MAQBOOL versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER on 7 September 2018

[2018] 12 S.C.R. 885

MAQBOOL

v.

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER

(Criminal Appeal No. 1143 of 2018)

SEPTEMBER 07, 2018

[KURIAN JOSEPH AND SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.326A and 326B – Offence under,whether attracted, if the injury in an acid attack is simple – Plea ofappellant for discharge u/s.326A on the ground that the injurycaused was simple as per the medical report hence, he cannot becharged u/s.326A, rejected – Propriety of – Held: It is not thepercentage or gravity of injury, which makes the difference – Be itsimple or grievous, if the injury falls under the specified eight typesu/s.326A on account of use of acid, the offence u/s.326A isattracted – Merely because the title to s.326A speaks aboutgrievous hurt by use of acid, it is not a requirement under theSection that the injuries caused should be invariably grievous –s.326B would be attracted in case the requirements specified aremet on an attempted acid attack – Appeal dismissed – The CriminalLaw (Amendment) Act, 2013.

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.326A and 326B – Difference between– Discussed.

Interpretation of Statutes – Title of the provision and itscontents – Conflict between – Held: Title to the provision need notinvariably indicate the contents of the provision – In the event of aconflict between the plain expressions in the provision and theindicated title, the title cannot control the contents of the provision– Title is only a broad and general indication of the nature of thesubject dealt under the provision.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Section 326A, IPC carries title of “voluntarilycausing grievous hurt by use of acid” whereas Section 326B, IPCdoes not carry any such indication in the title regarding thenature of injury as grievous. But, both the Sections provide for

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Aeight types of injuries - (i) permanent damage, (ii) partialdamage, (iii) deformity, (iv) burns, (v) maiming,(vi) disfigurement, (vii) disability or (viii) grievous hurt. The firstseven of the injuries referred to in the Sections are classifiedbased on the normal aftereffect of acid attack whereas the eighthone is on the gravity of the effect. Under Sections 326A and 326B,Bgrievous hurt is only one among the eight injuries. In view of theexplanation under Section 326B, the resultant damage ordeformity under 326A or 326B is not required to be irreversible.The other seven injuries may be either simple or grievous. Thenature of injury being simple or grievous, is irrelevant forCdistinguishing between Section 323, Section 326 and Section 326Aof IPC or between Section 326A and Section 326B of IPC. If theinjury referred to under Section 326A or 326B is one among thespecified eight injuries, whether the seven of them be simple orgrievous, the special provisions are attracted. [Paras 6, 7][890-E-H; 891-A]D

1.2 The basic difference between Sections 326A and 326Bof IPC is the presence of actual injury under Section 326A. Theresultant injury has made the offence more serious with amandatory minimum punishment of ten years which may extend

to imprisonment for life and, in either case, with a fine. The fineEis mandatory and the quantum should be just and reasonable inthe sense that it should be, in any case, sufficient to meet themedical expenses for the treatment of the victim. Therefore, thesecond proviso under Section 326A requires that the fineimposed should be paid to the litigant. Under Section 326B, theFmere act of throwing or attempt to throw or attempt toadminister or attempt to use any other means with the intentionof causing any of the injuries referred to in the Section, is to bevisited with a mandatory minimum imprisonment of five years,which may extend to seven years and fine. Thus, merelybecause the title to Section 326A of IPC speaks about grievousGhurt by use of acid, it is not a requirement under the Section thatthe injuries caused should be invariably grievous. Even if theseven injuries are simple, Section 326A, and under Section 326Bthe mere act of throwing or attempt, as indicated in the Section,would attract the offence. [Paras 8, 9] [891-B-D]H

1.3 The title to the provision need not invariably indicatethe contents of the provision. If the provision is otherwise clearand unambiguous, the title pales into irrelevance. On thecontrary, if the contents of the provision are otherwiseambiguous, an aid can be sought from the title so as to define theprovision. In the event of a conflict between the plainexpressions in the provision and the indicated title, the titlecannot control the contents of the provision. Title is only a broadand general indication of the nature of the subject dealt underthe provision. [Para 10] [891-E-F]

