P. DHARAMARAJ versus SHANMUGAM & ORS. on 8 September 2022

972

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 9 S.C.R.

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P. DHARAMARAJ

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SHANMUGAM & ORS.

(Criminal Appeal No. 1514 of 2022)

BSEPTEMBER 08, 2022

[S.ABDUL NAZEER AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss.320, 482 –Compounding of Offence – Inherent powers of High Court – Exerciseof, permissibility – As per s.320(9), no offence can be compoundedCexcept as provided in the said section – Compounding of offencesnot so covered is not permissible – Non-Compoundable offencesare well within the jurisdiction of the High Court u/s.482 of theCode and Art. 226 of the Constitution and can be quashed on thebasis of settlement but the court has to go slow while exercisingDsuch jurisdiction when the offence has impact not only on the partiesinter se but on others also.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: Corruption by a publicservant is an offence against the State and the society at large –The Court cannot deal with cases involving abuse of official positionEand adoption of corrupt practices, like suits for specificperformance, where the refund of the money paid may also satisfythe agreement – Such corrupt practices by public servant undoubtedlyattract the relevant provisions of PC Act.

Public Employment: Corruption in Public Employment – LocusFStandi in criminal proceedings, discussed.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. It is clear from the counter affidavit of theInvestigation Officer filed in a connected writ petition, thatpersons who claim to have paid money, but did not receive ordersGof appointment, were not the only victims. Persons who weremore meritorious, but who did not get selected, on account ofbeing edged out by candidates who paid money and got selected,are also victims of the alleged corrupt practices, if those allegationsare eventually proved. The fact that candidates, who are selectedHand appointed to posts in the Government/public corporations by adopting corrupt practices, are eventually called upon torender public service. The quality of public service rendered bysuch persons will be inversely proportionate to the corruptpractices adopted by them. Therefore, the public, who arerecipients of these services, also become victims, thoughindirectly, because the consequences of such appointments getreflected sooner or later in the work performed by the appointees.Hence, to say that the appellants have no locus standi, is to denythe existence of what is obvious. [Para 16, 18][985-G-H; 986-A,D-F]

Janata Dal v. H.S Chowdhary and Others (1991) 3 SCC756 : [1991] 3 SCR 752 – held inapplicable.

P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and Another(1980) 3 SCC 141 : [1980] 2 SCR 873; Lalita Kumariv. Government of Uttar Pradeshand Others (2014) 2SCC 1 : [2014] 4 SCR 562 – referred to.

2. It is clear that the final report implicated the accused foroffences under Sections 406, 409, 420 and 506(1) IPC. None ofthese offences except the one under Section 506 IPC iscompoundable under sub-Section (1) of Section 320, Cr.P.C. Theoffences under Sections 406 and 420 are compoundable undersub-Section (2) of Section 320. Sub-section (9) of Section 320makes it clear that no offence shall be compounded except asprovided by the Section. Therefore, there was no way the offenceunder Section 409 IPC, included in the final report, could havebeen compounded. As a matter of fact, the High Court hasrecognised in the penultimate paragraph of the impugned orderthat the final report includes offences which are not compoundable.[Para 31, 32][993-C-E]

Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another (2012) 10SCC 303 : [2012] 8 SCR 753; State of Maharashtrathrough Central Bureau of Investigation v. VikramAnantrai Doshi and Others (2014) 15 SCC 29 : [2014]10 SCR 506 – relied on.

3. The Court has to go slow even while exercisingjurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.PC or Article 226 of theConstitution in the matter of quashing of criminal proceedingson the basis of a settlement reached between the parties, when AB

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Athe offences are capable of having an impact not merely on thecomplainant and the accused but also on others. As seen fromthe final report filed in the instant case and the counter affidavitfiled by the I.O., persons who have adopted corrupt practices tosecure employment in the Transport Corporation fall under twocategories namely, (i) those who paid money and got orders ofBappointment; and (ii) those who paid money but failed to secureemployment. If persons belonging to the 2nd category are allowedto settle their dispute by taking refund of money, the same wouldaffix a seal of approval on the appointment of persons belongingto the 1st category. Therefore, the High Court ought not to haveCquashed the criminal proceedings on the basis of the compromise.[Para 42, 43][999-F-H; 1000-A-B]

4. Corruption by a public servant is an offence against theState and the society at large. The Court cannot deal with casesinvolving abuse of official position and adoption of corruptDpractices, like suits for specific performance, where the refundof the money paid may also satisfy the agreement holder.Therefore the High Court was completely in error in quashingthe criminal complaint. [Para 44][1000-B-C]

Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab (2008) 4 SCCE582 : [2008] 5 SCR 526 – distinguished.

B.S. Joshi and Others v. State of Haryana and another(2003) 4 SCC 675 : [2003] 2 SCR 1104; NikhilMerchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr.(2008) 9 SCC 677 : [2008] 12 SCR 236; Manoj SharmaFv. State and Others (2008) 16 SCC 1 : [2008] 14 SCR539; Narinder Singh and Others v. State of Punjab andAnother (2014) 6 SCC 466 : [2014] 4 SCR 1012;Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. RavishankarPrasad and Others (2009) 6 SCC 351 : [2009] 9 SCR1025; Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai BhimsinhbhaiGKarmur and Ors. v. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641: [2017] 10 SCR 12; The State of Madhya Pradesh v.Dhruv Gurjar and Another (2019) 2 MLJ Crl 10;Sanjay Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another 2020SCC Online SC 1027 – referred to.

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P. DHARAMARAJ v. SHANMUGAM & ORS.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal AppealNo.1514 of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.07.2021of the High Courtof Judicature at Madras in CRL. O.P. No.13374 of 2021 and CRL. M.P.No.7355 of 2021.

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Criminal Appeal Nos.1515-1516 of 2022.

Siddharth Bhatnagar, A. N. Venugopala Gowda, Rakesh Dwivedi,Manan Kumar Mishra, A. Mariarputham, Mukul Rohtagi, Prabhakaran,Gopal Shankaranarayanan, C.A. Sundaram, Ms. S. Prabakaran, Sr.Advs,. Rakesh Sharma R., Siddhartha Iyer, Ms. Pracheta Kar, NadeemA., Prashant Bhushan, Pranav Sachdeva, Jatin Bhardwaj, Ms. NehaRathi, Ms. Garima Jain, Ms. Aakriti Priya, Dr. Ram Sankar, Ms. AnjulDwivedi, Ms. Usha Prabhakaran, Ms. Sujatha Bagadhi, Arya Tripathy,Tarunvir Singh, Ms. Theepa M., Ms. Divya, N. B. Kumar, M. Naveenfor M/S. Ram Sankar & Co, Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., Ms. Nupur Sharma,Shobhit Dwivedi, Sanjeev Kumar Mahara, L.A. Gowthman, Ms. T.Archana, Mohit Singh, Ms. Jhanvi Dubey, Ms. Rohini Musa, Zaffar InayatGani, Yusuf, Advs. for the appearing parties.

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AThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.

Permission to file Special Leave Petition(s) is granted inD.No.11748 of 2022.

