Supreme Court of India

HEMANT NARAYAN RASNE versus THE COMMISSIONER AND ADMINISTRATOR OF PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS. on 19 October 2022

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 18 S.C.R.

AHEMANT NARAYAN RASNE

v.

THE COMMISSIONER AND ADMINISTRATOR OF PUNEMUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 7685 of 2022)

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OCTOBER 19, 2022

[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND J.K. MAHESHWARI, JJ.]

Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949: ss. 6, 6A,20, 452A; Constitution of India, Art.243U – Corporation election –CContinuance of Standing Committee – When the term of PuneMunicipal Corporation (PMC) came to an end – State governmenton being informed that it was not possible to conduct generalelections for constitution of the new Corporation, appointed anadministrator – Appellant, Chairman of the Standing Committee ofDPMC filed a writ petition before High Court on the ground that theStanding Committee shall remain in existence until constitution ofnew Standing Committee, irrespective of appointment of theadministrator – High Court dismissing writ petition held that oncea Councillor ceases to be Councillor, the Standing Committee wouldnot still exist and continue to function as such and it was theEAdministrator, who was appointed, who would exercise the powersand functions of the Corporation – Challenge against – Held: Whenno person could be said to be holding the office of the Councillorafter completion of the term in view of the mandate of ss.6 and 6Aof the Act of 1949, it follows as a necessary corollary that theFStanding Committee stood dissolved along with the completion ofthe term of the Corporation – The proviso to sub-section (3) of s.20cannot be read to mean that notwithstanding the expiration of theduration of a Corporation and thereby, termination of the term ofoffice of the Councillors, there could still be any Standing Committeein existence – Sub-sections (1A) and (1B) of s.452A of the Act,Gwhich are operating in the instant case, deal with a specific peculiarcontingency where general elections could not be held during thetime specified by the enactment even after the expiry of the term ofthe Corporation, essentially due to COVID-19 pandemic situation– Appointment of Administrator in such a contingency does not andH

cannot override the mandate of Art.243U of the Constitution ofIndia as also the provisions of ss.6 and 6A of the Act as regards thetenure – End of the tenure of Corporation has its consequentialeffect of the end of the term of the office of the Councillor; andwhen no person including the present appellant could be said to beholding the office of Councillor after end of the term of theCorporation, existence of any Standing Committee thereafter, issimply out of question – Any other interpretation shall be standingat conflict with the mandate of Art.243U of the Constitution of Indiaand ss.6 and 6A of the Act of 1949.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Whether the Standing Committee could be saidto be a continuing Committee even after the term of theCorporation has come to an end and thereby, the term of theoffice of its members, i.e., the Councillors has also ended. Theanswer could only be in the negative. [Para 12][196-F]

1.2 When no person could be said to be holding the officeof the Councillor after completion of the term in view of themandate of Sections 6 and 6A of the Act of 1949, it follows as anecessary corollary that the Standing Committee stands dissolvedalong with the completion of the term of the Corporation. Theproviso to sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act of 1949essentially comes in operation only in the eventuality when thereare existing members of the Standing Committee in office whengeneral elections are held and they are to retire on the electionof a new Committee, i.e., at the first meeting of the Corporationafter general elections. The proviso cannot be read to mean thatnotwithstanding the expiration of the duration of a corporationand thereby, termination of the term of office of the Councillors,there could still be any Standing Committee in existence. It getsperforce iterated that the Standing Committee stands dissolvedalong with the completion of the term of the Corporation. [Para13 & 14][197-B-E]

1.3 The provision of Section 452 essentially operates inrelation to the contingency where the State Government takesthe steps for dissolution of the existing Corporation after AB

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Aopportunity of show cause upon being satisfied that theCorporation is not competent to perform the duties imposed uponit or is persistently making default or is abusing its powers. Sub-sections (1A) and (1B) of Section 452A of the Act, which areoperating in the present case, deal with a specific peculiarcontingency where general elections could not be held duringBthe time specified by the enactment even after the expiry of theterm of the Corporation, essentially due to COVID-19 pandemicsituation. Appointing of Administrator in such a contingency doesnot and cannot override the mandate of Article 243U of theConstitution of India as also the provisions of Sections 6 and 6ACof the Act as regards the tenure. [Para 15][197-F-H; 198-A]CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7685of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.03.2022 of the High Courtof Judicature at Bombay in W.P. (C) No.3627 of 2022.DShyam Divan, Vinay Navare, Sr. Advs., Shreeyash U. Lalit,Mahesh Kumar, Nikhil Borwonkar, Manish Sharma, Roopenshu PratapSingh, Ms. Devika Khanna, Mrs. V. D. Khanna, Advs. for the Appellant.

