SHRI RAJENDRA LALITKUMAR AGRAWAL versus SMT. RATNA ASHOK MURANJAN & ANR. on 31 January 2019

Issues

[2019] 1 S.C.R. 815

SHRI RAJENDRA LALITKUMAR AGRAWAL

v.

SMT. RATNA ASHOK MURANJAN & ANR.

(Civil Appeal No.1331 of 2019)

JANUARY 31, 2019

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE ANDDINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s. 100(4), (5) – Secondappeal – Substantial question of law – On facts, suit for specificperformance of contract on basis of an agreement – Decreed bythe trial court, however, set aside by the first Appellate Court – Insecond appeal, dismissal by the High Court on the ground that itdoes not involve any substantial question of law – Justification of –Held: Interpretation of any terms and conditions of a documentsuch as the agreement which is admitted by the parties, constitutesa substantial question of law within the meaning of s.100 – HighCourt should have framed substantial question of law in relation tothe true intent, rights and obligations arising from the agreement –Also it could have framed questions on the issues material for grantor refusal of specific performance – High Court decided the secondappeal bipartite like the first appeal without keeping in view thescope of its jurisdiction conferred by s.100 (4) and (5) – Approachof the High Court not in conformity with the requirements of s.100– Thus, the matter remanded to High Court for deciding the secondappeal after framing substantial question of law.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The High Court was not right in holding thatthe appeal does not involve any substantial question of law withinthe meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.The appeal did involve the substantial question of law and thesame, therefore, should have been framed at the time of admissionof the second appeal as provided under Section 100 (4) for itsfinal hearing. Indeed Section 100 (5) provides that the appealshall be heard only on the substantial question of law framed bythe High Court under Section 100 (4) of the Code. [Para 11][818-C-D]

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A1.2 It cannot be disputed that the interpretation of any termsand conditions of a document (such as the agreement in this case)constitutes a substantial question of law within the meaning ofSection 100 of the Code. It is more so when both the partiesadmit the document. Since the interpretation of documentsconstitutes the substantial question of law, the High Court shouldBhave first framed appropriate substantial question(s) arising inthe case especially on the questions in relation to the true intent,rights and obligations arising from the agreement in the contextof pleadings and the reversing findings of the two courts belowand then should have called upon the respondents to reply to theCquestions framed keeping in view its jurisdiction under Section100(5) and its proviso. In addition, the High Court also couldhave framed questions on the issues, which are material for grantor refusal of specific performance keeping in view therequirements of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, pleadingsof the parties, and the reversing findings of the two courts belowDon such issues with a view to find out as to which finding is morepreferable. [Paras 12-14][818-E-H; 819-A]

1.3 From the reading the impugned order, it is found thaton one hand, the High Court went on interpreting the terms ofthe document after hearing the argument of both sides and onEthe other hand, in conclusion, held that it does not involve anysubstantial question of law. It virtually, therefore, decided thesecond appeal bipartite like the first appeal without keeping inview the scope of its jurisdiction conferred by Section 100 (4)and (5) of the Code. The approach of the High Court whileFdeciding the second appeal was not in conformity with therequirements of Section 100. While setting aside the impugnedorder, the case is remanded to the High Court for deciding thesecond appeal on merits in accordance with law after framingappropriate substantial question of law arising in the case. [Para15][819-B-C, E-F]GCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1331of 2019.

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.08.2018 of the High Courtof Judicature at Bombay in Second Appeal No. 44 of 2017.

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Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv., Makarand D. Adkar, Braj K. Mishra,Vijay Kumar, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Advs. for the Appellant.

R.B. Singhal, Sr. Adv., R.K. Singh, Ms. Rashmi Singh, Advs. forthe Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and orderdated 06.08.2018 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in SecondAppeal No. 44 of 2017 whereby the High Court dismissed the secondappeal filed by the appellant herein.

3. In order to appreciate the short controversy involved in thisappeal, few relevant facts need mention hereinbelow.

4. The appellant is the plaintiff whereas the respondents are thedefendants in the civil suit out of which this appeal arises.