B2. Leave granted.

3. There are three Special Leave Petitions on hand, two of whichchallenge an Order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras ina Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C”), quashing a criminal complaint inCCC No.25 of 2021 pending on the file of the Additional Special Court fortrial of cases related to Members of Parliament and Members ofLegislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu, on the ground that all the victimshave compromised their claims with the accused. The third Special LeavePetition arises out of an order of dismissal passed by the High Court in aCriminal Miscellaneous Petition filed by a third party by name AntiDCorruption Movement, seeking the recall of the order dated 30.07.2021in the quash petition.

4. We have heard the learned senior counsel appearing for theparties, which include the de facto complainant, persons named asaccused as well as third parties who claim to be interested/ affected,Ealbeit indirectly.

Background Facts

5. The brief facts sufficient for the disposal of these special leavepetitions are as follows:- F(i) On a complaint lodged by one K. Arulmani, working in thetechnical wing of the factory of the Metropolitan Transport Corporationof Tamil Nadu, a FIR in Crime No. 344 of 2018 was registered on13.08.2018. To avoid any confusion, the contents of the said complaintare extracted as follows:G“I have been working as a Worker in the Technical Wing ofthe Factory of Metropolitan Transport Corporation (MTC),at Perambur. In the year 2014, an announcement in regard tovacancies existing for the posts of Conductor and Driver inthe Transport Department. When I went to our Head Officein Pallavan Salai in connection with work, one Mr. Rajkumar H

got introduced to me. He told me that he hails fromPambaipadayur near Kumbakonam and he had got closecontact with the then Transport Minister, Mr.Senthil Balajiand his younger brother Asok Kumar, through one Mr.Shanmugam, who was the Personal Assistant to Mr. SenthilBaljai and on paying money, jobs would certainly be got. Myfriends by name Ambedkar, Senthil, Vijayakanth, Muthiah anda few others told to get them jobs in the Transport Corporationand they are ready to pay money for the same.

I told that money was to be given to through one Mr.Rajkumarand should there surface any problem, we should be ready toface the same. They also, agreeing to the same, paid me money,in several installments during the period from 25.12.2014 to04.01.2015, amounting to Rs.40,00,000/-. conveyed thosedetails to Mr. Rajkumar. In the first week of January 2015,he and myself went to the house of Thiru Senthil Balaji atR.A. Puram. At that time, Mr. Shanmugam, P.A. to Thiru SenthilBalaji came towards me and received the sum of Rs.40,00,000/-. We insisted on Thiru Shanmugam to see Thiru Asok Kumarand Thiru Senthil Balaji in person. Thiru Asok Kumar, whocame there, when we gave the amount, had assured that allwho have paid amounts would issued with appointment orders.He took us then itself to Thiru Senthil Balaji. He told in anassuring voice that there is no need to worry and all thosewho gave money would be definitely given appointment orders.

In the list of names released by the Transport Corporation,the names of persons for whom I gave money, have notappeared in list of appointments. Hence, persons who gavemoney to me started pestering me to return the money. When Iasked about it to Thiru Rajkumar, he told that in the next list,their names would definitely come. But in the next list also,names of none came. When I informed this to Thiru Rajkumar,he said that he would enquire about the same to Asok Kumarand Shanmugam and then he would say. But each time whenI asked Rajkumar, giving me the very same reply, asked me towait for some time. Persons who gave me money, startedthreatening me. On their insistence, I gave them my chequesfrom my savings bank account with Canara Bank, AmbaturBranch, as security.

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AIn pursuance of that, when I asked Rajkumar on 12.10.2015for returning the money, he gave me two cheques drawn onCity Union Bank, Mount Road Branch, filling each chequewith a sum of Rs.15,00,000/- He told me to deposit the saidcheques for collection at the time when he instructs, on hisbeing paid repaid the amounts by Thiru Senthil Balaji, AsokBKumar and Shanmugam and the balance sum of Rs.10,00,000/- would be given by him later on. When I went to City UnionBank, Mount Road Branch and checked whether there aresufficient amounts in their accounts, the Bank Officer saidthat there were no sufficient funds. When I met Raj Kumar,CShanmugam and Asok Kumar several times and requested forreturning the money, they asked me to wait for some time.Persons who gave me money started pestering me very muchdemanding money. In October 2016, when I met Messrs SenthilBalaji, his younger brother Asok Kumar, and P.A Shanmugamand Rajkumar, and entreated them to return the money to me,Dafter explaining my pathetic position, each one of them saidthat they cannot return the amount, nothing can be doneagainst them and if I give them trouble demanding money,they would liquidate me along with my family. I am living dailyin consternation along with my two children. As Thiru SenthilEBalaji was a Minister then and subsequently a MLA in theruling party, the situation posing threat to my life in the eventof my lodging a complaint against him, was in existence. Icame forward to give the complaint now, since he is not holdingany post. I therefore humbly request you to kindly initiateappropriate legal action against Messrs Senthil Balaji, AsokFKumar, Shanmugam and Raj Kumar for their acts of fraud,deception and also the threats unleashed against me and getme back the sum of Rs.40,00,000/- payable to me by all ofthem.”

(ii) The FIR was for alleged offences under Sections 405, 420Gand 506(1) of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”). Four persons byname Shri Senthil Balaji (the then Transport Minister), Shri Ashok Kumar(the brother of the Minister), Shri Shanmugam (Personal Assistant tothe Minister) and Shri Raj Kumar were cited as the accused in the FIR.(iii) After investigation, the police filed a final report datedH12.04.2019 under Section 173(2)(i) of Cr.P.C., against all the four accused named in the First Information Report. The final report indicted the personsnamed as accused, for alleged offences under Sections 406, 409, 420,506(1) read with Section 34 IPC. The Special Court for trial of casesrelated to Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assemblyof Tamil Nadu took the final report on file in CC No.25 of 2021.

(iv) Shri Shanmugam, named as accused No.3 then filed a criminaloriginal petition in Criminal O.P. No.13374 of 2021 on the file of theHigh Court of Judicature at Madras under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.praying for quashing the criminal complaint CC No.25 of 2021.

(v) Before the High Court, the de facto complainant Shri K.Arulmani filed an affidavit supporting the accused and praying forquashing of the final report, on the ground that what the victims had withthe accused was only a money dispute and that the same had beensettled out of Court and that due to political rivalry between two groups,his complaint got converted into a more serious one, by includingunwarranted statements which were not made by him.

(vi) The victims who originally claimed to have paid money forprocuring employment, also filed individual affidavits supporting theaccused.

(vii) A joint compromise memo dated 28.7.2021 containing thesignatures of 13 victims (who had paid money) on the one hand andaccused No.3 on the other hand was also filed before the High Court.

(viii) When the quash petition came up for hearing, the learnedGovernment Advocate appearing for the State made a submission thatthe occurrence took place in the year 2014 and that the matter wascompromised between the accused and the victims in the year 2019after the filing of the final report.

