CRP/4/2009 of The Branch Manager New India Assurance Co Ltd Vs Meena Devi and Ors on 11 December 2009

JUDGMENT

Wa'nad.I' I.

These two Revision Petitions have been taken up togetherfor djsposa[ by this common I.udgment as the question involvedfor adjudication in them are substantially the same.Civil Revision Petition No.04 of 2009.

This Revision Petition is directed against the award ofthe Member, Motor Accident claims Tribunal, East and NorthSikkim at Gangtok, dated 23.02.2007, by which the petitioner,New India Assurance Company Limited, Gangtok Branchthrough its Branch Manager, was made liable for payment ofdeath compensation of Rs.16,31,460.00 (Rupees sixteen lakhsthirty one thousand four hundred and sixty), against the deathof the victim, Dev Bahadur, the husband of the respondent no.1and the father of the respondent nos.2, 3 and 4 respectively.

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2. The undisputed facts of the case are that on03.05.2004 at about 9.35 a,in. bus bearing registration No.SK-04/3889 owned by the respondent no.5 in which the victim DevBahadur, S/o Lt. Man Bahadur was I:ravelling a.s its conductormet with an accident near Traffic Point, Singtam Bazar, PO & PSSingtam, East Sikkim, in which he was fatally injured and wasdeclared dead when brought to the Singtam District Hospital.Joint claim petition under Sections 140 and 166 of the MotorVehicles Act,1988 was filed by the respondent nos.1, 2, 3 and 4before the Motor Accident claims Tribunal, East and NorthSikkim at Gangtok, registered as M.A.C.T. Case No.23 of 2007,claiming compensation for the death caused to the victim, dueto the aforesaid accident against the respondent no.5 as theowner of the accident bus and the petitioner, New IndiaAssurance Company Limited, Gangtok Branch through itsBranch Manager with which the bus had been insured. TheAccident Claims Tribunal on completion of the due processunder Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, passed theimpugned judgment awarding compensation of Rs.16,31,460.00to be paid by the petitioner wit:h interest @ 10% per annumwith effect from the date of the claim pet:ition to be paid withintwo months from the date of the judgment.

In I:he revision petition, the only ground set up by thepetitioner for assailing the impugned judgment was that theTribunal had wrongly assessed the compensation under theschedule provided in the Motor Vehicles Act when it was quite

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well established that: the victim was a workman under therespondent no.5 and had died during the course of hisemployment due to the accident of the vehicle belonging to therespondent no.5 which necessitated assessment of the quantumof compensation as per schedule IV prescribed under theWorkmen's Compensation Act, 1923. On account of sucherroneous assessment, the amount of compensation arrived atwas exorbitantly high and therefore, the award called for beingquashed and set aside. Apart from the above, the petitioneralso sought to challenge the award of interest @10% as beingon the higher side, in view of the prevailing rate of interest incommercial transactions by banks.

It may be stated that the revision petition havingbeen filed beyond the period prescribed under the law, anapplication for condonation of delay under Section 5 of theLimitation Act, 1963 was filed along with the revision petition.This was allowed by this Court vide order dated 23.07.2009 inCivil Misc. Application No.42 of 2009 and the revision petitionwas taken up for hearing on admission on 05.08,2009. On beingadmitted, arguments on behalf of the parties were finally heardon 08.12.2009. In the meanwhile, on 20.11.2009, uponhearing the parties, the points for consideration in the casewere narrowed down to the following: -

'`(i) Whether the delay in filing the Revision Petition can becondoned.condoned.

(ii) Whether the Revision Pet:ition is maintainable.

(iii) Whether the defence of the Insurance Company can beallowed to be raised on the admitted position, that it:was neither raised in their written statement nor wasit placed orally before the Tribunal.allowed to be raised on the admitted position, that it:was neither raised in their written statement nor wasit placed orally before the Tribunal.

(iv) Subject to the finding on the above, whether thedefence taken by the Insurance Company of its limitedliability is valid in the eye of law.defence taken by the Insurance Company of its limitedliability is valid in the eye of law.

Of the above points, point no. (i) having beenalready decided by the order of this Court vide order dated23.07.2009 in Civil Misc. Application No.42 of 2009 wasabandoned accordingly and the case was heard on theremaining points which are dealt with hereunder.