5. The appellant filed a civil suit against the respondents for specificperformance of the contract in relation to the suit property. The said suitwas based on an agreement dated 08.08.1984. The respondents filedtheir written statement and denied the appellant’s claim. The Trial Courtby judgment/decree dated 05.07.2004 decreed the appellant’s suit andpassed a decree for specific performance of the contract against therespondents.

6. The respondents felt aggrieved and filed first appeal before theDistrict Judge, Pune. By judgment/decree dated 10.11.2016, the firstAppellate Court allowed the respondents’ (defendants’) appeal anddismissed the suit. The appellant (plaintiff) felt aggrieved and filed secondappeal before the High Court.

7. By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the second appealholding that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of lawas is required to be made out under Section 100 of the Code of CivilProcedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) which has givenrise to filing of the present appeal by way of special leave by the plaintiffin this Court.

8. The short question, which arises for consideration in this appeal,is whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the plaintiff’s second A

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Aappeal on the ground that it does not involve any substantial question(s)of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code.

9. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusalof the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal and whileBsetting aside the impugned order remand the case to the High Court fordeciding the second appeal on merits in accordance with law after framingappropriate substantial question(s) of law arising in the case.

11. Having perused the record and the judgments of the TrialCourt, first Appellate Court and the impugned order, we are of theCconsidered view that the High Court was not right in holding that theappeal does not involve any substantial question of law within the meaningof Section 100 of the Code. In our view, the appeal did involve thesubstantial question of law and the same, therefore, should have beenframed at the time of admission of the second appeal as provided underDSection 100 (4) of the Code for its final hearing. Indeed Section 100 (5)of the Code provides that the appeal shall be heard only on the substantialquestion of law framed by the High Court under Section 100 (4) of theCode.

12. It cannot be disputed that the interpretation of any terms andEconditions of a document (such as the agreement dated 08.08.1984 inthis case) constitutes a substantial question of law within the meaning ofSection 100 of the Code. It is more so when both the parties admit thedocument.

13. As mentioned above, since the interpretation of documentsconstitutes the substantial question of law, the High Court should haveFfirst framed appropriate substantial question(s) arising in the caseespecially on the questions in relation to the true intent, rights andobligations arising from Clauses 3, 5 and 15 of the agreement dated08.08.1984 in the context of pleadings and the reversing findings of thetwo Courts below and then should have called upon the respondents toGreply to the questions framed keeping in view its jurisdiction under Section100(5) of the Code and its proviso.

14. In addition, the High Court also could have framed questionson the issues, which are material for grant or refusal of specificperformance keeping in view the requirements of Section 16 of the H

Specific Relief Act, pleadings of the parties, and the reversing findingsof the two Courts below on such issues with a view to find out as towhich finding is more preferable.

15. From the reading the impugned order, we find that, on onehand, the High Court went on interpreting the terms of the documentafter hearing the argument of both sides (see appearance of both partiesthrough lawyers) and on the other hand, in conclusion, held that it doesnot involve any substantial question of law. It virtually, therefore, decidedthe second appeal bipartite like the first appeal without keeping in viewthe scope of its jurisdiction conferred by Section 100 (4) and (5) of theCode. In our view, the approach of the High Court while deciding thesecond appeal was not in conformity with the requirements of Section100 of the Code.

16. Learned counsel for the respondents(defendants), however,vehemently argued that the findings of the High Court, which are ofaffirmance, do not call for any interference which rightly resulted indismissal of the suit on material issues but, in our view, it is now for theHigh Court to examine the issue afresh on merits after framing thesubstantial question(s) of law. We, therefore, express no opinion on themerits of the issues urged.

17. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we refrain from enteringinto the merits of the case having formed an opinion to remand the caseand while allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned order remandthe case to the High Court with a request to admit the appeal and frameappropriate substantial question(s) of law which arise(s) in the case interms of Section 100 (4) of the Code and then decide the second appealon merits by answering the question(s) framed as per Section 100 (5) ofthe Code in accordance with law without being influenced by any of ourobservations on merits.

18. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is setaside.

Nidhi Jain

Appeal allowed.

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