(ix) Interestingly, all the 13 victims also appeared before the learnedJudge of the High Court of Madras through Video Conference andclaimed that the issues have been resolved between them and theaccused.

(x) In the light of what had transpired after the filing of the finalreport, the High Court passed an order dated 30.07.2021 quashing thecriminal complaint on the ground that “by passage of time, the partieshave decided to bury their hatchet and that no useful purpose wouldbe achieved by keeping the criminal case pending”. After noticing A

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Athat the offences are not compoundable in nature, the High Court recordedin one sentence that it had taken note of the guidelines issued by thisCourt in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur andOrs. vs. State of Gujarat[1] and The State of Madhya Pradesh vs.Dhruv Gurjar and Another[2 ]and concluded that the complaint could bequashed.B

(xi) Upon coming to know of the quashing of the complaint, aperson by name Shri P. Dharamaraj, who participated in the process ofselection for appointment to the post of drivers/conductors in theMetropolitan Transport Corporation, but who did not get selected, hascome up with one special leave petition contending that what happenedCwas a cash-for-job scam and that he would have got selected if thescam had not taken place. Since he was not a party to the quashproceedings before the High Court, his special leave petition wasaccompanied by an application for leave to file Special Leave Petition.The said application was allowed by this Court on 11.02.2022.

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(xii) In the meantime, an organisation by name Anti CorruptionMovement, moved a Miscellaneous Petition before the High Courtseeking recall of the order dated 30.07.2021 on the ground that thecomplaint involved allegations of corruption and abuse of official positionand that therefore the charge-sheet could not have been quashed on theEbasis of a compromise between the parties. This application for recallwas rejected by the High Court by an Order dated 14.03.2022, primarilyon the ground that this Court has already entertained a special leavepetition against the order sought to be recalled.

(xiii) Therefore, challenging the original order dated 30.07.2011Fand the order dated 14.03.2022, the said Association, namely, AntiCorruption Movement has come up with two special leave petitions.

6. Before we proceed further, it is necessary to take note of thefact that there are a few interlocutory applications whose details are asfollows:G IA No.49555/2022 filed by Anti Corruption Movement seekingintervention in SLP (Crl.) No.1354 of 2022 filed by Dharamaraj;

IA No.59173/2022 filed by the appellant in SLP (Crl.) No.1354of 2022, for impleading the four persons named as accused.

1 (2017) 9 SCC 641H2 (2019) 2 MLJ Crl 10

IA No.59176/2022 filed by the appellant in SLP (Crl.) No.1354of 2022 seeking the appointment of a Senior Advocate as SpecialPublic Prosecutor to conduct the trial.

IA Nos.126399 and 126400 of 2022 filed by one Y. Balaji, whodid not get selected for the post of conductor/driver, seekingimpleadment and the appointment of an impartial Special PublicProsecutor.

IA No.108569/2022 filed by one Shri S. Prithvirajan, who claimsto be a victim due to non-selection, for impleading himself as partyto the special leave petition.

Rival Contentions

7. Assailing the order of the High Court, it is contended by ShriSiddharth Bhatnagar & Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned seniorcounsel, that it is shocking to see that a matter of this nature, where thebribe-giver and bribe-taker have come together, has been allowed to beclosed on the basis of a compromise memo; that the original complainantShri Arulmani was himself an employee of the Metropolitan TransportCorporation and consequently a public servant; that the allegationsrevolved around payment of money to the then Transport Minister throughhis Personal Assistant for procuring appointment in the MetropolitanTransport Corporation; and that, therefore, the High court committed aserious illegality in quashing the complaint on the basis of a compromise,despite the fact that even the offences indicated in the charge-sheet arenot compoundable. The learned senior counsel drew our attention to thecounter affidavit filed by the Investigation Officer before the High Courtof Judicature at Madras in a writ petition in WP No.9061 of 2021 tohighlight that the allegations are of serious nature warranting a prosecutionunder the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “P.C. Act”) andargued that the shocking manner in which the High Court had handled it,deserves special attention, if not special treatment.

8. Shri Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for AntiCorruption Movement, which is the appellant in 2 of the appeals, contendedthat the prosecution itself was guilty of not including in the charge-sheetthe offences under the P.C Act and that even the opportunity nowavailable to the Court under Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. is nipped in thebud by the High Court allowing a compromise and quashing the complaint.

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A9. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for thefirst respondent in these special leave petitions and who was the petitionerbefore the High Court in the quash petition, supported the order of theHigh Court contending inter alia that the statements of the victims didnot make out a case for prosecution of the accused under the P.C Act;that this is why the final report filed by the police did not implicate theBaccused for any offence under the P.C Act; that the prosecution wasconstrained to include Section 409 IPC only because of a statement asthough respondent No.1 was a Personal Assistant to the then Minister(A-1); that however no such order of appointment of respondent No.1as the Personal Assistant to the Minister was ever brought on record;Cthat in the Additional Affidavit filed by respondent No.1, he categoricallydenied any association with the Minister as his Personal Assistant; thatan attempt was made earlier, by two other individuals who made similarallegations against the then Transport Minister (present A-1), by filingpetitions in Criminal O.P. (MD) No.14067 and 14967 of 2016, seeking adirection to the police to register a complaint and investigate into theDsame; that during the pendency of those petitions, a criminal complaintcame to be registered in Crime No.15 of 2016; that one of the accused(the Managing Director of the Transport Corporation) immediately fileda quash petition in Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 16023 of 2016 in which theTransport Minister also got impleaded; that all those 3 criminal originalEpetitions were heard together by the High Court; that by a final Orderdated 19.09.2016 the petitions seeking a direction for registering acomplaint were rejected but the petition for quashing the complaint wasallowed; that the common order so passed by the High Court on19.09.2016 in Criminal O.P. (MD) Nos. 14067, 14967 and 16023 of 2016was challenged before this Court by a third party, by way of specialFleave petitions; that by an order dated 05.01.2017 this Court refused togrant leave to the third party to file special leave petitions; that the firstattempt so made by 2 individuals way back in 2016 to somehow implicatethe Minister thus failed; and that, therefore, the High Court was right inthis case, in putting to rest, the repeated attempts made by rivals inGpolitics to nix the accused.

10. Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel appearing for ShriArulmani, on whose complaint the FIR in Crime No.344 of 2018 wasregistered on 13.08.2018, also supported the impugned order of the HighCourt by contending inter alia that the allegations made in the complaintHdid not make out a case for prosecution under the P.C Act; that the

affidavits filed by all the so called victims before the High Court made itcrystal clear that it was a simple money dispute; that the allegationscomplained of against the accused do not constitute offences againstthe State but revolved around a private dispute with regard to paymentof money; that even in cases arising out of a prosecution under the P.CAct, this Court held in Sanjay Tiwari vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &Another.[3] that a third party, who is neither a victim nor an accused,cannot poke his nose into the criminal proceedings; that therefore, theappellants in the above appeals have no locus standi to question theorder of the High Court; and that in the light of the contents of theaffidavit filed by the de facto complainant-Shri Arulmani before theHigh Court, no conclusion other than the one reached by the High Courtis possible.

