GANESAN REP BY ITS POWER AGENT G. RUKMANI GANESAN versus THE COMMISSIONER, THE TAMIL NADU HINDU RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS BOARD & ORS. on 3 May 2019

1. The definition of Court as contained in Section 6(7)clearly indicates that what Act, 1959 refers to a Court is a civilcourt created in the State. The scheme of the Act clearly indicatesthat Commissioner is an authority under the Act who is to beappointed by the Government. The Commissioner is entrustedwith various functions under the Act and one of the functionsentrusted to the Commissioner is hearing of the appeal underSection 69 of the Act, 1959. [Para 15] [113-E]

2. Section 70 of the Act further provides that any partyaggrieved by an order of the Commissioner under sub-section(1) or sub-section (2) of Section 69 can file a suit in the Courtagainst such order. When an appeal is provided against the orderof the Commissioner under Section 69 to the Court which isdefined under Section 6(7), there is no question of treating the A

B

CD

E

F

G

H

ACommissioner as a Court under the statutory scheme of Act,1959. Thus, Commissioner is not a Court within the meaning ofAct, 1959. [Paras 16, 17] [114-D-E; 115-A]

Whether applicability of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act iswith regard to different limitation prescribed for any suit, appealBor application to be filed only in a Court or Section 29(2) can bepressed in service with regard to filing of a suit, appeal orapplication before statutory authorities and tribunals provided inSpecial or Local Laws?

Whether the Commissioner while hearing the appeal underCSection 69 of Act 1959 is entitled to condone a delay in filing anappeal applying the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,1963?

3. Both the questions being inter-connected are takentogether. The ratio which can be culled from the various SupremeDCourt judgments, especially judgment of three-Judge Benches,is as follows:

(1) The suits, appeals and applications referred to in theLimitation Act, 1963 are suits, appeals and applications whichare to be filed in a Court.

E(2) The suits, appeals and applications referred to in theLimitation Act are not the suits, appeals and applications whichare to be filed before a statutory authority like Commissionerunder Act, 1959.

(3) Operation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act isFconfined to the suits, appeals and applications referred to in aspecial or local law to be filed in Court and not before statutoryauthorities like Commissioner under Act, 1959.

(4) However, special or local law vide statutory scheme canmake applicable any provision of the Limitation Act or excludeGapplicability of any provision of Limitation Act which can be decidedonly after looking into the scheme of particular, special or locallaw. [Para 54] [139-A-E]

3.1 Thus, questions are answered in the following manner:

(i) The applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is H

GANESAN v. COMMNR., T.N. HINDU RELIGIOUS & CHARITABLEENDOWMENTS BOARD

with regard to different limitations prescribed for any suit, appealor application when to be filed in a Court.

(ii) Section 29(2) cannot be pressed in service with regardto filing of suits, appeals and applications before the statutoryauthorities and tribunals provided in a special or local law. TheCommissioner while hearing of the appeal under Section 69 ofthe Act, 1959 is not entitled to condone the delay in filing appeal,since, provision of Section 5 shall not be attracted by strength ofSection 29(2) of the Act. [Para 55] [139-E-G]

Whether the statutory scheme of Act 1959 indicate thatSection 5 of Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings beforeits authorities?

4. A special or local law can very well provide forapplicability of any provision of Limitation Act or excludeapplicability of any provision of Limitation Act. The provisions ofLimitation Act including Section 5 can very well be applied indeciding an appeal by statutory authority which is not a Court bythe statutory scheme of special or local law. This Court, thus,need to notice the provisions of Act, 1959 as to whether thescheme under Act, 1959 shows that enactment intended to applySection 5 of the Limitation Act. [Para 56] [139-H; 140-A-B]

5. The mere fact that a statutory authority is empowered tofollow the procedure as nearly may be in accordance withprocedure under C.P.C. to the trial of suits or hearing of appeals,the statutory authority shall not become a Court. There is nothingunder Section 110 which indicates that Limitation Act is also madeapplicable in hearing of the appeal. [Para 58] [140-F-G]

6. Section 115 deals with limitation. It only provides that incomputing the period of limitation prescribed under Act, 1959for any proceeding, suit, appeal or application for revision againstany order or decree passed under this Act, the time requisite forobtaining a certified copy of such order or decree shall beexcluded. [Para 59] [140-G-H]

7. The provision of Section 69 of Act, 1959 also indicatesthat Legislature never contemplated applicability of Section 5 ofthe Limitation Act in proceedings before Commissioner. Section A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A69(2) noted above provides that any order passed by the JointCommissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may, inrespect of which no appeal has been preferred within the periodspecified in sub-section (1) may be revised by the Commissionersuo motu and the Commissioner may call for and examine therecords of the proceedings to satisfy himself as to the regularityBof such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety ofany decision or order passed by the Joint Commissioner or theDeputy Commissioner, as the case may be. [Para 60] [141-A-C]

8. Thus, Section 69(2) gives suo motu power to theCommissioner to call for and examine the records of theCproceedings of Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissionerin respect of which no appeal has been preferred within the periodspecified in sub-section (1). Thus, in a case appeal is not filedwithin 60 days against the order of Joint Commissioner or theDeputy Commissioner, the Commissioner is vested with suo motuDpower to call for and examine the records. The suo motu powerhas been given to the Commissioner to correct the orders ofJoint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner even if noappeal has been filed within 60 days. Giving of suo motu power tothe Commissioner is with object to ensure that an order passedby the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner may beEcorrected when appeal is not filed within time under Section 69(1).The scheme of Section 69 especially sub-section (2) also re-enforces our conclusion that Legislature never contemplatedapplicability of Section 5 in Section 69(1) for condoning the delayin filing an appeal by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act.F[Para 61] [141-C-F]

9. The above provision clearly indicates that provision foronly computation of limitation has been made applicable to theproceedings under Act, 1959. Section 115 cannot be read in amanner as to providing applicability of Section 5. There is noGother provision in the scheme from which it can be inferred thatAct, 1959 intended applicability of Section 5 of the LimitationAct to proceedings of appeal before the Commission. Thus,Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as per the schemeof Act, 1959. [Para 63] [142-A-B]

P. Sarathy v. State of Bank of India (2000) 5 SCC355:[2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 402 – distinguished.

The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow v. M/s.Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur (1975) 4 SCC 22 ;Town Municipal Council, Athani v. The PresidingOfficer, Labour Courts, Hubli (1969) 1 SCC 873 : [1970]1 SCR 51 ; Nityananda, M. Joshi and others. v. LifeInsurance Corporation of India and others (1965) 2SCC 199 ; Sakuru v. Tanaji, 1985 (3) SCC 590 : [1985]2 Suppl. SCR 109 ; Officer on Special Duty (LandAcquisition) and another v. Shah Manilal Chandulaland others (1996) 9 SCC 414 ; ConsolidatedEngineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary,Irrigation Department and others (2008) 7 SCC 169 ;M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of CentralExcise 2015 (7) SCC 58 – relied on.

The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P.Kunhaliumma (1976) 4 SCC 634 : [1977] 1 SCR 996 ;The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. M/s. Madan LalDas & Sons, Bareilly (1976) 4 SCC 464 ; State ofMadhya Pradesh and another v. Anshuman Shukla(2014) 10 SCC 814 : [2014] 11 SCR 361 ; Syed ZalilAkhtar v. Zila Sahkari Krishi Avam Gramn Vikas Bank,Mydt., (2016) 12 SCC 365 ; Mukri Gopalan v. CheppilatPuthanpurayil Aboobacker (1995) 5 SCC 5 : [1995] 2Suppl. SCR 1 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4582of 2019.

CFrom the Judgment and Order dated 04.12.2017 of the MaduraiBench of Madras High Court in W.A. (MD) No. 1094 of 2014.

M. Ajmal Khan, Sr. Adv., A. Lakshminarayanan, Karri VenkataReddy, Advs. for the Appellant.

S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., M. P. Parthiban, R. S. Vairakkin, R.DSudhatiavan, Vinodh Kanna B., Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 04.12.2017Eof Madurai Bench of Madras High Court dismissing the writ appealfiled by the Appellant. The appellant had filed the writ appeal against thejudgment of learned single Judge dated 22.08.2014 by which judgmentwrit petition filed by the appellant challenging the judgment and orderdated 31.07.2013 of the Commissioner Tamil Nadu Hindu ReligiousEndowment Board has been dismissed.F

2. Brief facts of the case necessary to be noticed for deciding theappeal are: - 2.1The appellant filed an application under Section 63 of HinduReligious endowment charitable Act, 1959 (hereinafterGreferred to as Act 1959) claiming his Ambalam right. TheJoint Commissioner of Hindu Religious & charitableendowment Board after holding an inquiry passed an orderdated 21.12.2010 holding that appellant to be entitled forAmbalam Right and to receive first respect as an Ambalamin the village, Tirupathartalu, Shiv Gangi District, Tamil Nadu.

