RFA/3/2009 of M/s. Himal Match Company Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. Vs Raj Bansi Bhagat on 16 November 2009

JUDGMENT

Wanc'di' J.

This appeal is directed against the judgment anddecree dated 13.04.2009 passed by the learned District Judge,East and North Sikkim at Gangtok in Eviction Suit No,5 of2005, by which the appellants/defendants were evicted fromthe rented premises belonging to the respondent/plaintiff.

The facts of the case so far as it is relevant for thedisposal of this appeal are as follows: -

(i) The respondent/plaintiff as the absolute owner of atwo storied RCC building situated at Mandi Bazar, Rangpo,East Sikkim, (referred to as the suit premises) had let it out tothe appellants/defendants in the year 1977 at a monthly rentof Rs.400/- and that in the year 1978, the suit premises wasrepaired by t:he respondent/plaintiff at an expenditure ofRs.2000/-.

(ii) That in the month of February, 2000, theappellants/defendants commenced with major repair works byengaging a contractor for the purpose, which was stopped bythem when the respondent/plaintiff objected.

(iii) That the respondent/plaintiff stopped receiving rent:for the suit premises from January, 2000 prompting theappellants/defendants to send it through money order then C+

onwards, which have also been refused by therespondent/plaintiff.

The above constitutes the substance of the relevantfacts involved in the suit which are undisputed. In the suit,the respondent/plaintiff has sought for eviction of theappellants/defendants from the suit premises on the groundthat the appellants/defendants had made material additionsand alterat:ions in the suit premises by demolishing someportions thereof. Therefore, it becomes apparent that the suitwas filed under the provisions of Gangtok Rent Control andEviction Act, 1956, as only under that Act, one of the groundsfor evict:ion of a tenant is for making material additions andalterat:ions to a rented premise without the knowledge andconsent of the landlord. But then\sub-section (iii) of Section 1of the Act provides that the law would be applicable only to allbuildings and constructions situate within t:he area of GangtokBazar to be fixed from time to time by the Sikkim Darbar, i.e.,the Stat:e Government, in terms of Clause 3 of the Adaptationof Sikkim Laws (No.1) Order, 1975. For t:he sake ofconvenience, sub-section (iii) of Section 1 of the Gangtok RentControl and Eviction Act,1956 is reproduced: - Section 1(iii) Extent - It shall extend to allBuildings & Construction situate within the areaof Gangtok Bazar, which may be fixed from timeto time by the Sikl(im Darbar.

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Analysis

Therefore, as the law is not applicable to premisessituated at Rangpo, where the rented premise in question issituated, the suit would not be maintainable under that law,notwithstanding the fact that in earlier three decisions of thisCourt .in the cases oF Jokhiram vs. Mangturam : (1977) 1Sikkim LJ 30, Shakuntala Bai vs. K. N. Dewan (1977) 1Sikkim LJ 33 and Paul Sangay vs. Mahabir PrasadAgalrwalla : AIR 1980 Sikkim 13, doubts had beer\expressed as to whether the Gangtok Rent Control andEviction Act:, 1956 was at all applicable in Gangtok as the areaof ``Gangtok Bazar" had never been fixed by the Sikkim Darbaror by the State Government as required under Section 1 (iii)of the said Act.

4. The law governing landlord and tenants in ot:herparts of the State is provided under Notification No.6326-600/H.&W.B., dated 14th April, 1949, and for the ends of].ustice the present suit may be considered to be one broughtthere-under. The question that would then arise would be asto whether under that notification ``material additions andalterations made to a rented premise without thewritten permission of the landlord" constitutes a groundfor eviction of a tenant and, if not, whether a Courtconstituted under that law has the jurisdiction to evict atenant on a ground not contemplated there-under on equitable consideration, as has been done in the present case. Thisquestion, in my view, is crucial to decide this appeal andresultantly, the original suit.

