MUSUNURI SATYANARAYANA versus DR. TIRUMALA INDIRA DEVI & ORS. on 27 October 2021

1. Special leave granted. With consent of counsel for the parties,the appeals were heard finally. The appellant is aggrieved by an order ofthe High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Andhra andTelangana[1] dismissing his revision petitions.

2. The appellant (hereafter called “Musunuri Satyanarayana”)had approached Andhra Pradesh Tenancy Tribunal (hereafter “thetribunal”) claiming various reliefs under Section 16 (1) of the AndhraPradesh Tenancy (Andhra Area) Act (hereafter “the Tenancy Act”)i.e. for declaratory relief that the price of the schedule land i.e., `1,25,000/per acre is reasonable and stood accepted by the first respondent(hereafter “Indira Devi”) by receiving the first instalment of `49,125/-by demand draft; that he was entitled to pay the balance sale price of`4,42,125/- to Indira Devi in nine instalments; for a declaration that tworegistered sale deed documents[2] (hereafter “the impugned sale deeds”)executed by Indira Devi in favour of the second and third respondents(collectively called here as “contesting respondents” or “purchasers”)are void and for injunction against the respondents to prevent them frominterfering with his possession and tenancy of the petition schedule lands.The tribunal granted the reliefs; the appellate authority (District Judge)upset that order and the High Court affirmed the District Judge’s order,dismissing the appellant’s revision petitions.

3. Indira Devi’s husband -late Dr. T. Veeraiah- had three brothersDr. T. Suryanarayana, Dr. T. Seshagiri Rao and T. Satyanarayana aretired Engineer (R&B). T. Suryanarayana and T. Seshagiri Rao weresettled in the United States of America. T. Satyanarayana also used tobe in the USA for some time; he returned to Hyderabad to his daughter’shouse. After the death of their father Narasaiah, the said four brothersgot landed properties. Dr. T. Suryanarayana appointed Indira Devi ashis general power of attorney. Her husband, T. Veeraiah died intestate 1 Dated 12.06.2015 in CRP No. 816/2015 and CRP No. 3591/2015.

2 Nos. 139/06 dated 03-02-06 and the registered sale deed document No. 140/06, dated03-02-06

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Aon 04-02-2002. In terms of his will, his share of the properties devolvedon Indira Devi. These properties were situated at Mulukuduru and otherplaces. After her husband died, Indira Devi became the absolute ownerof all the properties, and she was a land lady within the meaning of theprovisions of Tenancy Act. Indira Devi, for herself and on behalf of Dr.T. Suryanarayana (as his general power of attorney) filed A.T.C.No.5/B02 on the file of Special Officer, Ponnur against the appellant, one PamidiKoteswara Rao, Vezendla Rama Krishna, Chakravarapu Papa Raju,her brother, her brother-in-law T. Satyanarayana and Marupudi GnanaPrasada Rao Under Section 16(1) of the Tenancy Act to declare thatthe lease between the appellant and the other respondents relating to theCappellant’s 2/4[th] share in agreed maktha[3] due for the years 2002-2003and in future either to T. Satyanarayana or to Marupudi Gnana PrasadaRao.

4. The appellant alleged that he was cultivating 13.65 acres andthe respondents 2 and 4 (in the petition) were cultivating 4.17 acres,D1.37 acres and 1.00. acre respectively. The appellant filed a suit[4], forgrant of permanent injunction against Ari Venkateswara Rao and 6 otherswho at the instance of T. Satyanarayana were interfering with his tenancyrights in the said land of 13.63 acres which includes the above scheduleland of 3.93 acres. The appellant also filed A.T.C. No. 3/02 againstIndira Devi, her brother-in-law Dr. T. Suryanarayana represented by hisEG.P.A. (Indira Devi) T. Satyanarayana and T. Seshagiri Rao fordeclaration that he was the cultivating tenant of those 13.65 acres andthat the tenancy was subsisting. Interim injunction restraining therespondents from interfering or causing obstruction with his tenancyrights in the said lands too was sought.F

5. It was alleged further that during pendency of the suits(O.S.No.174/02, A.T.C.5/02 and A.T.C.3/02) a compromise took placebetween all the parties (i.e. Indira Devi, and her brother-in-law Dr. T.Suryanarayana and the appellant). The said two parties got their shareof 10.76 acres (which comprises of 7.04 acres in D.No.56/2,0.10 acresGin D.No.56/3, 0.36 acres in D. No. 65/5B, and 1.89 acres in D.No.473/3; 1.37 acres in D. No. 25). The remaining extents of lands situated inother survey numbers fell to the share of T. Satyanarana and anotherbrother Dr. T. Seshagiri Rao. It was agreed by Indira Devi and 3 Agreed rent, either in cash or in kind, in the form of a measure of agricultural produce.H4 O.S.No. 174/02

T. Suryanarayana that the petitioner would continue to cultivate the saidland 10.76 acres as a tenant and pay maktha to Indira Devi.

6. The appellant urged that he and his wife purchased 3.37 acresout of 5.39 acres belonging to T. Suryanarayana and the entire saleconsideration was paid to his G.P.A. Indira Devi, who, out of her land of5.37 acres sold 0.76 acres in D. No. 473/3 to Jasti Sree Vani and 0.68acres in D.No.25 to Venedla Rama Krishna, retaining with her scheduleland of 3.93 acres- which was in the appellant’s possession. As cultivatingtenant of the said schedule land, the appellant incurred heavy expenditureand could complete the transplantation of paddy crop in the scheduleland in the end of last month only, and regularly paid the agreed makthaswithout defaulting payments of cash amounts. It was alleged that whenthe appellant wished to purchase the agreed land, Indira Devi threatenedthat she would sell the land to others in case he did not pay the entiresale consideration at once and obtain registered sale deed from her. Theprice determined for the schedule land was @ `1,25,00/- per acre. Healso alleged that as the price of the schedule land was determined, hewas entitled to pay the sale consideration in ten equal instalments of`49,125/- to Indira Devi one of such instalment was paid by way of ademand draft drawn on Syndicate Bank, Mulukuduru in her name andthat the sale was deemed to have been effective. Consequently, thebalance consideration was payable in instalments upon terms agreed bythe parties.