11. Shri C.A. Sundaram, learned senior counsel appearing for A-1 contended inter alia, that the appellants who have approached thisCourt have no locus standi to interfere with the proceedings initiated atthe behest of individual complainants; that the appellants have takencudgels on behalf of the political rivals, to undo a compromise reachedbetween a few individual complainants and persons who received moneyfrom them; that the parameters laid down by this Court for closingcriminal cases on the basis of the compromise reached between partieseven in the case of non-compoundable offences, have been followedproperly by the High Court in this case; and that since allegations ofcorruption are not made out in this case, there is no element of publicinterest involved. According to the learned senior counsel for A-1, theappellants are relying heavily upon other cases filed under the P.C Act,to upset a compromise reached in a case which does not concernallegations under the P.C Act.

12. Shri Manan Kumar Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearingfor respondent No.1 contended that the attempt of the appellants hereinis only to harass the Minister. According to the learned senior counsel,there are two other pending complaints where allegations under the P.CAct are included. The appellants have already impleaded themselves asparties to those criminal complaints. Therefore, it is contended by ShriManan Kumar Mishra that the whole exercise is unwarranted and nothingbut witch hunting. Insofar as persons who claim to be victims due totheir non-selection for appointment to the post of conductors/drivers are 3 2020 SCC Online SC 1027

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Aconcerned, it is contended by Shri Manan Kumar Mishra that they havealready filed writ petitions challenging their non-selection and hence theirremedy does not lie in the present proceedings.

13. Shri S. Prabhakaran, learned Senior Counsel contended thatthe Minister concerned was a member of the splinter group which revoltedBagainst those in office during the previous regime and that therefore thepresent criminal complaints came to be registered at the behest of hispolitical opponents and that the same group is now targeting him as hehad again become a Minister in the present regime. Therefore, the learnedSenior Counsel submitted that this Court should see through this gamebefore being swayed by legal nuances.C

Discussion and Analysis

14. In a nutshell, the rival contentions revolve around three importantissues. They are: (i) the locus standi of the appellants; (ii) the effect ofthe compromise entered into between the de facto complainant and 13Dnamed victims on the one hand and the four accused on the other hand;and (iii) the non-inclusion in the charge-sheet of the offences under theP.C. Act.

Locus standi

15. The preliminary objection of the respondents to the locusEstandi of the appellants, has to be rejected outright, for several reasons.The first is that in the counter affidavit filed by the Assistant Commissionerof Police, Central Crime Branch, Job Racket Wing, Chennai, to the writpetition WP No.9061 of 2021, he has narrated certain sequence of eventswhich are as follows:F(i) Pursuant to an order passed by the High Court on 09.06.2014in Writ Appeal No.1027 of 2013, directing all appointments in allGovernment departments to be made only after due notificationto the public in Newspapers besides sponsorship from theEmployment Exchange, the Secretary to Government,Employment and Training Department sent a communication toGthe Managing Directors of all State Transport Undertakings on30.07.2014 to follow the directions of the High Court in the matterof appointments;

(ii) All the representatives of all the State Transport undertakingsresolved in a meeting held on 06.10.2014 to conduct futureH

recruitments only after inviting applications from the open marketthrough newspaper advertisements apart from getting a list ofcandidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange;

(iii) Thereafter, Thiru Senthil Balaji, the then Transport Minister(A-1 in the present case) instructed the officers to collect detailsregarding the day-to-day progress of the recruitment in all 8Transport Corporations of the State;

(iv) These communications were directed to be transmitted to theMinister’s office via e-mail and the mail box was operated andmaintained by Shri B. Shanmugam and not by any of the otherPersonal Assistants of the Minister;

(v) The advertisements for recruitment were issued in newspaperson 02.11.2014. Simultaneously, the lists of eligible candidates werealso invited from the concerned Employment Exchanges;

(vi) A total of 22602 applications were issued to the aspirantsduring the period from 03.11.2014 to 20.11.2014;

(vii) These 22,602 applications related to the posts of ReservedCrew Driver, Reserved Crew Conductor, Junior Tradesman, JuniorEngineer and Assistant Engineer;

(viii) The total number of filled in applications received from thecandidates was 16081;

(ix) But 12765 candidates attended the interview;

(x) Orders of appointment were issued to 2209 candidates fromthe list given by the Minister;

(xi) There were 5542 other eligible candidates;

(xii) Many of the note files have been created without any date;

(xiii) Appointment orders were issued to candidates whose nameswere contained in the list sent by the Transport Minister throughhis associate Shanmugam.

16. From what is extracted above from the counter affidavit ofthe Investigation Officer filed in a connected writ petition, it is clear thateven according to the Investigating Officer, persons who claim to havepaid money, but did not receive orders of appointment, were not theonly victims. Persons who were more meritorious, but who did not A

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Aget selected, on account of being edged out by candidates who paidmoney and got selected, are also victims of the alleged corruptpractices, if those allegations are eventually proved. Shri P.Dharamaraj, who is the appellant in one of these appeals, claims to be acandidate who participated in the selection, but could not make it. Thereis also an intervenor by name Shri Prithivirajan who was the petitioner inBWP No.9061 of 2021, in which the counter affidavit referred to in thepreceding paragraph was filed by the Investigation Officer. This candidatewas not selected and according to him, he would have got selected, hadthere been no corrupt practices on the part of the concerned.

17. Even the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of theCrespondents could not contest the position that a victim is entitled to filean appeal against the impugned order of the High Court. If personswho participated in the selection process but who could not make itto the final list of selected candidates on account of the allegedcorrupt practices adopted by those in power are not victims, we doDnot know who else could be a victim.

18. We cannot shy away from the fact that candidates, who areselected and appointed to posts in the Government/public corporationsby adopting corrupt practices, are eventually called upon to render publicservice. It is needless to say that the quality of public service renderedby such persons will be inversely proportionate to the corrupt practicesEadopted by them. Therefore, the public, who are recipients of theseservices, also become victims, though indirectly, because theconsequences of such appointments get reflected sooner or later in thework performed by the appointees. Hence, to say that the appellantshave no locus standi, is to deny the existence of what is obvious.F19. The decision in Sanjay Tiwari (supra), relied upon by Shri

F19. The decision in Sanjay Tiwari (supra), relied upon by ShriMukul Rohtagi, learned senior Counsel for the de facto complainant, isof no application to the case on hand. The appeal in Sanjay Tiwari’scase arose out of an application for expediting the trial of a criminal casepending on the file of the Special Judge,Gorakhpur, for alleged offencesunder Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 477A, 120B IPC and SectionG13(1)(c)(d) read with Section 13(2) of P.C. Act. The said application forexpediting the trial was moved by a person who was neither the victimnor the accused. Therefore, this Court found out that a person who hasnothing to do with the pending trial, cannot seek to expedite the trial,Paragraphs 11 to 15 of the said decision on which heavy reliance isHplaced read as follows:-