Before going into that it is of relevance to point outat this stage that at the time of arguments Mr. Sudesh Joshi,learned Counsel representing the petitioner while placing hiscase in his opening submissions on 22.9.2009, strongly stressedon the grounds set out in the revision petition and submittedthat the award passed by t:he learned Tribunal making thepetitioner entirely liable for payment of the compensation waserroneous on the face of the insurance policy under which therespondent no.5 was indemnified. It was submitted that as therespondent no.5 had paid Rs.25/- only as special premium tocover the liability that would be worked out under theWorkman's Compensation Act, 1923 under Indian Motor Tariff(IMT) 40, it was erroneous on the part of the learned Tribunal tohave fastened the entire liability of the compensation awardedin favour of respondent nos. 1 t:o 4. It was, therefore, `T- Og?

submitted that t:he impugned order of the learned Tribunal wasliable to be modified to that extent.

However, in complete contrast to the aforesaidstand, on 08,12.2009 when the hearing resumed, Mr. SudeshJoshi submitted that the victim of the accident was not at all stand, on 08,12.2009 when the hearing resumed, Mr. Sudesh covered under the insurance policy for the reason that: - (a)The victim was not engaged in driving the vehicle, i.e., the bus which met with the accident in the present case; and (b)The bus which met with the accident causingthe death of the victim was not a public servicevehicle as provided under the proviso to sub-section 1 of Section 147 of the Motor VehiclesAct, 1988 although he was a conductor of thatbus.the death of the victim was not a public servicevehicle as provided under the proviso to sub-section 1 of Section 147 of the Motor VehiclesAct, 1988 although he was a conductor of thatbus.

As per him, having regard to the above facts, I:heclaimants ought to have to have applied for compensation underthe Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. In support, strongreliance was placed by him upon 2007 f5j Sac 428 ; Ori-enfa/Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Meena Variyal and Othersr moreparticularly paragraph 12 thereof.

It is, therefore, to be seen as to which of the twopropositions placed by Mr. Joshi would be applicable, or as towhether any of the two propositions would be applicable in thefacts and circumstances of the case. I shall deal with those at alater point of time, but before that it is felt necessary to dealwith the point nos. (ii) and (iii) indicated above since that woulddecide as to whether it would be at all necessary. to go intothem.

Whether the Revision Petition is maintainable.HB]

In order to answer this question it would be essentialto examine as to whether the claims Tribunal constituted underthe Motor Vehicles Act is a court subordinate to the High Courtas provided under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code,1908. It is also to be seen as to whether the Claims Tribunal isa Civil Court within the meaning of Section 3 of the said Code.When we examine those questions in the light of the provisionsof the M.otor Vehicles Act, 1988 one would arrive at anirresistible conclusion that the claims Tribunal under the MotorVehicles Act, 1988 is not a Civil Court under Section 3 CPC and,therefore, not a subordinate court contemplated under Section115 of the said Code.

Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is aspecial provision made for providing expeditious relief to thevictims of accidents or their representatives. It prescribes acomplete mechanism for making claims for compensation, forfiling appeals against awards, etc. and, therefore, a completecode by itself. Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988expressly bars Civil Courts from entertaining .any questionrelating to any claim for compensation which may beadjudicated upon by the claims Tribunal. The powers of CivilCourts vested in the Claims Tribunal are limited. In sub-section2 of Section 169 of the Act it has been prescribed that theClaims Tribunal shall have "All powers of a Civil Court: for thepurpose of taking evidence on oath and for enforcing the cb

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att:endance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery andproduction of documents and material objects and for suchother purposes as may be prescribed; and the claims Tribunalshall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes ofSection 195 of Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973". Thus by an express provision a clear restriction hasbeen imposed in the application of the CPC.

±n the case Of V\ N. Munegowda vs. Mushraff AllBaig and Another -. 2000 AC] 1545 a S-ingle Bench Of theHigh Court of Karnataka, while examining the very questionbefore us, held as follows: -

"Though this revision ..... „ ..................., appears tobe not maintainable in view of the decision of this Court inOriental Insurance Co. I:id. V. Thibbegowda, 2000 ACJ438 fKamafakaj, whereu nder this cou rt,

