THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA, UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND REGULATION) ACT, 1976 AND ANR. versus DAVID MANTOSH & ORS. on 26 February 2019

THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA, UNDER THELAND (CEILING AND REGULATION) ACT, 1976 AND ANR.

v.

DAVID MANTOSH & ORS.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 10629-10631 of 2014 etc.)

FEBRUARY 26, 2019

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976:

ss. 12(4), 13, 30, 33(1), 33(3), 33(4) and 40 – Land in questionsubjected to ceiling proceedings under the Act – Thereafter allottedto respondent-hospital on a long term lease of 30 years – TheNotification issued u/s. 10(3) of the Act was challenged byrespondent No. 1 – The notification was upheld by High Court andSupreme Court – However, Supreme Court observed that it was opento the respondent to avail any appropriate remedy – Thereuponrespondents 1 to 7 filed the present suit seeking declaration thatthe proceedings under the Act which culminated in issuance ofnotification u/s. 10(1) of the Act be declared null and void and therespondents be declared owners of the suit property – Trial courtdismissed the suit interalia holding that the suit was not maintainableand was also barred by limitation – In appeal, High Court interaliaheld that the civil court had the jurisdiction to try the suit on meritsand hence the suit was maintainable and that the plaintiffs(respondent Nos. 1 to 7) were the owners of the suit property – Onappeal, held: The Act is a self-contained code in itself providingcomplete machinery while dealing with the land-owners right inrelation to the excess land prescribed under the Act – The Act givesfinality to the orders passed by the appellate authority u/s. 33 andalso provides bar to file civil suits in relation to cases falling u/s.30(5) and s. 40 of the Act – Therefore, jurisdiction of civil courts totry the civil suits with respect to land which were subjected to ceilingproceedings under the Act, are impliedly barred – The civil courthad no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs as sought in the present case– Belated challenge to the ceiling proceedings is meritless –Furthermore, the State after acquiring ownership of the suit property

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[2019] 4 S.C.R.

Ahas allotted it to the hospital on 30 years lease and hence the situationhas become irreversible – Jurisdiction.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The entire scheme of the Urban Land (Ceilingand Regulation) Act, 1976 makes two things clear. First, the ActBis a self-contained code in itself, which provides completemachinery while dealing with the rights of the land-owners inrelation to their lands, which are in excess of the ceiling limitsprescribed under the Act. It also provides adequate remedies tocorrect all kinds of errors committed by the competent authorityCunder the Act; and Second, the Act gives finality to the orderspassed by the appellate authority under Section 33, and alsoprovides a bar to file the civil suits in relation to cases fallingunder Section 30 (5) and Section 40 of the Act. [Para 50][348-B, C]

D2. The jurisdiction of the civil court is held to be exclusedby implication to try the civil suit in question. This is for thefollowing reasons: First, the Act in question gives finality to theorders passed by the appellate authority [refer to Section 33(3)].Second, the Act provides adequate remedies in the nature ofappeals, such as first appeal to the Tribunal and second appeal toEthe High Court. [refer to Sections 12 (4), 13 and 33 (1)]. Thirdthe Act is a complete code in itself and gives overriding powerson other laws (refer to Section 42). Fourth, the Act expresslyexcludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to the casesfalling under Sections 30 and 40 (refer to Section 30(5) and SectionF40). Fifth, as a result of dismissal of writ petition and SLP in thefirst round of litigation it was held therein that the proceedingsunder the Act in question were done in conformity with the Act inquestion. In the light of the aforesaid five reasons - a fortiori, thejurisdiction of the civil court in relation to all the issues arisingunder the Act is held impliedly excluded thereby satisfying allGthe conditions set out in clause (1) of *Dhula Bai case. Therefore,the jurisdiction of the civil courts to try the civil suits with respectto the lands, which were subjected to ceiling proceedings underthe Act, are held to be impliedly barred, since the Act excludesthe jurisdiction of the civil court. [Paras 54, 55 and 56] [350-A-F]

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THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING ANDREGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH

3. It is evident from the relief prayed for in the plaint thatthe plaintiffs have sought a declaration that the notification dated12.02.1990 issued under Section 10 of the Act be declared nulland void; that a statement filed by defendant No. 2 under Section6 of the Act before the Competent Authority be declared null andvoid; and that the statement filed by defendant No. 3 under Section8 of the Act be declared null and void. The Civil Court had nojurisdiction to grant the afore-mentioned reliefs inasmuch as itsjurisdiction to grant such reliefs is impliedly barred under theAct. [Paras 57, 58][350-G, H; 351-A, B]

4. If Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 - Plaintiffs claimed themselvesto be the lawful owners and holders of the suit property to theexclusion of others, there were three remedies available in lawwhich they could have availed of: (i) First, a remedy accrued tothem when defendant No. 2 claimed to have purchased the suitproperty from the alleged vendors on 30.11.1962. TheRespondents should have filed a Civil Suit against the vendors(ii) The second remedy arose under Section 6 of the Act, for filinga statement as owners and holders of the suit property beforethe Competent Authority, after the Act came into force in 1976.This was also not availed of by the plaintiffs. (iii) The third remedywas in filing objections under Section 10(1) of the Act before theCompetent Authority when the Competent Authority invitedobjections on 12.02.1990 from public and pursuant to it, the noticewas issued in that behalf. The respondents again did not avail ofthis remedy, and failed to file any objections. [Para 59][351-B-F]

5. The Respondents-Plaintiffs having failed to avail any ofthe three remedies at appropriate time, resorted to fourth remedyof filing a Writ Petition to challenge the notifications dated11.05.1990. This Writ Petition was, however, dismissed. Theorder of dismissal was affirmed by this Court in SLP. The dismissalof the SLP by this Court had a three-fold effect on the rights ofthe parties to the lis in relation to the suit property: First, theentire action taken by the competent authority initiated fromSection 6 of the Act till issuance of notifications under Section10(1) and (3) of the Act issued on 12.02.1990 and 11.05.1990 inrelation to the suit property were held to be in conformity with