“11. It is well settled that criminal trial where offences involvedare under the Prevention of Corruption Act have to be conductedand concluded at the earliest since the offences under Preventionof Corruption Act are offences which affect not only the accusedbut the entire society and administration. It is also well settled thatthe High Court in appropriate cases can very well under Section482 Cr.P.C. or in any other proceeding can always direct trialcourt to expedite the criminal trial and issue such order as may benecessary. But the present is a case where proceeding initiatedby respondent No. 2 does not appear to be a bona fide proceeding.Respondent No. 2 is in no way connected with initiation of criminalproceeding against the appellant. Respondent No. 2 in hisapplication under Section 482 Cr. P. C in paragraph 6 has describedhim as social activist and an Advocate. An application by a personwho is in no way connected with the criminal proceeding or criminaltrial under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot ordinarily be entertainedby the High Court. A criminal trial of an accused is conducted inaccordance with procedure as prescribed by the CriminalProcedure Code. It is the obligation of the State and the prosecutionto ensure that all criminal trials are conducted expeditiously sothat justice can be delivered to the accused if found guilty. Thepresent is not a case where prosecution or even the employer ofthe accused have filed an application either before the trial courtor in any other court seeking direction as prayed by respondentNo. 2 in his application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

12. With regard to locus of a third party to challenge the criminalproceedings or to seek relief in respect of criminal proceedings ofaccused had been dealt with by this Court Janata Dal v. H.S.Chowdhary,(1991) 3 SCC 756. In the above case the CBI hadregistered FIR under the IPC as well as under the Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1947 against 14 accused. On an application filedby the CBI the learned trial Judge allowing the application to theextent that request to conduct necessary investigation and to collectnecessary evidence which can be collected in Switzerland passedorder on 05.02.1990 which is to the following effect:

“In the result, the application of the CBI is allowed tothe extent that a request to conduct the necessary investigationand to collect necessary evidence which can be collected in A

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Switzerland and to the extent directed in this order shall bemade to the Competent Judicial Authorities of theConfederation of Switzerland through filing of the requisite/proper undertaking required by the Swiss law and assurancefor reciprocity.”

13. A criminal miscellaneous application was filed by Shri H.S.Chowdhary seeking various prayers before the Special Judgewhich petition was dismissed by the Special Judge. A criminalRevision under Sections 397/482 Cr. P.C. was filed by H.S.Chowdhary in the High Court to quash the order of the SpecialJudge, which Revision was also dismissed by the High Court.The appeals were filed in this Court by different parties challengingthe said order including H.S. Chowdhary. This court whiledismissing the appeals filed by the H.S. Chowdhary and othersmade the following observations:

“26. Even if there are million question of law to be deeplygone into and examined in the criminal case of this natureregistered against specified accused persons, it is for themand them alone to raise all such questions and challenge theproceedings initiated against them at the appropriate time beforethe proper forum and not for third parties under the garb ofpublic interest litigants.

“27. We, in the above background of the case, afterbestowing our anxious and painstaking consideration and carefulthought to all aspects of the case and deeply examining therival contentions of the parties both collectively and individuallygive our conclusions as follows:

1. Mr. H.S. Chowdhary has no locus standi (a) to file thepetition under Article 51A as a public interest litigant prayingthat no letter rogatory/request be issued at the request ofthe CBI and he be permitted to join the inquiry before theSpecial Court which on 5.2.90 directed issuance of letterrogatory/request to the Competent Judicial Authorities ofthe Confederation of Switzerland; (b) to invoke the revisionaljurisdiction of the High Court under Section 397 read with401 of the CrPC challenging the correctness, legality orpropriety of the order dated 18.8.90 of the Special Judge;and (c) to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High

Court under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing the FirstInformation Report dated 22.1.90 and all other proceedingsarsing therefrom on the plea of preventing the abuse of theprocess of the Court.

28. In the result, we agree with the first part of the Orderdated 19.12.90 of Mr. Justice M.K Chawla holding that Mr. H.S.Chowdhary and other intervening parties have no locus standi.We, however, set aside the second part of the impugned orderwhereby he has taken suo moto cognizance and issued show causenotice to the State and CBI and accordingly the show cause noticeissued by him is quashed.”

14. This Court in the above case laid down that it is for the partiesin the criminal case to raise all the questions and challenge theproceedings initiate against them at appropriate time before theproper forum and not for third parties under the grab of PublicInterest Litigants.

15. We are fully satisfied that respondent No. 2 has no locus inthe present case to file application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. askingthe Court to expedite the hearing in criminal trial. We have alreadyobserved that all criminal trials where offences involved underthe prevention of Corruption Act have to be concluded at an earlydate and normally no exception can be taken to the order of theHigh Court directing the trial court to expedite the criminal trialbut in the present case the fact is that proceedings have beeninitiated by respondent No. 2 who was not concerned with theproceedings is any manner and the respondent No. 2 has no locusto file application which was not clearly maintainable, we are ofthe view that the impugned judgment of the High Court dated09.09.2020 cannot be sustained.”

20. All that this Court pointed out in paragraph 11 of the decisionin Sanjay Tiwari (supra) was that an application for expediting the trial,filed by a person who is in no way connected with the criminal proceedingor criminal trial cannot “ordinarily be entertained by the High Court.”

21. The decision in Janata Dal vs. H.S Chowdhary and Others[4]cited in paragraphs 12 and 13 of Sanjay Tiwari also has no applicationto the case on hand. In Janata Dal (supra), which arose out of Bofors 4 (1991) 3 SCC 756

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Acase, the Special Court allowed an application of CBI to conductnecessary investigation and to collect necessary evidence, in Switzerland.A letter rogatory was also issued. At that stage an Advocate by nameH.S. Chowdhary filed a petition in public interest before the SpecialJudge, invoking Article 51A of the Constitution. He sought several reliefsincluding a direction not to issue letter rogatory and to allow him to joinBthe enquiry before the Special Court in the capacity of a public interestlitigant. The Special Court dismissed the petition filed by H.S. Chowdhary,but took up for consideration suo moto, the question as to whether anyaction under Section 340 of the Cr.PC. should be initiated or not. Theorder of the Special Judge was challenged by H.S. Chowdhary by wayCof revision before the High Court. The High Court held that H.S.Chowdhary did not have any locus standi to maintain the petition. Itwas the said order that was challenged by H.S. Chowdhary before thisCourt. The order of the Special Judge taking suo moto action was alsochallenged by political parties.

D22. While disposing of those appeals, this Court held that a thirdparty has no locus standi in a matter of this nature. It must be notedthat the attempt made by H.S. Chowdhary was to upset the move initiatedby CBI to have a letter rogatory issued. He also wanted the FIR to bequashed. It is in that context that this Court answered the question oflocus standi as aforesaid.E23. Today, we have travelled a long way from the position of lawas it stood then. By Act 5 of 2009, the definition of the word “victim”was inserted in Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. It reads thus:

“victim” means a person who has suffered any loss or injuryFcaused by reason of the act or omission for which the accusedperson has been charged and the expression “victim” includes hisor her guardian or legal heir.”

