THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AND ANR versus SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD on 10 April 2023

THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKAAND ANR.

v.

SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD

(Civil Appeal Nos. 2519-2522 of 2019)

APRIL 10, 2023

[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN AND PANKAJ MITHAL, JJ.]

Service Law – Respondent was appointed as a Civil Judge(Junior Division) – Respondent was suspended from service onallegations of gross misconduct, followed by the initiation ofdisciplinary proceedings – As per the enquiry reports, some chargesstood proved and the other charges were not proved – Full Court ofthe High Court resolved to impose the penalty of dismissal fromservice upon the respondent – Based on the resolution, respondentwas dismissed from service – Respondent challenged the findingsof the enquiry officer and the order of dismissal from service byfiling writ petitions before the High Court – High Court dismissedthe same – The respondent filed intra-court appeals against thesame – Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order ofpenalty and the findings of the enquiry officer and also directedthat no further inquiry can be held against the respondent – Onappeal, held: Some of the charges against the respondent were veryserious in nature, such as pronouncing the operative portion of thejudgment in open court without the whole text of the judgment beingready, and similarly the conduct of auction sale of properties seizedduring the investigation – Judicial Officer pronouncing theconcluding portion of his judgment in open court without the entiretext of the judgment being prepared/dictated would amount to grossmisconduct – Such conduct is completely unacceptable andunbecoming of a judicial officer – High Court was not justified insetting aside the penalty and in ordering that there shall be nofurther enquiry against the Respondent – Judgment of High Courtset aside.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. Once those charges which revolve around themanner of disposal of certain cases are ignored, what remains

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Aare certain serious charges that revolve around pronouncementof operative portion of the judgment in open court without thewhole text of the judgment being ready. Take for instance, ChargeNos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 in DI No.3/2005. These Charges are very seriousin nature, where the respondent is alleged to have pronouncedBthe operative portion of the judgment in open court without thewhole of the judgment being ready. Similarly Charge No.1 in DINo.5/2005 related to the conduct of auction sale of properties,seized during the investigation. These are very serious in natureand the reply given by the respondent to these charges is wishywashy. [Para 12][59-D-E]C

2. A judicial officer cannot pronounce the concluding portionof his judgment in open court without the entire text of thejudgment being prepared/dictated. All that the respondent hasdone in the departmental enquiry is just to pass on theresponsibility to the inefficient and allegedly novice stenographer.DThis Court does not know how the findings with regard to suchserious charges have been completely white-washed by the HighCourt in the impugned judgment. A look at the impugned judgmentof the High Court shows that the Division Bench of the HighCourt was swayed away unduly by the animosity attributed by theErespondent to a member of the local Bar and the Assistant PublicProsecutor. If it is assumed for a minute that the charges wereon the basis of complaints initiated by persons bearing ill-willand motive against the respondent. Even then, such ill-will andmotive may not make the conduct of the respondent in notpreparing judgments but pronouncing the outcome of the case, aFcondonable conduct. It is true that some of the charges revolvearound judicial pronouncements and the judicial decision-makingprocesses and that they cannot per se, without anything more,form the foundation for departmental proceedings. Therefore,this Court is ignoring those charges. But the charges whichGrevolve around gross negligence and callousness on the part ofthe respondent in not preparing/dictating judgments, butproviding a fait accompli, is completely unacceptable andunbecoming of a judicial officer. [Paras 13, 14, 15][59-F-H; 60-A- B]

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THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA v.SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD

3. The defence taken by the respondent that the lack ofexperience and the inefficiency on the part of the stenographerhas to be blamed, for the whole text of the judgment not gettingready even after several days of pronouncement of the result inopen court, was entirely unacceptable. But unfortunately, the HighCourt not only accepted this panchatantra story, but also went tothe extent of blaming the administration for not examining thestenographer as a witness. Such an approach is whollyunsustainable. If it was the case of the respondent that the entireblame lay upon the stenographer, it was for him to have summonedthe stenographer as a witness. The High Court unfortunatelyreversed the burden of proof. [Para 16][60-C-D]

Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited vs.Mahesh Dahiya (2017) 1 SCC 768 : [2016] 9 SCR879; Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC398 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 131; Union of India andOrs. vs. E. Bashyan (1988) 2 SCC 196 : [1988] 3 SCR209; Union of India and Ors. vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan(1991) 1 SCC 588 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 248; TheManaging Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. vs. B.Karunakar and Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 727 : [1993] 2 Suppl.SCR 576 – referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2519-2522 of 2023.

From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2019 of the High Courtof Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA Nos. 14, 1040, 1041 and 1042 of2012.

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ABasava Prabhu S Patil, Sr. Adv., V. N. Raghupathy, Geet Ahuja,Manendra Pal Gupta, Advs. for the Appellants.