Mrs. Anita Shenoy, Sr. Adv., Makarand D. Adkar, Vijay Kumar,EMs. Rekha Rani, Shantanu M. Adkar, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Anand Landge,Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Advs. for theRespondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.F

Leave granted.

2. By way of this appeal, the appellant has questioned the orderdated 29.03.2022 whereby, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay hasdismissed the writ petition (No. 3627 of 2022) filed by him while assertinghis capacity as the Chairperson of the Standing Committee of respondentGNo. 2, Pune Municipal Corporation[1] and seeking the relief essentially tothe effect that irrespective of expiry of the term of the Corporation, theStanding Committee shall nevertheless continue to function and the orderissued by the Government on 03.03.2022, appointing an Administrator,does not forbid the Standing Committee from functioning in accordanceH1 Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Corporation’.

with the provisions of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949[2].

with the provisions of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949[2].

3. For comprehension of the relevant factual aspects, we maytake note of the fact that the term of the Pune Municipal Corporationwas coming to an end on 14.03.2022 and when the Government wasinformed that it would not be possible to conduct general elections forconstitution of the new Corporation, the referred order dated 03.03.2022was issued, appointing the Commissioner, Pune Municipal Corporation,as its Administrator. This order dated 03.03.2022 reads as under: - “GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA

Urban development department

Govt. Order No. M C O – 2020/ C. No. 71(part - 2) Na.

Vi. – 14

Mantralaya (main building), 4[th] floor, Madam Cama road, Hutatma rajguru Chowk, Mumbai –

400032.

Dtd. 03 March 2022.

Ref : - 1] The Maharashtra act No. 1 of year 2021 dtd. 13/1/2021 2] The Maharashtra act No. 6 of year 2021 dtd. 23/03/2021 3] letter of the state election commission No. RaNi Aa/ Ma Na Pa – 2020 / C. No. 7 / Ka – 5 Dtd. 02/02/2022.

Government Order

2]It has been informed vide ref. No. 3 that, it will not bepossible to conduct general elections whose tenure is endingin the months of March – April, 2022; within the prescribedtime and also to appoint the administrator there after thetenure of the local bodies is over.

3]As the tenure of the municipal corporation is at themost five years from the date of the first meeting as per thearticle 243 U of the Constitution of India and also as per theprovision in the sec. 6, 6(A) of the Maharashtra municipalcorporation act 1949, hence the above said tenure cannotcontinued beyond that.

2 Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Act of 1949’/ ‘the Act’.

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A4]Due to this, The appointment of the Commissioner,Pune Municipal Corporation is being made as theadministrator at the Pune Municipal Corporation whosetenure is ending on the date 14/03/2022, as per the provisionsin the of the Maharashtra municipal corporation act 1949and especially as per the provisions in the (1 A), (1 B) ofBthe sec. 452 A.

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5] The Commissioner, Pune Municipal Corporation shouldtake the charge as the administrator when the prescribedtenure of the Pune Municipal Corporation is over and carryout the necessary procedure as per the provisions in theCact.

In the name of and by the order of the Hon. Governor ofMaharashtra.

Sd/-

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( Mahesh Pathak )

The Principal Secretary ( Na Vi – 2 )”

3.1. The case of the appellant is that on 24.02.2022, theprogramme for election of the new Chairperson of the StandingCommittee of the Corporation was announced; and in the electionsEconducted on 04.03.2022 in that regard, he was duly elected as theChairman. The appellant made a representation on 10.03.2022 to theeffect that irrespective of the appointment of Administrator, the StandingCommittee will remain in existence until constitution of new StandingCommittee after general elections. This representation was replied byFthe Government on 14.03.2022 with reference to the provisions containedin Article 243U of the Constitution of India and Section 6A of the Act of1949 while stating that the proposition of the appellant was inconsistentwith the applicable provisions of law. Feeling aggrieved, the appellantpreferred the writ petition that has been dismissed by the High Court byway of its impugned order dated 29.03.2022.G

4. The High Court, after detailed survey of the relevant provisions,found the suggestions made on behalf of the appellant devoid of substance,while observing, inter alia, as under: - H

“5. First and foremost, it is required to be noted that there isno provision under the Maharashtra Municipal CorporationAct, 1949 which states that notwithstanding the tenure ofthe Corporation coming to an end, the Standing Committeeof the Corporation continues to exist and can function as aStanding Committee. It is well settled principle in law thatthe Court cannot read anything into the statutory provisionswhich is not provided therein.