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Athe provisions of the Act. This satisfied the last condition of clause(1) of *Dhula Bai case. Second, the suit property stood vested inthe State free from all encumbrances under Section 10(3) of theAct. Third, the State Government was held to be in legalpossession of the suit property as the owner on and after11.05.1990, to the exclusion of all, by following the due procedureBof law. In such a situation, the Respondent Nos.1 to 7 could nottake recourse to filing of the civil suit on the basis of theobservation made by this Court. [Paras 60-62][351-F-H;352-A-C]

6. If there were any remedy available to the respondents inCrelation to the suit property, then any such remedy was underthe Act but not by filing a civil suit in a civil court and start a freshround of litigation with respect to the suit property. Such a suitwas impliedly barred in the light of exclusion of jurisdiction ofthe civil court under the Act. [Para 63][352-D, E]

D7. The intention of the Legislature is more explicit inexcluding the jurisdiction of the civil court under the Act inquestion. It is clear from a reading of Sections 12(4), 13, 30, 33(1),33(3), 33(5) and 40 of the Act in question. [Paras 70 and 71][355-C, D]8. Thus, the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the civilEsuit in relation to the land which is subject to ceiling proceedingsunder the Act in question; nor did the civil court have thejurisdiction to declare the proceedings held under the Act, asvoid or illegal or non est, since it was impliedly excluded andbarred under the Act. [Para 72][355-F]F

9. It cannot be said that prejudice was caused to respondentNos. 1 to 7 by the ceiling proceedings which proceeded againstthem behind their back as it has been held that the civil courthad no jurisdiction to entertain a civil suit with respect toproceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, being a specialGand self-contained enactment. Furthermore, respondent Nos. 1to 7/ Plaintiffs having failed to raise objections to the ceilingproceedings at any stage, the suit property stood vested in theState, free from all encumbrances. The belated challenge to thesame is meritless. Having failed to avail of the remedies underthe Urban Land Ceiling Act and the one resorted to resulted inHrejection of the claim made therein upto this Court, Respondent THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING AND

REGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH

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Nos. 1 to 7/ Plaintiffs sought to start a fresh round of litigation byfiling a civil suit, which was barred under the Act. Furthermore,the State after acquiring ownership over the suit land has allottedthe suit land to the Hospitals on a 30 years lease. Hence, thesituation has now become irreversible. [Paras 73-75][355-H;356-A-D]

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10. Therefore, the Division Bench of High Court was notjustified in allowing the Respondents’ appeal, and decreeing thecivil suit whereas the trial court was right in dismissing the civilsuit. [Para 76][356-D]

Dhula Bai v. State of MP (AIR 1969 SC 78) : [1968]SCR 662 – followed.

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State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar (1995) 4 SCC 229 :[1995] 3 SCR 857; Laxmi Chand v. Gram PanchayatKararia (1996) 7 SCC 218 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 774;Bangalore Development Authority v. K. S Narayan(2006) 8 SCC 336 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 186; State ofPunjab v. Amarjit Singh (2011) 14 SCC 713 – reliedon.

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 10629-10631 of 2014

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.09.2013 of the HighCourt at Calcutta in F.A. No. 202 of 2008 and Order dated 24.07.2014in RVW 36 of 2014 with CAN 1450 of 2014 in F.A. No. 202 of 2008.

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Civil Appeal Nos. 9829-9830, 9900 of 2016.

Kalyan Bandopadhya, C. U. Singh, Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Advs.,Ms. Madhumita Bhattacharjee, Pratap Venugopal, Ms. Surekha Raman, H

AAnuj Sarma, Ms. Remya Raj (for M/S. K J John And Co), AnubhavRay, Krishna Parkhani, Ankolekar Gurudatta, Chandan ShreekantMalapur, Debarshi Bhuyan, Advs. for the appearing parties.

Charles Mantosh, In-Person.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered byB

ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. C.A. Nos.10629-10631of 2014 are filed by the Competent Authority against the Judgment andOrder dated 27.09.2013 in F.A. No. 202/2008, Judgment and Order dated24.07.2014 in the Review Petition being RVW No. 36/2014 with CANNo.1450/2014 in F.A. No.202/2008 passed by the High Court at Calcutta.

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2. C.A. Nos.9829-9830 of 2016 are filed by M/s Apollo GleneaglesHospitals Ltd. against the judgment and order dated 27.09.2013 in F.A.No.202/2008 with CAN No.1054/2014 and C.A. No. 9900/2016 againstthe judgment and order dated 24.07.2014 in RVW No.117/2014 in F.A.No.202/2008 passed by the High Court at Calcutta.D

3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in these appeals,it is necessary to set out the facts in detail, which led to filing of theseappeals. The facts set out hereinbelow are taken from the list of datesfiled by the parties.

4. Appellant No.1 herein is the Competent Authority, Calcutta-EDefendant No. 3, Appellant No.2 is the State of West Bengal-DefendantNo. 2, whereas Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 herein are Plaintiff Nos. 1 to 7,Respondent No. 8 is Defendant No.1 and Respondent No. 9 is DefendantNo. 2 in the Civil Suit out of which these appeals arise.

5. The dispute pertains to land bearing No.73, holding No.42, CanalFCircular Road, Calcutta - 700 054 measuring around 2 bighas, 2 katas, 4chataks and 25 sq. ft. (which is a part of and adjacent to a bigger chunkof land measuring around 29 bighas) (hereinafter referred to as “suitproperty”).

6. One Abdul Jabbar claimed to have purchased the suit propertyGon 29.07.1919 in an auction sale. He, in turn, claimed to have sold it toone Maula Ataul Haq on 29.09.1927 who, in turn, is alleged to have soldit to one Poonam Chand Sethia on 15.08.1933.