H

2.2Two writ petitions were filed in the High Court challengingAthe order dated 31.12.2010 being W.P.M.D. No. 14382 of2011 filed by Radha Krishnan and W.P. No.185 of 2012 filedby Madhavan. Both the writ petitions were dismissed by theHigh Court vide its judgment dated 10.01.2012. A W.P.M.D.No. 379 of 2012 was filed by one Laxmanan in which initiallyBan interim order dated 12.01.2012 was passed. The thirdrespondent P.R. Ramanathan filed an appeal No.2007 OF2012 against the order dated 31.12.2010 passed by JointCommissioner. The appeal filed by third respondent wasunder Section 69 of Act, 1959. W.P.M.D. No.3379 of 2013was filed by P.R. Ramanathan, third respondent, seeking aCdirection to decide his statutory appeal filed under Section69 of Act 1959. The High Court vide its judgment and orderdated 07.03.2013 directed the commissioner to dispose ofthe appeal expeditiously and in any case within a period offour months to the date of the copy of the order.

D

2.3A delay condonation application dated 30.04.2013 was filedby third respondent in his appeal no. 2007 of 2012 prayingfor condonation of delay of 266 days. The cause for delayshown was that third respondent was ill for 7-8 months andwas unable to travel to Chennai to instruct his counsel. Acounter affidavit was filed by the appellant objecting theapplication filed by the third respondent for condonation ofdelay. In his counter affidavit appellant took a plea that Section5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable.

E

E

2.4Learned commissioner passed an order dated 31.07.2013condoning the delay of 266 days in filing the appeal. Againstthe order dated 31.07.2013, writ petition was filed by theappellant being W.P.M.D. No. 13804 of 2013. Learned singleJudge referring to certain provision of the Act 1959 as wellas few decisions of this Court and Madras High Court heldthat in appeal proceedings before the Commissioner Section5 of the Limitation Act is fully applicable and there is sufficientcause and the delay has rightly been condoned by theCommissioner. Aggrieved against the judgment of learnedsingle Judge, writ appeal has been filed by the appellant whichhas been dismissed by the impugned judgment.

F

G

H

A2.5The Division Bench of the Madras High Court placedreliance on several judgments of this Court and after referringto various provisions of the Act, 1959, held that Act 1959does not exclude the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963.The appellant aggrieved by the Division Bench judgmentdated 04.12.2017 has come up in this appeal.B

3. We have heard Shri M. Ajmal Khan, senior Advocate for theappellant and Shri S.Nagvathu, senior Advocate appearing for the thirdrespondent, as well as learned counsel appearing for the State.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the commissionerChas no jurisdiction to consider application filed under Section 5 of LimitationAct. It is submitted that the commissioner who is empowered to decidethe appeal under Section 69 of Act 1959 is not a court. He submits thatSection 6(6) defines the commissioner whereas Section 6(7) defines theCourt, which clearly indicate that commissioner is not the court. It issubmitted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable only inDapplication filed before a Court. The commissioner being not a Court,there was no applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

5. He further submits that by virtue of Section 115 of Act 1959,the only provision of the Limitation Act which has been made applicableis that the time requisite for obtaining certified copy of order or decreeEshall be excluded. He submits that specifically applying provisions ofSection 12(2) of Limitation Act, indicates that other provisions have notbeen made applicable to the Act 1959. He submits that in event thelimitation Act was to be applicable to the proceeding of appeal under1959 Act, there was no occasion of Section 115 of Act 1959. LimitationFAct has been applied only to the extent as mentioned in Section 115,other provisions are not applicable.

6. Learned counsel for the respondent refuting the submissions oflearned counsel for the appellant submits that although Commissioner isnot a Court as defined in Act 1959, but it is a court for the purposes ofGSection 5 of the Limitation Act. Relying on Section 110, he submits thatprocedure provided for hearing of appeal is as nearly as may be inaccordance with the procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908to the trial of suits or the hearing of the appeals as the case may be. TheCommissioner has thus all powers of the Court for hearing the appeal.The authorities under Act 1959 had trappings of the court. CommissionerHdecide the appeal in a judicial manner. The scheme of Act 1959 does not indicate that it never intended to exclude Section 5 of the Limitation Act.Reliance has been placed on Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and it issubmitted that there being no express exclusion of Section 5 of theLimitation Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is fully attracted in hearingof an appeal by the commissioner.

A

7. Learned counsel for both the parties have placed reliance onvarious judgments of this court which shall be referred to whileconsidering their submissions in detail.

B

8. After hearing learned counsel for both the parties and perusalof the record, following are the questions which arises for considerationin this appeal:- C

1) Whether the Commissioner while hearing the appeal underSection 69 of Act, 1959, is a Court?

2) Whether applicability of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act iswith regard to different limitation prescribed for any suit,appeal or application to be filed only in a Court or SectionD29(2) can be pressed in service with regard to filing of a suit,appeal or application before statutory authorities and tribunalsprovided in Special or Local Laws?

3) Whether the Commissioner while hearing the appeal underSection 69 of Act 1959 is entitled to condone a delay in filingan appeal applying the provisions of Section 5 of the LimitationAct, 1963?

E

4) Whether the statutory scheme of Act 1959 indicate thatSection 5 of Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings beforeits authorities?

F

Question No.1

9. The above question has to be answered in reference to theTamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959.Both the “Commissioner” and “Court” has been defined under the Act,1959. The Commissioner is defined under Section 6(6) which is to thefollowing effect:

G

“Section 6(6) “Commissioner” means the Commissioner appointedunder section 9;”

10. The Court is defined in Section 6(7) in the following manner:

H

A“Section 6(7) “Court” means- (i) in relation to a math or templesituated in the Presidency town, the Chennai City Civil Court;

(ii) in relation to a math or temple situated elsewhere, theSubordinate Judge’s Court having jurisdiction over the area inwhich the math or temple is situated, or if there is no such Court,Bthe District Court having such jurisdiction;

(iii) in relation to a specific endowment attached to a math ortemple, the Court which would have jurisdiction as aforesaid inrelation to the math or temple;

(iv) in relation to a specific endowment attached to two or moreCmaths or temples, any Court which would have jurisdiction asaforesaid in relation to either or any of such maths or temples;”

11. Section 8 of the Act, 1959 enumerates the authorities underthe Act. Section 8 is as follows:- “Section 8.Authorities under the Act.- There shall be theDfollowing classes of authorities under this Act, namely.- (a) The Commissioner; (aa) Additional Commissioner; (b) Joint Commissioner; E

(c) Deputy Commissioners; and

(d) Assistant Commissioners.”

12. Section 9(1) provides that the Government shall appoint theCommissioner as it may think fit. Section 9(2) provides various modesFof appointment to the post of Commissioner.

13. The definition of the Court refers to the Civil Court constitutedby Legislature in the State for administration of justice. The conventionaldefinition of the Court as mentioned in Advanced Law Lexicon by P.Ramanatha Aiyer, Third Edition is:G

“A Court is defined in Coke on Littleton as a place wherein justiceis judicially administered. “In every Court, there must be at leastthree constituent parts- the actor, reus and judex: the actor, orplaintiff, who complains or an injury done; the reus, or defendant,who is called upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex, orHjudicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, and to

determine the law arising upon that fact, and if any injury appearsto have been done, to ascertain, and b its officers to apply, theremedy,” (3 Steph. Comm. 6[th] Ed., pp.383, 385). See also 30 M.326: 2 MLT 267, Court is a body in the government to which thepublic administration of justice is delegated; an organised body,with defined powers, meeting at certain times, and places, for thehearing and decision of causes and other matters brought beforeit, and aided in this, its proper business, by its proper officers, viz.,attorneys and counsels, to present and manage the business, clerksto record and attest its acts and decisions, and ministerial officersto execute its commands and secure order in its proceedings.”

14. The constitution of Court in this country has been by legislativeenactments. For constituting Civil Courts, the Bengal, Agra and AssamCivil Courts Act, 1887 was enacted which provided classes of civil courtsand provided for constitution of courts of District Judges, Sub-ordinateJudges and Munsifs. Similarly for civil courts in the town of Bombay,Calcutta and Madras, the Presidency Small Causes Act, 1882 wasenacted.

