitions were listed for admission on9.1.2017, this Court deferred the hearing by passing the followingorder: - “On a query as to whether the petitioner would be in a positionstill to spare a small room for the respondent, learned counselBprays for some time to produce a plan of the shop.

List the matter after three weeks.”

The matter was then listed on 15.2.2017 when the Court notedCthe submission of the learned counsel for the appellant and issued noticeto the respondent. That order reads thus: - “Delay condoned.

The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that therespondent is not even permitting the petitioner to demolish theDbuilding and go for construction.

In view of the above submission, issue notice, returnable infour weeks.”

7. Thereafter, the matter was listed on 14.11.2017 when the Courtafter noting the submissions of the parties, passed the following order:-E

“The petitioner is permitted to complete the construction ofthe building.

There shall be no obstruction whatsoever caused by therespondent or his men for doing the construction work. TheFrespondent shall also not cause any obstruction for the ingressand egress of the petitioner.

The petitioner is directed to complete the constructionwithin four months from today.

List on 1.5.2018, when the parties are directed to be presentGbefore this Court.

In view of the order, as above, the petitioner shall notbe liable to pay the amount of Rs.1000/ per day, as orderedby the High Court for the delayed construction.

OM PRAKASH v. SURESH KUMAR[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

We make it clear that before the petitioner making theactual use of the premises, permission shall be sought fromthis Court so that this Court may pass appropriate ordersto protect the interests of the respondent as well.”

It has come on record that during the pendency of these cases,the appellant transferred the abutting plot being khasra No. 778 to hisson on 14.3.2018.

8. Be that as it may, in view of the deliberations in Court, thelearned counsel for the appellant sought time to take instructions, as isnoted in the order dated 21.8.2019 which reads thus: - “List these matters after three weeks to enable the counselfor the petitioner to get instructions in the matter.”

Again on 22.11.2019, the matter was deliberated upon, whereafterthe learned counsel appearing for the respondent took time to file affidavitof a qualified Architect to show that the building constructed afterdemolition of the suit premises can be provided with access to the upperfloors (first and second floors) from outside the building. That has beenrecorded in the order dated 22.11.2019, which reads thus: - “Learned counsel for the sole respondent prays for time toplace on record affidavit of a qualified Architect indicating thereinthe feasibility of providing access to first and second floor of thebuilding from outside the building.

List the matters on 5th December, 2019.”

Pursuant to the liberty given, the respondent has filed an affidavitof one Ram Swaroop, son of Mr. Prithvi Chand, a qualified Architect,accompanied by the relevant sketches/plan(s) and photographs of thebuilding from outside, as well as, floor-wise in support of the stand takenearlier that the appellant can provide access to the upper floors throughthe staircase outside the newly constructed building, without disturbingthe possession of the respondent on the ground floor thereat. Theappellant, however, by filing affidavit dated 20.1.2020, has pointed outthat the staircase already constructed is on the rear side of the buildingwithin the premises (being triplex house) and it is not possible to provide A

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Aadditional access to the first and second floors from outside the building.The appellant is also placing reliance on the photographs in support ofthis submission.

9. The moot question is: whether the appellant should be bound bythe statement made by his counsel before the High Court that theBrespondent-tenant will be re-inducted in equal area in the newlyconstructed building within one month i.e. on or before 30.11.2017 fromthe date of completion of the construction work i.e. 31.10.2017. Fromthe tenor of the statement made before the High Court on behalf of theappellant, it is obvious that it is an unequivocal statement made by thecounsel engaged by the appellant to espouse his (appellant’s) causeCbefore the High Court. It is not the case of the appellant that he hadexpressly instructed his counsel not to make such a statement. Further,the statement was in respect of the commitment of the appellant qua thesubject matter of the proceedings in which the counsel was engagedand instructed to appear. Not only that, right from the beginning andDeven before this Court, an attempt was made by the parties to explorepossibility of working out an amicable solution, as is evident from theorder dated 9.1.2017 before the respondent was put to notice of theseappeals, and more particularly, dated 14.11.2017.