Ms. Anitha Shenoy, Sr. Adv., Narendra Kumar, Ms. T S Shanthi,Sanjeev Kumar, Advs. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered byB

V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. Challenging a common order passed by the Division Bench ofthe High Court of Karnataka, setting aside a penalty of dismissal fromCservice imposed upon the respondent herein, who happened to be a CivilJudge (Junior Division), the Registrar General of the High Court ofKarnataka has come up with the above appeals.

3. We have heard Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned seniorcounsel appearing the appellant-High Court and Ms. Anitha Shenoy,Dlearned senior counsel appearing for the respondent.

4. The respondent was appointed as a Civil Judge (Junior Division)vide a notification dated 31.01.1995.

5. On certain allegations of gross misconduct, the respondent wasplaced under suspension by an order dated 25.01.2005, followed by theEinitiation of disciplinary proceedings, with the issue of Charge Memosdated 23.03.2005 in DI No.2/2005; DI No.3/2005; DI No.4/2005 and DINo.5/2005.

6. Separate enquiries followed in connection with all the fourCharge Memos namely DI Nos. 2,3,4,5 of 2005, after the culmination ofFwhich, separate reports were submitted by the enquiry officer on29.03.2007 and 27.04.2007. As per the enquiry reports, some chargesstood proved and the other charges were not proved.

7. Therefore, second show cause notices were issued andthereafter the Full Court of the High Court of Karnataka resolved onG04.10.2008 to impose the penalty of dismissal from service upon therespondent. Based on the resolution of the Full Court, an order of dismissalfrom service was passed by the Governor of Karnataka, vide orderdated 19.03.2009.

8. Challenging the findings of the enquiry officer, the respondentHfiled a set of three writ petitions and challenging the order of dismissal from service, the respondent filed a separate writ petition. All these writpetitions were dismissed by a learned Judge, through a common orderdated 30.11.2011.

9. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed intra-court appeals.Those appeals were allowed by the Division Bench of the High Courtby a very strange order, not only setting aside the order of penalty andthe findings of the enquiry officer but also directing that no further inquirycan be held against the respondent. It is against such a common orderpassed in a batch of four intra-court appeals that the Registrar Generalof the High Court has come up with these civil appeals.

10. Before we proceed to consider the correctness of the viewtaken by the High Court, in the light of the rival contentions, it will beuseful to extract in a tabular column the charges framed against therespondent under each of the Charge Memos; his reply to each of thecharges and the findings of the enquiry officer in respect of those charges.

Charges against the Judicial Officer

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56SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2023] 4 S.C.R.ABCDEFGH

THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA v.SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

57ABCDEFGH

58SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2023] 4 S.C.R.ABCDEFGH

THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA v.SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

11. It is seen that among the charges held proved, some related tothe judicial orders passed by the respondent. Therefore, we are preparedstraightaway, to ignore those charges and see whether the order of penaltyof dismissal from service was justified qua the other charges and whetherthe Division Bench of the High Court was right in setting aside the same.

12. Once those charges which revolve around the manner ofdisposal of certain cases are ignored, what remains are certain seriouscharges that revolve around pronouncement of operative portion of thejudgment in open court without the whole text of the judgment beingready. Take for instance, Charge Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 in DI No.3/2005.These Charges are very serious in nature, where the respondent is allegedto have pronounced the operative portion of the judgment in open courtwithout the whole of the judgment being ready. Similarly Charge No.1 inDI No.5/2005 related to the conduct of auction sale of properties, seizedduring the investigation. These are very serious in nature and the replygiven by the respondent to these charges is wishy washy.

13. A judicial officer cannot pronounce the concluding portion ofhis judgment in open court without the entire text of the judgment beingprepared/dictated. All that the respondent has done in the departmentalenquiry is just to pass on the responsibility to the inefficient and allegedlynovice stenographer. We do not know how the findings with regard tosuch serious charges have been completely white-washed by the HighCourt in the impugned judgment.

14. A look at the impugned judgment of the High Court showsthat the Division Bench of the High Court was swayed away unduly bythe animosity attributed by the respondent to a member of the local Barand the Assistant Public Prosecutor. Let us assume for a minute that thecharges were on the basis of complaints initiated by persons bearing ill-will and motive against the respondent. Even then, such ill-will and motive A

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Amay not make the conduct of the respondent in not preparing judgmentsbut pronouncing the outcome of the case, a condonable conduct.