Mr. A. Moulik, learned Senior Advocate appearingon behalf of the appellants/defendants, apart from makingsubmissions on the factual aspects of the case as regards theallegations of material additions and alterations alleged tohave been made to the rented premises, strongly pressed theplea of non-maintainability of the suit, primarily on the groundthat the Gangt:ok Rent Control and Evict:ion Act, 1956 did notapply to the area where the rented premises was situat:ed. Hefurther submitted that the 1949 Notification which is the lawgoverning landlord and tenant in other parts of the State, didnot prescribe for the eviction of a tenant on the ground ofmaking material additions and alterat:ions to a rented premise.He further submitted that the learned trial Court had exerciseda jurisdiction not vested in it by law, when it passed the orderof eviction on the ground of the appellants/defendants havingmade material additions and alterations to the suit premisesby erroneously considering itself to be a court of equity.

As regards the allegations of having causedmaterial addit:ions and alterations to the suit premises areconcerned, it is found t:hat in substance, the facts remainundisputed in t:he pleadings contained in the written statement as would appear from paragraphs 13 and 15 of the writtenstatement, relevant portions of which are reproduced below: -

"13 ..,. „...„ ................... In fact the suitpremises although was occupied by theemployees of the defendants it was in factjnhabjtab[e for tlie worl(ing staff. Discussionwas made with the landlord for certain minormaintenance works to provide properventilation, sanitation and `^/ater supplies for thepremises. Sri Raj Kishore Prasad; the landlordhad agreed to such works to be done at I:he costof tlie defendants. Therefore the works Ofrepairing was started. Then the defendantcompany had through an agreement dated25.1.2000 deployed one Sonam Topgay BhLJ1:ia,Government Contractor and supplier to do theminor Civil Works in the suit premises to repairthe comD[ete floor and the roof of the bujldinawith arranaements for I)roDer ventilation,sanitation, water suDDlv etc. and also to rei)airthe electrical installations and fittinas. As perthe contract, the said contractor had I:henstarted such minor repairing works. \^/bilehowever the contractor had proceeded with thecivil works of repairing the landlord and hisrepresentatives raised protest surprisinglyresi[ing from his earlier coiisent and against theterms of the lease agreement and filed thepresent suit .......... „ ............................... "

15 ......................... „ .......... Therefore thedefendants have taken up the work of minorrepair and maintenance worl{s in the suitPremises to Provide DroDer ventilation,sanitation and water sLiDDlies to the premisesthat too at the cost of the defendants."

7. No doubt, the appellants/defendants have chosento term the works undertaken as `minor repair andmaintenance works' taken up with the consent of thelandlord, but when we consider the extent of the worksundertaken, as is quite apparent from the above pleadings(underlined) and the evidence appearing in the records, thereis no manner of doubt that the works cannot but be termed asto term the works undertaken as `minor repair andmaintenance works' taken up with the consent of thelandlord, but when we consider the extent of the worksundertaken, as is quite apparent from the above pleadings(underlined) and the evidence appearing in the records, thereis no manner of doubt that the works cannot but be termed as material additions and alterations and that they wereundertaken without obtaining the consent of the landlord, i.e.,respondent/plaintiff. The details of the evidence havedeliberately not been dealt with, as I am of the view that thequestion would not be material for disposing of this appeal.

Mr. a. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate appearingon behalf of the respondent/defendant, on the other hand,defended the judgment and decree on the following grounds:-(a) The suit was `maintainable under theprovisions of Notificat:ion No. 6326-600/H.&W.B.,dated 14th April, 1949.

(b) The scarcity of accommodation which existedin the year 1949, did not exist any more now andthe appellants/defendants had sufficient alternativemeans of accommodation available to him and thisby itself would constitute a ground for evictionunder the 1949 Notification.

(c) There was violation of contract on the part ofthe appellants/defendants, in as much as, theterms of the agreement dated January 9, 1978(Ext.D1), had been violated, thereby attracting theprovisions of Section 111 of the Transfer ofProperty Act, resulting in the forfeiture of the lease.

(d) The affidavit of evidence affirmed by theappellants/defendants under Order 18 Rule 4(1)had not been validated, and therefore, was notvalid in the eye of law, and was non-est and anugatory.

(e) The present appeal is in violation of clause 5of the High Court (Practice & Procedure) Rules1991, in as much as, it has not been signed by theparty.

For the aforesaid reasons, it was submitt:ed that theappeal was liable to be rejected.