10. Considering the above, the appellant cannot now be allowedEto resile from the statement made before the High Court, which theHigh Court justly declined to undo in the review petition filed by theappellant for that purpose. In the peculiar facts of this case, the decisionof this Court in Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society (supra) willbe of no avail to the appellant. Inasmuch as, it is not a case where thecounsel, who made the statement was not engaged by the appellantFbefore the High Court. The engagement was in respect of evictionproceedings and the statement was in relation to the commitment of theappellant qua the subject matter thereof and being an unequivocalstatement, it will be binding on the appellant. In any case, even thisCourt showed indulgence to the appellant on the basis of impressionGgiven to this Court about the possibility of at least sparing a small roomfor the respondent, which was the basis for issuing notice to therespondent, as is evident from the orders dated 9.1.2017 and 15.2.2017.

11. Reverting to the exposition in paragraph 22 of the reporteddecision, the same reads thus: - H

“22. Apart from the above, in our view lawyers are perceived tobe their client’s agents. The law of agency may not strictly applyto the client-lawyer’s relationship as lawyers or agents, lawyershave certain authority and certain duties. Because lawyers arealso fiduciaries, their duties will sometimes be more demandingthan those imposed on other agents. The authority-agency statusaffords the lawyers to act for the client on the subject-matterof the retainer. One of the most basic principles of the lawyer-client relationship is that lawyers owe fiduciary duties to theirclients. As part of those duties, lawyers assume all the traditionalduties that agents owe to their principals and, thus, have to respectthe client’s autonomy to make decisions at a minimum, as to theobjectives of the representation. Thus, according to generallyaccepted notions of professional responsibility, lawyers shouldfollow the client’s instructions rather than substitute their judgmentfor that of the client. The law is now well settled that a lawyermust be specifically authorised to settle and compromise a claim,that merely on the basis of his employment he has no implied orostensible authority to bind his client to a compromise/settlement.To put it alternatively that a lawyer by virtue of retention, has theauthority to choose the means for achieving the client’s legal goal,while the client has the right to decide on what the goal will be. Ifthe decision in question falls within those that clearly belong to theclient, the lawyer’s conduct in failing to consult the client or inmaking the decision for the client, is more likely to constituteineffective assistance of counsel.”

Our attention was also invited to paragraph 31 of the same decision,which reads thus: - “31. Therefore, it is the solemn duty of an advocate not totransgress the authority conferred on him by the client. It is alwaysbetter to seek appropriate instructions from the client or hisauthorised agent before making any concession which may, directlyor remotely, affect the rightful legal right of the client. The advocaterepresents the client before the court and conducts proceedingson behalf of the client. He is the only link between the court andthe client. Therefore his responsibility is onerous. He is expectedto follow the instructions of his client rather than substitute hisjudgment.”

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AIn addition, we may usefully refer to paragraph 32 of the saiddecision, which reads thus: - “32. Generally, admissions of fact made by a counsel arebinding upon their principals as long as they areunequivocal; where, however, doubt exists as to a purportedBadmission, the court should be wary to accept suchadmissions until and unless the counsel or the advocate isauthorised by his principal to make such admissions.Furthermore, a client is not bound by a statement or admissionwhich he or his lawyer was not authorised to make. A lawyergenerally has no implied or apparent authority to make anCadmission or statement which would directly surrender orconclude the substantial legal rights of the client unlesssuch an admission or statement is clearly a proper step inaccomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer wasemployed. We hasten to add neither the client nor the court isDbound by the lawyer’s statements or admissions as to matters oflaw or legal conclusions. Thus, according to generally acceptednotions of professional responsibility, lawyers should follow theclient’s instructions rather than substitute their judgment for thatof the client. We may add that in some cases, lawyers canmake decisions without consulting the client. While inEothers, the decision is reserved for the client. It is oftensaid that the lawyer can make decisions as to tactics withoutconsulting the client, while the client has a right to makedecisions that can affect his rights.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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As aforesaid, in the present case, the counsel who was engagedby the appellant and had appeared for him before the High Court did not,stricto sensu, transgress the authority conferred on him by the appellant.Notably, the appellant filed review petition before the High Court byengaging another Advocate for reasons best known to him. This CourtGhas deprecated the conduct of such petitioners and has opined that suchreview petitions should not be encouraged and need to be dismissed, asexpounded in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & Anr. vs. Raju Reddiar& Anr.[2] Not only that, even before this Court, the appellant, advisedly, 2 (1997) 9 SCC 736H

