TRILOKI NATH SINGH versus ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. on 6 May 2020

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[2020] 4 S.C.R. 650

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2020] 4 S.C.R.

ATRILOKI NATH SINGH

v.

ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR. LRS. & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 3961 of 2010)

BMAY 06, 2020

[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. 23, r. 3 A – The appellant-plaintiff, stranger to a Compromise decree, filed suit seeking adeclaration that the Compromise decree by the High Court onC15.09.1994 in the second appeal was illegal, inoperative andobtained by fraud and misrepresentation – Held: The appellant wasnot a party to the stated Compromise decree – He was, however,claiming right, title and interest over the land referred to in a statedsale deed dated 06.01.1984 which was purchased by him from oneDof the party to compromise decree – It is well settled that thecompromise decree passed by the High Court in the second appealwould relate back to the date of institution of the suit between theparties thereto – In the suit now instituted by the appellant, at thebest, he could seek relief against the person who sold property tohim, but cannot be allowed to question the compromise decree passedEby the High Court in the partition suit between the other parties –In other words, the appellant could file a suit for protection of hisright, title or interest devolved on the basis of the stated sale deeddated 06.01.1984, allegedly executed by one of the party to theproceedings in partition suit, which could be examinedFindependently by the Court on its own merits in accordance withlaw – That apart, the Trial Court in any case would not be competentto adjudicate the grievance of the appellant herein in respect of thevalidity of compromise decree dated 15.09.1994 passed by the HighCourt in partition suit – It must, therefore, follow that suit institutedbefore the Civil Court by the appellant was not maintainable inGview of specific bar u/r. 3A of Or. 23 CPC – Also, findings wererecorded by the Trial Court against the appellant in reference toissue regarding the right, title and interest of suit property and saidfindings were not interfered by the Court of Appeal preferred at theinstance of the appellant – Thus, there were concurrent findings of H

Courts below against the appellant-plaintiff – Consequently, theappeal is dismissed.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. In the present case, the partition suit was filedin 1978 and after the decision of the trial Court, the matter wentin first appeal and eventually, Second Appeal No. 495/86 beforethe High Court. During the pendency of first appeal beingcontinuation of the suit as stated, one of the parties to the pendingproceedings, allegedly entered into a sale deed with the appellanton 6[th] January, 1984. Indubitably the issue regarding right, titleand interest in respect of the land which was the subject matterof sale deed dated 6[th] January, 1984, was still inchoate and notfinally decided. In that sense, the claim of the appellant was to begoverned by the decision in favour of or against the party whoentered into a sale deed with him in the pending appeal. It mustfollow that the alleged transaction effected in favour of theappellant by a sale deed dated 6[th] January, 1984 ought to abide bythe outcome of the said proceedings which culminated with thecompromise decree passed by the High Court in Second AppealNo. 495/86 dated 15[th] September, 1994. [Para 20][661-G-H;662-A-C]

2. Indeed, the appellant was not a party to the statedcompromise decree. He was, however, claiming right, title andinterest over the land referred to in the stated sale deed dated6[th] January, 1984, which was purchased by him from judgmentdebtor and party to the suit. It is well settled that the compromisedecree passed by the High Court in the second appeal wouldrelate back to the date of institution of the suit between the partiesthereto. In the suit now instituted by the appellant, at the best,he could seek relief against the party who entered into a saledeed, but cannot be allowed to question the compromise decreepassed by the High Court in the partition suit. In other words,the appellant could file a suit for protection of his right, title orinterest devolved on the basis of the stated sale deed dated 6[th]January, 1984, allegedly executed by one of the party to theproceedings in the partition suit, which could be examinedindependently by the Court on its own merits in accordance withlaw. The trial Court in any case would not be competent to A

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Aadjudicate the grievance of the appellant herein in respect of thevalidity of compromise decree dated 15[th] September, 1994 passedby the High Court in the partition suit. [Para 21][662-C-F]