7. Indira Devi resisted the proceedings; pendente lite, an interimorder was made restraining alienation, which was extended from time totime and was in force till 14-02-06. In violation of the interim order andof Section 15 of Tenancy Act, Indira Devi sold 3.57 acres (which consistsof 3.47 acres cents in D. No. 56/2 and 0.10 acres in D. No. 56/3 ofMulukuduru village, i.e. items 1 and 2 of the petition schedule property)to the second respondent (Gorijavolu Srinivasa Rao- hereafter “GS Rao”)by Registered sale deed No.139/06, dated 03-02-2006 and 0.36 acres inD. No. 6515B of the same village (item No.3 of the petition scheduleproperty) to third respondent Undrakonda Rama Rao (“U.R. Rao”hereafter)[5] by a Registered Sale Deed No. 140, dated. 03-02-06. It wasfurther alleged that the respondents, encroached and disturbed cropheaped in the said land of 3.47 acres committing theft of the paddy of 5 The second and third respondents are collectively referred hereafter, as “the contestingrespondents”

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Aabout 110 bags for which the appellant lodged a report to the Ponnurpolice station. The sale of the lands by Indira Devi, were therefore illegal;the impugned sale deeds were alleged to be invalid and void under law.

8. Indira Devi’s stand, in her reply was of denial; she alleged thatwhen a compromise took place between the parties, the appellant, by anBoral agreement, gave up his tenancy in respect of the lands of her brother-in-law, for which she was general power of attorney holder. It was allegedthat he however, failed to pay the makhta for prior periods. As he wasa retired revenue official, versed in procedure, he used to assist herfrom time to time, and had even assisted her in respect of sale of theClands to Jasti Sree Vani and Venedla Rama Krishna. She alleged thatthere was no land lord tenant relationship between her and the appellantand further contended that at no point of time, she offered to sell theschedule land to the appellant. The question of determination of pricefor the schedule land @ `1,25 ,000/- per acre never arose. As there wasno negotiation for sale and purchase of the schedule land between them,Dthe question of threatening the appellant for payment of the entire saleconsideration at once etc., does not arise. Furthermore, she adjusted thesum of `49,125/- sent by the appellant through demand draft towardsthe instalment towards arrears of maktha payable by her to the appellantfor the year 200l-03.

E9. The contesting respondents/ purchasers alleged that Indira Devicultivated the land during the year 2005-06 and raised crops. She offeredto sell the land and they offered to purchase them; and also paid substantialamounts before the execution of the impugned sale deeds. Indira Devidelivered the land with heaps of paddy and they were entitled to thoseFcrops which they took away after thrashing. The appellant’s false reportto police led to investigation of the case. They further denied that theappellant was ever in possession of the suit land after 2002-03 andconsequently the appellant was not entitled to any relief claimed.

10. Before the tribunal, the appellant produced the compromiseGdeed, as well as the covering letter by which the sum of `49,125/- wastendered to Indira Devi, towards part payment of consideration for thesale. Indira Devi examined herself; the purchasers too participated inthe proceedings and they examined themselves. Several documents wereproduced, including deeds giving effect to the compromise, andsubsequent sale deeds, including the impugned documents.H

11. The tribunal, upheld the appellant’s claim. In doing so, thetribunal took into consideration the admission by Indira Devi, the firstrespondent -during the course of her oral deposition, that she had soldher property to the appellant as she was alone and was unable to manageit. The tribunal rejected her contention that the appellant had surrenderedhis tenancy. Most importantly, the tribunal held that the first respondent’sargument that `49,125/- sent to her by the appellant was appropriatedtowards past arrears of rent as untenable. To so conclude, the tribunalrelied upon the circumstance that no demand for alleged arrears of renthad ever been made and that the document under which the demanddraft for the sum - `49,125/- was sent (produced as Ex. P-12) clearlyreferred to the sale transaction and that the amount was part-paymenttowards it. Furthermore, the tribunal noted that in terms of the pleadingsof the parties, the rent agreed appeared to be `5,000/- per acre.Arguendo, on a calculation, assuming that some arrears existed for apast period, for the extent of land, i.e. 5.37 acres, the rental amountswould have been only `28,850/-. On these considerations, the tribunalupheld the claim and granted relief. In holding that the consideration of`1,20,000/- per acre was reasonable, the tribunal took into account anothertransaction whereby 3.57 acres in Survey No. 56/2 (which was registeredas Ex. P-15 and P-16) were valued at `1,25,000/- per acre when theywere sold by the first respondent. On an overall analysis of Section 14of the Tenancy Act, the Tribunal held that the appellant had neversurrendered the tenancy; that the compromise which was arrived atbetween the landlords and that his possession as a cultivating tenantremained undisturbed. Consequently, he was entitled to the purchaserights as the law allowed which he had provided in the facts of the case.