Simultaneously, a proviso was also inserted under Section 372 ofthe Code providing a right of appeal to the victims.G24. In fact, long before the aforesaid amendment, the question oflocus standi was considered by this Court in P.S.R. Sadhananthamvs. Arunachalam and Another[5]. The said case arose under peculiarcircumstances. A person who was convicted by the Sessions Court foran offence under Section 302 and whose conviction was set aside by H5 (1980) 3 SCC 141

the High Court, was convicted by this Court in a criminal appeal, filednot by the State, but by the brother of the victim, though he was neitherthe complainant nor the first informant. Thereafter, the accused filed awrit petition under Article 32 contending that this Court had no power togrant special leave to the brother of the victim to file an appeal againstthe judgment of the High Court. While rejecting the contention, Hon’bleJustice V.R. Krishna Iyer (as he then was) said in his inimitable style:

“……the bogey of busybodies blackmailing adversariesthrough frivolous invocation of Article136is chimerical.Access to Justice to every bona fide seeker is a democraticdimension of remedial jurisprudence even as public interestlitigation, class action, pro bono proceedings, etc. We cannotdwell in the home of processual obsolescence when ourConstitution highlights social justice as a goal.”

Therefore, the objection about the locus standi of the appellantsis without any merit. In any case, the appellant in one of these appeals,is a victim, as he could not get selected on account of the alleged corruptpractices. Therefore, the contention regarding the locus standi of theappellants is to be rejected.

25. In fact, it is surprising that the de facto complainant ShriArulmani has raised the question of locus standi. It is seen from hiscomplaint dated 13.08.2018 that he is working in the Technical Wing ofthe factory of the Metropolitan Transport Corporation. Therefore, heshould not have, in the first instance, become a party to the transactionsnarrated in his complaint. After having been a party to the collection ofmoney for illegitimate purposes, even while working in the TransportCorporation, the de facto complainant Shri Arulmani has committed thesecond mistake of filing an affidavit supporting the compromise andclaiming therein as though he never made allegations against the Minister.

26. The stand taken by Arulmani before the High Court isdeplorable for one more reason. It is seen from an entry in the FIR outof which the present case arises, that Arulmani filed a criminal originalpetition in Crl. O.P.No. 24029 of 2017 on the file of the High Court,complaining that he lodged a complaint against these 4 accused wayback on 21.09.2017 and that no action was taken. On 16.11.2017, theHigh Court passed an order directing the Police to act in accordancewith the law laid down by this Court in Lalita Kumari vs. Government A

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Aof Uttar Pradeshand Others[6]. It is only thereafter that the Policeregistered the FIR in Crime No. 344 of 2018 on 13.08.2018. Therefore,we would have hardly expected Shri Arulmani to say that the allegationsagainst the Minister were added up later by the Police and that it was asimple money dispute. His present stand supporting the accused andquestioning the locus standi of the appellants, is, to say the least, shockingBand warrants something more than mere condemnation. We leave it atthat in the hope that the employer and the State would take notice of hisconduct. Suffice it to say for our present purpose that the objectionrelating to the locus standi of the appellants is liable to be rejected.Accordingly, it is rejected.CThe Effect of the compromise and the non-inclusion of theoffences under the P.C. Act

27. The second issue arising for consideration is about the effectof the compromise entered into between the de facto complainant and13 named victims on the one hand and the 4 accused on the other hand.D

28. As we have pointed out earlier, the FIR was registered onlyfor offences under Sections 405, 420 & 506(1) of the IPC. This wasdespite the fact that the allegations contained in the complaint very clearlypointed to payment of money for procuring employment in the PublicTransport Corporation. We have already extracted the entire complaintEin paragraph 5(i) above. It was stated in the said complaint that in theyear 2014, an announcement for filling up vacant posts of Conductorand Driver in the Transport Corporation was issued and that thecomplainant got introduced to one Mr. Rajkumar. In fact there is also anaverment in the complaint that in the first week of January 2015, theFcomplainant went along with the said Rajkumar to the residence of ThiruSenthil Balaji at R.A. Puram and that the amount of Rs.40 lakhs waspaid therein to Shri Shanmugam, P.A. to the Minister. The complainanthad gone on to state that upon his insistence, he was allowed to meet theMinister and his brother and that the Minister and his brother assuredhim that all those who gave money would definitely be given appointmentGorders.

29. It must be recalled that though the FIR came to be registeredonly on 13.08.2018, it was actually in pursuance of an order passed bythe High Court on 16.11.2017 in Crl. O.P. No. 24029 of 2017. Therefore, H6 (2014) 2 SCC 1

we are surprised that the FIR did not include the offences under theP.C. Act, 1988.

30. While filing a final report, the Investigation Officer seems tohave been little more gracious by including Section 409 IPC, since Sh.Shanmugam, the person who received the money from the complainantand the victims was stated to be a Personal Assistant to the Minister.Additionally, the money was said to have been paid at the residence ofthe Minister with his knowledge and the Minister is stated (in the FIR) tohave acknowledged that those who paid money will be rewarded withthe appointment orders.

31. Thus it is clear that the final report implicated the accused foroffences under Sections 406, 409, 420 and 506(1) IPC. None of theseoffences except the one under Section 506 IPC is compoundable undersub-Section (1) of Section 320, Cr.P.C. The offences under Sections406 and 420 are compoundable under sub-Section (2) of Section 320.

32. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 makes it clear that no offenceshall be compounded except as provided by the Section. Therefore, therewas no way the offence under Section 409 IPC, included in the finalreport, could have been compounded. As a matter of fact, the HighCourt has recognised in the penultimate paragraph of the impugned orderthat the final report includes offences which are not compoundable.However, the High Court proceeded to quash the final report, purportedlyon the basis of the guidelines issued by this Court in Parbatbhai Aahir@ Parbathbhai (supra) and The State of Madhya Pradesh (supra).Therefore we may now proceed to examine whether the High Courtwas right in doing so.

33. In Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another[7], a threeMember Bench of this Court was concerned with a reference made bya two Member Bench, which doubted the correctness of the decisionsin B.S. Joshi and Others vs. State of Haryana and another[8], NikhilMerchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr.[9] and ManojSharma vs. State and Others[10].

34. B.S. Joshi (supra) was a case where the dispute was a familydispute and the offences complained were under Sections 498A, 323and 406. Therefore, this Court appears to have taken a lenient view.7 (2012) 10 SCC 3038 (2003) 4 SCC 6759 (2008) 9 SCC 67710 (2008) 16 SCC 1

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A35. Nikhil Merchant (supra) is a case where a borrowercommitted default in repayment of the loans taken from Andhra Bank.Apart from filing a suit for recovery of money, the Bank also filed acriminal complaint both against the officers of the company and againstthe officers of the bank, not only for offences under the IPC but also foroffences under the PC Act. After the suit was compromised, theBManaging Director of the borrower Company sought to get dischargedfrom the complaint. The special Judge (CBI) rejected the application fordischarge. The High Court confirmed the same. But this Court reversedthe decision of the High Court, solely on the ground that the amountpayable to the Bank stood settled. However, it must be noticed that inCNikhil Merchant, the operative portion of the order of this Court merelystated that the criminal proceedings were quashed against theappellanttherein.There is no indication therein that the complaint against theofficers for offences under the P.C. Act were also quashed.