15. The definition of Court as contained in Section 6(7) as notedabove, thus, clearly indicates that what Act, 1959 refers to a Court is acivil court created in the State. The scheme of the Act clearly indicatesthat Commissioner is an authority under the Act who is to be appointedby the Government. The Commissioner is entrusted with various functionsunder the Act and one of the functions entrusted to the Commissioner ishearing of the appeal under Section 69 of the Act, 1959. In the presentcase we are concerned with Section 69 which is to the following effect:

“Section 69.Appeal to the Commissioner.-

(1) Any person aggrieved by any order passed by [1][the JointCommissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be],under any of the foregoing sections of this chapter, may withinsixty days from the date of the publication of the order or of thereceipt thereof by him as the case may be, appeal to theCommissioner and the Commissioner may pass such order thereonas he thinks fit.

(2) Any order passed by [1][the Joint Commissioner or the DeputyCommissioner, as the case may be], in respect of which no appealhas been preferred within the period specified in sub-section (1)

AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

may be revised by the Commissioner suo motu and theCommissioner may call for and examine the records of theproceedings as to satisfy himself as to the regularity of suchproceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decisionor order passed by [1][the Joint Commissioner or the DeputyCommissioner, as the case may be]. Any such order passed bythe Commissioner in respect of an order passed by [1][the JointCommissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be],shall be deemed to have been passed by the Commissioner on anappeal preferred to him under sub-section (1).

(3) Any order passed by the Commissioner on such appeal againstwhich no suit lies to the Court under the next succeeding sectionor in which no suit has been instituted in the Court within the timespecified in sub-section (1) of section 70 may be modified orcancelled by the Commissioner if the order has settled or modifieda scheme for the administration of a religious institution or relatesto any of the matters specified in section 66.”

16. Section 70 of the Act further provides that any party aggrievedby an order of the Commissioner under sub-section (1) or sub-section(2) of Section 69 can file a suit in the Court against such order. Section70 is as follows:

“Section 70. Suits and appeals.- (1) Any party aggrieved byan order passed by the Commissioner”-

(i) under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 69 and relatingto any of the matters specified in section 63, section 64 or section67; or

(ii) under section 63, section 64 or section 67 read with sub-section(1)(a), 2 or (4)(a) of section 22 or under section 65 may, withinninety days from the date of the receipt of such order by him,institute a suit in the Court against such order, and the Court maymodify or cancel such order, but it shall have no power to stay oforder of the Commissioner pending the disposal of the suit.

(2) Any party aggrieved by a decree of the Court under sub-section (1), may, within ninety days from the date of the decree,appeal to the High Court.”

17. When an appeal is provided against the order of theCommissioner under Section 69 to the Court which is defined underSection 6(7), there is no question of treating the Commissioner as aCourt under the statutory scheme of Act, 1959. We, thus, conclude thatCommissioner is not a Court within the meaning of Act, 1959.

18. We may, however, notice a judgment of this Court in P. Sarathyvs. State of Bank of India, (2000) 5 SCC 355. In the above caseDeputy Commissioner of Labour(Appeals) was an authority constitutedunder Section 41(2) of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947to hear and decide appeal. The appellant, an official of the State Bank ofIndia was removed by an order dated 11.01.1983 after holding regulardepartmental proceedings. The appellant had filed an appeal under Section41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 whichappeal was dismissed holding that provisions of Tamil Nadu Shops andEstablishments Act, 1947 are not applicable to nationalized Banks. Afterthe dismissal of the said appeal the orders of Deputy Commissioner ofLabour(Appeals) dated 01.09.1987 was challenged in this Court whichtoo are rejected. It was thereafter appellant instituted a regular suit inthe City Civil Court where the question came for consideration regardingapplicability of Section 14 of Limitation Act. In the above case inparagraph 3 the issue was noted to the following effect:

“3. In order to bring a suit within the period of limitation, theappellant claimed benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act onthe ground that he had represented to the Local Board and,thereafter, filed an appeal under Section 41(2) of the Tamil NaduShops and Establishments Act, 1947 and was, therefore,prosecuting “civil proceedings” in a court with due diligence. It isclaimed that the entire period during which those proceedings werepending has to be excluded and if this is done, the suit will be wellwithin limitation.”

19. In the above context, this Court in paragraphs 12 to 15 laiddown following:

“12. It will be noticed that Section 14 of the Limitation Act doesnot speak of a “civil court” but speaks only of a “court”. It is notnecessary that the court spoken of in Section 14 should be a “civilcourt”. Any authority or tribunal having the trappings of a courtwould be a “court” within the meaning of this section.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A15. Applying the above principles in the instant case, we are ofthe opinion that the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals),which was an authority constituted under Section 41(2) of theTamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 to hear and decideappeals, was a “court” within the meaning of Section 14 of theLimitation Act and the proceedings pending before him were civilBproceedings. It is not disputed that the appellant could file an appealbefore the Local Board of the Bank, which was purely adepartmental appeal. In this view of the matter, the entire periodof time from the date of institution of the departmental appeal asalso the period from the date of institution of the appeal underCSection 41(2) before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour(Appeals) till it was dismissed will, therefore, have to be excludedfor computing the period of limitation for filing the suit in question.If the entire period is excluded, the suit, it is not disputed, wouldbe within time.”D20. There are two reasons due to which the above case is notapplicable in the present case. Firstly, in the above case this Court wasconsidering applicability of Section 14 of Limitation Act for excludingtime (civil proceeding). The present is a case where applicability ofSection 5 of the Limitation Act has to be examined. Thus, the abovejudgment is distinguished. The second reason for not relying the aboveEjudgment is three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in TheCommissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow vs. M/s. Parson Toolsand Plants, Kanpur, (1975) 4 SCC 22. In the above case under theU.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 the appellate authority has been constituted.

The question arose as to whether the period taken in pursuing the appellateFproceedings can be excluded by applying Section 14 of the LimitationAct for purposes of filing revision before the Revisional Authority underSection 10(3-B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. In the above context,this Court held that appellate authority and the Judge(Revisions) are notcourts, hence, Section 14 of the Limitation Act shall not be applicable. Inparagraph 9 following has been laid down:G

“9. The above observations were quoted with approval by thisCourt in Jagannath Prasad case[1]and it was held that a SalesTax Officer under U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 was not a courtwithin the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of CriminalProcedure although he is required to perform certain quasi-judicialHfunctions. The decision in Jagannath Prasad case it seems, was not brought to the notice of the High Court. In view of thesepronouncements of this Court, there is no room for argument thatthe Appellate Authority and the Judge (Revisions) Sales taxexercising jurisdiction under the Sales Tax Act, are “courts”. Theyare merely Administrative Tribunals and “not courts”. Section 14,Limitation Act, therefore, does not, in terms apply to proceedingsbefore such tribunals.”

21. There being three-Judge Bench judgment having held thatappellate authority under U.P. Sales Tax Act is not a Court, we are notpersuaded to follow the judgment of two-Judge Bench in P Sarthy(supra).

Question Nos.2 and 3

22. Both the above questions being inter-connected are takentogether. The main question to be answered in this appeal is as to; whetherthe Commissioner while hearing appeal under Section 69 of the Act,1959 is entitled to condone the delay in filing an appeal by applying theprovision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963? Whether on thestrength of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provisions of Sections4 to 24 (inclusive of the Limitation Act) shall apply in the proceedings ofappeal before Commissioner under Section 69 of the Act, 1959? Whenby special or local law a different period of limitation is prescribed forany suit, appeal or application, the suit, appeal or application contemplatedunder Section 29(2) are suit, appeal or application in a Court or Section29(2) shall also cover suit, appeal or application which are to be filedbefore the statutory authorities or quasi-judicial authorities and tribunalsalso?

23. The Limitation Act, 1963 is an Act to consolidate and amendthe law for the limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposesconnected therewith. The law of Limitation before enactment of Act,1963 was governing by the law of limitation under Indian Limitation Act,1908. The different provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 refers to ‘Court’.Section 4 provides where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal orapplication expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal orapplication may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when thecourt reopens. Similarly, Section 5 provides that any appeal or anyapplication, other than an application under any of the provisions of OrderXXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be admitted after theprescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that A

B

C

DE

F

G

H

Ahe has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making theapplication within such period. Section 6 refers to institution of a suit ormaking of application for the execution of a decree by a minor or insane,or an idiot who may institute the suit or make the application within thesame period after the disability has ceased.