7. Mr. Poonam Chand Sethia, in turn, on 17.08.1933 claimed tohave transferred the suit property to one Moti Chand Nakhat, AmritoH

THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING ANDREGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

Lal Shah, Thakur Lal Mehta and Champa Lal Daphtary, being the trusteesof a Trust who, in turn, claimed to have transferred it to one Mr. P.S.Mantosh - the predecessor-in-interest of the original Plaintiff, who isnow represented by his legal representatives (Respondent Nos. 1 to 7).

8. It may be mentioned here that after 1933 till 30.11.1962, thesuit property went through several transfers between various parties. Itwas also the subject matter of civil and criminal proceedings betweenthe parties, who claimed to have possessed the suit property. We,however, do not consider it necessary to set out these details here.

9. Suffice it to say, that eventually the suit property along with itsadjacent land bearing Nos.73, 60, 72, etc. came into the hands of Mr.Monilal Goyee and Mr. Bijay Kumar Goyee who, in turn, claimed tohave sold it to M/s Hindustan Housing on 15.06.1957. M/s HindustanHousing, in turn, transferred the suit property along with adjacent land toM/s Orient Beverage Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “M/s OBL”) videregistered sale deed dated 30.11.1962.

10. On 17.02.1976, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,1976 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) came into force. It wasextended to the State of West Bengal on the same day. The suit propertyalong-with the adjacent land was an “urban land” under Section 2(o) ofthis Act, and was falling under urban agglomeration as defined by Section2(n) of the Act.

11. M/s OBL claiming to be a “person” under Section 2(i) of theAct, and claiming “to hold” the suit property under Section 2(l) of theAct in excess of the ceiling limits specified under Section 4 of the Actfiled a statement on 15.09.1976 under Section 6(1) of the Act before theCompetent Authority.

12. It may be mentioned here that in the statement M/s OBLshowed the suit property as a vacant land, and prayed that they be allowedto hold the excess vacant land for constructing the dwelling housesthereon under Section 21 of the Act.

13. The Competent Authority by order dated 27.09.1988, however,rejected the prayer made by M/s OBL. The rejection resulted in M/sOBL agreeing to surrender the possession of the entire excess land heldby them beyond the prescribed ceiling limit. On 04.01.1990, M/s OBLaccordingly surrendered their possession on the land bearing Nos. 58,

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A60, 72, 73, 79, & 81 situated at Canal Circular Road, Calcutta in favourof the State. The said surrender included the suit property also. TheDeputy Secretary, Land & Land Reforms Department then directed M/s OBL to file the statement as required under Sections 8 to 10 of theAct.

B14. On 22.01.1990, M/s OBL informed the Competent Authoritythat they are prepared to surrender the possession of the suit propertysubject to awarding them compensation as provided under the Act. On08.02.1990, the Competent Authority served final statement under Section9 of the Act on M/s OBL. This led to the issuance of a notification bythe State under Section 10(1) of the Act which was duly published in theCCalcutta Gazette Extraordinary on 15.02.1990 inviting objections fromthe general public. The Competent Authority, however, did not receiveany objection from any person pursuant to the notice published. Thiswas followed by issuance of the final notification under Section 10(3) on11.05.1990 which resulted in vesting of the suit property in the State ofDWest Bengal free from all encumbrances.15. The Competent Authority, on 23.05.1990, served notice to M/s OBL calling upon them to physically surrender the possession of thesuit property to the State, which was done on 28.05.1990.

16. The State of West Bengal (Appellant No.2 herein) onE04.04.1991 allotted the suit property (No.73) along with adjacent landmeasuring around 34,147 sq. meters bearing premises Nos. 58, 59, 60,61, 62, 72, 73, 79, & 81 at Canal Circular Road to Respondent No. 8(Defendant No. 1-M/s Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals) on a long term leaseof 30 years. The Respondent No. 8 (Defendant No. 1) then was givenFpossession of the land from the State. The State executed a lease deeddated 02.12.1994 in favour of M/s Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals.Thereafter, M/s Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals set up a hospital at a hugecost, and is running their hospital since the last two decades.

17. In the year 1992, Respondent No.1 (Plaintiff No. 1) woke upGfrom her slumber, and claimed to be the owner and holder of the suitproperty and part of the adjacent land. The Plaintiff felt aggrieved bythe notification issued under Section 10(3) on 11.05.1990 and filed aWrit Petition (WP No.1382/1992) to challenge the same before theCalcutta High Court.

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18. The Single Judge vide Order dated 26.08.1992 allowed theWrit Petition and quashed the notification dated 11.05.1990.

19. The Respondent No.8 (Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals Ltd.) feltaggrieved by the order of the Single Judge dated 26.08.1992 and filedWrit Appeal No.324/1993 before the Division Bench of the High Court.

20. The Division Bench vide order 03.04.1997 allowed the appealand set aside the order of the Single Judge, and dismissed the Writ Petition.As a consequence, thereof, the notification dated 11.05.1990 issued bythe State was held to be legal and valid and was accordingly restored.

21. The Respondent No.1 felt aggrieved by the Judgment of theDivision Bench and filed S.L.P.(C) No.12726 of 1997 in this Court. ByOrder dated 28.07.1997, this Court dismissed the said petition. This Court,however, observed that if the Petitioner (Respondent No.1 herein) hasany appropriate remedy under the Act or any other law, it would be opento her to avail the same in accordance with law.

22. It is in this background, that Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 filed CivilSuit (TS No. 101/1998) out of which the present appeals arise. The suitwas filed against the present Appellants, i.e., the Competent Authorityunder the Act, the State of West Bengal, and Respondent Nos. 8 and 9in the Court of Additional District Judge, Sealdah.