1.4 It is not the percentage or gravity of injury, which makesthe difference. Be it simple or grievous, if the injury falls underthe specified types under Section 326A on account of use of acid,the offence under Section 326A is attracted. Section 326B wouldbe attracted in case the requirements specified are met on anattempted acid attack. [Para 16] [894-A-B]

1.5 The observations and findings in the present Judgmentare only for the purpose of reaching the conclusion as to whethercharge under Section 326A of IPC has been correctly framed andwhether the trial court committed an error in rejecting theapplication for discharge under Section 326A of IPC. All otheraspects would remain to be considered during the trial whichshall be conducted uninfluenced by any of the observations onthe merits of the matter. [Para 17] [894-C-D]

Laddu Ram v. State of Rajasthan[CriminalMiscellaneous Petition No. 681 of 2017 decided on06.02.2017 by Rajasthan High Court] ; M. SiluvaiMurugan @ Murugan v. State2018 SCC OnLine Mad2332 – overruled.

Raichurmatham Prabhakar and Another v. RawatmalDugar (2004) 4 SCC 766 : [2004] 3 SCR 1130 ;Union of India (UOI) and Another v. NationalFederation of the Blind and Others(2013) 10 SCC772 : [2013] 9 SCR 1023 – relied on.

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Case Law Reference

[2004] 3 SCR 1130[2013] 9 SCR 1023

relied on relied on

Para 11

Para 11

BCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal AppealNo. 1143 of 2018

From the Order dated 19.07.2018 of the High Court of Judicatureat Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 2231 of 2018

L. B. Rai, Askari Husain, Saurav Singhla, Kartik Rai, ShankarCDivate, Advs. for the Appellant.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KURIAN, J. 1.Leave granted.

2. In an acid attack, if the injury is simple, whether an offenceDunder Section 326A of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as‘IPC’) is attracted, is the main question for consideration in this case.And if the injury is only simple, whether charge can be framed underSection 326B is the incidental issue.

3. Section 326A was introduced by The Criminal LawE(Amendment)Act, 2013 pursuant to the recommendations contained inthe Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law,popularly known as J.S. Verma Committee Report. The pre-amendedprovision covering such injuries is Section 326. To quote:

“326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerousFweapons or means.—Whoever, except in the case provided forby section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of anyinstrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which,used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by meansof fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or anyGcorrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, orby means of any substance which it is deleterious to the humanbody to inhale, to swallow, or to re-ceive into the blood, or bymeans of any animal, shall be pun-ished with 1[imprisonment forlife], or with imprisonment of either description for a term whichmay extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

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4. “Grievous hurt” is defined under Section 320 of IPC and “hurt”under Section 319 of IPC. To quote:

“319. Hurt.—Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmityto any person is said to cause hurt.”

“320. Grievous hurt.—The following kinds of hurt only aredesignated as “grievous”:—

First — Emasculation.

Secondly — Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.

Thirdly — Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear, Fourthly — Privation of any member or joint.

Fifthly — Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint.

Sixthly — Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.

Seventhly— Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.

Eighthly — Any hurt which endangers life or whichcauses the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodilypain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.”

5. Injuries caused or attempted to be caused by use of acid, havebeen, under the amendment, categorized differently as separate orspecial offences under Sections 326A and 326B of IPC:

“326A. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid,etc.-Whoever causes permanent or partial damage or deformityto, or burns or maims or disfigures or disables, any part or parts ofthe body of a person or causes grievous hurt by throwing acid onor by administering acid to that person, or by using any othermeans with the intention of causing or with the knowledge that heis likely to cause such injury or hurt, shall be punished withimprisonment of either description for a term which shall not beless than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life,and with fine; Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meetthe medical expenses of the treatment of the victim; A

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Provided further that any fine imposed under this sectionshall be paid to the victim.”

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“326B.Voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw acid.-Whoever throws or attempts to throw acid on any person orattempts to administer acid to any person, or attempts to use anyother means, with the intention of causing permanent or partialdamage or deformity or burns or maiming or disfigurement ordisability or grievous hurt to that person, shall be punished withimprisonment of either description for a term which shall not beless than five years but which may extend to seven years, andshall also be liable to fine.