24. Sections 9,10 and 11 refer to suit. Section 12 deals withcomputation of period of limitation. The section refers to computation ofperiod of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal orfor revision or for review of a judgment, obviously was meant for judgmentof a court. Section 13 again refers to Court. Section 14 specifically refersto the Court. Section 14 of the Act is as follows:

B

C

“Section 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide incourt without jurisdiction. –(1) In computing the period oflimitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has beenprosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whetherin a court of first instance or of the appeal or revision, against thedefendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to thesame matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a courtwhich, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature,is unable to entertain it.

D

(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, thetime during which the applicant has been prosecuting with duediligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of firstinstance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for thesame relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecutedin good faith in a count of first instance or of appeal or revision,against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, wheresuch proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, fromdefect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable toentertain it.

E

F

E

F

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIIIof the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisionsof sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit institutedon permission granted by the court under rule of that Order, wheresuch permission is granted on the ground that the first suit mustfail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court of othercause of a like nature.

G

H

Explanation - For the purpose of this section, - (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceedingwas pending, the day on which that proceeding was institutedand the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemedto be prosecuting a proceeding;

(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemedto be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.”

21. Subsequent Sections 16 and 17 refer to suits. Sections 18 to21 again contain different provisions pertaining to computation of limitation.Thereafter comes Section 29, which is a saving provision. Section 29 isas follows:

“Section 29. Savings. – (1) Nothing in this Act, shall affectsection 25 of the Indian Contract Act,1872.

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,appeal or application a period of limitation different from the periodprescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall applyas if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule andfor the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribedfor any sit, appeal or application by any special or local law, theprovisions contained in section 5 to 24 (inclusive shall apply onlyin so far, as and to the extent to which, they are not expresslyexcluded by such special or local law.

(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being inforce with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Actshall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.

(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of “easement” insection 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to whichthe Indian Easements Act,1882 may for the time being extend.

22. The Schedule of the Act provides for “Periods of Limitation”.First Division deals with different kinds of suits. Second Division dealswith appeals and Third Division deals with applications. The suits, appealsand applications which have been referred to in the Schedule obviouslymean suits, appeals and applications to be filed in Court as per theprovisions referred to in the Act noted above.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A23. Section 29(2) provides that where any special or local lawprescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation differentfrom the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Scheduleand for the purpose of determining any period of limitation and theprovisions contained in Sections 4 to 21 (inclusive) shall apply only in soBfar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded bysuch special or local law. Whether prescription of appeal of limitation ofany suit or application in any special or local law relates to suit, applicationor appeal to be filed in Court or it may refer to statutory authorities andtribunals also, is the question to be answered. Different special or localClaws have been enacted by Legislature covering different subjects,different rights and liabilities, methodology of establishing, determiningrights and liabilities and remedies provided therein. Special or local lawmay also provide remedy by institution of suits, appeals and applicationsin the Courts, i.e., civil court and to its normal hierarchy and also create

special forum for determining rights and liabilities and provide remedies.DMost common example of creating statutory authorities for determiningrights, liabilities and remedies are taxing statutes where assessingauthorities have been provided for with hierarchy of authorities. Theremedy of appeal and revision is also provided in the taxing statuteswhich authorities are different from normal civil courts. Section 29(2) inEreference to different special or local laws came for consideration beforethis Court in large number of cases. This Court had occasion to considerthe provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, in reference to different statuteswhich contain provisions of suits, appeals or applications to the courts/authorities/tribunals. There are series of judgments of this Court holdingthat provisions of the Limitation Act are directed only when suit, appealFor application are to be filed in a Court unless there are express provisionsin a special or local law.

24. Section 29(2) also came for consideration before this Court inseveral cases. There is another set of cases where it was held that theprovisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 is to be applied even for suit,Gappeal or application under special/local law is to be filed before statutoryauthorities and the tribunal. We shall notice both sets of cases to find outthe ratio which need to be applied in the present case.

25. The first case to be noticed is Town Municipal Council,Athani vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli,(1969) 1H

SCC 873. In the above case applications under Section 33(c)(2) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 were filed by various workmen of theappellant. The question which was considered by this Court in the abovewas as to whether Article 137 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act,1963 governs applications under Section 33(c)(2) of the IndustrialDisputes Act, 1947. Referring to various articles of Limitation Act, 1963,this Court laid down following:

“12…………The scope of the various articles in this divisioncannot be held to have been so enlarged as to include within themapplications to bodies other than courts, such as a quasi judicialtribunal, or even an executive authority. An Industrial Tribunal ora Labour Court dealing with applications or references under theAct are not courts and they are in no way governed either by theCode of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. Wecannot, therefore, accept the submission made that this articlewill apply even to applications made to an Industrial Tribunal or aLabour Court…………”

26. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nityananda, M. Joshiand others. vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others,(1965) 2 SCC 199, had occasion to consider the applicability of Article137 of the Limitation Act to an application filed under Section 33(c)(1)and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Labour Court.Three Judge bench categorically held that the scheme of the LimitationAct is that it only deals with application to Courts, and the Labour Courtis not a Court within Limitation Act, 1963. Following was laid down inparagraph 3:

“3. In our view Article 137 only contemplates applications toCourts. In the Third Division of the Schedule to the LimitationAct, 1963 all the other applications mentioned in the various articlesare applications filed in a court. Further Section 4 of the LimitationAct, 1963, provides for the contingency when the prescribed periodfor any application expires on a holiday and the only contingencycontemplated is “when the court is closed.” Again under Section5 it is only a court which is enabled to admit an application afterthe prescribed period has expired if the court is satisfied that theapplicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. Itseems to us that the scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that it AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

Aonly deals with applications to courts, and that the Labour Courtis not a court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.”

Issues

27. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court had occasion toconsider the provisions of U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 and the LimitationAct, 1963, in The Commissioner of Sales Tax Act, 1948, U.P.BLucknow vs. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur, (1975) 4SCC 22. The question which came for consideration in the above casehas been noted in paragraph 1 which is to the following effect:

“1. The common question of law for determination in these appealsby special leave is: Whether Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act,Cin terms, or, in principle, can be invoked for excluding the timespent in prosecuting an application under Rule 68(6) of the U.P.Sales Tax Rules for setting aside the order of dismissal of appealin default, under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (for short, “theSales Tax Act”) from computation of the period of limitation forfiling a revision under that Act?”D

28. The assessee’s appeals against assessment order weredismissed in default on 10.05.1963. The assessee made applications forsetting aside the dismissal order. Revision Petitions under Section 10 ofthe Sales Tax Act were filed more than 18 months after the dismissal ofthe appeal. Assessee prayed for exclusion of time spent by him inEprosecuting proceedings for setting aside the dismissal of appeals indefault. The revisional authority excluded the time spent by applyingSection 14 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner made a referenceto the High Court as to “Whether under the circumstances of the case,Section 14 of the Limitation Act extended the period for filing of theFrevisions by the time during which the restoration applications remainedpending as being prosecuted bona fide”. The High Court answered thereference in affirmative which judgment was questioned before this Court.Three-Judge Bench held that the appellate authority and the Judge(Revisions) Sales-tax exercising jurisdiction under the Sales-tax Act arenot courts and hence, Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not apply.GFollowing was laid down by this Court in paragraphs 9 and 24:

“9……………In view of these pronouncements of this Court,there is no room for argument that the Appellate Authority andthe Judge (Revisions) Sales tax exercising jurisdiction under theSales Tax Act, are “courts”. They are merely Administrative Tribunals and “not courts”. Section 14, Limitation Act, therefore,does not, in terms apply to proceedings before suchtribunals………”

24. For all the reasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion that theobject, the scheme and language of Section 10 of the Sales TaxAct do not permit the invocation of Section 14(2) of the LimitationAct, either in terms, or in principle, for excluding the time spent inprosecuting proceedings for setting aside the dismissal of appealsin default, from computation of the period of limitation prescribedfor filing a revision under the Sales Tax Act. Accordingly, weanswer the question referred, in the negative.”