23. The Civil Suit was filed for declaration and possession of thesuit property. The Plaintiffs claimed a declaration that the entireproceedings which culminated in the issuance of the notification dated12.02.1990 under Section 10 (1) under the Act in relation to the suitproperty be declared null and void and the plaintiffs be declared ownersof the suit property. The reliefs claimed in the suit read as under:

“(a) A declaration that the Notification No.53-X-U.L.(Cal)dated February 12, 1990 is null and void.

a) A declaration the statement filed by the defendant No.2under sub-Section 1 of Section 6 of Urban Land (Ceilingand Regulation) Act, 1976 is null and void so far as itrelates to premises No.73, Canal Circular Road,Calcutta being the suit premises;

b) A declaration that the draft statement prepared by the defendant No.3 under Section 8 of the Urban Land

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A(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, on the basis of thestatement filed by the defendant No.2 is null and voidand not binding upon the plaintiffs so far as it relates tothe suit property;

c) A declaration that letter No.1500-UL/AV-11/19 datedBApril 4, 1991 and/or the purported allotment of the suitpremises to the defendant No.1 by the defendant No.3is inoperative, collusive, fraudulent and void;

d) A declaration that the plaintiffs are the owners of thepremises No.73, Canal Circular Road, Calcutta and theCplaintiffs is entitled to possession of the suit propertyas owner;

e) A decree for recovery of possession evicting thedefendant No.1 from suit property;

f) A decree for a sum of Rs.1 crore from the defendantDNo.1 as mesne profit and/or damages for illegal use andoccupation of the suit premises;

g) Costs of the suit;

h) Such other or further relief or reliefs that the plaintiffs may be entitled to in law or equity.”E

24. The Appellants-State of West Bengal, the Competent Authority,and Respondent Nos. 8 and 9 herein filed their respective WrittenStatements.

25. The Trial Court on the basis of pleadings framed the followingF11 issues:

“1. Is there any cause of action for the suit?

2. Is the suit maintainable?

3. Is the suit barred by limitation?

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4. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?

5. Has the plaintiff any right title and interest over theland in suit?

6. Has the suit property vested to the State?

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THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING ANDREGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

7. Is the Plaintiff entitled to get a decree for declarationthat Notification No.53-X-UL(Cal) dated 12.02.1990 isnull and void, or a declaration that the statement filedby the Defendant No.2 under provisions of Urban Land(Ceiling & Regulation) Act is null and void or declarationthat the statement prepared by Defendant No.3 is nulland void or a declaration that letter No.1500-UL/AV/II/19 dated 04.04.1981 and the purported allotment ofthe suit premises to the Defendant No.1 is inoperative,collusive, fraudulent and void?

8. Is the Plaintiff entitled to a decree for declaration thatthe Plaintiff is entitled to a possession of the suitproperty as a co-owner?

9. Is the plaintiff entitled to get a decree for recovery ofpossession of the suit property by evicting theDefendant No.1 therefrom?

10. Is the Plaintiff entitled to a decree of Rs.1 crore againstthe Defendant and mesne profit?

11. To what other relief, if any, is the Plaintiff entitled to?”

26. The parties then adduced their evidence. The Trial Court videjudgment and decree dated 24.04.2008 answered all the 11 issues againstthe Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 herein) and dismissed the Suitwhich gave rise to filing of First Appeal (No.202/2008) before the CalcuttaHigh Court by the Plaintiffs - Respondent Nos. 1 to 7.

27. The Division Bench vide the impugned Judgment allowed theplaintiffs’ appeal, and set aside the Judgment and Decree of the TrialCourt, and decreed the suit filed by the Plaintiffs’. The High Court heldthat the suit is maintainable; that it is not barred; that the Civil Court hasthe jurisdiction to try the civil suit on merits; that the Plaintiffs are theowners of the suit property; that the competent authorities did not followthe mandatory procedure laid down under the Act; that the proceedingsunder the Act are not binding on the Plaintiffs; that the Appellant–ApolloGleneagles Hospitals was in unauthorized possession of the suit propertyand were directed to deliver vacant possession of the suit property tothe Plaintiffs, or in the alternative, to pay its value within 3 months tothe Plaintiffs.

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28. The Competent Authority - Defendant No. 3, the State ofWest Bengal - Defendant No. 4 and Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals -Defendant No.1 being aggrieved by the Judgment of the High Courtfiled the present Special Leave Petitions in this Court, which have beenrenumbered as Civil Appeal Nos. 10629-10631/2014.

29. The question, which arises for consideration in these appeals,is whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in allowingthe appeal filed by the Plaintiffs’ (Respondent Nos. 1 to 7) and decreeingthe suit.

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30. We have heard Mr. Kalyan Bandopadhya, learned seniorCcounsel appearing for the Appellant - State of West Bengal andCompetent Authority, Mr. C.U Singh learned Senior counsel appearingfor Appellant - M/s Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals and Mr. Dhruv Mehta,learned senior counsel for the Respondent – Plaintiffs.

31. The counsel for the Competent Authority inter alia submitted that:D

(i) the reliefs prayed for by the Plaintiffs could not be granted bythe Civil Court, as the Civil Suit was barred under the Act. Havingregard to the scheme of the Act, the Act is a self-contained Actwhich provided adequate remedies to the land holders to challengeEany action taken, and orders passed by the competent authoritiesin revision/appeals, as the case may be, in ceiling proceedingsunder the Act itself.

(ii) It was further contended that Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 havinglost their legal battle, which had attained finality up to this Court inthe first round of litigation, all issues pertaining to the suit propertyFhad already come to an end. According to the learned counsel, noissue in relation to the suit property survived for adjudication byany Court, much less the Civil Court.

(iii) It was further contended that the legal effect of issuance ofthe notification under Section 10 (1) of the Act on 12.02.1990,Gfollowed by issuance of the consequential final notification underSection 10(3) on 11.05.1990, was that the suit property stood vestedin the State free from all encumbrances. Therefore, no personhas any right to claim a right, title and interest over the suit propertyon and after the suit property stood vested in the State onH11.05.1990.

(iv) Learned counsel for the Appellants then contended that theCivil Suit filed by the Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1 to 7) wasbarred by limitation, because the Plaintiffs had slept over theiralleged right of ownership over the suit property by not availing ofremedies under the Act.