12. The first respondent appealed to the appellate authority, i.e.the District Judge. The appeals were allowed by the District Judge whoheld that the appellant had not established any continuing jural relation oflandlady and tenant to show that the same subsisted between him andthe first respondent. It was held that though the compromise, Ex. P-2mentioned that he was a tenant ipso facto, that could not be givencredence having regard to other circumstances. The District Judge wasswayed by the fact that two other persons had purchased parts ofproperties in 2003 and held that the appellant lost possession as a tenant,as a result of which there was no jural relation of landlord and tenantbetween the appellant and Indira Devi which entitled him to claim theright of purchase. It was furthermore held that the compromise indicated A

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Asurrender of tenancy in part which is impermissible. The District Judgeconstrued the compromise deed as evidencing surrender of a part of thetenancy and that disentitled a claim in terms of Section 14 (2) of theTenancy Act.

13. The appellant approached the High Court through revisionBpetitions. His contention was that he continued as a tenant and therefore,had a priority right to purchase the property under Section 15. On theother hand, the respondents contended that the appellant had surrenderedpart of the tenancy. The High Court stated that the District Judge hadelaborately discussed the evidence on record and ruled against theappellant holding that he had surrendered the tenancy in 2003 itself. ItCwas further held that by virtue of Section 14(2), no tenant could surrendera part of the holding and that having regard to this bar, the appellant’scontention that he did not surrender the holding was unacceptable. TheHigh Court concurred with and endorsed the reasoning of the DistrictJudge that the claim for priority purchase was in the facts of the caseDuntenable and that the relief granted, by the tribunal was impermissible.On the basis of these findings, the High Court dismissed the appellant’srevision petition.

Parties’ contentions

14. It was argued on behalf of the appellant by Mr. SridharEPotaraju, who was requested to act as amicus curiae (since the appellantrepresented himself in the proceedings) that the findings recorded bythe District Judge are contrary to the record. It was argued that both theDistrict Judge as well as the High Court overlooked the salientcircumstance that the compromise [which took place in 2003] was inFrespect of settlement of inter se disputes of landlords. In terms of thecompromise, Indira Devi and T. Suryanarayana were given certainportions whereas other two brothers became owners in respect of otherportions of the land. This compromise decree which was recorded inwriting, clearly acknowledged that in respect of parts of those lands, i.e.13.65 acres, the appellant continued as a cultivating tenant. Furthermore,Gthe document, Ex. P-2 also recognized that his landlord was Indira Devi.In these circumstances, his status as cultivating tenant was unquestionableand could not have disputed much less held not to exist by the lowerauthorities.

15. The findings of the District Judge, according to learned counsel,Hthat the petitioner appellant failed to establish anything beyond the written documents that he continued as a cultivating tenant are unreasonable.Elaborating on this, it was submitted that the first respondent’s argumentwas solely based on the circumstance that the construction of thecompromise petition along with an overall surrender would mean thatthe appellant had surrendered some or whole of his tenancy. In theabsence of any particulars with respect to when the oral agreementtook place or any other document establishing that possession had beenlost, the status granted by law to the appellant who is admittedly inpossession of the lands as cultivating tenant could not have beenquestioned. Learned counsel relied on Sections 14 and 15 of the TenancyAct, to highlight that surrender of tenancy is known to law, and can beinferred if the procedure prescribed by law, is followed, and not otherwise.

16. It was also argued by the amicus that the District Judge andthe High Court proceeded on an entire misappreciation of the evidence,particularly, the documentary materials on the record. It was pointed outthat the compromise principally was to settle the disputes between thelandlords. The appellant’s participation was because he was in possessionof the lands that were the subject matter of the inter se disputes of thelandlords. Those landlords – in effect all of them were parties to thecompromise as the appellant was. The document did not expressly recordany surrender of tenancy. In the circumstances, none of the lowerauthorities could have fairly concluded that a surrender of tenancy muchless part of surrender of tenancy had taken place as was held by theDistrict Court. It was also argued that the District Judge and the HighCourt completely overlooked a material circumstance that Ex. P-12covering letter by which the sum of `49,125/- was remitted as partconsideration for the sale was sought to be explained in an entirelyunconvincing manner, the Tribunal’s findings on this were categorical.Besides noting that the landlady virtually admitted that she wished to sell theproperty, had no explanation to offer with respect to receipt of `49,125/-.

17. Mr. Potaraju highlighted and relied upon the observations ofthe tribunal and that the first Respondent’s case that the said amountwas appropriated towards past arrears did not make any sense at all. Inthis regard, the tribunal’s findings that at best the arrears would haveworked out to `28,850/- and the alleged arrears of `49,125/- completelyfalsified the first respondent’s case.

18. Learned counsel relied upon the provisions of Sections 14 to16 of the Tenancy Act and submitted that both the District Judge and the A

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AHigh Court lost sight of the fact that the appellant had never surrenderedin an overt or covert manner, his tenancy. Consequently, the protectionafforded by law as a tenant in cultivation and possession of the propertyand his corresponding right to purchase a part of the property upon aproper valuation was unquestionable.B19. On behalf of the respondents, it is argued that the findings ofthe lower court with respect to surrender of tenancy was based on theevidence. Learned counsel highlighted that the mere mention ofsubsistence of the tenancy in the compromise recorded by the courtwas not sufficient to make out the appellant’s case to continue hisprotected tenant status. It was argued that both the District Judge asCwell as the High Court took note of a salient circumstance which is thesale of certain parts of land in the appellant’s favour. Furthermore, thefirst respondent Indira Devi had deposed that the appellant was a retiredrevenue officer and therefore versed with the procedures. In thecircumstances, the question of his being unaware of any surrender ofDtenancy did not arise.