29. In The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum vs.T.P. Kunhaliumma, (1976) 4 SCC 634, this Court had occasion toconsider applicability of Article 137 of Limitation Act, application filedunder Section 16 of the Telegraphs Act, 1885. This Court in the abovecase differing with the view taken by the two-Judge Bench in Athani’scase held that application under Article 137 of Limitation Act is notconfined to application contemplated by or under the C.P.C. However,the application contemplated under Telegraphs Act has to be an applicationto a Court. In paragraphs 18 and 22 following has been laid held:

“18. The alteration of the division as well as the change in thecollocation of words in Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963compared with Article 181 of the 1908 Limitation Act shows thatapplications contemplated under Article 137 are not applicationsconfined to the Code of Civil Procedure. In the 1908 LimitationAct there was no division between applications in specified casesand other applications as in the 1963 Limitation Act. The words“any other application” under Article 137 cannot be said on theprinciple of ejusdem generis to be applications under the CivilProcedure Code other than those mentioned in Part I of the thirddivision. Any other application under Article 137 would be petitionor any application under any Act. But it has to be an application toa court for the reason that Sections 4 and 5 of the 1963 LimitationAct speak of expiry of prescribed period when court is closedand extension of prescribed period if applicant or the appellantsatisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferringthe appeal or making the application during such period.

A

B

C

D

E

FG

H

A

A22. The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed underany Act to a civil court. With respect we differ from the viewtaken by the two-judge bench of this Court in Athani MunicipalCouncil case and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Actis not confined to applications contemplated by or under the CodeBof Civil Procedure. The petition in the present case was to theDistrict Judge as a court. The petition was one contemplated bythe Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The petition is an applicationfalling within the scope of Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act.”

30. In the above case since the application under the TelegraphsCAct was filed before the Court, this Court held that Article 137 of theLimitation Act was applicable. It is to be noticed that in the abovementioned cases this Court held that applications contemplated underLimitation Act are applications to a Court but in the above cases theCourt did not refer to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

D

31. A two-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Sakuru vs.Tanaji, 1985(3) SCC 590, needs to be noticed. In the above case thequestion was as to whether delay in filing appeal before Court underSection 19 is condonable under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. ThisCourt held that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 apply only toEproceedings in ‘courts’ and not to appeals or applications before bodiesother than courts such as quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities,notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vestedwith certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes ofCivil or Criminal Procedure. In paragraph 3 following has been laid down:

F“3. After hearing both sides we have unhesitatingly come to theconclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that theview taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiah case[1]is perfectlycorrect and sound. It is well settled by the decisions of this Courtin town Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court,Nityananda M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of IndiaGand Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad that the provisions ofthe Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in “courts” andnot to appeals or applications before bodies other than courts suchas quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstandingthe fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certainHspecified powers conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal waspreferred by the appellant herein under Section 90 of the Act notbeing a court, the Limitation Act, as such, had no applicability tothe proceedings before him…………”.

32. This Court, however, further held that relevant special statutemay contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority,such as the Collector, to extend the prescribed period of limitation whichneeds to be examined looking to the scheme of the special statute. Section93 of the Act was a provision pertaining to the applicability of theLimitation Act. Referring to the said provision this Court held that 1958Act does not indicate that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable.Following was further laid down in paragraph 3:

“3…………But even in such a situation the relevant specialstatute may contain an express provision conferring on theAppellate Authority, such as the Collector, the power to extendthe prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shownby laying down that the provisions of Section 5 of the LimitationAct shall be applicable to such proceedings. Hence it becomesnecessary to examine whether the Act contains any such provisionentitling the Collector to invoke the provisions of Section 5 of theLimitation Act for condonation of the delay in the filing of theappeal. The only provision relied on by the appellant in thisconnection is Section 93 of the Act which, as it stood at the relevanttime, was in the following terms:

93. Limitations.—Every appeal and every application forrevision under this Act shall be filed within sixty days from thedate of the order against which the appeal or application isfiled and the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shallapply for the purpose of the computation of the said period.

On a plain reading of the section it is absolutely clear that itseffect is only to render applicable to the proceedings before theCollector, the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to“computation of the period of limitation”. The provisions relatingto computation of the period of limitation are contained in Sections12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5is not a provision dealing with “computation of the period oflimitation”. It is only after the process of computation is completedand it is found that an appeal or application has been filed after A

BC

D

E

F

G

H

A

Athe expiry of the prescribed period that the question of extensionof the period under Section 5 can arise. We are, therefore, incomplete agreement with the view expressed by the DivisionBench of the High Court in Venkaiah case[1]that Section 93 ofthe Act did not have the effect of rendering the provisions ofSection 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the proceedingsBbefore the Collector.”

33. This Court in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition)and another vs. Shah Manilal Chandulal and others, (1996) 9 SCC414, the Land Acquisition Officer has rejected the application forreference under Section 18 on the ground that it was barred by limitation.CA writ petition was filed contending that provision of Section 5 of theLimitation Act applies to the proceedings before the Collector. The HighCourt accepted the argument and condoned the delay against whichjudgment appeal was filed before this Court. This Court held that Section5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period ofDlimitation prescribed under proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18.Following was held in paragraph 18:

“18. Though hard it may be, in view of the specific limitationprovided under proviso to Section 18(2) of the Act, we are of theconsidered view that sub-section (2) of Section 29 cannot beEapplied to the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18. TheCollector/LAO, therefore, is not a court when he acts as a statutoryauthority under Section 18(1). Therefore, Section 5 of the LimitationAct cannot be applied for extension of the period of limitationprescribed under proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18. TheHigh Court, therefore, was not right in its finding that the CollectorFis a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”

34. Another judgment which needs to be noticed is ConsolidatedEngineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, IrrigationDepartment and others, (2008) 7 SCC 169. The question whichwas posed, in the above case, for consideration before this Court hasGbeen mentioned in paragraph 18 which is to the following effect:

“18. The question posed for consideration before the Court iswhether the provision of Section 14 of the Limitation Act wouldbe applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of theAct of 1996 for setting aside the award made by theHarbitrator………”

35. The provision of sub-section (3) of Section 34 has been noticedin paragraph 19 which is to the following effect:

“19. A bare reading of sub-section (3) of Section 34 read withthe proviso makes it abundantly clear that the application for settingaside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) ofSection 34 will have to be made within three months. The periodcan further be extended, on sufficient cause being shown, byanother period of 30 days but not thereafter. It means that as faras application for setting aside the award is concerned, the periodof limitation prescribed is three months which can be extended byanother period of 30 days, on sufficient cause being shown to thesatisfaction of the court.”

36. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act as well as Section 34 ofthe Arbitration Act was referred to. This Court after noticing theprovisions of Section 34 opined that Section 5 of the Limitation Act isexcluded. In paragraph 20 following has been laid down:

“20. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act inter alia provides thatwhere any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal orapplication a period of limitation different from the period oflimitation prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3shall apply as if such period was the period prescribed by theSchedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitationprescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special orlocal law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall applyonly insofar as, and to the extent, they are not expressly excludedby such special or local law. When any special statute prescribescertain period of limitation as well as provision for extension up tospecified time-limit, on sufficient cause being shown, then theperiod of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevailand to that extent the provisions of the Limitation Act shall standexcluded. As the intention of the legislature in enacting sub-section(3) of Section 34 of the Act is that the application for setting asidethe award should be made within three months and the period canbe further extended on sufficient cause being shown by anotherperiod of 30 days but not thereafter, this Court is of the opinionthat the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not beapplicable because the applicability of Section 5 of the LimitationAct stands excluded because of the provisions of Section 29(2)

A

BC

D

E

FG

H

A

A

BC

D

E

FG

H

A

of the Limitation Act. However, merely because it is held thatSection 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an applicationfiled under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside an award, oneneed not conclude that provisions of Section 14 of the LimitationAct would also not be applicable to an application submitted underSection 34 of the Act of 1996.”

B

37. The three-Judge Bench noticed earlier judgment of this Courtin CST v. Parson Tools and Plants. The three-Judge Bench held thatproceedings initiated for setting aside the arbitral award are not “courts”and three-Judge Bench held that in CST v. Parson Tools and Plantsthe appellate authority and the revisional court were not the courts henceCthis case was distinguished. Following was laid down in paragraph 26:

“26. From the judgment of the Supreme Court in CST, (1975)2 SCC 22, it is evident that essentially what weighed with theCourt in holding that Section 14 of the Limitation Act was notapplicable, was that the appellate authority and the revisionalauthority were not “courts”. The stark features of the revisionalpowers pointed out by the Court, showed that the legislature haddeliberately excluded the application of the principles underlyingSections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. Here in this case, theCourt is not called upon to examine scope of revisional powers.The Court in this case is dealing with Section 34 of the Act whichconfers powers on the court of the first instance to set aside anaward rendered by an arbitrator on specified grounds. It is not thecase of the contractor that the forums before which theGovernment of India undertaking had initiated proceedings forsetting aside the arbitral award are not “courts”. In view of theseglaring distinguishing features, this Court is of the opinion that thedecision rendered in CST did not decide the issue which falls forconsideration of this Court and, therefore, the said decision cannotbe construed to mean that the provisions of Section 14 of theLimitation Act are not applicable to an application submitted underSection 34 of the Act of 1996.”