6. Article 243-U(1) of the Constitution lays down that everyMunicipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for thetime being in force, shall continue for five years from thedate appointed for its first meeting and “no longer”. Similarly,Section 6(i) of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Actprovides that every Corporation, unless sooner dissolved,shall continue for a period of five years from the dateappointed for its first meeting and “no longer”. The words“no longer” used in Article 243-U(1) of the Constitutionand section 6(1) of the Maharashtra Municipal CorporationAct, thus mandate that the duration of the Corporation canonly be for a period of 5 years and there can be no extensionto the tenure of the Corporation. Section 6A of theMaharashtra Municipal Corporation Act stipulates that theterm of the Councillors shall be co-terminus with the durationof the Corporation.

7. On a plain reading of the above provisions, there can beno manner of doubt that upon the duration of the Corporationcoming to an end, a Councillor ceases to be Councillor. Oncea Councillor ceases to be Councillor, we do not see how theStanding Committee, which comprises 16 Councillors, canstill exist and continue to function as such and it is theAdministrator, who is appointed, exercises the powers andfunctions of the Corporation.The entire emphasis of thelearned Counsel for the Petitioner is on the proviso to section20(3) of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, whichstates that all the members of the Standing Committee inoffice shall retire from office on the election of the newCommittee under sub-section (2) of section 20. Thissubmission of the learned Counsel entirely overlooks the AB

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situation in the present case where an Administrator (theCommissioner) has been appointed. Once an Administratoris appointed, it is only the Administrator who can exercisethe powers and perform functions of the Corporation. Thisis also clear on plain reading of section 452A of theMaharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, which mandatesthat the Administrator shall exercise “all” the powers andperform “all” the functions and duties of the Corporationunder the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Actand shallhold office until the first meeting of the Corporation. ThePetitioner has not raised any challenge to the appointmentof the Administrator by the State Government and thechallenge is limited to the extent of proscription in allowingthe Standing Committee to function. In the teeth of thesection 452A of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act,we do not see how it can be contended that notwithstandingthe tenure of the Corporation coming to an end andnotwithstanding the appointment of the Administrator, theStanding Committee would still exist and can continue tofunction. Merely because in case of ‘Transport Committee’there is a specific provision [i.e. proviso to section 25(5)]that the member of the Transport Committee on ceasing tobe Councillor, ceases to be member of the TransportCommittee and its office becomes vacant or in case of‘Wards Committee’, there is a specific provision [i.e. section29A(3)] that the duration of the Wards Committee shall beco-terminus with the duration of the Corporation, cannotlead to the conclusion that despite the absence of any suchspecific provision in the Maharashtra Municipal CorporationAct, the Standing Committee still exists and can continue tofunction. It is difficult to fathom a situation wherenotwithstanding section 452A under which the Administratorexercises all the powers and perform functions, the StandingCommittee simultaneously exercises such powers andfunctions under the provisions of the Maharashtra Municipal”Corporation Act.

(emphasis supplied)

5. While considering the petition filed by the present appellant inchallenge to the order aforesaid, this Court broadly took note of thesubmissions made on behalf of the appellant, particularly with referenceto the scheme of Act of 1949 as also the provisions contained in theBombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888[3] and, while issuing notices,observed as under: - “A copy of the impugned order dated 29.03.2022, asfiled with I.A. No. 71890 of 2020 is taken on record.

No further order is required on the application seekingpermission to file special leave petition without certified copyof the impugned order. The application I.A. No. 61735 of2022 is, accordingly, disposed of.

While questioning the order impugned, learned seniorcounsel appearing for the petitioner has, inter alia, takenus through the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 20 ofthe Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (‘theAct of 1949’) as also the provisions contained in Section452 (2) (c) and while contrasting it with the provisionscontained in Section 452 A (1B) of the Act of 1949.