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Explanation I.—For the purposes of section 326A and thissection, “acid” includes any substance which has acidic or corrosivecharacter or burning nature, that is capable of causing bodily injuryleading to scars or disfigurement or temporary or permanentdisability.

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Explanation 2.— For the purposes of section 326A and thissection, permanent or partial damage or deformity shall not berequired to be irreversible.”

6. Section 326A carries title of “voluntarily causing grievous hurtby use of acid” whereas Section 326B does not carry any suchindication in the title regarding the nature of injury as grievous. But oncloser analysis, it can be seen that both the Sections provide for eighttypes of injuries - (i) permanent damage, (ii) partial damage,(iii) deformity, (iv) burns, (v) maiming, (vi) disfigurement, (vii) disabilityor (viii) grievous hurt.

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7. The first seven of the injuries referred to in the Sections areclassified based on the normal aftereffect of acid attack whereas theeighth one is on the gravity of the effect. Under Sections 326A and326B, grievous hurt is only one among the eight injuries. In view of theexplanation under Section 326B, the resultant damage or deformityGunder 326A or 326B is not required to be irreversible. The other seveninjuries may be either simple or grievous. The nature of injury beingsimple or grievous, is irrelevant for distinguishing between Section 323and Section 326A of IPC or between Section 326A and Section 326B ofIPC. If the injury referred to under Section 326A or 326B is one among H

the specified eight injuries, whether the seven of them be simple orgrievous, the special provisions are attracted.

8. The basic difference between Sections 326A and 326B of IPCis the presence of actual injury under Section 326A. The resultant injuryhas made the offence more serious with a mandatory minimumpunishment of ten years which may extend to imprisonment for life and,in either case, with a fine. The fine is mandatory and the quantum shouldbe just and reasonable in the sense that it should be, in any case,sufficient to meet the medical expenses for the treatment of the victim.Therefore, the second proviso under Section 326A requires that the fineimposed should be paid to the litigant. Under Section 326B, the mere actof throwing or attempt to throw or attempt to administer or attempt touse any other means with the intention of causing any of the injuriesreferred to in the Section, is to be visited with a mandatory minimumimprisonment of five years, which may extend to seven years and fine.

9. Thus, merely because the title to Section 326A of IPC speaksabout grievous hurt by use of acid, it is not a requirement under theSection that the injuries caused should be invariably grievous. Even ifthe seven injuries are simple, Section 326A, and under Section 326B themere act of throwing or attempt, as indicated in the Section, wouldattract the offence.

10. The title to the provision need not invariably indicate thecontents of the provision. If the provision is otherwise clear andunambiguous, the title pales into irrelevance. On the contrary, if thecontents of the provision are otherwise ambiguous, an aid can be soughtfrom the title so as to define the provision. In the event of a conflictbetween the plain expressions in the provision and the indicated title, thetitle cannot control the contents of the provision. Title is only a broad andgeneral indication of the nature of the subject dealt under the provision.

11. We are benefitted with two precedents in this regard -(i) Raichurmatham Prabhakarand another v. Rawatmal Dugar[1]and (ii) Union of India (UOI) and another v. National Federationof the Blind and others[2].

12. In Raichurmatham Prabhakar(supra), it was held by theCourt at paragraph-14 of the judgment as follows:1 (2004) 4 SCC 7662 (2013) 10 SCC 772