(v) According to learned counsel for the Appellants, when M/sOBL claimed to have purchased the suit property in 1962, thePlaintiffs ought to have filed a Suit for Declaration of their title,which they failed to do so. In any case, the Plaintiffs had a remedyto file their statement under Section 6 of the Act on 15.09.1976,or raised an objection on the issue of ownership qua M/s OBL atthat time under Section 10(4) of the Act.

(vi) It was contended that the Respondent- Plaintiffs, at no stageof the pendency of the ceiling proceedings, raised any objectionunder Section 10 (1). Hence, their right, if any, to claim any right,title and interest in the suit property got extinguished consequentupon vesting of the suit property in the State under Section 10(3)of the Act on and after 11.05.1990.

32. The learned Senior Counsel for Apollo Gleneagles Hospitalsinter alia while elaborating the submission of learned senior counselMr. Kalyan Bandopadhya submitted that:

(i) The suit property is governed by the Act, which continues tobe in operation in the State of West Bengal. As a consequence,according to the learned counsel, a Civil Suit would impliedly bebarred and hence the Respondents had a remedy which is availableunder the Act. It was urged that the Act being a complete Codecreates rights, remedies and fora for adjudication of disputes andhence the Civil Suit filed by Respondents No.1 to 7 would not bemaintainable.

(ii) That in any event Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 had failed to establishtheir claim of ownership and possession over the suit property.The suit instituted by Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 was also barred bylimitation because the Plaintiffs/Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 were notin possession of the suit property since 1962. The notification underthe Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 was publishedon 17.02.1976 and as per scheme of the Act, the owner of the suit A

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Aproperty was obligated to file a return, since the suit property wasbeyond the ceiling limit.

(iii) Plaintiffs/Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 claimed that theirpredecessor-in-interest viz. namely Ms. Daisy Mantosh was theowner of premises No. 71/1, 60,72 and 73 Canal Circular RoadBand since the extent of land held was in excess of the ceiling limit,yet she did not file any return in respect of the suit properties.

(iv) On the other hand, M/s Orient Properties Pvt. Ltd. (renamedas M/s Orient Beverages Ltd. “OBL”) submitted a return underSection 6 of the Act, and also made an application under Section21 for retaining the excess land, which was refused on 27.09.1986.

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(v) The Land and Reforms Department on 04.04.1991 decided toallot the suit property to M/s Janapriya Hospital Corporation Ltd.,later renamed as Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals for setting up ahospital. This was done by executing a lease for 30 years, forDwhich a premium of Rs. 98, 41,300 was paid to the State. A largehospital with all amenities has since been set up.

33. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel, appeared on behalfof Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs and supported the reasoning andconclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugnedOrder. It was inter alia contended that no case for interference wasEmade out with the impugned Order.

34. The Counsel submitted that there was a non-compliance withthe provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder while dealingwith the suit property. A mere notification in the Official Gazette wasnot sufficient for vesting to take place under the Act. The notification,Faccording to learned counsel was issued without ensuring propercompliance of the Act read with Rules and therefore the entire processof vesting of the suit property in the Appellants was vitiated and bad inlaw.

35. It was then contended that the Civil Suit was maintainableGand the civil court’s jurisdiction was not impliedly excluded as the CivilSuit was filed pursuant to the directions of the Division Bench of theCalcutta High Court and this Court in SLP (C) No. 12726 of 2007. ThisCourt had dismissed the said SLP vide Order dated 28.07.1998 with theliberty to pursue the remedy available under the Act or any other law. ItHwas submitted that since the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs were THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING ANDREGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

illegally dispossessed from the suit property (as they were not given aproper and valid notice in terms of the provisions of the Act and theRules framed thereunder), there was a violation of the principles of naturaljustice.

36. Thus, according to learned counsel, even where a statute givesfinality to a decision, such a provision does not exclude cases where theprovisions of the particular statute have not been complied with, or thetribunal has not acted in conformity with the statute or fundamentalprinciples of judicial procedure. Hence, the Civil Suit filed by RespondentNos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs was maintainable and not barred by law.

37. It was sought to be contended that the rights, title and interestof the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs in the suit property are commonlaw rights and do not emanate from the Act and therefore, must beadjudicated only by a civil court.

38. The learned counsel further contended that there was nooccasion for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs to file a Return ordeclaration in respect of the suit property since the suit property was nota “vacant land” in terms of the Act. The Act only contemplates filing ofReturns with respect to “vacant lands”. Hence, the provisions of theAct were not applicable to the present case.

39. The learned Counsel further argued that the civil court wastherefore the proper forum for adjudication of the disputes between theparties as the Appellants/Defendants had colluded amongst themselveswith respect to the suit property and had committed a fraud on theRespondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs. Hence, the dispute could not havebeen decided by a tribunal by ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court.

40. Lastly, the Senior Counsel contended that the Civil Suit filedon 29.06.1998 was well within limitation since the cause of action of theRespondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs to file the suit ripened only after thisCourt vide Order dated 28.07.1997 had disposed of the SLP (C) No.12726/1997 granting liberty to the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/Plaintiffs topursue any appropriate remedy under the Act or any other law.

41. We have heard the learned Senior Counsels appearing for theparties and perused the record of the case including the writtensubmissions. We find force in the submissions advanced on behalf of theAppellants - Defendants.

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A42. The three principal issues, which arise for consideration inthese appeals, are:

First, whether the High Court was justified in holding that theCivil Court has the jurisdiction to try the civil suit in relation to thesuit property which was subjected to ceiling proceedings underBthe Act.

Second, whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to declare theceiling proceedings under the Act as void and not binding on thePlaintiffs even though the same had attained finality in the firstround of litigation upto this Court.

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Third, whether the High Court was justified in holding that thePlaintiffs are the owners of the suit property and entitled to claimpossession of the suit property or its value from the Appellant -M/s Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals.

43. Before we examine the afore-mentioned three issues, it isDnecessary to first examine the scheme of the Act in question and thelaw governing the issues raised in the present appeals.