Learned senior counsel has further referred to thespecific provision contained in Section 48 of the BombayMunicipal Corporation Act, 1888 (‘the Act of 1888’), whichprovides for continuity of the Standing Committee,irrespective of the retirement of the councillors and untilthe appointment of new Standing Committee.

Learned senior counsel submits that though no suchprovision akin to Section 48 of the Act of 1888 is there inthe Act of 1949 but, a comprehensive consideration of theprovisions of the Act of 1949, including those contained inSection 20 read with Section 452A as also the otherprovisions concerning other committees like Section 25concerning Transport Committee and Section 29Aconcerning Wards Committee would lead to the logicaldeduction that so far the Standing Committee in terms ofSection 20 is concerned, its life cannot be treated as co-terminus with the term of the Corporation.

3 Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Act of 1888’.

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AIssue notice, returnable in six weeks.

Dasti service in addition to ordinary process is permitted”.

6. The contesting respondents having appeared and having filedthe counter affidavit, we have heard the learned counsel for the partiesfinally at this stage itself.B

7. Learned senior counsel for the appellant has taken us throughthe scheme of the Act of 1949 and has put forth the submissions that theconstitution and term of the Standing Committee is governed by Section20 of the Act of 1949 and, when the prescription therein is comparedwith the provisions in relation to the other Committees like the TransportCCommittee in Section 25 and the Wards Committee in Section 29A, thestriking feature is that while the term or period of existence of thoseCommittees or its Member-Councillors are limited or co-terminus withthe duration of Corporation, there is no such corresponding provision inSection 20. On the contrary, as per the proviso to sub-section (3) ofDSection 20, all the members of the Standing Committee in office at thetime of holding of elections, retire from the office only on the election ofa new Standing Committee. Therefore, according to the learned counselfor the appellant, the scheme of enactment is clear that the tenure of theStanding Committee has never been envisaged to be co-terminus withthe term of the Corporation.E

7.1. Learned senior counsel has further referred to variousprovisions of the Act of 1949, like those contained in Sections 68(2),69(2), 96, 101, 102 and 272 to underscore the point that the StandingCommittee remains rather pivotal in the entire functioning of theCorporation and even if an Administrator is appointed in the givenFcontingencies, particularly those pertaining to Section 452A of the Actof 1949, continuance of the Standing Committee for proper performanceof the functions and duties of Corporation is rather indispensable.

7.2. Learned senior counsel has further submitted with referenceto Section 48 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 that in theGsaid enactment, provision has specifically been made for continuanceof the Standing Committee, until the appointment of new StandingCommittee, notwithstanding that the members of the Committee maynot be Councillors. This, according to the learned counsel, is clearlyindicative of the fact that in the scheme of the enactments relating to H

municipal functions, perpetual continuance of Standing Committee is nota concept unknown; rather it is explicitly provided in the Act of 1888 andis implicit in the scheme of the Act of 1949.

7.3. According to the learned senior counsel for the appellant,when a dissolution of the Corporation takes place in terms of Section452 of the Act, the powers and duties of the Corporation including StandingCommittee could be exercised by such Government Officer/Officers asmay be appointed in terms of clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section452 but then, there is no such akin provision in Section 452A of the Act.This is also, according to the learned counsel, indicative of the fact thatin relation to the contingencies of Section 452A, as applicable to thepresent case, the Standing Committee shall continue to operate.

7.4. In substance, the submission of the learned senior counselfor the appellant has been that the Standing Committee being appointedas continuing body, does not cease to function with expiry of term of theCorporation; and the Standing Committee that was constituted on04.03.2022, before the expiry of the term of the Corporation, that isbefore 14.03.2022, continues to exist.

8. Per contra, learned senior counsel for the contesting respondentshas particularly drawn our attention to the provisions relating to thecomposition of the Transport Committee and Wards Committee and hassubmitted that the said Committees being comprising of Councillors asalso other members, specific provisions for limiting their term was requiredto be made. According to the learned counsel, no such provision wasrequired to be made for the Standing Committee because of thefundamental fact that the Standing Committee, in terms of sub-section(1) of Section 20, consists only of Councillors as its members (16 innumber).