showed willingness to explore possibility of settlement as is evident fromdifferent orders recorded above. It is obvious that the delivery ofpossession of the suit premises, then in possession of the respondent,was expedited and made over to the appellant only after intervention ofthis Court, which indulgence was shown because the appellant hadexpressed inclination to spare portion of premises for the respondent.Only after this Court intervened, the appellant could take the constructionof proposed building forward and completed it on 19.6.2018. In terms ofthe order dated 14.11.2017 of this Court, it was made absolutely clearthat the appellant will not put the newly constructed premises to usewithout seeking prior permission of this Court. That permission is yet tobe given to the appellant.

12. The argument of the appellant that the respondent cannottake benefit of amendment to Section 14(3)(c) of the Himachal PradeshUrban Rent Control Act, 1987 in the form of Himachal Pradesh RentControl (Amendment) Act, 2008, will be of no avail to the fact situationof the present case. For, in this case, the appellant is obliged to abide bythe unequivocal statement made before the Court to re-induct therespondent-tenant in the newly constructed building and to provide himsame area which was being used by him earlier, namely, 36.53 squaremeters. Considering the above, the appellant cannot be permitted toextricate himself from the obligation flowing from the impression givento the Court (before the High Court and again before this Court) andneed to be bound by the same.

13. However, from the subsequent affidavits filed before this Court,it is obvious that the entire ground floor cannot be given to the respondent.Initially, the appellant had given an offer to accommodate the respondenton the upper floor, but it is noticed that the staircase going towards theupper floors (namely, first and second floor) in the newly constructedbuilding passes through the ground floor itself. The same is erected atthe rear side within the building (being triplex house). The photographsproduced before us, however, depict that an opening (exit door) is providedon the rear side of the building, on the ground floor, which opens towardsplot No. 778 (which the appellant had transferred in favour of his sonduring the pendency of these appeals). In other words, it is possible toprovide access to the upper floors from the rear side of the building,which also opens on the road (as a car parked at that entrance can beseen in the photographs) or portion of plot being khasra No. 778 (now AB

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Aowned by the appellant’s son). The fact remains that the staircase hasbeen erected in such a manner, for the reasons best known to theappellant, that the access to first and second floors would be possibleonly through the ground floor premises, as it is inside the building and notoutside the building.

B14. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the learned counsel forthe appellant without prejudice, gave offer to provide portion of the markedground floor premises to the respondent, admeasuring 2.25 meters x7.57 meters by carving out a passage within the ground floor providingaccess for upper floors through the staircase from the front door of thenewly constructed building. The proposed ground floor plan, as submittedCby the appellant through counsel is as follows: - D

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15. This offer has been turned down by the respondent, firstlybecause the area of the premises will get reduced to just about 17.0325square meters instead of the original area, admeasuring 36.53 squaremeters. Moreover, the premises, as offered, would be unusable forcarrying on the business as cloth merchant therefrom. The width beingjust 2.25 meters (7.382 feet) will not be enough to accommodate salecounter and stock storage space; and moreso leaving no space for freemovement of customers/sales persons.