..,................................,.... „ ......... Motor Accidents Claims Tribunalcannot be held to be ci.vil court for the purpose of section115 Of Civil Procedure Code ................ u ........ n.Th-ls v-lew Ofthis court has been taken aft:er taking into considerationthe provisions of the Nofor VeA/ares Act, J939 as well assections 175 and 173(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act as wellas provisions relating to the const:itution of the Mot:orAccidents Claims Tribunal whichSo merelv because itis headed bv or Presided bv a Civil Judcie or District Judae,that will not make it a civil court because if I aDDlv thisDrinciDle otherwise for in this case Tribunal is headed bv asittinci or retired Hicih Court Judae, auestion will arisewhether it should ba taken as a Hiah Court? I answercertainly not, and such a question had been considered bytheir Lordships of the Apex Court in the context of section7 Of Anddhra Pradesh Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, L9&2-in the case Of State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Mohan Lal,J998 r5j Sac 468, where a special court was constitutedunder that Act and which Act provided that it shall corrsistof a Judge of the High Court, sitting or retired as itsChairman and two District Judges and two revenueofficers. Their Lordships observed even though it ist:ermed as special court, it will not form part of judicatureor civil ]-udicature. It held it to be a Tribunal and remedyagainst the order thereof will be petition under Article226/227 of the Constitution.

1A. Further section 169 of the "ofor Veh/.c/es Actreveals that leaislature while enact:inc] Motor Vehicles Actdid not intend-or conceive it to be 5 civil court. It hasreferred to the Tribunal as the claims Tribunal and then it

Drovides bv virtue of sub-section f2) that the claimsTribunal shall have Dowers of a civil court under Code totake record of evidence on oath as well as to enforceattendance of witnesses. It reveals that the leciislaturemaintained a distinction between the Tribunal and civilgg±±±, and legislature specifically enacted the provision inthe Act and in absence of Provisions of sub-section f2) ofsection 169 of the Act, it could not exercise those Bowersof civil court to take evidence on oath or enforceattendance of witnesses, etc. So by sub-section (2) suchpowers are conferred on the Claims Tribunal which powersare ordinarily vested in the civil court for taking evidenceon oath and of enforcing the att:endance of witnesses andof compelling the discovery and production of documentsand material objects. The later part of such-section (2) ofsection 169 further reveals that the legislature for certainspecial and specific purposes indicated, has incorporatedlegal fiction of `the deeming clause' and it has providedthat for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the claims Tribunalshall be deemed t:o be civil court. It is one of the wellsettled principles of law that when effect of deemingclause of legal fiction has to be considered, the court hasto take into consideration the purposes for which the legalfiction has been created and legal fiction is to be giveneffect for only that or those purposes and not beyondthat. It means it is deemed to be a civil court only forlimited DurDoses of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of Codeof Criminal Procedure.

2. Thus considered in my opinion, the Tribunalcannot be deemed to be or considered to be civil court: forthe DurDoses of sections 3, 9 and 115 of C/-wi/ Proc LfreCode. -Under Civf-/ Procedure Cbde, revision lies from acourt subordinate to Hiah Court and what courts aresubordinate to Hic[h Court has been defined under section3 Of the Civil Prodedure Code .Itself .................... "

( underiining supplied )

±0. ±n the case Of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs.Stnt. Florrentina Hilario Gonslaves and Others E 1999 (2)7IAC 732 another Single Bench of the Karnataka High Courtaccepted the principle laid down in the above judgment and heldthat the civil revision filed under Section 115 of the CivilProcedure Code was not maintainable. Although the aforesaidtwo judgments were rendered by Benches constituted by Judgessitting singly, I have no hesitation in relying upon the principleeni]nciated therein that a Claims Tribunal not being asubordinate court under this High Court for the purpose of Section 115 CPC., the revision petition would not bemaintainable and it is accordingly held so.

11. However, there is another aspect of the matter whichrequires consideration in the light of the decision of the ApexCourt -in 2002 (2) SCC 265 -. united Insurance Co.Ltd. vs.BA«sAan Sachdewa andr Others wherein after examining thecontours of Sections 173, 168 and sub-section 2 of Section 149of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 it was held in paragraph 11 asfollows: - "11. We are, therefore, of the vi,ew that the insurancecompany can fall within the ambit of the words ``anyperson aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal" asused in Sect:ion 173(1) of the Act, when the insuredfailed to file an appeal against the award."

12. It is relevant to note that in the above case as in theone on hand, the insured/owner of the accident vehicle did notprefer to challenge the award of the claims Tribunal and thatthe Petitioner Insurance Company had filed a revision petitionas it was felt that an appeal could not be filed by the insurer tochallenge the award. It has been held in that decision I:hat ifthe insured fails to prefer an appeal against an award of theClaims Tribunal, that also would amount to failure to contest theclaim as contemplated under clause (b) of Section 170 of theMotor Vehicles Act, 1988. In such eventuality, the Act enablesthe insurer to contest an award on all grounds available to aninsured. In the present case the circumstances being identical,it was open for the insurance company to have invoked the rightunder Section 173 of the Act as the insured had failed to appeal E

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against the award. Under such circumstances, the revisionpetition filed by the petitioner in my view deserves to be treatedas an appeal petition filed under Section 173 of the Act.