8.1. Learned senior counsel would submit that when the termof office of the Councillor is co-terminus with the duration of theCorporation in view of Section 6A of the Act of 1949 and then, theduration of Corporation itself is for a period of five years and no longer,any proposition of survival of Standing Committee after completion ofterm of the Corporation (and thereby ending the term of the Councillors),is incompatible with the scheme of the Act of 1949. Learned counselhas also referred to provisions contained in Article 243U of the AB

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AConstitution of India to submit that the unextendible term of theMunicipality being five years, any proposition of continuance of StandingCommittee cannot be countenanced.

8.2. Thus, learned counsel for the contesting respondents hassupported the order passed by the High Court.

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9. Learned senior counsel for the appellant would submit inrejoinder that proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act of 1949makes it clear that the members of the Standing Committee are to retirefrom office only on the election of new Committee under sub-section(2); and such a positive provision, contradistinguished with the provisionsCof Sections 25 and 29A, makes it clear that the Standing Committee is acontinuing body and even when the term of the Corporation has come toan end, the lastly constituted Standing Committee shall continue tofunction until the constitution of the new Standing Committee.

10. Having given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissionsDwith reference to law applicable, we are clearly of the view that thisappeal remains devoid of substance and deserves to be dismissed.

11. The relevant provisions referred to by the learned counsel forthe parties and having bearing on the present discussion read as under: - The Constitution of India E

“243U. Duration of Municipalities, etc.-(1) EveryMunicipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for thetime being in force, shall continue for five years from thedate appointed for its first meeting and no longer:

Provided that a Municipality shall be given a reasonableFopportunity of being heard before its dissolution.

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Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949

“Section 6. Duration of Corporation.

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(1) Every Corporation, unless sooner dissolved, shallcontinue for a period of five years from the date appointedfor its first meeting and no longer.

(2) A Corporation constituted upon the dissolution of aCorporation before the expiration of its duration, shall H

continue for the remainder of the period for which thedissolved Corporation would have continued under sub-section (1) had it not been so dissolved.

Section 6A. Term of office of Councillors.

The term of office of the Councillors shall be co-terminuswith the duration of the Corporation.”

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“Section 20. Constitution of Standing Committee.

(1) The Standing Committee shall consist of sixteencouncillors.

(2) The Corporation shall at its first meeting after generalelections appoint sixteen persons out of its own body to bemembers of the Standing Committee.

(3) One-half of the members of the Standing Committeeshall retire every succeeding year at noon on the first dayof the month in which the first meeting of the Corporationmentioned in sub-section (2) was held:

Provided that all the members of the StandingCommittee in office when general elections are held shallretire from office on the election of a new Committee undersub-section (2).

(4) The members who shall retire under sub-section (3)one year after their election under sub-section (2) shall beelected by lot at such time previous to the date for retirementspecified in sub-section (3) and in such manner as theChairman of the Standing Committee may determine, andin succeeding years the members who shall retire underthis section shall be those who have been longest in office:

Provided that, in the case of a member who has beenre-appointed, the term of his office for the purposes of thissub-section shall be computed from the date of his re-appointment.

(5) The Corporation shall at its meeting held in the monthpreceding the date of retirement specified in sub-section A

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(3) appoint fresh members of the Standing Committee tofill the offices of those who are due to retire on the saiddate.

(6) Any Councillor who ceases to be a member of theStanding Committee shall be eligible for re-appointment.”

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“Section 25. Appointment of Transport Committee.

(1) In the event of the Corporation acquiring orestablishing a Transport Undertaking, there shall be aTransport Committee consisting of thirteen members forthe purpose of conducting the said undertaking in accordancewith the provisions of this Act and subject to the conditionsand limitations as are contained therein.

(2) The Corporation shall at its first meeting after aTransport Undertaking is acquired or established, appointtwelve members of the Transport Committee from amongpersons who in the opinion of the Corporation have hadexperience of, and shown capacity in, administration ortransport or in engineering, industrial, commercial, financialor labour matters and who may or may not be councillors.

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(5) One-half of the members of the Transport Committeeappointed by the Corporation shall retire in every secondyear on the first day of the month in which the meetingreferred to in sub-section (2) was held:

Provided that, in the case of a councillor appointed amember of the Transport Committee, if at any time beforethe date of his retirement he ceases to be a councillor, heshall cease to be such member, and his office shall thereuponbecome vacant. The vacancy shall be filled in accordancewith the provisions of sub-section (9), as if it had occurredunder Section 26.