36. Manoj Sharma (supra) was a case where the offencesDcomplained were under Sections 420, 468, 471, 34 read with Section120B IPC. Though this Court quashed the criminal complaint in the saidcase also, one of the learned Judges constituting the Bench (MarkandeyKatju, J.) reserved the question regarding the power of the High Courtto quash non-compoundable cases under Section 482 Cr.P.C or Article226 of the Constitution, on the basis of the compromise reached betweenEthe parties, to be decided by a larger bench at an appropriate time.Paragraph 27 of the decision in Manoj Sharma which contains theopinion of Markandey Katju, J., reads as follows:

“27. There can be no doubt that a case under Section 302 IPC orother serious offences like those under Sections 395, 307 or 304-FB cannot be compounded and hence proceedings in thoseprovisions cannot be quashed by the High Court in exercise of itspower under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or in writ jurisdiction on the basisof compromise. However, in some other cases, (like those akin toa civil nature) the proceedings can be quashed by the High CourtGif the parties have come to an amicable settlement even thoughthe provisions are not compoundable. Where a line is to be drawnwill have to be decided in some later decisions of this Court,preferably by a larger bench (so as to make it more authoritative).Some guidelines will have to be evolved in this connection and thematter cannot be left at the sole unguided discretion of Judges,H

P. DHARAMARAJ v. SHANMUGAM & ORS.

[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

otherwise there may be conflicting decisions and judicial anarchy.A judicial discretion has to be exercised on some objective guidingprinciples and criteria, and not on the whims and fancies ofindividual Judges. Discretion, after all, cannot be the Chancellor’sfoot.”

37. Therefore in Gian Singh (supra), the three Member Benchof this Court took up for consideration the question regarding thedifference between the power of the court to quash a complaint/charge-sheet and the power to compound an offence. After analysing the statutoryprovisions and the various decisions of this Court, this Court summarisedthe position, in paragraph 61 of its decision in Gian Singh, as follows:

“The position that emerges from the above discussion can besummarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing acriminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherentjurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to acriminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 ofthe Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutorylimitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guidelineengrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice, or(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what casespower to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R maybe exercised where the offender and victim have settled theirdispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of eachcase and no category can be prescribed. However, before exerciseof such power, the High Court must have due regard to the natureand gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mentaldepravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot befittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and theoffender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not privatein nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, anycompromise between the victim and offender in relation to theoffences under special statutes like Prevention of CorruptionAct or the offences committed by public servants while workingin that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashingcriminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminalcases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavourstand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularlythe offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, A

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Apartnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out ofmatrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes wherethe wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the partieshave resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, theHigh Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, becauseof the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibilityBof conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminalcase would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice andextreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing thecriminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromisewith the victim. In other words, the High Court must considerCwhether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice tocontinue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminalproceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despitesettlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoerand whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that thecriminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the aboveDquestion(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within itsjurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

38. After Gian Singh, this Court was concerned in NarinderSingh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another[11] with the perennialproblem of courts swinging from one extreme to the other in respect ofEcases involving offences under Section 307 IPC. A via media was struckby this Court in the said decision, by holding that it would be open to theHigh Court to go into the nature of the injury sustained, nature of theweapons used etc. This was after holding that an offence under Section307 would fall in the category of heinous and serious offence.

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39. Then came the decision in State of Maharashtra throughCentral Bureau of Investigation vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi andOthers[12], where this Court was concerned with an order of the HighCourt of Bombay quashing the criminal proceedings for offencespunishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 & 471 read with SectionG120B IPC. It was a case involving credit facilities provided by the Banksand the failure of the borrowers to repay the loan. After the debts due tothe bank were assigned in favour of an Asset Reconstruction Company,a settlement was reached and the borrower took a “No Due Certificate”.

11 (2014) 6 SCC 46612 (2014) 15 SCC 29H

Therefore, relying upon the decisions of this Court in Madan MohanAbbot vs. State of Punjab[13] and Central Bureau of Investigation vs.A. Ravishankar Prasad and Others[14], the High Court of Bombayquashed the proceedings on the ground that no useful purpose would beserved by allowing the matter to proceed for trial. It is interesting to notethat Madan Mohan (supra), as seen from the last paragraph of theorder, was passed in the peculiar facts of the case. But in so far as A.Ravishankar Prasad (supra) is concerned, the High Court quashedthe proceedings on the basis of a settlement reached between theborrowers and the Indian Bank. But the decision of the High Court wasover turned, by a two Judge Bench of this Court even after taking noteof B.S.Joshi and Nikhil Merchant. In paragraph 46 of its decision, thisCourt said in A. Ravishankar Prasad :- “46. Before parting with the case we would like to observe thatmere repayment of loan under a settlement cannot exempt theaccused from the criminal proceeding in the facts of this case.”

40. Therefore, in Vikram Anantrai Doshi (supra), this Court tooknote of the aforesaid decisions and held in paragraph 26 as follows:- “26. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view. Beit stated, that availing of money from a nationalised bank in themanner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly expositsfiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandias narrated in the charge-sheet cannot be put in the compartmentof an individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it hasimmense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handlingof finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverlyconceived contrivance to avail of these kinds of benefits it cannotbe regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominatinglycivil character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates ahazard in the financial interest of the society. The gravity of theoffence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation. Thecleverness which has been skillfully contrived, if the allegationsare true, has a serious consequence. A crime of this nature, in ourview, would definitely fall in the category of offences which travelfar ahead of personal or private wrong. It has the potentiality tousher in economic crisis. Its implications have its own seriousness,13 (2008) 4 SCC 58214 (2009) 6 SCC 351

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Afor it creates a concavity in the solemnity that is expected in financialtransactions. It is not such a case where one can pay the amountand obtain a “no dues certificate” and enjoy the benefit of quashingof the criminal proceeding on the hypostasis that nothing moreremains to be done. The collective interest of which the Court isthe guardian cannot be a silent or a mute spectator to allow theBproceedings to be withdrawn, or for that matter yield to theingenuous dexterity of the accused persons to invoke thejurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section482 of the Code and quash the proceeding. It is not legallypermissible. The Court is expected to be on guard to these kindsCof adroit moves. The High Court, we humbly remind, should havedealt with the matter keeping in mind that in these kinds oflitigations the accused when perceives a tiny gleam of success,readily invokes the inherent jurisdiction for quashing of the criminalproceeding. The Court’s principal duty, at that juncture, should beto scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of allegations and theDcrux of the settlement. It is the experience of the Judge that comesto his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution,circumspection and courageous prudence. As we find in the caseat hand the learned Single Judge has not taken pains to scrutinisethe entire conspectus of facts in proper perspective and quashedEthe criminal proceeding. The said quashment neither helps to securethe ends of justice nor does it prevent the abuse of the process ofthe court nor can it be also said that as there is a settlement noevidence will come on record and there will be remote chance ofconviction. Such a finding in our view would be difficult to record.Be that as it may, the fact remains that the social interest wouldFbe on peril and the prosecuting agency, in these circumstances,cannot be treated as an alien to the whole case. Ergo, we have noother option but to hold that the order [Vikram AnantraiDoshi v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Application No. 2239of 2009, order dated 22-4-2010 (Bom)] of the High Court is whollyGindefensible.