20. Learned counsel also emphasized that the surrender of tenancywas a matter of inference based upon appreciation of the documentaryevidence on record. This comprised not only the compromise betweenthe parties recorded by the Court but also the subsequent sale deedsEexecuted by the parties. One set of the sale deeds was consequential inthe sense that it settled the rights of the landlords. The other, on theother hand, dealt with the sale of certain parcels of lands which belongedto the first respondent. Contemporaneously, as part of these transactions,the appellant’s wife had purchased a small portion of the land. In thecircumstances, the inference drawn by the lower authorities that a partFof the tenancy had been surrendered, was not perverse and was eminentlyreasonable.

21. Learned counsel also argued that Indira Devi’s evidence wascogent with respect to the treatment and appropriation of `49,125/- whichwas towards the arrears payable for the previous years of 2002-03 andGpart of 2003-04, which had found express mention in the compromiseitself. In the circumstances, the deduction by the Tribunal that the amountconstituted part of the consideration for the agreed sale transaction inrespect of 3.93 acres, was not based on law.

22. Learned counsel relied upon the findings of the District Judge,Has affirmed by the High Court to say that the express stipulation in Section

14 of the Tenancy Act which barred the relief, of priority of purchase ofa cultivating tenant are clearly attracted to the facts of this case becausethe transactions which were concededly part of the record evidencedthat a part of the tenancy had been surrendered. In fact, the firstrespondent Indira Devi’s claim was that the entire tenancy had beensurrendered through an oral arrangement. She supported that fully in thecourse of her oral deposition. For these reasons, urged learned counsel,the present appeals should not be allowed and the findings of the lowerauthority as well as the High Court should be left undisturbed.

Analysis and reasoning

23. Before proceeding with the merits of the parties’ contentions,it would be essential to extract the relevant portions of the Tenancy Act.They are as follows:

“14. Surrender of holding by cultivating tenant (Substitutedby Section 11 Act No. 39 of 1974) :-(1) A cultivating tenantmay terminate his tenancy and surrender his holding at theend of any agricultural year after giving to the landlord andthe Special Officer at least three months’ notice expiring withthe end of such agricultural year: and the surrender of suchholding shall take effect only after it is accepted by the SpecialOfficer on being satisfied, after making such inquiry as hethinks fit, that such surrender is voluntary and genuine:

Provided that where any holding is cultivated jointly by jointtenants of members of a Hindu undivided family, unless thesurrender is made by all of them, it shall be ineffective inrespect of such joint tenants or members as have not joinedin the notice for surrender.

(2) No tenant shall surrender a part of his holding only.

15. Cultivating tenant’s right to first purchase the land leasedto him (Sub. by S. 10 of Act No. 39 of 1974) :—(1) Any landlordintending to sell the land leased to a cultivating tenant shallfirst give notice to such cultivating tenant, of his intention tosell such land, and requiring him to exercise his option topurchase the land. The particulars to be specified in the noticeand the time within which the option shall be exercised bycultivating tenant shall be such as may be prescribed.

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(2) If the cultivating tenant exercises his option to purchasethe land there is an agreement between the landlord and hiscultivating tenant in regard to the price payable, the landlordshall sell the land to such cultivating tenant in accordancewith such agreement.

(3) Where the cultivating tenant exercise his option to purchasethe land; but there is no agreement in regard to the pricepayable, the landlord or the cultivating tenant may apply tothe Special Officer for the determination of reasonable priceof such land; and the Special Officer shall, after giving noticeto the landlord, and the cultivating tenant and after makingsuch enquiry as he thinks fit, determine the reasonable price;

Provided that the reasonable price so determined shall notexceed five times, the fair rent, if any fixed after thecommencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy(Amendment) Act, 1974 and in force in respect of that land;or where no such fair rent has been fixed or is in force, fivetimes the fair rent that would have been so fixed, has anapplication been made for determination of such rent on thedate of giving of notice under sub-section (1).

(4) The reasonable price determined under sub-section (3)shall be payable in ten equal annual instalments in suchmanner as may be prescribed; and the sale shall be deemedto have become effective on the payment of the first instalmentand land shall be deemed to be the security for the paymentof the balance of the instalments.

(5) If the cultivating tenant fails to exercise his option topurchase the land or fails to pay the first instalment of thereasonable price, the landlord shall be entitled to sell the landto any other person.

Provided that where the land is not sold toanyother personwithina period of two years from the date of notice givenunder sub-section (1),the landlord shall not sell the landthereafter without giving a fresh option under this section tothe cultivating tenant to purchase the land.

(6) Any sale of the land by the landlord in violation of thissection shall be voidable to the option of the cultivatingtenant).”

16. Adjudication of disputes and appeal (Subs. by Section 13of Act No. 39 of 1974) :—(1) Any dispute arising under thisAct, between a landlord and a cultivating tenant in relationto a matter not otherwise decide by the Special Officer underthe provisions of this Act, shall, on application by the landlordor the cultivating tenant, as the case may be, be decided bythe Special Officer after making an enquiry in the mannerprescribed.

(2) Against any order passed by the Special Officer underthis Act an appeal shall lie to the District Judge havingjurisdiction, within thirty days of the passing of the order;and the decision of the District Judge on such appeal shallbe final].

24. The undisputed facts are that Tummala Narasaiah, father ofT. Suryanarayana, T. Satyanarayana, T. Seshagiri Rao, and Indira Devi’shusband, (late Veeraiah) owned the scheduled property. T.Satyanarayana, T. Suryanarayana and T. Seshagiri Rao were residing inU.S.A.T. Suryanarayanaexecuted a general power of attorneyconstituting the first respondent, Indira Devi during the life time of herhusband, Dr. Veeraiah. The properties were divided by their father; therevenue records recognized the same and issued pattadar pass booksand title deeds in their names in the year 1994-95. The appellant used tomanage the properties during Narasaiah’s (father of the said four brothers)lifetime.After the death of Narasaiah, the appellant used to pay themaktha to his sons.Dr. Veeraiahdied on 4.2.2002 executing a will inrespect of all his properties situated at Mulukuduru and other places,favouring his wife, Indira Devi. Shebecame the absolute owner of allthe properties including the lands in A, B, C and D schedules.The fourbrothers thus were landlords and the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 (includingthe appellant) were tenants under the provisions of the Tenancy Act,1956.