D

E

F

G

38. Three-Judge Bench held that Section 14 of the Limitation Actwas applicable to application filed under Section 34 of the ArbitrationAct, 1996. R.V. Raveendran, J. in his concurring opinion has held thatSections 3 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act will not apply to proceedings H

before the tribunal, to appeals or applications before the tribunals, unlessexpressly provided. In paragraph 44 following was laid down:

“44. It may be noticed at this juncture that the Schedule to theLimitation Act prescribes the period of limitation only to proceedingsin courts and not to any proceeding before a tribunal or quasi-judicial authority. Consequently Sections 3 and 29(2) of theLimitation Act will not apply to proceedings before the tribunal.This means that the Limitation Act will not apply to appeals orapplications before the tribunals, unless expressly provided.”

39. The most elaborate judgment holding that the Limitation Actapplies only to courts and not to the tribunals is the judgment of thisCourt in M.P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of CentralExcise, 2015(7) SCC 58, Rohinton Fali Nariman, J. speaking for theCourt reviewed all earlier judgments of two-Judge and three-JudgeBenches of this Court. In paragraphs 11 to 35 all earlier judgments havebeen considered. In the above case Commissioner of Customs(Appeals)dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that appeal isbarred by time and the Commissioner(Appeals) had no power to condonedelay beyond the period specified in Section 128 of the Customs Act. Inthe above case, benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act was sought.It was contended before this Court that while Section 2 of the LimitationAct, Section 14 of the Limitation Act was also applied to criminal, specialor local law. This Court noticed the ingredients of applicability of Section14. Two-Judge Bench has held that relying on earlier judgments of thisCourt that provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable only to suits,appeals and applications filed in Courts. Section 29(2) was also consideredby this Court and following was laid down in paragraph 33:

“33……Section 29(2) states:

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,appeal or application a period of limitation different from theperiod prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by theSchedule and for the purpose of determining any period oflimitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by anyspecial or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent towhich, they are not expressly excluded by such special or locallaw.”

A bare reading of this section would show that the special or locallaw described therein should prescribe for any suit, appeal orapplication a period of limitation different from the period prescribedby the Schedule. This would necessarily mean that such specialor local law would have to lay down that the suit, appeal orapplication to be instituted under it should be a suit, appeal orapplication of the nature described in the Schedule. We havealready held that such suits, appeals or applications as arereferred to in the Schedule are only to courts and not to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. It is clear, therefore, that only when asuit, appeal or application of the description in the Schedule is tobe filed in a court under a special or local law that the provisiongets attracted. This is made even clearer by a reading of Section29(3). Section 29(3) states:

B

C

D

“29. Savings.—(1)-(2)

***

(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being inforce with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Actshall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.”

E

When it comes to the law of marriage and divorce, the sectionspeaks not only of suits but other proceedings as well. Suchproceedings may be proceedings which are neither appeals norapplications thus making it clear that the laws relating to marriageand divorce, unlike the law of limitation, may contain proceedingsother than suits, appeals or applications filed in courts. This againis an important pointer to the fact that the entirety of the LimitationAct including Section 29(2) would apply only to the three kinds ofproceedings mentioned all of which are to be filed in courts.”

F

F

40. Two-Judge Bench, however, held that provisions of SectionG14 would certainly apply. We in the present case are concerned onlywith applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

41. Now, we come to the second set of cases which cases haveapplied provisions of Limitation Act on special and local law. A three-Judge Bench judgment in The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. vs.

H

M/s. Madan Lal Das & Sons, Bareilly, (1976) 4 SCC 464, hasbeen relied by the counsel for the respondents. In the above case anappeal relating to assessment year 1960-61 was decided by the appellateauthority. The copy of the appellate order was served on the dealer on02.08.1965. The dealer lost the copy of the appellate order and on15.06.1966 made an application for obtaining another copy of the orderwhich was ready on 17.08.1967. Revision under Section 10 of the U.P.Sales Tax Act, 1948 was filed by the dealer before the Judge(Revision)Sales Tax on 09.09.1967. The dealer claimed that the time taken inobtaining certified copy needs to be excluded under Section 12(2) of theLimitation Act, 1963. The Judge(Revision) accepted the contention anddecided revision on merits. At the instance of the Commissioner of SalesTax a question was referred to the High Court as to whether the timetaken by the dealer in obtaining another copy of the appellate ordercould be excluded for the purpose of limitation for filing revision underSection 10(1) of the Act, 1948. The High Court answered the questionin favour of the dealer and against the Revenue.

42. The Commissioner of Sales Tax filed an appeal in this Courtquestioning the judgment of the High Court. It was contended beforethis Court that U.P. Sales Tax Act constitutes a complete court in itselfand the High Court committed an error in relying on Section 12(2) of theLimitation Act, 1963. In paragraph 4 of the judgment following was laiddown:

“4. There can be no manner of doubt that the U.P. Sales TaxAct answers to the description of a special or local law. Accordingto sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, reproducedabove, for the purpose of determining any period of limitationprescribed for any application by any special or local law, theprovisions contained in Section 12(2), inter alia, shall apply insofaras and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded bysuch special or local law. There is nothing in the U.P. Sales TaxAct expressly excluding the application of Section 12(2) of theLimitation Act for determining the period of limitation prescribedfor revision application. The conclusion would, therefore, followthat the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act of 1963can be relied upon in computing the period of limitation prescribedfor filing a revision petition under Section 10 of the U.P. Sales TaxAct.”

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

A43. This Court held that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act canbe relied upon in computing the period of limitation prescribed for filingthe revision. The Judge(Revision) before whom revision is filed is not aCourt, it is clear from the scheme of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.Section 10 under which revision is filed provides for Revising Authority.Section 10(1) provides for appointment of Revising Authority which isBas follows:

“Section 10. Power of revision.-(1) The State Government shallappoint as Revising Authority a person qualified under clause (2)of Article 217 of the Constitution for appointment as Judge of aHigh Court.”C

44. The above provision makes it clear that revision is to be filedbefore a Revising Authority created under Act, 1948 and is not a Court.We have already noticed above that a three-Judge Bench of this Courtin The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow vs. M/s. ParsonTools and Plants, Kanpur (supra) had considered the question ofDapplicability of Limitation Act, 1963 before Revision Authority underU.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. This Court in paragraph 9 of the judgment hascategorically held that Judge(Revisions) Sales Tax exercising jurisdictionunder Section 10 are not courts but mere administrative tribunals. InCST, U.P. vs. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, the question was withEregard to applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The three-Judge Bench categorically held that the Judge(Revision) being not aCourt, Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedingsbefore such tribunal. Before three-Judge Bench which heard CST, U.P.vs. M/s. Madan Lal Das & Sons(supra) unfortunately the earlierjudgment of equal strength i.e. three-Judge Bench in CST, U.P. vs. M/Fs. Parson Tools and Plants was not cited. CST, U.P. vs. M/s. ParsonTools and Plants was judgment was on the same issue i.e. applicabilityof the Limitation Act in reference to Judge(Revision) exercising thejurisdiction under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, CST, U.P. vs. M/s. ParsonTools and Plants(supra) has held that Limitation Act is not applicableGto such authority. Thus, three-Judge judgment was neither noticed and acontrary view was expressed in CST, U.P. vs. M/s. Madan Lal Das& Sons. We have also noticed that there has also been earlier three-Judge Bench judgment in Nityananda, M. Joshi and others. vs. LifeInsurance Corporation of India and others(supra) where it washeld that Limitation Act applies only to suits, applications and appealsHfiled in Courts. The judgment of this Court in CST, U.P. vs. M/s. Madan Lal Das & Sons having not referred to earlier judgments of equalstrength, we are persuaded to follow the earlier three-Judge Benchjudgment of this Court in CST, U.P. vs. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants.