15. It is true that some of the charges revolve around judicialpronouncements and the judicial decision-making processes and that theycannot per se, without anything more, form the foundation forBdepartmental proceedings. Therefore, we are ignoring those charges.But the charges which revolve around gross negligence and callousnesson the part of the respondent in not preparing/dictating judgments, butproviding a fait accompli, is completely unacceptable and unbecomingof a judicial officer.C16. The defence taken by the respondent that the lack of experienceand the inefficiency on the part of the stenographer has to be blamed,for the whole text of the judgment not getting ready even after severaldays of pronouncement of the result in open court, was entirelyunacceptable. But unfortunately, the High Court not only accepted thispanchatantra story, but also went to the extent of blaming theDadministration for not examining the stenographer as a witness. Such anapproach is wholly unsustainable. If it was the case of the respondentthat the entire blame lay upon the stenographer, it was for him to havesummoned the stenographer as a witness. The High Court unfortunatelyreversed the burden of proof.E17. While considering a challenge to an order of penalty imposedupon a judicial officer pursuant to the disciplinary proceedings followedby a resolution of the Full Court of the High Court, the Court is obligedonly to go by established parameters namely, (i) whether the chargesstood proved; (ii) whether the findings of the inquiry officer are reasonableand probable and not perverse; (iii) whether the rules of procedure andFthe principles of natural justice have been followed; and (iv) whetherthe penalty is completely disproportionate, especially in the light of thegravity of the misconduct, his past record of service and any otherextenuating circumstances.

18. Unfortunately, the High Court did not test the correctness ofGthe order of penalty in this case, on the above parameters. Instead, theHigh Court has recorded a finding in Paragraph 26 of the impugnedorder, as though the learned judges had first hand information about theproblems that the judicial officers faced at the lower level. The opinionof the High Court in Paragraph 26 of the impugned order that the acts ofHomission and commission attributed to the respondent do not constitute grave misconduct, is very-very curious. Adding fuel to fire, the HighCourt has recorded in Paragraph 36 of the impugned order that“dismissing him from service itself is very atrocious”. Such a findingis nothing but a veiled attack on the Full Court of the High Court. Afterholding so, the High Court has gone to the extent of certifying therespondent as an innocent and honest officer. We do not know wherefromthe High Court came to such a conclusion.

19. One more reason articulated in the impugned order of theHigh Court is that the second show cause notice indicated the penaltyproposed and that therefore, the same was contrary to law. In this regardthe High Court placed reliance upon the decision of this Court inHimachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited vs. MaheshDahiya[1].

20. But the decision of this Court in Himachal Pradesh StateElectricity Board Limited (supra), is one where the disciplinaryauthority-cum-whole time members of the Electricity Board were foundto have formed an opinion to impose a major penalty even beforeforwarding the copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent. But in thiscase the Full Court of the High Court did not consider the enquiry reportand did not take a decision in advance to impose the penalty of removalfrom service.

21. As a matter of fact, the history of evolution of law relating tosecond show cause notice is almost forty years old. The requirement ofa second show cause notice relating to the proposed penalty was removedfrom Article 311 of the Constitution by the Constitution (42[nd] Amendment)Act, 1976. The same was upheld by a Constitution Bench of this Courtin Union of Indiaand Anr. vs. Tulsiram Patel[2]. However, a two-member Bench of this Court opened a small window in Union of Indiaand Ors. vs. E. Bashyan[3], which led to the decision in Union of Indiaand Ors. vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan[4], wherein this Court held that theopportunity to respond to the findings of the inquiry officer is differentfrom the opportunity to respond to the penalty proposed. Eventually, theissue got clarified in The Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad andOrs. vs. B. Karunakar and Ors.[5].

1 (2017) 1 SCC 768

2 (1985) 3 SCC 398

3 (1988) 2 SCC 196

4 (1991) 1 SCC 588

5 (1993) 4 SCC 727

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A22. It is not the case of the respondent that the Full Court of theHigh Court took a decision to impose the penalty of dismissal from serviceeven before furnishing the copies of the enquiry reports to the respondent.The show cause notices enclosing the enquiry reports, are dated11.10.2007. The representations made by the respondent are dated26.10.2007. It is only thereafter that the Administrative Committee No.1Bconsidered the matter on 28.08.2008 and it was placed before the FullCourt on 04.10.2008. Therefore, the opinion of the High Court that thesecond show cause notices were in violation of the principles of naturaljustice is not factually and legally correct.

23. We have not come across a case where the High Court, whileCsetting aside an order of penalty has held that there shall not be anyfurther inquiry against the delinquent. But in this case, the High Courthas done exactly the same, creating a new jurisprudence. The relevantportion of the impugned order of the High Court reads as follows:- “Writ Appeal is allowed. Impugned order passed by the learnedDSingle Judge in W.P.Nos.10756/2009 & 11030-32 of 2009 (S.DIS)dated 30.11.2011 is hereby set aside. Punishment order dismissingthe appellant from service is hereby quashed. All Inquiry reportsare quashed. There shall not be any further enquiry against theappellant. The appellant is to be treated as if he had been in serviceEtill the date of superannuation and pay all consequential monetarybenefits with interest at 8% p.a. The compliance shall be within aperiod of three months.”

24. For all the above reasons, the appeals are liable to be allowed.Accordingly, they are allowed and the impugned order of the DivisionFBench of the High Court is set aside. The order of penalty imposed uponthe respondent is upheld and the writ petitions filed by the respondentshall stand dismissed. No costs.

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Ankit Gyan(Assisted by : Sirgapoor Sahil Reddy and Aarsh Choudhary, LCRAs)

Appeals allowed.

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