13. Mr. Ajay Rathi, Advocate for the respondents 1 to 4roferred to 2003(3) SCC 524 -. Sadhana Lodha vs. NationalInsurance Co. £tidl. Andr Others to press the point that therevision petition is not maintainable as a Claims Tribunal wasnot a Civil Court. I do not think the decision is of any assistanceto the respondent nos. 1 to 4 as the question that was in issuebefore the Court was solely limited to the question as towhether a pet.ition under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indiawas maintainable when a remedy by way of appeal to the HighCourt was available under Section 173 of the Motor VehiclesAct, 1988. In t:hat case the Apex Court noted the situationwhere there was collusion between the claimant and the insuredor where the insured did not contest the claim or where thetribunal did not implead the insurance company to contest theclaim. Under such circumstances it was held that it would beopen to an insurer to seek permission of the tribunal to contestthe claim on the ground available to the insured or to a personagainst whom the claim has been made and that, if permissionis granted and the insurer is allowed to contest the claim onmerit, it was permissible for the insurer to file an appeal againstthe award of the tribunal on merit. It was, therefore, held inthe facts and circumstances obtaining in that case, the remedyofflllnganappealbeforetheHIghcourtwasavallabSothe ?

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insurer. The essence of the ratio laid down in the above twocases is that if, in a claims case, the insured does not contestthe claim or the award, it would be permissible for the insurer toseek remedy of appeal under Section 173 of the Motor VehiclesAct, 1988 on all grounds available and not restricted to thosecontained in sub-section 2 of Section 149 of the Motor VehiclesAct, 1988. I, therefore, hold that for this reason also thepetitioner has a remedy of appeal and under such circumstancesand in the interest of I-ustice this revision petition is herebytreated as an appeal.

14. Having held so in point no.(ii), the petitioner wouldnow be required to cross the hurdle as set out in point no.(iii) inorder to succeed in this proceeding which I proceed to deal withhereunder: -

(iii) Whether the defence of the Insurance ComDanv canbe allowed to be raised on the admitt:ed Position, that itwas neither raised in their written statement nor was itI)laced orally before the Tribunal.

As in almost all the appeals filed by the insurancecompanies that have come before me thus far for ad].udication,the grounds raised in the present revision petition had not at allbeen taken before the Claims Tribunal eit:her in the writtenobjection or in the oral arguments. No evidence at all was ledon behalf of the petitioner on any of the averments contained inthe written objection, let alone on the grounds that have beenraised in the present petition. As held by this Court in ".A,C.I.Appeal No.01 of 2009 -. Senior Branch Manager NationalInsurance Co. L±d. 31 Ar National Highway, Opposite Tourism Departmentr Gangtokr Eaist Sikkim vs. NamitaDi-xi-I and Offlers fpara 23j, the Insurance Policy is a contractbetween the insurer and the insured. The law enjoins the partyraising ob].ections to specifically plead and prove all objectionsbefore the Claims Tribunal. This admittedly was not: done. Asheld in the case of rvami-£a Di-xi-I fs«praj it is impermissible foran appellant to raise a question as an abstract question of lawbefore this Court in the present petition.

15. Nothing has been brought on record by the petitionerto show that the bus that met with the accident in which thevictim was engaged as a conductor was not a public servicevehicle. As already stated, the petitioner did not adduce anyevidence at all apart from filing a formal written objection. Eventhe insurance policy in question was brought on record andexhibited by the claimants/respondents 1 I:o 4. Under suchcircumstances, it is now not permissible for the petitioner toraise the objection at this stage. In a similar situation as incase at hand, it has been held by the Supreme Court in 2008(7) SCC 305 -. Rajesh Kumar @ tfaju vs. Yudhvir Singhand Another as under-. - "11 ...... „ ...... „.It even does not appear that the contentionsraised before us had either been raised before theTribunal or the High Court. The Tribunal as also the HighCourt, therefore, proceeded on the materials brought onrecord by the parties. In absence of any contentionhaving been raised in regard to the applicability of theWorkmen's Compensation Act which, in our opinion, exfacie has no application, the same, in our opinion, cannot Workmen's Compensation Act which, in our opinion, exbe permitted to be raised for I:he first time"'-i r==e`EE

Therefore, in answering point (iii) it is held that t:heground raised in the petition cannot be allowed to be raised atthis stage when admittedly it was neither raised in their writtenobjection nor was it placed orally before the claims Tribunal byapplication of the principles of waiver, estoppel andacquiescence.