45. The judgment on which reliance has been placed by the learnedcounsel for the respondent is Mukri Gopalan vs. CheppilatPuthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5. In the above case,question for consideration was as to whether the appellate authorityunder Section 18 of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,1965 has power to condone the delay in filing appeal. The issue whichhas been noticed in paragraph 1 is to the following effect:

“1. In this appeal by special leave a short but an interesting questionfalls for determination. It is to the effect “whether the appellateauthority constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to asthe ‘Rent Act’) has power to condone the delay in the filing ofappeal before it under the said section”. Majority of the KeralaHigh Court in the case of Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina KunhiUmma[, AIR 1974 Ker 162,] has taken the view that the appellateauthority has no such power. Following the said decision a DivisionBench of the Kerala High Court by its judgment and order underappeal has dismissed the revision application moved by the appellantherein whose appeal before the appellate authority was dismissedas time barred and the application for condonation of delay wastreated to be not maintainable before the appellate authority.”

46. One fact which is to be noticed is that appellate authorityunder the above Act was District Judge. The notification issued by theState Government conferring on the District Judge power of the appellateauthority has been noticed and extracted in paragraph 5 of the judgment.Relevant part of paragraph No.5 is as follows:

“5. …………………………At this stage it will be useful tonote that the Government of Kerala in exercise of its power underSection 18(1) has issued a notification conferring on District Judgesthe powers of appellate authority for the purpose of Kerala RentAct. The said notification reads as under:

“Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965-Noti. underSection 18(1) conferring on District Judges powers ofappellate authorities A

B

C

DE

F

G

H

A

(Published in Kerala Gazette No. 38 dated 26th September,1989 : SRO :1631 of 1989)

NOTIFICATION

S.R.O. No. 1631 of 1989 In exercise of the powers conferredby clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the KeralaBuildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) and insupersession of all previous notifications on the subject, theGovernment of Kerala hereby confers on the District Judges havingjurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the saidAct have been extended, the powers of the appellate authoritiesfor the purposes of the said Act, in the said areas.”

B

C

47. This Court in the above case held that appellate authority wasnot “persona designata”. This Court in paragraph 8 held that the appellateauthority who was District Judge would be court and not personadesignata. Following was observed in paragraph 8:

D

“8…………When the aforesaid well settled tests for decidingwhether an authority is a court or not are applied to the powersand functions of the appellate authority constituted under Section18 of the Rent Act, it becomes obvious that all the aforesaidessential trappings to constitute such an authority as a court areEfound to be present. In fact, Mr Nariman, learned counsel forrespondent also fairly stated that these appellate authorities wouldbe courts and would not be persona designata…………”

48. Section 29(2) was also considered. This Court further heldthat Section 29(2) will get attracted to appeals filed before appellateauthority under Section 18 of the Rent Act. In paragraphs 11 and 15Ffollowing has been laid down:

“11. It is also obvious that once the aforesaid two conditions aresatisfied Section 29(2) on its own force will get attracted to appealsfiled before appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Act.When Section 29(2) applies to appeals under Section 18 of theRent Act, for computing the period of limitation prescribed forappeals under that Section, all the provisions of Sections 4 to 24of the Limitation Act would apply. Section 5 being one of themwould therefore get attracted. It is also obvious that there is noexpress exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act taking out the G

H

applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filedbefore appellate authority under Section 18 of the Act.Consequently, all the legal requirements for applicability of Section5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals in the light of Section29(2) of Limitation Act can be said to have been satisfied. Thatwas the view taken by the minority decision of the learned SingleJudge of Kerala High Court in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina KunhiUmma. The majority did not agree on account of its wrongsupposition that appellate authority functioning under Section 18of the Rent Act is a persona designata. Once that presumption isfound to be erroneous as discussed by us earlier, it becomes atonce clear that minority view in the said decision was the correctview and the majority view was an erroneous view.”

15. After repealing of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and itsreplacement by the present Limitation Act of 1963 a fundamentalchange was made in Section 29(2). The present Section 29(2) asalready extracted earlier clearly indicates that once the requisiteconditions for its applicability to given proceedings under specialor local law are attracted, the provisions contained in Sections 4to 24 both inclusive would get attracted which obviously wouldbring in Section 5 which also shall apply to such proceedings unlessapplicability of any of the aforesaid sections of the Limitation Actis expressly excluded by such special or local law. By this changeit is not necessary to expressly state in a special law that theprovisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall applyto the determination of the periods under it. By the general provisioncontained in Section 29(2) this provision is made applicable to theperiods prescribed under the special laws. An express mention inthe special law is necessary only for any exclusion. It is on thisbasis that when the new Rent Act was passed in 1965 the provisioncontained in old Section 31 was omitted. It becomes thereforeapparent that on a conjoint reading of Section 29(2) of LimitationAct of 1963 and Section 18 of the Rent Act of 1965, provisions ofSection 5 would automatically get attracted to those proceedings,as there is nothing in the Rent Act of 1965 expressly excludingthe applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals underSection 18 of the Rent Act.”

AB

C

D

E

F

G

A

A49. This Court in the above case held that Section 5 was attractedin appeal which was to be heard by the appellate authority. It is, further,relevant to notice that in M.P. Steel Corporation (supra), MukriGopalan has been referred to and has been held to be no longer goodlaw in view of the earlier three-Judge judgments of this Court. Dealingwith Mukri Gopalan’s case two-Judge Bench in M.P. SteelBCorporation had held following in paragraph 29 :

“29. Quite apart from Mukri Gopalan case being out ofstep with at least five earlier binding judgments of this Court, itdoes not square also with the subsequent judgment in ConsolidatedEngg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt. A three-Judge Bench ofthis Court was asked to decide whether Section 14 of the LimitationAct would apply to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and ConciliationAct, 1996. After discussing the various provisions of the ArbitrationAct and the Limitation Act, this Court held:…………”

C

32. Obviously, the ratio of Mukri Gopalan does not squareDwith the observations of the three-Judge Bench in ConsolidatedEngg. Enterprises. In the latter case, this Court has unequivocallyheld that Parson Tools is an authority for the proposition that theLimitation Act will not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals.To the extent that Mukri Gopalan is in conflict with the judgmentEin Consolidated Engg. Enterprises case, it is no longer goodlaw.”

D

50. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on three-Judge Benchjudgment of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and another vs.Anshuman Shukla, (2014) 10 SCC 814. In the above case this CourtFwas examining as to whether delay in filing revision before the HighCourt under M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 wascondonable applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, Section 29(2) aswell as Mukri Gopalan case was referred to by three-Judge Bench.In paragraph 20 following was laid down:

“20. Section 19 of the Act confers the power of revision on theHigh Court. It provides that the aggrieved party may make anapplication for revision before the High Court within three monthsof the date of the award. This section was amended in 2005, toconfer the power on the High Court to condone the delay. Since G

H

this dispute pertains prior to 2005, thus, the provision of theunamended Act shall apply in the present case.”

51. After considering the legislative scheme of Act, 1983 followingwas laid down in paragraph 32 and 33:

“32. Section 19 of the 1983 Act does not contain any expressrider on the power of the High Court to entertain an applicationfor revision after the expiry of the prescribed period of threemonths. On the contrary, the High Court is conferred with suomotu power, to call for the record of an award at any time. Itcannot, therefore, be said that the legislative intent was to excludethe applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 19 ofthe 1983 Act.

33. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to delve into the questionwhether the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the Act is a courtor not for answering the issue in the present case as the delay infiling the revision has occurred before the High Court, and not theArbitral Tribunal.”

52. It is relevant to notice that this Court from the scheme of Act,1983, itself found that legislative intent was not to exclude the applicabilityof Section 5 of the Limitation Act. There cannot be any dispute to theproposition that if the legislative scheme of special or local law indicatethat enactment intended applicability of Section 5. Section 5 shall beapplicable independent with operation of Section 29(2). However, inparagraph 33, the Court did not delve into the question as to whetherArbitral Tribunal is a court or not. Due to a reason that revision was filedbefore the High Court and there cannot be any issue as to the HighCourt is not a Court, thus, when revision application was filed before aCourt Section 29(2) was clearly attracted applying Section 5 of theLimitation Act. The said judgment cannot be said to be authority for theproposition that in appeals filed before statutory authorities which arenot Court, Section 5 of the Limitation act shall be attracted. Anotherjudgement relied by the respondent is Syed Zalil Akhtar vs. Zila SahkariKrishi Avam Gramn Vikas Bank, Mydt., (2016) 12 SCC 365. ThisCourt in the above case was considering the power of condonation ofdelay in filing appeal under Section 55(2) of M.P. Cooperative SocietiesAct, 1960. The High Court has upheld the decision of the M.P. StateCooperative Tribunal, appellant’s application filed under Section 55(2)

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

138SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Awas belated and since there being no provision for condoning the delayin filing of the appeal and Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also notapplicable. Two-Judge Bench has referred to Mukri Gopalan (supra).Relying on Mukri Gopalan and Anshuman Shukla, two-Judge Benchheld that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable. Inparagraphs 11 and 12 following has been held:B

“11. Having noted the said view expressed in para 34, ascompared to a detailed analysis made in the earlier decision ofthis Court made in Mukri Gopalan case we are of the consideredview that in the light of the subsequent larger Bench decision ofthis Court in Anshuman Shukla case which has given its seal ofCapproval to the decision in Mukri Gopalan case, the latter decisioncan be followed in all respects and the one held in Noharlal Vermacase cannot be said to be good law.