25. Disputes between the landlords, i.e. sons of Narasaiah(including the first respondent and her brothers-in-law) led to institutionof proceedings. Further, the appellant had initiated proceedings claiming A

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Ainjunction to prevent injury to his property; the first respondent had filedproceedings alleging default in payment of rent, by the appellant. Allthese disputes were settled during pendency of the proceedings, by theparties. A joint application for recording of compromise, was made. Therelevant extracts of the order passed by the jurisdictional tribunal, in thiscontext, are as follows:B

“Brief allegations made in the petition, are as follows:

a) One Tummala Narasaiah is the father of the 2nd petitioner,5th respondent, husband of the first petitioner namely lateVeeraiah and one T. Seshagiri Rao, and he owned andCpossessed the schedule property. The second petitioner, fifthrespondent and their brother T. Seshagiri Rao are residing inU.S.A. The second Petitioner T. Suryanarayana executedgeneral power of attorney in favour of the first petitionerduring the life time of T. Narasaiah, he got divided theproperties among all his four sons. The revenue records alsoDrecognized the same and issued pattadar pass Books and titledeeds in their name in the year 1994-95. He used to managethe properties during his lifetime. Even during his life timeand after his death, they used to pay the maktha to Narasaiahtill his death and to his sons after his death. The firstEPetitioner’s husband Dr. Veeraiah died on 4.2.2002 executinga will in respect of all his properties situated at Mulukuduruand other places, and as such, she became the absolute ownerof all the properties including the lands in A, B C and Dschedules. Therefore, the petitioners, fifth respondent and T.Seshagiri Rao are the landlords and the Respondent Nos. 1Fto 4 are the tenants under the provisions of the A.P.(A.A)Tenancy Act, 1956.

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(c) The Respondent No.1 is the cultivating tenant of the landof Ac 13.65 cents, secondrespondent is the cultivating tenantof Ac 4.17 cents, third respondent is thecultivating tenant ofAc 1.37 cents and fourth respondent in the cultivating tenantofAc 1.00 which are shown as A, B, C and D scheduleproperties respectively. Theyare neither evicted from theholdings nor they surrendered the holding either wholly or G

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partly either to fifth Respondent or to the petitioners and T.Seshagiri Rao at anypoint of time. So, the respondents 1 to 4are liable to pay the petitioners andT. Seshagiri Rao’s 3/4thshare out of the agreed maktha due for theyear2002-2003and also due during the years 2003-2005. The first respondentpaid the first Petitioner Rs. 11,450/ under receipt, dated1.6.2002 towards her 1/4th share for the year 2001-2002.He also paid Rs. 18510/- to fifth respondent by way of payorder of Syndicate Bank, Mulukuduru on 30.5.2002 whichamount includes also lease amount due for his wife’s land.The respondent nos. 3 & 4 did not pay any amount to thepetitioners and Dr. T. Seshagiri Rao their 3/4th shares inagreed makthas due in the year 2001-2002. The petitionerscame to know that the respondents 2 to 4 agreed to pay theentire maktha as due for B, C and D schedule lands whilethey have been cultivating, to the fifth Respondent this yearand also to deposit the total maktha amounts due for the saidholdings in future years in Syndicate Bank, Mulukuduru infifth respondent’s personal account No.3617. Thus, there havebeen disputes between the petitioners- land-lords andrespondents-tenants. Hence, the petition.

3. The petitioner also filed I.A.No.641/2002 for temporaryinjunction prohibiting the respondents 1 to 4 from paying themaktha due towards their share in the A, B, C and D scheduleland to the respondents 5 and 6 for the last year 2001-2002and in future years also pending disposal of the main petition.

4. The Respondent No.1 herein i.e. Musunuri Satyanarayanaalso filed a suit in O.S.No.174/2002 against the DefendantNos.1 to 7 therein for permanent injunction restraining them,their men, agents, associates, assignees, followers andconfederates from in any way interfering with and or causingobstruction to the peaceful possession and enjoyment of theplaint schedule lands as tenant thereof. Further, theRespondent No.1 herein also filed ATC.3/2002 against thelandlords i.e. the Petitioners herein, fifth respondent and hisbrother T. Seshagiri Rao for declaration that he is thecultivating tenant of the petition schedule property thereinand that his tenancy is subsisting and also for interim AB

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injunction restraining the Respondent No.1 and his men,associates, agents, power of attorney holders if any from inany way interfering or causing obstruction in any way to thepetitioner’s tenancy rights in the petition schedule land.