41. In Parbatbhai Aahir (supra), referred to by the High Court inthe impugned order, a 3 member Bench of this Court again summarisedthe broad principles on this question in paragraph 16. Paragraph 16.6and 16.8 to 16.10 of the decision read as follows:- H

“16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and whiledealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the HighCourt must have due regard to the nature and gravity of theoffence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravityor offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriatelybe quashed though the victim or the family of the victim havesettled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not privatein nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision tocontinue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overridingelement of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise fromcommercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similartransactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriatesituations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminalproceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants,the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of acriminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out inpropositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involvingthe financial and economic well-being of the State have implicationswhich lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between privatedisputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quashwhere the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial oreconomic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the actcomplained of upon the financial or economic system will weighin the balance.”

42. Thus it is clear from the march of law that the Court has to goslow even while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.PC or Article226 of the Constitution in the matter of quashing of criminal proceedingson the basis of a settlement reached between the parties, when theoffences are capable of having an impact not merely on the complainantand the accused but also on others.

43. As seen from the final report filed in this case and the counteraffidavit filed by the I.O., persons who have adopted corrupt practicesto secure employment in the Transport Corporation fall under twocategories namely, (i) those who paid money and got orders of A

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Aappointment; and (ii) those who paid money but failed to secureemployment. If persons belonging to the 2[nd] category are allowed tosettle their dispute by taking refund of money, the same would affix aseal of approval on the appointment of persons belonging to the 1[st]category. Therefore, the High Court ought not to have quashed the criminalproceedings on the basis of the compromise.B

44. It is needless to point out that corruption by a public servant isan offence against the State and the society at large. The Court cannotdeal with cases involving abuse of official position and adoption of corruptpractices, like suits for specific performance, where the refund of themoney paid may also satisfy the agreement holder. Therefore we holdCthat the High Court was completely in error in quashing the criminalcomplaint.

45. Coming to the next issue regarding the non-inclusion in thefinal report, of the offences under the P.C. Act, the less said the better.In the counter affidavit filed by the I.O. to the writ petition W.P.No.9061Dof 2021, filed by the non-selected candidates, the modus operandiadopted by the accused has been given in detail. We have provided agist of the contents of such counter affidavit elsewhere in this judgment.We are constrained to say that even a novice in criminal law would nothave left the offences under the P.C. Act, out of the final report. TheEattempt of the I.O. appears to be of one, “willing to strike but afraid towound” (the opposite of what Alexander Pope wrote in “Epistle toDr.Arbuthnot”)[15].

46. An argument was sought to be advanced as though the Ministerwas not involved and that Shri Shanmugam who is allegedly involved,Fwas not the P.A. to the Minister. But this argument flies in the face ofthe contents of paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit filed by the I.O. inW.P. No.9061 of 2021 which reads as follows:-

“11. It is respectfully submitted that, after the Notification processTr.V.Senthil Balaji, then Minister for Transport instructedGTr.Sarangan, Special Officer, Tr.K.T.Govindarajan, Senior DeputyManager, Administration, Tr. V.Venkadarajan, who were servingin the Chairman office, to collect the details regarding the day-to-dayprogress of the recruitment such as, sale of application, receipt15 Damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer, And without sneering, teach the rest tosneer, Willing to wound and yet afraid to strike, just hint a fault, and hesitateHdislike.

of filled application, interviews conducted, etc… Accordingly, theyhave collected the details from all the eight Transport Corporationsthrough their email address ‘[REDACTED]’and on the sameday, they transmitted it to the Minister’s office email id‘[REDACTED]’. The e-mail communications madebetween Chairman office and Transport Corporations on03.11.2014, 04.11.2014 and 05.12.2014 from the office of theChairman, Transport Corporations, Chennai. Many a time, thedata had also been sent to Tr.M. Vetrichelvan, Public RelationsOfficer (PRO) of MTC to his email address ‘vetri67@gmailcom’,as he was very close to the then Transport Minister Tr.V. SenthilBalaji. It is pertinent to mention here that the e-mail named‘[REDACTED]’had been maintained only byTr.B.Shanmugam and not by any of the Personal Assistants ofthe Minister Tr.V.Senthil Balaji.”

Therefore, the argument that there is nothing on record to showthat Shri Shanmugam was appointed as P.A. to the Minister, is tobe stated only to be rejected.

47. Yet another contention raised on behalf of the respondents isthat there are two other cases where allegations of corruption are madeand that CC No.25 of 2021 with which we are concerned now, did notinvolve allegations of corruption. But the said contention is abhorring,for the simple reason that all criminal complaints arose out of the verysame cash-for-job scam. We are informed that the proceedings in respectof those two cases have also been stayed by the High Court. We do notknow how the High Court could have stayed prosecution of personsunder the P.C. Act, especially in matters of this nature.

48. As a matter of fact, the State ought to have undertaken acomprehensive investigation into the entire scam, without allowing theaccused to fish out one case as if it was a private money dispute.

49. The reliance placed by the respondents on an order passed bythe Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court on an earlier occasion inCriminal O.P.(MD)Nos.14067, 140967, 16023 of 2016, will not havebearing upon the present complaints. In fact, the SLP filed by a 3[rd] partyagainst the order passed in those petitions was dismissed by this Courton 05.01.2017 even at the stage of permission to file SLP. Therefore therespondents cannot rely upon the same as if it constitutes a precedent.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

AConclusion

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

AConclusion

50. In the light of what is stated above, the impugned order of theHigh Court is wholly unsustainable. Therefore the appeals are allowedand the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The criminalcomplaint is restored to file. The I.O. shall now proceed under SectionB173(8) of the Code to file a further report, based on the observationsmade in the preceding paragraphs. Additionally/alternatively, the SpecialCourt before which the CC is pending, shall exercise power under Section216 of the Cr.P.C., if there is any reluctance on the part of the State/I.O.If two other cases where offences under the P.C. Act are included, areunder the orders of stay passed by the High Court, the State should takeCappropriate steps to have the stay vacated. The Court dealing with thosetwo cases should also keep in mind the disastrous effect of putting onhold the prosecution under the P.C. Act.

51. At present we are not passing any orders on the prayer madeby the intervenors either to constitute a Special Investigation Team or toDappoint Special Public Prosecutor, since we do hope that based on theobservations made above, the State itself may do the needful. We alsomake it clear that at the time of trial, the Special Court may not beswayed by the observations contained herein, but proceed on the meritsof the case and the law on the points.EThe appeals are allowed. I.As stand closed.

Devika Gujral

(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)

Appeals allowed.

F

G

H