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“14. The view is now settled that the headings or titlespre-fixed to sections or group of sections can be referred to inconstruing an Act of the legislature. But conflicting opinions havebeen expressed on the question as to what weight should beattached to the headings or titles. According to one view, theheadings might be treated as preambles to the provisionsfollowing them so as to be regarded as giving the key to openingthe mind of the draftsman of the clauses arranged thereunder.According to the other view, resort to heading can only be takenwhen the enacting words are ambiguous. They cannot control themeaning of plain words but they may explain ambiguities.(See: Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh,9[th] Edn., 2004, pp.152,155). In our opinion, it is permissible toassign the heading or title of a section a limited role to play in theconstruction of statutes. They may be taken as very broad andgeneral indicators of the nature of the subject-matter dealt withthereunder. The heading or title may also be taken as acondensed name assigned to indicate collectively thecharacteristics of the subject-matter dealt with by the enactmentunderneath; though the name would always be brief having itsown limitations. In case of conflict between the plain language ofthe provision and the meaning of the heading or title, the headingor title would not control the meaning which is clearly and plainlydiscernible from the language of the provision thereunder.”

13. In National Federation of the Blind(supra):

“44. It is settled law that while interpreting any provision ofa statute the plain meaning has to be given effect and if languagetherein is simple and unambiguous, there is no need to traversebeyond the same. Likewise, if the language of the relevantsection gives a simple meaning and message, it should beinterpreted in such a way and there is no need to give any weightageto headings of those paragraphs. This aspect has been clarified inPrakash Nath Khanna and Anr. v. Commissioner of Income Taxand Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 686. Paragraph 13 of the said judgment isrelevant which reads as under:

“13. It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot readanything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. Thelanguage employed in a statute is the determinative factor oflegislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is thatthe intention of the legislation must be found in the words used bythe legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposedand has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes shouldbe construed, not as theorems of Euclid”, Judge Learned Handsaid, “but words must be construed with some imagination of thepurposes which lie behind them”. (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co.v. Yensavage.) The view was reiterated in Union of India v. FilipTiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama and Padma SundaraRao v. State of T.N.””

14. In the present case, the appellant sought discharge underSection 326A of IPC on the ground that the injury caused was simple asper the medical report. The trial court rejected the application and thesame has been upheld by the High Court. Learned Counsel for theappellant has submitted that even if the entire prosecution story isaccepted to be true and correct, no grievous hurt has been caused to thevictim since the injuries are reported to be simple, and hence, he cannotbe charged under Section 326A. Reliance is sought to be placed on twodecisions, one of the High Court of Rajasthan in Laddu Ramv. State ofRajasthan decided on 06.02.2017 in Criminal Miscellaneous PetitionNo. 681 of 2017 and the other of the High Court of Madras inM. Siluvai Murugan @ Murugan v. State decided on 30.07.2018 inCriminal Appeal No. 861 of 2016 (2018 SCC OnLine Mad 2332).

15. In Laddu Ram (supra), the High Court of Rajasthan has takenthe view that the injury caused being simple in nature, Section 326A ofIPC is not attracted but only Section 326B of IPC would apply. Similarly,the High Court of Madras in M. Siluvai Murugan @ Murugan(supra) held that if the injury caused by use of acid is simple in nature,there cannot be any conviction under Section 326A of IPC. In M. SiluvaiMurugan @ Murugan (supra), though the High Court has analysedthe legal position correctly, it has unfortunately committed a patent errorin taking note of the nature of injury as simple and altering the convictionto Section 326B of IPC on the ground that the injury as per medicalreport was simple being chemical injury at twelve per cent.

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A16.As we have already discussed above, it is not the percentageor gravity of injury, which makes the difference. Be it simple orgrievous, if the injury falls under the specified types under Section 326Aon account of use of acid, the offence under Section 326A is attracted.Section 326B would be attracted in case the requirements specified aremet on an attempted acid attack. Therefore, both the High Court ofBRajasthan in Laddu Ram(supra) and High Court of Madras inM. Siluvai Murugan @ Murugan (supra) do not lay down the correctposition of law and they are overruled.

17. The appeal is hence dismissed. However, we make it clearthat the observations and findings in this Judgment are only for theCpurpose of reaching the conclusion as to whether charge under Section326A of IPC has been correctly framed and whether the trial courtcommitted an error in rejecting the application for discharge underSection 326A of IPC. All other aspects would remain to be consideredduring the trial which shall be conducted uninfluenced by any of theDobservations on the merits of the matter.

Divya Pandey

Appeal dismissed.

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