3. In other words, the appellant can only claim through hispredecessor, to the extent of rights and remedies available toBher in reference to the compromise decree. Merely because theappellant was not party to the compromise decree in the facts ofthe present case, will be of no avail to the appellant, much lessgive him a cause of action to question the validity of thecompromise decree passed by the High Court by way of asubstantive suit before the civil Court to declare it as fraudulent,Cillegal and not binding on him. Assuming, he could agitate aboutthe validity of the compromise entered into by the parties to thepartition suit, it is only the High Court, who had accepted thecompromise and passed decree on that basis, could examine thesame and no other Court under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23DCPC. It must, therefore, follow that the suit instituted before thecivil Court by the appellant was not maintainable in view of specificbar under Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC as held in the impugnedjudgment. [Para 22][662-F-H; 663-A-B]

Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) Through LR Sadhna RaiE(Smt) v. Rajinder Singh and Others (2005) 5 SCC 566:[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 370; R. Rajanna v. S.R.Venkataswamy and Others (2014) 15 SCC 471 : [2014]14 SCR 535 – relied on.

Case Law Reference

GFrom the Judgment and Order dated 20.04.2009 of the High Courtof Judicature at Patna in Second Appeal No. 153 of 2003.

S. K. Bhattacharya, B. P. Yadav, Kumar Neeraj, L. K. Paonam,Ms. Seema Sharma, Niraj Bobby Paonam and Ms. Tomthinnganbi Koijam,Advs. for the Appellant.

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M. Yogesh Kanna, Adv. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AJAY RASTOGI, J.

1. The question arises in the appeal for our consideration is as towhether the decree passed on a compromise can be challenged by thestranger to the proceedings in a separate suit.

2. The seminal facts which are relevant for the present purposeand the circumstances in which it arises for our consideration are thatthe appellant-plaintiff filed suit before 4[th] sub-judge, Chapra seeking adeclaration that the compromise decree dated 15[th] September, 1994passed in Second Appeal No. 495/86 by the High Court is illegal,inoperative and obtained by fraud and misrepresentation and also prayedfor injunction against the respondents-defendants restraining them fromentering into peaceful possession of the suit property.

3. The case in shorn of the appellant-plaintiff is that the landdescribed in Schedule 1 of the plaint originally belonged to Lakhan Singhwho died leaving behind three sons, namely, Din Dayal Singh, Jalim Singhand Kunjan Singh. Din Dayal Singh is said to have died issueless duringlifetime of his father and his other brother, namely, Jalim Singh also diedleaving behind a son Ram Nath Singh and two daughters Sampatiya andSoniya. As regards the third son Kunjan Singh, he is said to have diedissueless but prior to his death he gifted the land of his share to Sampatiyaon the basis of a gift deed dated 10[th] July, 1978 which came on possessionover her.

4. The further case of the appellant is that one Salehari wife ofSatyanarayan Prasad claiming herself to be the daughter of late KunjanSingh filed a partition suit 13/78 in the Court of Munsif, Chapra for settingaside the aforesaid gift and for partition of her share in the ancestralproperty. In that suit, Sampatiya, Dulari Devi, Ram Nath and Soniyawere impleaded as party respondents-defendants. Ram Nath died duringpendency of the proceedings and only Sampatiya contested the suit. Itwas further stated that suit was dismissed and it was held that Salehariwas not the daughter of Kunjan Singh and have no right in the properties.

5. Salehari filed T.A. No. 19/84 which was dismissed on 7[th] April,1986. The further case is that a total of 3 Bigha 6 Katha 3 Dhurs wassold by Sampatiya to appellant-plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- by a A

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Aregistered sale deed dated 6[th] January, 1984 and put the appellant-plaintiffin possession over the suit property. In July, 1995, when respondents-defendants started making interference in possession of the suit propertyof the appellant-plaintiff and on query it revealed that it was claimed onthe strength of a compromise decree entered between Sampatiya andSalehari which was filed in second appeal before the High Court ofBPatna.