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5. During the pendency of the I.A.No.641/2002 filed byBPetitioners, for temporary injunction, a compromise took placebetween all the parties and the compromise agreement, dated25.7.2002 was also filed. As all the parties were present inthe court hall and all of them accepted that the contents ofthe compromise agreement are true and correct and they haveno objection to record the compromise and the same wasCrecorded, accordingly. In view of the said compromise, theRespondent No.1 herein has not pressed the O.S.No.174/2002and the tenancy petition in A.T.C.3/2002 and they weredismissed. As per the terms of compromise agreement, the wetlands to the extent of Ac 7.04 in S.No.56/2, wet land of AcD0.10 cents in Dl.No.56/3, extent of Ac 0.36 cents in D.No.65/5 T wet land of Ac 1.89 cents in D.No.473/3 and wet land tothe extent of Ac 1.37 cents in D.No.25, in total Ac 10.76 centsof wet land was fallen to the share of the petitioners and theremaining extent of the lands situated in other survey numberswere fallen to the shares of the fifth respondent- T.ESatyanarayana and his brother T. Seshagiri Rao. Further, asper the terms of the compromise agreement, the RespondentNo.1 herein shall continue as the cultivating tenant for thelands fallen to the share of the petitioners. Thus, from thesaid compromise petition, it is obvious that the first respondentFhas to pay the maktha in respect of the lands as mentionedabove, to the petitioners and the petitioners are no wayconcerned with the lands fallen to the share of the fifthrespondent and his brother.

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6. Since the compromise took place between the parties andsince as per the said compromise, first respondent has tocontinue his tenancy in respect of the lands fallen to the shareof the petitioners, I as inclined to declare that the lease betweenthe petitioners and the first respondent is subsisting in respectof the lands fallen to the share of the petitioners. Since, in thepetition, there is no allegation made against the first G

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respondent that he is ready to pay then maktha either to thefifth respondent or to the sixth respondent herein and sinceas per the agreement, the Respondent No.1 agreed to pay themaktha to the petitioners in respect of the lands fallen to theirshares, I am not inclined to grant any injunction.

7. In the result, the petition is allowed without costs in termsof the compromises, declaring that the lease between thepetitioners and the first respondent is subsisting and dismissingthe relief of suitable injunction is dismissed.”

26. A plain reading of the above extracts establishes that, (a) thesharing of properties, between the landlords, was re-arranged; (b) thestatus of the tenants including the present appellant, was reiterated,in more than one place; and (c) the relationship of landlord and tenant, inrespect of different properties, was arranged, keeping in mind thecompromise by the landlord parties. The operative part of the order,recording compromise between the appellant/ tenant, and the landlordsclearly stated that “the petition is allowed without costs in terms of thecompromises, declaring that the lease between the petitionersand the first respondent.”

27. The compromise is a matter of record, and could not be disputed;it was recorded by the Special officer, on 29-07-02 in A.T.C. 5/02. Itwas produced by the appellant, before the tribunal in the present case.The declaration of subsistence of the tenancy, having regard to the shareof the first respondent (Indira Devi) and Suryanarayana was to the extentof 10-76 acres. Crucially, the Special Officer’s order declared that thetenancy had to be continued.

28. The appellant had urged before the tribunal that in 2003, thefirst respondent had agreed to sell the property, 3.93 acres, for `1,25,000/-, payable in nine instalments. He urged that a part payment of `49,125/- through a demand draft dated 26-09-2003 issued by Syndicate Bank,Mulukuduru was made to the first respondent, who appropriated theamounts.

29. When the appellant approached the tribunal for various reliefs,it was contended by the first respondent that he had surrendered histenancy pursuant to an oral agreement and that having lost his status astenant, he could not claim recourse to the provisions enabling a tenant topurchase property, i.e. Section 15. 30. The statement of objects of the A

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ATenancy Act show that it was enacted with a view to protecting tenantswho were then in possession of agricultural lands from unjust eviction.Initially, an ordinance was promulgated; that was later replaced by anAct providing for permanent measures of tenancy reform. The statementof objects of the amendment, of 1974, through which certain provisionswere introduced, shows that the legislature provided for the regulationBof the rent payable by the tenant to the landlord, the prescription of aminimum period for agricultural leases, and other incidental matters, aswell as special provisions prescribing that (i) all leases should be for aminimum period of six years and should be automatically renewablesuccessively for further minimum periods of six years except where theClandlord wishes to resume his land for personal cultivation and (ii) thatthe cultivating tenant should have a right of first preference in thepurchase of the land under his tenancy if the landlord wishes to sell it.31. The provisions of Tenancy Act reveal that under Section 4 ofthe Act, every landlord and his cultivating tenant have to agree in regardDto the form of tenancy, in particular whether the rent shall be paid in theform of a share in the produce or in the form of a fixed rent in kind, or inthe form of a fixed rent in cash. Such agreement cannot be alteredduring the currency of the lease except by mutual agreement of theparties. By Section 5 of the amending Act No. 39 of 1974, the sentence‘during the currency of the lease’ stood omitted with effect from 01-07-E1980. In terms of an amendment to Section 10 of the Act, every leasesubsisting at the commencement of Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area)Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1974is deemed to be in perpetuity. Section13 of the Act enacts that, notwithstanding anything contained in Sections10, 11 and 12, a landlord cannot terminate the tenancy and evict hisFcultivating tenant except by an application made in that behalf to theSpecial Officer on the grounds mentioned in that section and if thecultivating tenant intends to surrender his tenancy the procedureprescribed by Section 14 of the Act has to be followed.

32. In Adapala Subbaiah vs. Shaik Hasan Saheb[6 ]theimportance and imperative nature of the procedure prescribed forGsurrender of tenancy, by a tenant, was explained by the High Court, inthe following terms:

“As per that Section 14, surrender of holding by a tenant canonly be at the end of any agricultural year, after giving his H6 2007(4) ALT 54

landlord and the Special Officer at least three months’ noticeexpiring with the end of such agricultural year. ‘Agriculturalyear’ is defined in Section 2(a) of the Act as the yearcommencing on the 1st day of June or such other date as maybe notified by the Government in the Andhra Pradesh Gazettein respect of any locality having regard to the usage or customof the locality in respect of the commencement of agriculturaloperations therein. If the respondent really had cultivated theland of appellant and had vacated the same in 1981-82, inview of Section 14 of the Act, he should have given a noticein March 1981 both to the appellant and the Special Officerintimating them about his intention to vacate the land. It isnot even the case of appellant that any such notice was givenby the respondent. When the tenancy Act confers special rightsincluding the right to purchase the land is given to the tenant,no ordinary prudent tenant would vacate the land that toowithout following the procedure prescribed in the Act.Therefore, the contention of the appellant that the respondenttook the land on lease for only one year and vacated it at theend of the year is difficult to be believed.”