44. The Act in question was enacted to provide for the impositionof a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition ofsuch land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction ofEbuilding on such land, and for matters connected therewith. It was enactedwith the object of preventing the concentration of urban land in the handsof a few persons, and speculation and profiteering with a view to bringingabout the equitable distribution of land in urban areas to sub- serve thecommon good.

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F45. The Act has 47 Sections. Section 2(a) to (q) defines the variousexpressions used in the Act. Section 3 prohibits the person from holdingthe land in excess of the ceiling limits after coming into the force of theAct. Section 4 specifies the ceiling limit for holding the land by anyperson. Section 5 deals with the transfer of vacant land by its holder.Section 6 provides for filing of Statement by the persons holding vacantGland in excess of ceiling limits. Section 7 also deals with filing of Statementin case if the land is situated within the jurisdiction of two or morecompetent authorities. Section 8 deals with preparation of draft statementas regards the vacant land in excess of ceiling limits. Section 9 dealswith the preparation of final statement. Section 10 deals with acquisitionHof vacant land in excess of ceiling limits.

46. Section 11 provides for payment of amount for vacant landacquired. Section 12 provides for constitution of Tribunal and appeal tothe Tribunal. Section 13 provides for filing second appeal to the HighCourt against the order of Tribunal. Section 14 provides for mode ofpayment. Section 15 provides for ceiling limits on future acquisition byinheritance, bequest or by sale in execution of decree etc. Section 16deals with filing of Statement when the Act is adopted by the Statesubsequently. Section 17 deals with power to enter upon any vacantland. Section 18 provides for imposition of penalties for concealment ofparticulars of vacant land. Section 19 provides exclusion clause fromapplicability of certain provisions of the Act to some specified landowners.Section 20 deals with power to exempt any land.

47. Section 21 provides that excess land not to be treated excessland in certain cases. Section 22 deals with retention of vacant landunder certain circumstances. Sections 23 and 24 deal with disposal ofvacant land acquired under the Act. Section 25 defines certainexpressions. Section 26 enjoins notice to be given before transfer ofvacant land. Section 27 provides for prohibition on transfer of urbanproperty. Section 28 deals with regulation of registration of documentsin certain cases. Section 29 deals with regulation of construction of buildingwith dwelling units. Section 30 gives power of demolition and stoppageof building. It also provides a right of appeal and bar of filing suits in civilcourt in relation to matters falling under Section 30.

48. Section 31 deals with powers of competent authority. Section32 deals with jurisdiction of competent authorities and the Tribunal inspecial cases. Section 33 provides a right of appeal to the appellateauthority whose order shall be final whereas Section 34 provides forfiling revision to State. Section 35 empowers the State to issue ordersand directions to competent authority. Section 36 gives power to centralgovernment to give directions to the State Government. Section 37 dealswith filing of returns and report by the competent authority. Section 38deals with offences and punishment. Section 39 deals with offences bycompanies.

49. Section 40 again provides for a bar from filing of the suit orother legal proceedings against the Government and officers in respectof anything, which is done in good faith or intended to be done by orunder the Act. Section 41 deals with cognizance of offences. Section 42gives overriding effect of the Act on other laws. Section 43 specifies the

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Acourt fees payable on the applications, appeals or other proceedingsunder the Act. Section 44 specifies certain officers to be public servant.Section 45 empowers the authorities to correct the clerical errors. Section46 is a rule making power and lastly Section 47 gives power to removedifficulties.

B50. The entire scheme of the Act set out above would make twothings clear. First, the Act is a self-contained code in itself, which providescomplete machinery while dealing with the rights of the land-owners inrelation to their lands, which are in excess of the ceiling limits prescribedunder the Act. It also provides adequate remedies to correct all kinds oferrors committed by the competent authority under the Act; and Second,Cthe Act gives finality to the orders passed by the appellate authorityunder Section 33, and also provides a bar to file the civil suits in relationto cases falling under Section 30 (5) and Section 40 of the Act.

51. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of DhulaBai vs. State of MP (AIR 1969 SC 78) examined the question as toDwhen the jurisdiction of the Civil Court can be held to have been expresslyor impliedly excluded in trying a civil suit in the context of Section 9 ofCode of Civil procedure, 1908.

52. Justice Hidayatullah, the then learned Chief Justice, speakingfor the Bench in his inimitable style, laid down 7 tests for examining theEafore-mentioned question. These tests read as under:

“(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of thespecial tribunals the civil courts’ jurisdiction must be heldto be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what thecivil court would normally do in a suit. Such provision,Fhowever, does not exclude those cases where theprovisions of the particular Act have not been compliedwith or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformitywith the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of theGcourt, an examination of the scheme of the particular Actto find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remediesprovided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain thejurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no expressexclusion the examination of the remedies and the schemeof the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes H

THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING ANDREGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. Inthe latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates aspecial right or a liability and provides for the determinationof the right or liability and further lays down that allquestions about the said right and liability shall bedetermined by the tribunals so constituted, and whetherremedies normally associated with actions in civil courtsare prescribed by the said statute or not.

(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultravires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted underthat Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that questionon a revision or reference from the decision of theTribunals.

(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutionalor the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged,a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a directionfor refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribedby the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy toreplace a suit.

(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery forrefund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits orillegally collected, a suit lies.

(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apartfrom its constitutionality are for the decision of theauthorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of theauthorities are declared to be final or there is an expressprohibition in the particular Act. In either case, the schemeof the particular Act must be examined because it is arelevant enquiry.

(7) An exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is notreadily to be inferred unless the conditions above set downapply.”

53. In the light of the tests laid down in Dhula Bai (supra) andfurther keeping in view the scheme of the Act, we have to examine theissue as to whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly orimpliedly excluded in trying the civil suit in relation to matters arising out

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Aof the Act in question and second, whether the Civil Court has thejurisdiction to declare the proceedings held under the Act, as being void.