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“29A. Constitution of Wards Committees.

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(2) Each Wards Committee shall consist of - B

(a) the councillors representing the electoral wardswithin the territorial area of the Wards Committee; (b) the officer incharge of the territorial area of theWards Committee;

(c) such number of other members not exceeding three,nominated by the Councillors referred to in clause (a), fromamongst the members of recognised non-GovernmentOrganisations and Community based organisations engagedin social welfare activities working within the area of theWards Committee:

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Provided that such persons are registered as electorsin the wards within the jurisdiction of the Wards Committee:

Provided further that the norms for recognition of theNon-Government Organisations, the requisite qualificationfor nomination as members and the manner in which theyare to be nominated shall be such as the State Governmentmay prescribe.

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(3) The duration of the Wards Committees shall be co-terminus with the duration of the Corporation.

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“Section 452. Power of State Government to dissolveCorporation.

(1) If at any time upon representation made or otherwiseit appears to the State Government that the Corporation isnot competent to perform, or persistently makes default inthe performance of, the duties imposed upon it by or underthis Act or any other law for the time being in force orexceeds or abuses it powers, the State Government may, G

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after having given the Corporation an opportunity to showcause why such order should not be made, by an orderpublished, with the reasons therefor, in the OfficialGazette dissolve the Corporation with effect from the dateto be specified in the Order,

(2) With effect from the date specified in the orderpassed under sub-section (1) or with effect from the dateon which the Corporation stands dissolved under the provisoto article 243-ZF, the following consequences shall ensue:- (a) ***

(b) ***

(c) all powers and duties of the Corporation, theStanding Committee, the Transport Committee andall other committees constituted under the Act, shall,during the period of dissolution be exercised andperformed by such Government Officer or Officersas the State Government may, from time to time,appoint in this behalf; (d) on dissolution of the Corporation all the propertyvested in the Corporation shall vest in the StateGovernment.

(e) the person or persons appointed under clause (c)may delegate his or their powers and duties to anindividual of a committee or sub-committee.

(f) the Government Officer or Officers appointedunder clause (c), and the individual or the membersof the committee or sub-committee referred to inclause (e) shall receive such remuneration from theMunicipal Fund as the State Government may fromtime to time determine.

(3) ***

(4) The Corporation shall be re-constituted by electionof councillors at general ward elections within the timespecified for the purpose in clause (b) of section 6B:

Provided that the person or persons appointed underclause (c) of sub-section (2) shall continue to exercise thepowers and perform the duties of the Corporation, theStanding, Committee and, as the case may be, the TransportCommittee until the first meeting of the Corporationconstituted by the election of councillors as aforesaid shallhave been held.

Section 452A. Power of State Government to appointGovernment officer or officers to exercise powers andperform functions and duties of Corporation.

(1) For every Municipal Corporation deemed to havebeen constituted or constituted for a larger urban area undersub-section (1) or sub-section (2) as the case may be, ofsection 3, the State Government may appoint a Governmentofficer or officers to exercise all the powers and to performall the functions and duties of a Corporation under this Act:

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(1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section,where the State Election Commission has brought to thenotice of the State Government that it is not possible for theState Election Commission to conduct the general electionsto the Corporation due to outbreak of COVID-19 pandemicin the State, then the State Government may, by order,appoint a Government officer or officers, or extend theperiod of any officer appointed under sub-section (1), forsuch period as may be requested by the State ElectionCommission, which shall not extend beyond the 30th April2021, to exercise all the powers and to perform all thefunctions and duties of the Corporation under this Act.

(1B) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section,where the State Election Commission has brought to thenotice of the State Government that it is not possible for itto conduct the general elections to the Corporation withinthe period specified in the order issued under sub-section(1A), due to COVID-19 pandemic situation in the State,then the State Government may, by order, appoint aGovernment officer or officers, or extend the period of any AB

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officer appointed under sub-section (1), for such period asmay be requested by the State Election Commission, forexercising all the powers and performing all the functionsand duties of the Corporation under this Act.