33. The above view had been previously echoed in the judgmentreported as Mygapula Venkateswara Rao vs. Ponangi Venkataraju[7]in the following terms:

“This requirement of giving notice before three months isstipulated with a view to safeguard the interests of the tenantSo long as the surrender as contemplated under Section 14of the Act has not been completed and final order has beenpassed in pursuance of an oral or written agreement if anyentered into between the landlord and the tenant, it cannotbe said to be a final one. Unless and until final order hasbeen passed with regard to the surrender by the Special Officerunder Section 14 of the Act, the relationship of landlord andtenant cannot be said to have been extinguished.”

34. Again, in Badugu Venkata Durga Rao and Ors. vs. SurneniLakshmi[8] the importance of following the procedure, under Section 14and its mandatory content, was reiterated. This court had, in the past, 7 1990 (1) APLJ (HC) 466

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Aexamined and interpreted identical terms of the law in the erstwhilestate of Bombay i.e. the Section 15 of the Bombay Tenancy andAgricultural Lands Act, 1948[9], in Vallabbhai Nathabhai vs. Baijivi &Ors.[10]

“3. Under Section 15 (1) a tenant, as defined by Section 2B(18) of the Act, can terminate the tenancy in respect of theland held by him as a tenant by surrendering his interest infavour of his landlord and as provided by Sub-section (2) onsuch surrender of the tenancy the landlord becomes entitledto retain the land so surrendered by the tenant in the samemanner as when the tenancy is terminated under Sections 31Cand 31A of the Act. The tenancy on such surrender comes toan end and thereupon the relationship between them of alandlord and a tenant and the rights arising out of thatrelationship terminate. The Legislature, however, was awareof the possibility of landlords taking advantage over theDtenants and therefore to safeguard the tenants against such apossibility, it laid down through the proviso that a surrenderby a tenant could only be valid and binding on him if it wasin writing and was verified by the Mamlatdar. Before theMamlatdar would verify such surrender it would be his dutyto ascertain whether the surrender was voluntary and wasEnot under pressure or undue influence of the landlord. But 9 The relevant portion of Section 15, which is in pari materia with Section 14 of theTenancy Act, in this case, reads as follows:

“15.Termination of tenancy by surrender thereof. - (1) A tenant may terminate thetenancy in respect of any land at any time by surrendering his interest therein in favourFof the landlord:Provided that such surrender shall be in writing, and verified before the Mamlatdar inthe prescribed manner.

(2) Where a tenant surrenders his tenancy, the landlord shall be entitled to retain theland so surrendered for the like purposes, and to the like extent, and in so far as theconditions are applicable subject to the like conditions, as are provided in sections 31and 31A for the termination of tenancies.G[(2A) The Mamlatdar shall in respect of the surrender verified under sub-section (1),hold an inquiry and decide whether the landlord is entitled under sub-section (2) toretain the whole or any portion of the land so surrendered, and specify the extent andparticulars in that behalf.”

10 [1969] 3 SCR 309 (this decision was followed in Polisetti Venkata Subbaiah vs.Karre Venkata Prasad & Ors. 1998 (1) ALT 79 in relation to Section 14 of the TenancyHAct- in the present case).

once the surrender satisfies these two conditions it has thesame effect as the termination of tenancy: the tenancy comesto an end and the landlord becomes entitled to retain the landof which possession is delivered to him by the tenantsurrendering his interest as a tenant therein. In cases, however,where the surrender has not satisfied the two conditions, evenif it is voluntary, it is no surrender and therefore there is notermination of relationship of a landlord and tenant.”

35. An identical view was expressed by a Full Bench of the BombayHigh Court, in Madhao Tatya Sonar v. Maharashtra Revenue TribunalNagpur & Ors[11] whilst interpreting provisions of Sections 20 and 36Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act (Bom.XCIX of 1958). Again, later, in Ramchandra Keshav Adke & Ors vsGovind Joti Chavare[12] the primacy, and imperative nature of suchprovisions was underlined, by this Court in the following terms:

“It will be seen from a combined reading of these provisionsthat a surrender of tenancy by a tenant in order to be validand effective must fulfil these requirements : (1) It must be inwriting. (2) It must be verified before the Mamlatdar. (3) Whilemaking such verification the Mamlatdar must satisfy himselfin regard to two things, namely, (a) that the tenant understandsthe nature and consequences of the, surrender, and (b) that itis voluntary. (4). The Mamlatdar must endorse his finding asto such satisfaction upon the document of surrender.