Taking up contention (a) raised by Mr. 8. Sharma,learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff,I have no hesitation to hold that the suit would bemaintainable under Notificat:ion No.6326-600/H.&B.W., dated14th April, 1949, as has already been held. Contentions (b)and (c) appear to be quite strange as firstly, they appear to begrossly misconceived and secondly, t:hose points were neverraised before the learned trial Court. While raising contention(b), Mr. 8. Sharma has placed reliance upon the openingwords of paragraph 2 of the Notification No. 6326-600/H.&B.W,, dated 14th April, 1949, and it is his case that since thescarcity of accommodation did not exist any more, t:hat byitself constituted a ground for eviction of the `l::I...\-)`

appellant:s/defendants from the rented premises. Thesubmission in my view, deserves outright rejection in view ofwhat appear in the very paragraph which reads as follows: - ``2. The ]and[ords cannot eject the tenants solong as tlie scarcity of housing accommodationlasts, but when the whole or part of 1:hepremises are required for their personaloccupal:ion or for thorough overhauling thepremises or on failure by the tenants to pay rentfor four months the landlords may be permittedto evict 1:he tenant on due application to theChief Court."

The words ``the ]and]ords cannot eject the tenant solong a scarcity of housing accommodation lasts"connotes that as a matter of rule under normal circumst:ances,the landlords cannot e].ect the i:enants as long as scarcity ofhousing accommodation lasts, but permissibility of eject:menthas been provided under circumstances appearing in thewords following thereafter, i.e., ``but when the whole orpart of the premises require for their personaloccupation or for thorougll overliauling the premises oron failure by the tenants to pay rent for foLlr months,the [and]ord may be permitted to evict the tenant ondue application to the Chief Court." The latter part isobviously an exception which has been carved out of thegeneral prohibition of ejectment of tenants. Therefore, onlythose falling within the mischief of the grounds contained inparagraph 2 of the said Notification would they be liable forev,ct,on from the rented prem,sesr` 97

appellants/defendants from the rented premises. Thesubmission in my view, deserves outright rejection in view ofwhat appear in the very paragraph which reads as follows: - ``2. The ]and[ords cannot eject the tenant:s solong as tlie scarcity of housing accommodationlasts, but when the whole or part of thepremises are required for their personaloccupation or for thorough overhauling thepremises or on failure by the tenants to pay rentfor four months the [andlords may be permittedto evict tlie tenant on due application to theChief Court."

The words ``the landlords cannot eject the tenant so long as the scarcity of housing accommodation lasts"connotes that as a matter 6f rule under normal circumstances,the landlords cannot e].ect the tenants as long as scarcity ofhousing accommodation lasts, but permissibility of ejectmenthas been provided under circumstances appearing in thewords following thereafter, i..e., ``but when the whole orpart of the premises require for their personaloccupation or for thorough overhauling the premises oroh failure by the tenants to pay rent for foL]r months,the landlord may be permitted to evict the tenant ondue application to the Chief Court." The latter part isobviously an exception which has been carved out of thegeneral prohibition of e].ectment of tenants. Therefore, onlythose falling within the mischief of the grounds contained inparagraph 2 of the said Notificatipn would they be liable foreviction from the rented premises.

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10. Contention (c) deserves similar rejection since inthe suit it is not the case of the plaintiff that there wasviolation of agreement Ext. Dl which constituted a breach ofcontract by the appellants/defendants and, secondly, theprovisions of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, hasno application in the facts and circumstances of the case froma plain reading of the section itself. Section 111 deals withthe question of determination of .a lease, and clauses (a) to(h) provides for the various circumstances under which thelease may be determined. Clause (g) deals with the forfeitureof lease under the circumstances mentioned therein requiringthe lessor to give notice in writing to the lessee of his intentionto det:ermine the lease. It has been held that: unless StateRent Acts provide for issue of a notice, notice required underSection 111 of the Transfer of Property Act would not benecessary and that: the grounds contained in the Rent Actsshall be the sole factors in determining a tenaney and theeviction of a tenant. In t:his regard, a Constitution Bench of 7Judges of the Supreme Court reported in AIR ]979 SupremeCourt 1745 .ir\ the matter of V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs.yesoda;Amma/ has held as follows : - "6 .................................... The notice spoken of in Clause fa` is a different I(ind Of notice andeven without the State Rerit Acts different viewshave been expressed as to whether such a noticein all cases is necessary or not. We onlv observehere that when the State Rent Acts I)rovideunder what circumstances and on what aroundseven without the State Rerit Acts different viewshave been expressed as to whether such a noticein all cases is necessary or not. We onlv observehere that when the State Rent Acts I)rovideunder what circumstances and on what arounds a tenant can be evicted, it does not provide thata tenant forfeits his right to continue inoccupation of the property and mat(es himselfliable to be evicted on fulfilment of thoseconditioris.............................................................Once the ljabilit`/ to be incurred bv the tenant, hecannot turn around and say that the contractuallease has been determined. The action of thelandlord in instituting a suit for e`/iction on thegrot]nd mentioned in any State Rent Act will betantamoLlnt to an expression of the intentionthat he does not want the tenant to continue ashis lessee and the iural relationship of lessor andlessee will come to an end on tlie passing of anorder or a decree for eviction„ ..... „ .................. "