In view of the findings on point No.(ii) that theclaims Tribunal is not a Civil Court and on point No.(iii) as setout above it is not felt necessary to go into the merit of thepetition. Consequ'ently, the impugned award is hereby upheld.

Needless to state that the amount paid t:o theclaimants/respondent nos.1 to 4 by the petitioner company inpursuance of the order of this Court dated 04.11.2009 shall bededucted from the amount awarded by the claims Tribunal.

16. In the result, the petition stands hereby dismissed.The award with necessary deduction shall be paid by thepetitioner to the respondents 1 to 4 within a period of onemonth from this date failing which the petitioner shall be liableto pay an additional interest of 20/o over and above the loo/aawarded by the claims Tribunal from the date of the claim.The petitioner shall further pay cost of Rs.10,000/-(Rupeesten thousand), half of the which will be paid to the BarAssociation of Sikkim and the other half to the respondents 1 to4.

17. Records of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, East:and North Sikkim be sent back forthwith.

18. Before parting with this case it is necessary to dealI with the regrettable att:itude exhibited by the PetitionerInsurance Company in this case. From the records of theTribunal, it appears that the claim petition was filed on22.12.2007 along with an application under Section 140 of theMotor Vehicles Act, 1988. By order dated 21.06.2008, theClaims Tribunal allowed the petition under Section 140 of theMotor Vehicles Act, 1988 for payment of interim relief anddirected that a sum of Rs.50,000/- be paid to the claimantswithin two months from the date of the order. Two monthsperiod obviously expired on 20.08.2008, but the order was notcomplied with. The petitioner neither preferred an appealagainst the int:erim award nor was extension of.time for makingthe payment sought for by the Insurance Company. Thesituation continued as such even as on 23.02.2009 when thefinal award was passed by the claims Tribunal. The petitionerhad remained obdurate even during the period when the appealwas pending disposal before this Court. There was, therefore, adeliberate and wilful disobedience of the order dated21.06.2008 which cannot be ignored by this Court as it amountsobstruction of the due course of justice and an affront to themajesty of law. Such attitude on the part of the InsuranceCompany not only defeats the object of Section 140 of theMotor Vehicles Act, 1988 of mitigating the plight of the victimsof motor accidents or their representatives, but also prima facieamounts to civil contempt as defined under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Under such circumstances, I direct theRegistry to register a suo moto case of civil contempt as definedunder Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 againstthe Branch Manager, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. GangtokBranch, and place the file before this Court for necessary orderson 16.02.2010 in view of the intervening winter vacation.

Civil Revision Petition No.08 of 2009

The only question raised before this Court in theRevision Petition is that the award passed by t:he ClaimsTribunal by its judgment dated 03.04.2008 in M.A.C.T. Case No.17 of 2007, fastening upon the petitioner the responsibility ofmaking the payment of the award, was erroneous and liable tobe set aside as the victim of the accident being a gratuitouspassengers travelling in a private vehicle was not covered underthe terms and conditions of the insurance policy and that noextra premium was paid to cover the risk of such passengers.

The ob]-ection raised on be.half of theclaimants/respondents no.1 to 3 are on two counts. They are: -(1) The revision petition was barred by thelaw of limitation having been filed wit:h a delayof 232 days and that there was no satisfactoryexplanation for it to be condoned; and

(2) Thatthe remedy against the award passedby the Claims Tribunal being provided underSection 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 therevision petition was not maintainable.

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On 20.11.2009, I:his Court, after hearing the parties, formulated the following points to narrow down the points forconsideration for a decision in this case: -

(i) Whether the delay in filing the Revision Petitioncan be condoned.can be condoned.

(ii) Whether the Revision petition is maintainable.

(iii) Subject to the finding on t:h`e above, whether theRevision Petition would be maintainable on it:s merits.

Point f il Whether the delay in filing the Flevision Petitioncan be condoned.

4. In considering this point I have perused theaverments contained in the application under Section 5 of theLimitation Act, 1963 in order to be satisfied as to whethersufficient cause has been made out for the delay beingcondoned. It is found that the reasons for the delay has beenset out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the application which arereproduced below for convenience: - "3. That the Petitioner Company had no knowledgeabout the pronouncement of Judgment/award passed bythe Learned Tribunal due to lack of communication fromtheir conducting counsel, after having come to learn aboutthe Judgment/award on 3/11/2008 from their counsel atNamchi, t:he Petitioner company immediately applied forcertified copy of Judgment/award on 04/11/2008, thecertified copy was made ready on 7/11/2008.