6. The case of the appellant-plaintiff is that the said compromisedecree was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation concealing the salientfact from the High Court that the sale deed was executed much prior tothe compromise being executed between the parties to the proceedingsCand as such the said compromise was liable to be declared to be voidwhich was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation.

7. The respondents-defendants contested the suit on the groundthat the suit was not maintainable. It was also alleged that the suit washit by the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and OrderD23 Rule 3A Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter being referred to as“CPC”). It also urged that the appellant-plaintiff has no right to file thesuit in the Court of Sub-Judge rather he ought to have filed an applicationbefore the High Court which passed the compromise decree and theappellant-plaintiff has no right to seek relief of injunction. That apart, itEwas stated to bebarred by Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act. Thespecific plea of the respondents-defendants in the written statement wasthat Kunjan Singh has not died issueless rather he had a daughter namelySalehari being his sole heir. It was also denied that he had executed adeed of gift in favour of Sampatiya and has delivered possession of thegifted land to her. It was, however, conceded that Salehari filed a partitionFsuit no. 13/79 in which she lost, whereafter she filed First Appeal No.19/84 which was dismissed. In Second Appeal No. 495/86 before theHigh Court, at her instance, a compromise was executed between theparties and accordingly, the compromise decree was passed by the HighCourt dated 15[th] September, 1994. The extract of the terms ofGcompromise is reproduced ad infra:- “That the said compromise has been reached on following termsand conditions:-

(i) That the respondent no. 1 (Sampatiya D/o Late Jalim Singh)accepts that the plaintiff-appellant Salehari Devi is theHdaughter of Kunjan Mahto.

(ii) That respondent no. 1 accepts the alleged deed of gift dated10.7.1987 executed by Kunjan Mahto in favour of respondentno. 1 is illegal, void and in-operative and that respondent no. 1derived neither title nor possession on account of the saiddeed of gift.

(iii) That it is accepted by the respondent no. 1 that the plaintiffappellant Salehari Devi after the death of her father KunjanMahto came in possession of his properties as she was thesole surviving legal heir of her father,

(iv) That the plaintiff-appellant accepts that she has got only halfshare in the entire suit properties and other half share belongsto respondent no. 1 Sampatiya Devi.

(v) That to remove vagueness as to which suit properties will goto whose share, it is made clear that schedule-I property ofthe plaint which is made annexure-1 containing exhaustivedetails of properties will go to the share of plaintiff appellantand the rest of the suit properties as described in schedule-IIof the plaint will go to the share of respondent no. 1,

(vi) That according to their respective shares the appellant andrespondent nos. 1 and 2 have come in possession thereof.”8. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Judgein all framed 9 issues. The same are reproduced as under:-

1. Is the plaintiff got any valid cause of action?

2. Is the suit as framed maintainable?

3. Is the Court fee paid sufficient?

4. Is the suit barred by limitation?

5. Is the suit u/s 34 S.R. Act.

6. Is the compromise dated 30[th] May, 1994 and order dated15[th] September, 1994 in 2[nd] appeal 495/95 of the Hon’bleHigh Court is illegal, inoperative and inaffective due tofraud.

7. Is the plaintiff got right, title and interest in the suitproperty?

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A8. Is the plaintiff entitle for decree as claimed

9. To what over relief and reliefts plaintiff to?

9. It is relevant to notice that issue nos. 4 & 5 were not pressedand rest of the issues were decided against the appellant-plaintiff afterdue appreciation of the evidence on record on merits by the trial JudgeBby its judgment and decree dated 31[st] July, 1998 which was challengedby the appellant-plaintiff in appeal before the learned District Judge inTitle Appeal No. 80/98(3/99). On due appreciation of evidence on record,the appeal came to be dismissed by the Court of Appeal by its judgmentdated 5[th] May, 2003 that came to be challenged by the appellant in SecondCAppeal No. 153 of 2003 before the High Court which came to bedismissed at the motion stage by judgment dated 20[th] April, 2009 whichis a subject matter in appeal before us.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff submits thatprovision of Order 23 Rule 3A CPC is applicable only to the parties toDthe suit and the said provision does not apply to a stranger to thecompromise decree, therefore, the remedy is always open to a strangerto the compromise decree to file a separate suit to ventilate his grievancein the appropriate proceedings. In the given circumstances, the HighCourt has committed a manifest error in dismissing the appeal at themotion stage to non-suit the appellant-plaintiff and make him remedilessEin questioning the compromise decree which has seriously affected hisright over the subject property in question and the only remedy availablewith the appellant-plaintiff was to file a suit claiming his right over thesubject land in question which was created on the basis of a sale deedexecuted by one of the party to the proceedings dated 6[th] January, 1984Fmuch before the compromise decree was passed by the High Court.