16. After considering the arguments of both parties, we are of theconsidered opinion that the appellant must provide the entire front portionof the ground floor premises, measuring 3.73 meters (width) x 7.57meters (length) by putting up a brick wall separating the back end of theground floor premises, where the staircase has been erected as is shownin the plan. In other words, instead of width of 2.25 meters, the premisesto be given to the respondent will have the entire frontage width of 3.73meters with exclusive access from the front side. The depth or thelength of the premises would be 7.57 meters as indicated in the plan.The appellant shall provide access to the first and second floors fromthe rear side of the building where exit door and staircase has alreadybeen erected, as is noticed from the plan/photograph(s). This is themost equitable arrangement that can be provided in the fact situation ofthe present case, to do complete justice to the parties. However, whiledoing so, as the respondent-tenant will be deprived of almost 8.2939square meters of the original area (36.53 square meters – 28.2361square meters), the appellant must compensate the respondentcommensurately for the said loss of area by paying amount quantified atRs.73,898.649 rounded off to Rs.74,000/- [i.e. equivalent to prevailingcircle rate (Rs.8910/- per square meter[3]) for the concerned locality, thatis to say, 8.2939 x 8910], by way of compensation/damages.

17. The arrangement directed by us would result in compliance ofthe statement made on behalf of the appellant before the High Courtand which was made the basis to dispose of the respondent’s revisionpetition and at the same time, minimise the loss of area to be made overto the respondent-tenant and optimize the utility of the premises to be 3 Per Notification Nos. HMR/DCH/DRA/Circle Rates-2019-20: 1517-37 dt. 30th March,2019 and HMR/DCH/DRA/Circle Rates-2019-20: 247-63 dt. 31[st] March, 2018 issuedby the District Collector, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P.

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Aused by him for non-residential purpose after re-induction and alsoadequately compensate him for the loss of area.

18. We may note that this arrangement is in lieu of the liability ofthe appellant to pay a sum of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) perday from 1.12.2017 towards damages for delayed re-induction of theBrespondent as directed by the High Court, which, if given effect to, wouldbe substantial amount. In other words, to do substantial and completejustice to the parties, we have modified the impugned decree to theabove extent. In terms of this modified decree, the appellant shallforthwith erect a brick wall beyond 7.57 meters from the front door, soas to divide the ground floor premises into two parts as indicated above.CWe direct the appellant to re-induct the respondent in the front portion,admeasuring 3.73 meters x 7.57 meters and the leftover rear portioncan be used by the appellant for providing access to upper floors (firstand second floors) through the staircase already erected in that area.

19. We, accordingly, modify the order/decree passed by the HighDCourt vide impugned judgment as under: -

(i) The appellant shall construct the brick wall separating groundfloor premises in two portions in the manner mentionedhitherto within six weeks from today and handover the frontportion premises to the respondent, whereafter theErespondent can use the same for non-residential purpose onmonthly rent basis.

(ii) In addition, the appellant shall pay the amount ofRs.74,000/- (Rupees seventy four thousand only) towardscompensation/damages and until such payment is made, theFappellant shall desist from using the first and second floorpremises for any purpose.

(iii) We appoint the Chief Administrative Officer, District Court,Hamirpur as receiver in respect of the newly constructedbuilding situated at Ward No. 6, M.C. Area, near Sabji Mandi,GUp Mahal, Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh owned by theappellant - Om Prakash, to ensure proper implementationof the above terms and submit compliance report to thisCourt.

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(iv) In case the appellant commits any breach of the conditionAof using the first and second floors until delivery ofpossession and payment of damages/compensation, theChief Administrative Officer, District Court, Hamirpur shallreport that fact to this Court forthwith and not later thanone week from the knowledge thereof.

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(v) For determination of monthly rent upon re-induction of therespondent in the suit premises, the parties shall file a jointapplication before the Rent Controller at Hamirpur. TheRent Controller shall decide the same expeditiously and notlater than six months from the date of presentation, inCaccordance with law after giving fair opportunity to bothparties in that regard.

20. The appeals are partly allowed and the impugned judgments/decree stand modified in the aforementioned terms. There shall be noorder as to costs. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall standdisposed of.

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Kalpana K. Tripathy

Appeals partly allowed.

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