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(2) The officer or officers appointed under sub-section(1) shall hold office until the first meeting of the Corporationor for a period of six months from the date of specificationof an area as a larger urban area, under sub-section (2) ofsection 3, whichever is earlier:

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Provided that the Administrator deemed to have beenappointed as the Government officer under sub-section (1)shall hold office until the first meeting of the Corporation.

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The Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888

“Section 48. The Standing Committee in existence on theday for the retirement of councillors shall continue to holdoffice until such time as a new Standing Committee isappointed under section 43, notwith-standing that themembers of the said Committee or some of them may nolonger be Councillors.”

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12. The importance of Standing Committee in the setup of aMunicipal Corporation and myriad functions to be discharged by it, asstated in various provisions of the Act of 1949, are hardly of any disputebut then, reference to all such provisions remains entirely inapposite tothe present case because the question herein is as to whether the StandingFCommittee could be said to be a continuing Committee even after theterm of the Corporation has come to an end and thereby, the term of theoffice of its members, i.e., the Councillors has also ended. In our view,the answer could only be in the negative.

13. When it is apparent that the duration of the Corporation itselfGis for a period of five years and no longer, as per the mandate ofArticle 243U(1) of the Constitution of India, duly reflected in Section 6of the Act of 1949; and the term of the office of Councillors hasspecifically been provided to be co-terminus with the duration ofCorporation in Section 6A of the Act of 1949; and then, the Standing H

Committee is to be consisting of “sixteen Councillors”, we are unable tofind any logic in the submissions made by the learned counsel for theappellant that even if the term of the Corporation comes to an end andeven when the term of office of the Councillors comes to an end yet, theStanding Committee as existing on the date of completion of the termsof Corporation and Councillors shall continue to be in office untilcomposition of the new Committee after elections. When no personcould be said to be holding the office of the Councillor after completionof the term in view of the mandate of Sections 6 and 6A of the Act of1949, it follows as a necessary corollary that the Standing Committeestands dissolved along with the completion of the term of the Corporation.

14. The proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act of1949 essentially comes in operation only in the eventuality when thereare existing members of the Standing Committee in office when generalelections are held and they are to retire on the election of a newCommittee, i.e., at the first meeting of the Corporation after generalelections. The proviso cannot be read to mean that notwithstanding theexpiration of the duration of a Corporation and thereby, termination ofthe term of office of the Councillors, there could still be any StandingCommittee in existence. It gets perforce iterated that the StandingCommittee stands dissolved along with the completion of the term of theCorporation.

15. The other contention urged on behalf of the appellant bycomparison of Sections 452 and 452A of the Act, particularly that noakin provision as that of Section 452(2)(c) is found in Section 452A, isalso devoid of logic and substance. The provision of Section 452essentially operates in relation to the contingency where the StateGovernment takes the steps for dissolution of the existing Corporationafter opportunity of show cause upon being satisfied that the Corporationis not competent to perform the duties imposed upon it or is persistentlymaking default or is abusing its powers. Sub-sections (1A) and (1B) ofSection 452A of the Act, which are operating in the present case, dealwith a specific peculiar contingency where general elections could notbe held during the time specified by the enactment even after the expiryof the term of the Corporation, essentially due to COVID-19 pandemicsituation. Appointing of Administrator in such a contingency does notand cannot override the mandate of Article 243U of the Constitution ofIndia as also the provisions of Sections 6 and 6A of the Act as regards AB

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Athe tenure. As already noticed, end of the tenure of Corporation has itsconsequential effect of the end of the term of the office of the Councillor;and when no person including the present appellant could be said to beholding the office of Councillor after end of the term of the Corporation,existence of any Standing Committee thereafter, is simply out of question.Any other interpretation, in our view, shall be standing at conflict withBthe mandate of Article 243U of the Constitution of India and Sections 6and 6A of the Act of 1949.

16. In regard to the other submissions on behalf of the appellantwith reference to Section 48 of the Act of 1888, we could only commentthat no such provision and not even an akin provision is found in the ActCof 1949. For what has been discussed hereinabove, the said argument does not take the case of the appellant any further.

17. Accordingly and in view of the above, this appeal fails and is,therefore, dismissed.

DDevika Gujral and Anurag Bhaskar

(Assisted by : Rahul Kumar, LCRA)

Appeal dismissed.

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