54. Having examined the issue, we are clearly of the opinion thatthe present case falls under clause(1) of Dhula Bai (supra) and satisfiesthe test laid down therein. Hence, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court isBheld to be excluded by implication to try the civil suit in question. This wesay for the following reasons: - First, the Act in question gives finality to the orders passed by theappellate authority [refer to Section 33(3)].

Second, the Act provides adequate remedies in the nature ofCappeals, such as first appeal to the Tribunal and second appeal tothe High Court. [refer to Sections 12 (4), 13 and 33 (1)].

Third, the Act is a complete code in itself and gives overridingpowers on other laws (refer to Section 42).

DFourth, the Act expressly excludes the jurisdiction of the CivilCourt in relation to the cases falling under Sections 30 and 40(refer to Section 30(5) and Section 40).

Fifth, as a result of dismissal of writ petition and SLP, it is heldtherein that the proceedings under the Act in question were donein conformity with the Act in question.E

55. In light of the aforesaid five reasons - a fortiori, the jurisdictionof the Civil Court in relation to all the issues arising under the Act is heldimpliedly excluded thereby satisfying all the conditions set out in clause(1) of Dhula Bai (supra).

56. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the jurisdictionof the Civil Courts to try the civil Suits with respect to the lands, whichwere subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Act, are held to beimpliedly barred, since the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.

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57. Now coming to the facts of the case, we find from the reliefGprayed for in the plaint (see prayers (a) to (d) quoted supra) that theplaintiffs have sought a declaration, that the notification dated 12.02.1990issued under Section 10 of the Act be declared null and void; Second, astatement filed by M/s OBL - defendant No. 2 under Section 6 of theAct before the Competent Authority be declared null and void; Third, H

THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING ANDREGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

the statement filed by defendant No. 3 under Section 8 of the Act bedeclared null and void.

58. In our opinion, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to grant theafore-mentioned reliefs inasmuch as its jurisdiction to grant such reliefsis impliedly barred under the Act.

59. In our view, if Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 - Plaintiffs claimedthemselves to be the lawful owners and holders of the suit property tothe exclusion of others, there were three remedies available in law whichthey could have availed of:

(i) First, a remedy accrued in favour of Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 ifnot earlier when M/s OBL claimed to have purchased the suitproperty from the alleged vendors on 30.11.1962. It was at thatpoint of time, a cloud was cast on their alleged title in relation tothe suit property. Since registration of the sale deed amounts to apublic notice, the Respondents should have filed a Civil Suit againstthe vendors of M/s OBL, and M/s OBL, for a declaration of theirownership and cancellation of their sale deed in relation to the suitproperty. It was not availed of.

(ii) The second remedy arose under Section 6 of the Act, forfiling a statement as owners and holders of the suit property beforethe Competent Authority, after the Act came into force in 1976.This was also not availed of by the plaintiffs.

(iii) The third remedy was in filing objections under Section 10 (1)of the Act before the Competent Authority when the CompetentAuthority invited objections on 12.02.1990 from public and pursuantto it, the notice was issued in that behalf. The respondents againdid not avail of this remedy, and failed to file any objections.

60. The Respondents-Plaintiffs having failed to avail any of thethree remedies at appropriate time, resorted to fourth remedy of filing aWrit Petition to challenge the notifications dated 11.05.1990 in the HighCourt of Calcutta. This Writ Petition was, however, dismissed by aDivision Bench of the High Court vide dated 03.04.1997. The order ofdismissal was affirmed vide order dated 28.07.1997 passed by this Courtin SLP (C) No.12726 of 1997.

61. In our considered opinion, the dismissal of the SLP by thisCourt vide Order 28.07.1997 had a three-fold effect on the rights of theparties to the Lis in relation to the suit property:

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AFirst, the entire action taken by the competent authority initiatedfrom Section 6 of the Act till issuance of notifications under Section10(1) and (3) of the Act issued on 12.02.1990 and 11.05.1990 inrelation to the suit property were held to be in conformity with theprovisions of the Act. This satisfied the last condition of clause(1) of Dhula Bai (supra) also.B

Second, the suit property stood vested in the State free from allencumbrances under Section 10 (3) of the Act.

Third, the State Government was held to be in legal possession ofthe suit property as the owner on and after 11.05.1990, to theCexclusion of all, by following the due procedure of law.

62. In such a situation, the Respondent Nos.1 to 7 could not takerecourse to filing of the Civil Suit on the basis of the observation madeby this Court.

63. As observed supra, if there were any remedy available to theDRespondents in relation to the suit property, then any such remedy wasunder the Act but not by filing a civil suit in a Civil Court and start a freshround of litigation with respect to the suit property. Such a suit was, inour view, impliedly barred in the light of exclusion of jurisdiction of theCivil Court under the Act.

E64. Indeed, we find support for our reasoning by the decisions ofthis Court rendered in several decided cases as mentioned below.

65. In State of Bihar vs. Dhirendra Kumar (1995) 4 SCC 229,a question arose as to whether a civil suit is maintainable, and if so,whether ad-interim injunction could be issued by the Civil Court in suchFsuit against the State where the proceedings under the Land AcquisitionAct were taken pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9 of theLand Acquisition Act, and delivered to its beneficiary.