4. That aft:er receiving the certified copy on7/11/2008, the Branch office of the Petitioner Company atGangtok immediately forwarded the copy of the said orderto the Divisional office at Siliguri for further instruction.The Division office in-turn forwarded the said order to theRegional office at Calcutta for further instruction in thematter. The Regional office referred the file to the LegalDepartment of the Appellant Company. The LegalDepartment further sought advice from the standingcounsel at Calcutta. Ultimately the Branch office atGangtok receive instructions on 16/11/2008 for preferringa Revision Petition against the Judgment/award.Accordingly the Branch Office contacted Shri Ashim Chettri and Dhurba Tewari, the I.unior counsel, toinstructing Sr. Counsel Shri A. K. Upadhayaya forconducting a Revision Petition before this Hon'ble Court.The junior Counsel could finally prepared t:he RevisionPetition by 19/11/2008 and after completing I:he formalitythe Revision Petition along with the application forcondonation of delay is filed on 22/11/2008. That therehas been delay of 232 days in preferring the RevisionPetition.„

Considering the facts and circumstances set out inthe application for condonation of delay registered as Civil Misc.Application No.91 of 2008, this Court, in the interest of justice,condones the delay in filing the revision petition. C.M.A. No.91of 2009 accordingly stands disposed of.

Point rii) Whetherlhe Revision Petition is maintainable.

This point has already been decided in Civil RevisionPetition No.4 of 2009 which are set out in paragraphs 7, 8, 9and 10 above. In view of this, it would not be necessary to dealwith it further. The point is, therefore, decided against thepetitioner as set out above and it is held that the RevisionPetition is not maintainable.

7! Although ithasbeen heldthatthe revision petition isnotmaintainable,inViewofthefindingsinCivHRevisionPetitionNo.4of2009,onitsmeritalsotherevisionpetitionwouldnotbesustainable. This aspect of the case is fully covered by theU¥uh:\`=ofs,ernEorBranchManagerrNatEonallnsurance3udgmentdated/01.12.2009inM.A.C.AppealNo.01of2oogin f/

C=°o.UITL_t==a=:^=_I,t..Nam'faD'X'tandOthers.|nwh.|chth..sCourt,afterconsjderjngthescopeofSectjon147(1)(b)(i)of theMotorVehjclesAct,1988,hasheldthatjnanjnsurancepoljcyprescribing the ljmjts of ljabjJjty under Section 11 (1)(P of theTariffPoljcwthejnsurerwouJdbeljableforpaymentofsuchamountasmaybeawardedbytheClajmsTribunalandthattheln,;r`' L`_:_ __y brings wjthjn its cover gratuitous passengers also.rragraph " and part of paragraph 22 of the judgement arejao;;:reproduced below for convenience: - ``15. It is now weH settled that Section 147(1)(b)(i)

brings within its ambit aH persons in the `third party'category including passengers travelling gratuitously byinterpretationoftheterm`anyperson'appearingtherejn.Under sub-section 2 of Section 147 the ljmjts of liabilityhas been prescribed as the amount of liability incurredunder the terms of the policy of insurance involved jn theCase.

22. . „ ....... „ ..................... Therefore, jt can be seen that in acaselikethepresentonewheretheinsurancepolicyhasspecjffcally incorporated "SECTION 11 - LIABILITY TOTHIRD PARTIES" there can be no room for doubt that thepolicy also covers gratuitous passengers and the insuredwho is the respondent no. 3 herein, is fully covered of aHrisks connected with such category of passengers settingat naught the only groL]nd of appeal set up by theappellant:.„

Against the column for `Limit of Liability' provided in the insurance cover in the present case, undeniably contains theentry `Limit of the 'account of the Company's Liability Underin( respect of any one accident : as per MotorSecfjon 11-1),1988'. Therefore, the victim of the accident who isVehicles Act:/,a gratuitouspassenger, stands fully covered by the insurance/porlcY.

ST.

10. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissedas not being maintainable apart from the fact that it cannot besustained on its merit also. In view of the fact that theclaimants/respondents 1, 2 and 3 have already been paid thecompensation in terms of the award passed by the ClaimsTribunal, there shall be no order as to costs.

Records of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Southnd West District, Sikkim at Namchi be sent back forthwith.