12. Therefore, applying the law thus laid down by this Courtin Mukri Gopalan case and Anshuman Shukla case we areDconvinced that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply in allforce to the case on hand and consequently when we considerthe extent of delay involved, we find that the last date for filingthe application was 8-9-1995, application was presented on 11-9-1995, in between two days, namely, 9-9-1995 and 10-9-1995 wereEsecond Saturday and Sunday. Therefore, it must be held that therewas every justification and sufficient cause for the appellant inhis claim for condoning the said two days in filing the applicationbefore the original authority. Consequently, we ourselves herebycondone the said delay of two days and since the Tribunal by itsorder dated 18-3-2009 merely dismissed the appeals of theFappellant as well as that of the respondent on the sole ground ofdelay caused by the appellant in preferring the original application,the said order cannot be sustained.”

53. We have already noticed that Mukri Gopalan was held to benot a good law by this Court in M.P. Steel on the ground that it has notGnoticed earlier three-Judge Bench judgments and also in view of thesubsequent three-Judge Bench judgment, the said case is not a goodlaw. As far as Anshuman Shukla’s case is concerned we have alreadynoticed the issue, in the said case, of applicability of Section 5 of LimitationAct in the revision filed in the High Court, High Court being a Court,HLimitation Act was fully applicable and the said judgment does not support the proposition that in application before not a Court, Section 5 shallautomatically be applicable.

54. The ratio which can be culled from above noted judgments,especially judgment of three-Judge Benches, as noted above, is as follows:

(1) The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the LimitationAct, 1963 are suits, appeals and applications which are to befiled in a Court.

(2) The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the LimitationAct are not the suits, appeals and applications which are tobe filed before a statutory authority like Commissioner underAct, 1959.

(3) Operation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is confinedto the suits, appeals and applications referred to in a specialor local law to be filed in Court and not before statutoryauthorities like Commissioner under Act, 1959.

(4) However, special or local law vide statutory scheme canmake applicable any provision of the Limitation Act orexclude applicability of any provision of Limitation Act whichcan be decided only after looking into the scheme of particular,special or local law.

55. We, thus, answer question Nos.2 and 3 in the following manner:

(i) The applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act iswith regard to different limitations prescribed for any suit,appeal or application when to be filed in a Court.

(ii) Section 29(2) cannot be pressed in service with regard tofiling of suits, appeals and applications before the statutoryauthorities and tribunals provided in a special or local law.The Commissioner while hearing of the appeal under Section69 of the Act, 1959 is not entitled to condone the delay infiling appeal, since, provision of Section 5 shall not beattracted by strength of Section 29(2) of the Act.

Question No.4

56. A special or local law can very well provide for applicability ofany provision of Limitation Act or exclude applicability of any provisionof Limitation Act. The provisions of Limitation Act including Section 5

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Acan very well be applied in deciding an appeal by statutory authoritywhich is not a Court by the statutory scheme of special or local law. We,thus, need to notice the provisions of Act, 1959 as to whether the schemeunder Act, 1959 shows that enactment intended to apply Section 5 of theLimitation Act.

B57. Section 110 provides for procedure and powers at inquiriesunder Chapters V and VI. The Commissioner hears appeals under Section69 which is under Chapter V of the Act. Section 110 of the Act is asfollows:

“Section 110. Procedure and powers at inquiries underCChapters V and VI.- (1) Where a Commissioner or a JointCommissioner or a Deputy Commissioner makes an inquiry orhears an appeal under Chapter V or Chapter VI, the inquiry shallbe made and the appeal shall be heard, as nearly as may be, inaccordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of CivilProcedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908) to the trial of suits orDthe hearing of appeals, as the case may be.

(2) The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872(CentralAct I of 1872) and the Indian Oaths Act, 1873 (Central Act X of1873), shall apply to such inquiries and appeals.

(3) The Commissioner [1][or a Joint Commissioner or aDeputy Commissioner] holding such inquiry or hearing such anappeal shall be deemed to be a person acting judicially within themeaning of the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850 (CentralAct XVIII of 1850).”

E

58. The mere fact that a statutory authority is empowered toFfollow the procedure as nearly may be in accordance with procedureunder C.P.C. to the trial of suits or hearing of appeals, the statutoryauthority shall not become a Court. There is nothing under Section 110which indicates that Limitation Act is also made applicable in hearing ofthe appeal.G

59. Section 115 deals with limitation. It only provides that incomputing the period of limitation prescribed under Act, 1959 for anyproceeding, suit, appeal or application for revision against any order ordecree passed under this Act, the time requisite for obtaining a certifiedcopy of such order or decree shall be excluded.

H

60. The provision of Section 69 of Act, 1959 also indicates thatLegislature never contemplated applicability of Section 5 of the LimitationAct in proceedings before Commissioner. Section 69(2) noted aboveprovides that any order passed by the Joint Commissioner or the DeputyCommissioner, as the case may, in respect of which no appeal has beenpreferred within the period specified in sub-section (1) may be revisedby the Commissioner suo motu and the Commissioner may call for andexamine the records of the proceedings to satisfy himself as to theregularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety ofany decision or order passed by the Joint Commissioner or the DeputyCommissioner, as the case may be.

61. Thus, Section 69(2) gives suo motu power to the Commissionerto call for and examine the records of the proceedings of JointCommissioner or the Deputy Commissioner in respect of which no appealhas been preferred within the period specified in sub-section (1). Thus,in a case appeal is not filed within 60 days against the order of JointCommissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, the Commissioner is vestedwith suo motu power to call for and examine the records. The suo motupower has been given to the Commissioner to correct the orders of JointCommissioner or the Deputy Commissioner even if no appeal has beenfiled within 60 days. Giving of suo motu power to the Commissioner iswith object to ensure that an order passed by the Joint Commissioner orthe Deputy Commissioner may be corrected when appeal is not filedwithin time under Section 69(1). The scheme of Section 69 especiallysub-section (2) also re-enforces our conclusion that Legislature nevercontemplated applicability of Section 5 in Section 69(1) for condoningthe delay in filing an appeal by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

62. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to two Rulesframed under Section 116 of 1959, Act, namely, the Application andAppeal Rules dated 30.08.1961 and the Holding of Inquiries Rules dated30.08.1961. The Application and Appeal Rules provide for proceduresand details of filing application, affidavits, memorandum of appeal,application for revision, etc. The said Rules, in no manner, support thecontention of the learned counsel for the respondent that Section 5 ofthe Limitation Act is applicable. Similarly, Holding of Inquiries Rulesprovide for procedure of holding of inquiries, issue of notice, etc. Theabove Rules also do not throw any light on the applicability of Section 5of the Limitation Act.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

A63. The above provision clearly indicates that provision for onlycomputation of limitation has been made applicable to the proceedingsunder Act, 1959. Section 115 cannot be read in a manner as to providingapplicability of Section 5. There is no other provision in the scheme fromwhich it can be inferred that Act, 1959 intended applicability of Section5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings of appeal before the Commission.BWe, thus, conclude that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicableas per the scheme of Act, 1959.

64. In view of the foregoing discussions, we allow the appeal, setaside the impugned judgment of the High Court. The order of theCommissioner dated 31.07.2013 is set aside and the appeal filed byCrespondent No.3 stands dismissed.

65. We may, however, observe that dismissal of the appeal filedby respondent No.3 as above shall not preclude the Commissioner inexercising his suo motu power under Section 69(2) of the Act, 1959.We, however, are not expressing any opinion with regard to exercise ofDsuo motu by the Commissioner under Section 69(2) in the present caseand it is for the Commissioner to invoke his power under Section 69(2) ifhe is so satisfied. Further, this will be without prejudice to any otherremedy open to the respondent No.3 in law.

66. The parties shall bear their own costs.E

Ankit Gyan

Appeal allowed.

F

G

H