11. Learned counsel further submits that when the previous suitfiled by Salehari was dismissed on merits on 30[th] December, 1983,thereafter on 6[th] January, 1984, Sampatiya sold the suit property to theappellant-plaintiff on the basis of the gift deed executed in her favour. ItGwas not open for Sampatiya to enter into the compromise against herpleadings without any consideration and such an act of Sampatiya clearlyimplies her collusion with Salaheri in order to dishonestly and fraudulentlydefeat the rights of her vendor/the appellant/plaintiff for no forceablereason whatsoever.

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12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-defendantswhile supporting the findings recorded by the High Court under theimpugned judgment submits that at least the compromise decree whichwas executed between the parties was not open to question even by thestranger to the proceedings although suit could have been filed by theappellant-plaintiff for the protection of his own rights admissible underthe law but, in the instant proceedings, suit was filed seeking a declarationthat a compromise decree dated 15[th] September, 1994 passed in SecondAppeal by the High Court of Patna be declared to be illegal which wasobtained by fraud and misrepresentation and that was not open to thecivil court for adjudication in view of bar under Order 23 Rule 3A CPC.That apart, the learned trial Judge on the basis of pleadings of the partiesspecifically framed issue nos. 6 & 7 and recorded a finding regardingthe effect of the compromise decree dated 15[th] September, 1994 passedby the High Court against the appellant. Even the finding in reference toissue no. 7 with regard to right, title and interest in the suit property ofthe appellant has been decided against him on merits. In the givencircumstances, their appears no substance in the present appeal anddeserve to be dismissed.

13. The precise question that falls for our determination is as towhether the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff in seeking a declarationagainst the decree of compromise dated 15[th] September, 1994 passedby the High Court of Patna in Second Appeal was maintainable in viewof the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3A CPC. Order 23 Rule3 and Rule 3A CPC may at this stage be extracted for ready reference:- “3.Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved to the satisfactionof the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by anylawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by theparties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect ofthe whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Courtshall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to berecorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so farit relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise, or satisfaction is the sameas the subject-matter of the suit:

Provided that where it is alleged by one party and deniedby the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived AB

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658SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aat, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shallbe granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless theCourt, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant suchadjournment.

Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is voidBor voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shallnot be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this Rule.

3A. Bar to suit – No suit shall lie to set aside a decree onthe ground that the compromise on which the decree is basedwas not lawful.”

C14. What is emerged as a legislative intent has been considered inextenso by this Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat(Dead) Through LRSadhna Rai(Smt)Vs. Rajinder Singh and Others1, after taking noteof the scheme of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3A added with effect from 1[st] February, 1977. The relevant paragraphs are as under:- D“17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions ofOrder 23 can be summed up thus:

(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree havingregard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.

(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the courtErecording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise)in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.

(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside acompromise decree on the ground that the compromise wasFnot lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.

(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid andbinding unless it is set aside by the court which passed theconsent decree, by an order on an application under the provisoto Rule 3 Order 23.

GTherefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decreeto avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court whichrecorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, andestablish that there was no compromise. In that event, the courtwhich recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide TRILOKI NATH SINGH v. ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR.LRS. & ORS. [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not.This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract betweenparties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. Thevalidity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of theagreement or compromise on which it is made. The seconddefendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree wasfully aware of this position as she filed an application for settingaside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there wasno valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, noneof the other defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasonsbest known to herself, the second defendant within a few daysthereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not topursue the application filed before the court which passed theconsent decree. Such an appeal by the second defendant was notmaintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section96(3) of the Code.

(Emphasis supplied)

15. The scope of intent of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3A wasfurther considered by this Court inR. RajannaVs. S.R. Venkataswamyand Others2 wherein this Court held as under:- “11. It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that in termsof the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 where one party alleges and theother denies adjustment or satisfaction of any suit by a lawfulagreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties,the Court before whom such question is raised, shall decide thesame. What is important is that in terms of Explanation to Order23 Rule 3, the agreement or compromise shall not be deemed tobe lawful within the meaning of the said Rule if the same is voidor voidable under the Contract Act, 1872. It follows that in everycase where the question arises whether or not there has been alawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by theparties, the question whether the agreement or compromise islawful has to be determined by the court concerned. What is lawfulwill in turn depend upon whether the allegations suggest anyinfirmity in the compromise and the decree that would make thesame void or voidable under the Contract Act. More importantly,Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the AB

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Aground that the compromise on which the decree is based wasnot lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relating tolawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before thecourt that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreementor compromise, it is that court and that court alone who canexamine and determine that question. The court cannot direct theBparties to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will liein view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. That isprecisely what has happened in the case at hand. When theappellant filed OS No. 5326 of 2005 to challenge the validity ofthe compromise decree, the court before whom the suit came upCrejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the applicationmade by the respondents holding that such a suit was barred bythe provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. Having thus got theplaint rejected, the defendants (respondents herein) could hardlybe heard to argue that the plaintiff (appellant herein) ought topursue his remedy against the compromise decree in pursuanceDof OS No. 5326 of 2005 and if the plaint in the suit has beenrejected to pursue his remedy against such rejection before a highercourt.”

(Emphasis supplied)

E16. By introducing the amendment to the Civil Procedure Code(Amendment) 1976 w.e.f. 1[st] February, 1977, the legislature has broughtinto force Rule 3A to Order 23, which create bar to institute the suit toset aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which decreeis based was not lawful. The purpose of effecting a compromise betweenthe parties is to put an end to the various disputes pending before theFCourt of competent jurisdiction once and for all.

17. Finality of decisions is an underlying principle of all adjudicatingforums. Thus, creation of further litigation should never be the basis of acompromise between the parties. Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC put a specificbar that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that theGcompromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. The schemeof Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permitparties to amicably come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writingand a voluntary act on the part of the parties. The Court can beinstrumental in having an agreed compromise effected and finalityHattached to the same. The Court should never be party to imposition of a compromise upon an unwilling party, still open to be questioned on anapplication under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC before theCourt.

18. It can be further noticed that earlier under Order 43 Rule1(m), an appeal which recorded the compromise and decide as to whetherthere was a valid compromise or not, was maintainable against an orderunder Rule 3 of Order 23 recording or refusing to record an agreement,compromise or satisfaction. But by the amending Act, aforesaid clausehas been deleted, the result whereof is that now no appeal is maintainableagainst an order recording or refusing to record an agreement orcompromise under Rule 3 of Order 23. Being conscious of this fact thatthe right of appeal against the order recording a compromise or refusingto record a compromise was being taken away, a new Rule 1A wasadded to Order 43 which is as follows:- “1-A. Right to challenge non-appealable orders in appealagainst decree.— (1) Where any order is made under this Codeagainst a party and thereupon any judgment is pronounced againstsuch party and a decree is drawn up, such party may, in an appealagainst the decree, contend that such order should not have beenmade and the judgment should not have been pronounced.

(2) In an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recordinga compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be opento the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that thecompromise should, or should not, have been recorded.”