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Next point to be considered is, what is the consequence ofnoncompliance with this mandatory procedure ? A centuryago, in Taylor v. Taylor(1876 Ch.D 426), Jassel M. R. adoptedthe rule that where a power is given to do a certain thing in acertain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at alland that other methods of performance are necessarilyforbidden. This rule has stood the test of time. It was appliedby the Privy Council, in Nazir Ahmed v Emperor (AIR 1936 P.C. 253) and later by this Court in several cases (Shiv BahadurSingh v. State of U. P. [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1098; Deep Chand v 11 1970 Mh. L.J. 991

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AState of Rajasthan [1962] S.C.R. 662), to a Magistrate makinga record under Sections 164 and 364 of the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1898. This rule squarely applies “where, indeed,the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainlydefeated if the command to do the thing in a particular mannerdid not imply a prohibition to do it in any other.( Maxwell’sBInterpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., pp, 362-363). The rulewill be attracted with full force in the present case becausenon-verification of the surrender in the requisite manner wouldfrustrate the very purpose of this provision. Intention of thelegislature to prohibit the verification of the surrender in aCmanner other than the one prescribed, is implied in theseprovisions. Failure to comply with these mandatory provisions,therefore, had vitiated the surrender and rendered it non-est…”

36. Thus, as a matter of law, the requirement of notice for theDprescribed period of three months, to the landlord, and the concernedrevenue official is mandatory. This provision, in the form of a procedureenacted for the welfare and protection of a tenant (like the appellant)has to be construed in its literal and plain terms. The material phrase inSection 14 (1) in the present case is that “the surrender of such holdingshall take effect only after it is accepted by the Special Officer onEbeing satisfied, after making suchinquiry as he thinks fit, that suchsurrender is voluntary and genuine.” This reinforces the conclusionthat not following the prescribed procedure, invalidates the so-calledsurrender. Therefore, the twin conditions that make a valid surrender oftenancy are firstly, three months’ notice in writingto the landlord, andFthe Special Officer about the intention to surrender the tenancy, andsecondly, satisfaction recorded by the Special Officer in an order, afterdue inquiry about the voluntary nature of the surrender of tenancy. NeitherIndira Devi nor the other contesting respondents (who purchased thelands from her) pleaded or proved that notice in writing was issued tothem by the appellant, followed by inquiry conducted by the SpecialGOfficer, culminating in an order accepting such alleged surrender.Therefore, clearly, the findings of the District Judge and the High Court,regarding surrender (either in part or fully) of the tenancy, are whollyuntenable.

37. This court is also of the opinion that the findings recorded byHthe High Court and the District Court, as regards lack of evidence of subsisting tenancy in favour of the appellant are contrary to the record.The order passed in the compromise petition, clearly recorded, in morethan one place, that the lease between the appellant on the one hand,and Indira Devi, on the other, was subsisting and continuing. Being anadmitted document, recording an incontrovertible fact, the burden wasupon the respondents to prove that the appellant’s tenancy had beenterminated, or surrendered in a manner known to law. They plainly failedto do so. As a result, the finding regarding surrender of tenancy iserroneous.

38. The next issue is with respect to the agreement to purchasethe scheduled lands. Here, the appellant had, in his petition, claimingvarious reliefs, contended that Indira Devi, for herself and as G.P.A of T.Suryanarayana orally offered to him to sell the lands in measuring 10.76acres. He accepted the offer to purchase 3.57 acres (in D.No.56/2belonging to T. Suryanarayana), 3.47 acres (in the same D.No.56/2)0.10 acres (in D. No. 56/3), and 0.36 acres (in D.No.65/5B) belongingIndira Devi on instalment basis @ `1,25,000/- per acre. It was arguedthat this was agreed during negotiations between him and Indira Deviafter payment of agreed maktha for the year 2002/03. He had also reliedon the fact that in consideration of Indira Devi’s request the appellantpaid full sale consideration in the shape of advance of `16,500/- in cashand `1,80,000/- by demand draft (No. 187502, Dated. 30-06-2003) andadvance of `45,500/- and `2,05,000/- in the shape of demand draft No.187501, dated. 30-06-03 on behalf of his wife M. Rajamohini whichresulted in execution of the sale deeds Ex. P 15 and P.16 at the agreedrate of `1,25,000/- per acre. These were incontrovertible facts, becausethe particulars of the demand drafts, and the registered sale deeds, wereexhibited during the proceedings. Having regard to these facts, his furthercase was that a sum of `49, 125/- was paid as first of the nine instalments,the balance being `4, 42,000/-. Ex. P-12 was the covering letter enclosinga demand draft dated 26-09-2003 issued by Syndicate Bank, Mulukuduru.That document categorically referred to the sale transaction, clearlyspelling out that the amount was towards an instalment payable asconsideration for purchase of property.

39. In the light of these facts, the first respondent’s stand wasthat the amount was appropriated towards maktha or rent for a part ofthe previous period. The tribunal held that the explanation for appropriationwas untenable, because no notice (as required by express provisions of A

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Athe Tenancy Act) had been issued; more importantly, in terms of theappellant’s pleadings, the rent was `5,000/- per acre, which meant thatthe arrears, at best would have been `28,850/-. As in the case of Section14, the law recognizes that a tenant can face eviction, if she or he fails todeposit rent. There was no specific pleading as to the period for whichrents were defaulted by the appellant. On the other hand, the notice wasBproduced (Ex. P-12) to establish that the amount paid was towardsconsideration. In the absence of a similar notice setting out withparticulars of the rent payable as well as the period, the District Judgeand the High Court could not have upset the order of the tribunal asregards the appellant’s exercise of right to purchase the property, underCSection 15.

40. For the above reasons, the impugned order of the High Court,as well as the judgment of the District Court, are hereby set aside. Theorder of the Tribunal[13], is hereby restored. This Court hereby records itsappreciation for the assistance given by Mr. Sridhar Potaraju, the amicus Dappointed in this case. The appeals are allowed in these terms, withoutorder on costs.

Ankit Gyan

Appeals allowed.

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13 Special Officer for A.P. Tenancy Tribunal-Cum-Prl. Junior Civil Judge, Punnur inA.T.C. NO. 2/2003 dated 30.11.2009.