66. This Court examined the issue in the context of the scheme ofthe Land Acquisition Act in juxtaposition with Section 9 of the CPCGand held that having regard to the object and scheme of the Act, thejurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the matters falling under theAct stands impliedly excluded, and is barred. Para 3 of the decision isapposite and reads as under:

“3. The question is whether a civil suit is maintainable andHwhether ad interim injunction could be issued where THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY CALCUTTA UNDER THE LAND (CEILING ANDREGULATION) ACT, 1976 v. DAVID MANTOSH [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

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proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was takenpursuant to the notice issued under Section 9 of the Actand delivered to the beneficiary. The provisions of the Actare designed to acquire the land by the State exercisingthe power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose.The State is enjoined to comply with statutory requirementscontained in Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act by properpublication of notification and declaration within limitationand procedural steps of publication in papers and the localpublications envisaged under the Act as amended by Act68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declarationunder Section 6, the public purpose gets crystallised andbecomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled toauthorise the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with theacquisition of the land and to make the award. Section 11-Anow prescribes limitation to make the award within 2 yearsfrom the last date of publication envisaged under Section 6of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Governmentneeds possession of the land urgently, it would exercisethe power under Section 17(4) of the Act and dispense withthe enquiry under Section 5-A. Thereon, the State is entitledto issue notice to the parties under Section 9 and on expiryof 15 days, the State is entitled to take immediatepossession even before the award could be made.Otherwise, it would take possession after the award underSection 12. Thus, it could be seen that the Act is a completecode in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. We are,therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that bynecessary implication the power of the civil court to takecognizance of the case under Section 9 of CPC standsexcluded, and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into thequestion of the validity or legality of the notification underSection 4 and declaration under Section 6, except by the HighCourt in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable.”

(Emphasis supplied)

67. This very issue then came up for consideration in anotherdecision of this Court in Laxmi Chand vs. Gram Panchayat Kararia ABC

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A(1996) 7 SCC 218. In that case, the question arose as to whether thecivil suit filed to challenge the award passed under the Land AcquisitionAct is maintainable and, if so, whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction toentertain such suit for deciding the issue raised therein on its merits.

68. This Court held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction toBentertain and try such civil suit on its merits. Its jurisdiction is impliedlybarred having regard to the object and the scheme of the Act. Paras 2and 3 of the decision are apposite and read as under:

“2………..It is seen that Section 9 of the Civil ProcedureCode, 1908 gives jurisdiction to the civil court to try allCcivil suits, unless barred. The cognizance of a suit of civilnature may either expressly or impliedly be barred. Theprocedure contemplated under the Act is a specialprocedure envisaged to effectuate public purpose,compulsorily acquiring the land for use of public purpose.The notification under Section 4 and declaration underDSection 6 of the Act are required to be published in themanner contemplated thereunder. The inference givesconclusiveness to the public purpose and the extent of theland mentioned therein. The award should be made underSection 11 as envisaged thereunder. The dissatisfiedEclaimant is provided with the remedy of reference underSection 18 and a further appeal under Section 54 of theAct. If the Government intends to withdraw from theacquisition before taking possession of the land, procedurecontemplated under Section 48 requires to be adhered to.If possession is taken, it stands vested under Section 16 inFthe State with absolute title free from all encumbrances andthe Government has no power to withdraw from acquisition.

3. It would thus be clear that the scheme of the Act is completein itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court to takecognizance of the cases arising under the Act, by necessaryimplication, stood barred. The civil court thereby is devoid ofjurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of theprocedure contemplated under the Act. The only right anaggrieved person has is to approach the constitutional courts,viz., the High Court and the Supreme Court under their G

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plenary power under Articles 226 and 136 respectively withself-imposed restrictions on their exercise of extraordinarypower. Barring thereof, there is no power to the civil court.”

(Emphasis supplied)

69. This view was reiterated by this Court in two later decisions(refer - Bangalore Development Authority vs. K.S Narayan (2006)8 SCC 336 and State of Punjab vs. Amarjit Singh (2011) 14 SCC713).

70. On comparing the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act withthe scheme of the present Act in question, we find that the intention ofthe Legislature is more explicit in excluding the jurisdiction of the CivilCourt under the Act in question.

71. Indeed, it is clear from a reading of Sections 12(4), 13, 30,33(1), 33(3), 33(5) and 40 of the Act in question. We also find that somesections of the Act in question which has bearing on the question ofexclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court are in pari materia withthe Sections in the Land Acquisition Act whereas some Sections of theAct which also have bearing on this question are not to be found in theLand Acquisition Act. Yet, this Court on examining the scheme of theLand Acquisition Act and the remedies provided therein has held thatthe jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly excluded and barred to trythe civil suit. The scheme of this Act, therefore, clearly indicates thatexclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction is provided therein impliedly.

72. It is for all these reasons, we have no hesitation in holding thatthe Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the civil suit in relation to theland which is subject to ceiling proceedings under the Act in question;nor did the Civil Court have the jurisdiction to declare the proceedingsheld under the Act, as void or illegal or non est, since it was impliedlyexcluded and barred under the Act.

73. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel for the Respondents- Plaintiffs vehemently argued on the facts of the case, which are setout in detail above, that a perusal of the facts would go to show as tohow the plaintiffs derived their title over the suit property from theirpredecessor-in-title, and the prejudice which was caused to them by theceiling proceedings which proceeded against them behind their back.

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74. We reject the contentions and submissions made on behalf ofRespondent Nos. 1 to 7/ Plaintiffs since we have inter alia held that theCivil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a Civil Suit with respect toproceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, being a special and self-contained enactment.

B75. Furthermore, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/ Plaintiffs havingfailed to raise objections to the ceiling proceedings at any stage, the suitproperty stood vested in the State, free from all encumbrances. Thebelated challenge to the same is meritless. Having failed to avail of theremedies under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the one resorted toresulted in rejection of the claim made therein upto this Court, RespondentCNos.1 to 7/ Plaintiffs sought to start a fresh round of litigation by filing aCivil Suit, which was barred under the Act. Furthermore, the State afteracquiring ownership over the suit land has allotted the suit land to the M/s Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals on a 30 years lease. Hence, the situation,in our view, has now become irreversible.

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76. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view thatthe Division Bench was not justified in allowing the Respondents’ appeal,and decreeing the Civil Suit whereas the Trial Court was right in dismissingthe Civil Suit.

77. As a consequence, the appeals succeed and are allowed. TheEimpugned judgments are set aside and the judgment of the Trial Court isrestored. As a result thereof, the suit filed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 7out of which these appeals arise is dismissed with no order as to costs.

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Appeals allowed.

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