19. Thus, after the amendment which has been introduced, neitherany appeal against the order recording the compromise nor remedy byway of filing a suit is available in cases covered by Rule 3A of Order 23CPC. As such, a right has been given under Rule 1A(2) of Order 43 toa party, who denies the compromise and invites order of the Court inthat regard in terms of proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC while preferringan appeal against the decree. Section 96(3) CPC shall not be a bar tosuch an appeal, because it is applicable where the factum of compromiseor agreement is not in dispute.

20. In the present case, the partition suit was filed in 1978 andafter the decision of the trial Court, the matter went in first appeal andeventually, Second Appeal No. 495/86 before the High Court. Duringthe pendency of first appeal being continuation of the suit as stated, one AB

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Aof the parties to the pending proceedings, namely, Sampatiya allegedlyentered into a sale deed with the appellant on 6[th] January, 1984.Indubitably the issue regarding right, title and interest in respect of theland which was the subject matter of sale deed dated 6[th] January, 1984,was still inchoate and not finally decided. In that sense, the claim of theappellant was to be governed by the decision in favour of or againstBSampatiya in the pending appeal. It must follow that the allegedtransaction effected in favour of the appellant by a sale deed dated 6[th]January, 1984 ought to abide by the outcome of the said proceedingswhich culminated with the compromise decree passed by the High Courtin Second Appeal No. 495/86 dated 15[th] September, 1994.C21. Indeed, the appellant was not a party to the stated compromisedecree. He was, however, claiming right, title and interest over the landreferred to in the stated sale deed dated 6[th] January, 1984, which waspurchased by him from Sampatiya-judgment debtor and party to thesuit. It is well settled that the compromise decree passed by the HighDCourt in the second appeal would relate back to the date of institution ofthe suit between the parties thereto. In the suit now instituted by theappellant, at the best, he could seek relief against Sampatiya, but cannotbe allowed to question the compromise decree passed by the High Courtin the partition suit. In other words, the appellant could file a suit forprotection of his right, title or interest devolved on the basis of the statedEsale deed dated 6[th] January, 1984, allegedly executed by one of the party(Sampatiya) to the proceedings in the partition suit, which could beexamined independently by the Court on its own merits in accordancewith law. The trial Court in any case would not be competent to adjudicatethe grievance of the appellant herein in respect of the validity ofFcompromise decree dated 15[th] September, 1994 passed by the High Courtin the partition suit.

22. In other words, the appellant can only claim through hispredecessor- Sampatiya, to the extent of rights and remedies availableto Sampatiya in reference to the compromise decree. Merely becauseGthe appellant was not party to the compromise decree in the facts of thepresent case, will be of no avail to the appellant, much less give him acause of action to question the validity of the compromise decree passedby the High Court by way of a substantive suit before the civil Court todeclare it as fraudulent, illegal and not binding on him. Assuming, hecould agitate about the validity of the compromise entered into by theH

parties to the partition suit, it is only the High Court, who had acceptedthe compromise and passed decree on that basis, could examine thesame and no other Court under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC. Itmust, therefore, follow that the suit instituted before the civil Court bythe appellant was not maintainable in view of specific bar under Rule 3Aof Order 23 CPC as held in the impugned judgment.

23. In the instant case, the suit was instituted in the year 1995 and25 years have rolled by now and after the finding has been recorded inreference to issue no. 7 regarding the right, title and interest of the suitproperty against the appellant by the learned trial Judge devolved on thebasis of a stated sale deed dated 6[th] January, 1984 and not interfered bythe Court of Appeal preferred at the instance of the appellant, in thegiven circumstances, remitting the matter back to the learned trial Courtto examine the suit filed at the instance of the appellant-plaintiffindependently for protection of his right, title or interest being devolvedon the basis of the stated sale deed dated 6[th] January, 1984 which asalleged to have been executed by one of the party to thecompromise(Sampatiya)in the changed circumstances may not serveany purpose more so after the concurrent finding of Courts below havebeen recorded against the appellant-plaintiff.

24. Consequently, in our view, the appeal is without substanceand the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

25. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Ankit Gyan

Appeal dismissed.

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