In view of the position of law indicated above, I have nohesitation to hold that the submissions made on behalf of therespondent/plaintiff is grossly misconceived, and, therefore,stands rejected accordingly.

11. Contentions (d) and (e) raised by Mr. 8. Sharmaappear to be absolutely hyper technical. The evidence ledbefore the learned trial Court were never challenged and havebeen accepted by all parties. Order 18 Rule 4(1) of t:he C.P.C.does not require validation of all affidavits of evidence exceptfor the limited purpose of the proviso theret:o. We have tobear in mind that Rule 4 of Order 18 C.P.C. lays down theprocedure for recording evidence and that the rules andprocedures are meant to be hand-maid of justice and not itsmistress. Furt:hermore, no objections had been raised on anygrounds whatsoever with regard to the evidence by therespondent/plaintiff during the course of the trial. He rather

c)

c)

chose to participate in the entire proceedings without a demurand has relied upon the evidence now being impugned by himclearly establishing that no prejudice has been caused to hiin.Therefore, the contention stands rejected as being afterthoughts and also as being hit by the principles of waiver,acquaisance and estoppel.

12. In so far as contention (e) is concerned, no doubtRule 5 of the High Court (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 1991prescribes that a memo of appeal require.s to be signed notonly by the party but also by his counsel. However, there isnothing in the rules which prohibits the Constituted Attorneysto sign on behalf of the party. In any case, such requirementhereby st:ands dispensed with in the larger interest of ].usticeand the objection st:ands over-ruled.

13. I have dealt with the ob].ections raised on behalf ofthe respondent/plaintiff, since the ones raised in contentions(a), (b) and (c) are quite technical, having some bearing onthe maintainability of the appeal. Had it not been so, it wouldnot have been necessary for the purpose of disposal of thisappeal, as will appear hereafter.

14. The records reveal that on the basis of thepleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court had framedt:he following issues : - chose to participate in the entire proceedings wit:hout a demurand has relied upon the evidence now being impugned by himclearly establishing that no prejudice has been caused to him.Therefore, the contention Stands rejected as being afterthoughts and also as being hit by the principles of waiver,acquiescence and estoppel.

12. In so far as contention (e) is concerned, no doubtRule 5 of the High Court (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 1991prescribes that a memo of appeal requires to be signed notonly by the party but also by his counsel. However, there isnothing in the rules which prohibits the Constituted Attorneysto sign on behalf of the party. In any case, such requirementhereby stands dispensed with in the larger interest of justiceand the objection stands over-ruled.

13. I have dealt with the ob].ections raised on behalf ofthe respondent/plaintiff, since the ones raised in contentions(a), (b) and (c) are quite technical, having some bearing onthe maintainability of the appeal. Had it not been so, it wouldnot have been necessary for the purpose of disposal of thisappeal, as will appear hereafter.

14. The recordsreveal that on the basis of thethe learned trial Court had framedpleadings of the parties,the following issues : --,..:i'-.-,i,..;, ``1. Whetherthe suit: is maintainable?

Whether the defendant has made materialalterations in the suit building without theprior permission of the plaintiff ?alterations in the suit building without theprior permission of the plaintiff ?

Whet:her for such alteration if any thedefendant is liable to be evicted ?defendant is liable to be evicted ?

