DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY versus BHAGI SINGH AND ORS. on 20 January 2023

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in WritPetition(C) No. 8291 of 2015 by which the High Court has allowed theBsaid writ petition and has declared that the acquisition proceedings initiatedunder the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “Act,1894”) with regard to the land in question is deemed to have lapsedunder Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparencyin Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013(hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”), the Delhi Development AuthorityC(DDA) has preferred the present appeal.

2. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties.

3. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt, it appears and so stated in the affidavit filed by the Land AcquisitionCollector (LAC)before the High Court that the possession of the land inDquestion – Khasra No. 28 was taken over by the DDA through LAC/L&B Department on 21.03.2007. Despite the above, the High Courthas declared that the acquisition with respect to the land in question isdeemed to have lapsed on the ground that no physical possession wastaken in respect of the suit land.

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4. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court isjust contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the Constitution Benchdecision in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs.Manoharlal and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129. In paragraph 366, theConstitution Bench of this Court has observed and held as under:- “366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer thequestions as under:

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366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in casethe award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencementof the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensationhas to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

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366.2. In case the award has been passed within thewindow period of five years excluding the period covered by aninterim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue asprovided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894Act as if it has not been repealed.

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366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) betweenpossession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”.The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction ofauthorities for five years or more prior to commencement of thesaid Act, the possession of land has not been taken norcompensation has been paid. In other words, in case possessionhas been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is nolapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession hasnot been taken then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensationin court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the provisoto Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect tomajority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as onthe date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with theprovisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interestunder Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit ofcompensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of landacquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect tothe majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation underthe 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date ofnotification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensationas provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open tohim to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) dueto non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. Theobligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensationor who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claimthat the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2)of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is tobe treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Actand as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest AB

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report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on takingpossession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests inState there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapseunder Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for adeemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authoritieshave failed due to their inaction to take possession and paycompensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act cameinto force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with theauthority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence ofinterim orders passed by court has to be excluded in thecomputation of five years.

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366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise tonew cause of action to question the legality of concludedproceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceedingpending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014.It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopenconcluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question thelegality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings ormode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of courtto invalidate acquisition.”

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5. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority (supra) to the facts of the case on hand,more particularly, when the possession of the land in question is held tohave been taken over by the DDA through LAC/ L&B Department on21.03.2007 by drawing the panchnama and preparing the possessionFreport, which is held to be permissible as observed and held by this courtin the aforesaid decision. Under the circumstances, the impugnedjudgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable and thesame deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashedand set aside, GPresent appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.

Nidhi Jain

(Assisted by : Abhishek Agnihotri, LCRA)

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