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover thearrears of rents from the month of February,2000 ?,,arrears of rents from the month of February,2000 ?,, In my view, in order to proceed further and deal with the issues No.2 and 3, finding on issue No.1 would be mostcrucial. The learned trial Court has dealt with this issue inparagraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment in the followingmanner: -

"9. On the other hand it is argued by theplaintiff that the provisions of the Gangtok RentControl and Eviction Act.1/1956 at Sec. 12recognizes the right of the land-lord if he carriesoLlt any addition and alteration without theappro\/al of the land-lord. Moreover, this Courtis also a Court of eauit`/ and would not beiustified in overlool(ina the arievances of theDlaintiff aaainst the defendants in this issue inthe absence of anv other specific relief bv whichthe Dlaintiff's arie`rances in the suit can besuitablv remedied.

10. It may be pointed out 1:hat the GangtokRent Control and Eviction Act 1/1956 is notapplicable to the instarit case since the said Actonly extends to Building and Constructionssituated witliin the area of Gangtol( Bazar. Theschedule property is admittedly in Rangpo.However, for the DurDose of this issue. I findthat there is no law or statutorv Provisions bvwhich the instant suit cannot stand in the evesof law. neither has the same been made out bvthe defendants. Accordinaiv, I am of the oDinionthat the suit is maintainable.

Issue decided accordingly."

tempha5upp,,ed,

The findings of the learned trial Court extracted above donot appear to be consistent with the legal position obtaining insuch matters and are contrary to the sound judicial principles.It is quite clear that there was no doubt in the mind of thelearned t:rial Court that the Gangtok Rent Control and EvictionAct, 1956 had no application in Rangpo. However, it isdifficult to accept that it is a court of equity when it was actingas a court under a special law prescribing specific ].urisdictionupon it. It is a settled position of law that equity cannotdepart from the statute and would follow the laws and rulessave and accept in exceptional circumstances. In this regard,reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court inHemalatha Gargya vs Commissioner of Income Tax, A.P.and Another reported .in (2003) Vol.9 Supreme CourtCases 510 in which it has been held as follows: - "10. Besides, the Scheme has conferred a

"10. Besides, the Scheme has conferred a benefit on those who had not disclosed theirincome earlier by affording them protect:ionagainst the possible legal conseqLlences of sLichnob-disclosure under the provisions of theIncome Tax Act. Where the assessees seek toclaim the benefit under the statutory schemethey are boLJnd to comply strictly with theconditions under which the benefit is granted.There is no scope for the aDDlication of anvequitable consideration when the statL]torvProvisions of the Scheme are stated in such Dlainlanauaae.income earlier by affording them protect:ionagainst the possible legal conseqLlences of sLichnob-disclosure under the provisions of theIncome Tax Act. Where the assessees seek toclaim the benefit under the statutory schemethey are boLJnd to comply strictly with theconditions under which the benefit is granted.There is no scope for the aDDlication of anvequitable consideration when the statL]torvProvisions of the Scheme are stated in such Dlainlanauaae.

11. Seen from the ana]e of thedesianated authoritv. which is created under theScheme, it is clear that the authoritv cannot actbevond the Drovisioris of the Scheme itself. ThePower to acceDt Davment under the Scheme hasbeen Prescribed bv the statute. There is noscope for the Revenue ALlthorities to imDlv aDrovision not sDecificallv Drovided for whichScheme, it is clear that the authoritv cannot actbevond the Drovisioris of the Scheme itself. ThePower to acceDt Davment under the Scheme hasbeen Prescribed bv the statute. There is noscope for the Revenue ALlthorities to imDlv aDrovision not sDecificallv Drovided for which would in anv wav modify the explicit termsffthe Scheme."

Although the above decision was rendered in the contextof controversies arising out of the Voluntary Disclosure ofIncome Scheme, 1997 under the Income Tax Act 1961, theprinciple laid down therein nevertheless would be fullyapplicable in the present case also.

15. As observed earlier, the law governing landlord andtenants in the State other than Gangtok, is provided underNotification N.o.6326-600/H.& B.W., dated 14th April, 1949,and even if the suit is to be considered to be one under t:hatlaw, it would be of little help to the respondent/plaintiff, asthis law does not provide for eviction of a tenant on theground of having made material additions and alterations tothe rented premises. It, therefore, follows that it would beimpermissible for a Court functioning under a special lawwhich prescribes limits of it:s powers and ].urisdiction, to pass adecree of eviction against the tenant for such violation as itwould lack the necessary ].urisdiction which in my view wouldgo to the root of the case. It is a well settled position of lawthat the benefits conferred on the t:enants through therelevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of a strictcompliance with the statutory provisions and that equitableconsideration has no place in such matters where the statute contains express provisions. In this regard, we may usefullyrefer to (2003j I Supreme Court Cases 123 in the matterOf E. Palanisamy vs. Palanisamy and Others. The relevantparagraph 5 of the judgment reads as follows : -

"5 ........... „ ......... „ ......... The rent legislation isnormally intended for the benefit of the tenants.At the same time, it is well settled that thebenefits conferred on the tenants through therelevant statutes can be enjoyed only on thebasis of sti.ict compliance with the sl:atutorypro`risions. Equitable consideration has no Placein such matters. The statute contains expressDrov-istions .... „u„„ ........ " ( emphasis supplied )

±6. In AIR 1994 Andhra Pradesh 164 -in the matterOf Sheriff Iqbal Hussain Ahmad vs. Kota VenkataSubbamma and Others a Division Bench of the AndhraPradesh High Court has laid down the following: - "9. Equity is not available where effective andappropriate remedy is avai]ab[e. Equity cannotbe invoked to effect the appropriate and specificremedy, available tlirough the common, generalor express law of the land. Equity always fo[[owstlie law, but is not vice versa. Even whereequities are equal, law prevails. But, in theinstant case, the question of invocation of equityin favour of the defendants does not and cannotarise at all. Equity is basically a gloss orappendage to the common law and not a rival orcompeting system. Equity does not destroy thelaw nor create it, but assists it. Even if the Courtfeels that by enforcing the express law of tlieland, hardship is caused to the defendant therecannot be any equitable intervention.

L]. In Raghunath Rai Bareja and Another vs.

Punjab National Bank and Others (2007) 2 SupremeCourt Cases 230, the Apex Court has held as follows: - "29 .............................. While we fully agree withthe learned counsel that equity is wholly jnfavour of the respondent Bank, since obviously athe learned counsel that equity is wholly jnfavour of the respondent Bank, since obviously a bank should be allowed 1:o recover its debts, wemust, however, state that it is well settled thatwhen there is a conflict between law and equity,it is the law which has to prevail, in accordancewith the Latin maxim "dura /ex sed /ex" whichmeans "the law is hard, but it is 1:lie law". Equitycan only supplement the law, but it cannotsupplant or override it."

18. The learned trial Court while deciding Issue No,3,i.e., ``Whether for such alteration if any, the defendant isliable to be evicted?'', arrived at the finding that theappellants/defendants had been found to have caused majoradditions and alterations in t:he suit premises, and on suchfinding passed t:he impugned decree for their eviction therefrom. But when the law prescribes specific grounds `on whichan order of eviction can be passed by the court acting thereunder, it would not be permissible to do so on a ground aliento such law. If it is so done, as has been done in t:he presentcase, it would amount to rewriting the statute book which isimpermissible.

19. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am ofthe view that the learned trial Court has act:ed in excess of itsjurisdiction by erroneous application of the law of equity whenthe provisions of the law clearly provides no room forapplication of such principle.

20. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugnedjudgment and decree stands set aside and the original suit

stands dismissed with the observation that it shall be open forthe respondent/plaintiff to seek remedy as may be availablet:o him in an appropriate proceeding under the law.

No order as to costs.

DISTRICT : EAST SIFHIM

IN RE. ErGE cotjRT oF' sIREn4 AT GENGTOK(CIVII. APPEI.IATE JURISDICTION)RFA No. 3 of 2009.

Himal Match Company Pvt. Ltd.& Anr .... Defendants/Appellants.Versus Shri Raj Bansi Bhagat .... Plaintiff/Respondent.

CASE LAWS REI[IED ON BY THE APPELLANTS.

1.2003(1)SCC 123(E.Palanisamy Vs Palanisamy and Others.Head not.e A. Paragraphs 3,4 5 and 8.

2.2003 (2) SCC 577Nasiruddin and others Vs Sita Ram Agarwal-Head Note a. Paragraph 35/37/40/41.

/3. 2003(9) SCC 510

Hamlatha Gargya Vs Commissioner of Income TaxA.P. and Another.Head Note-A. Paragraph 10/11/13

4 . 2007 (5) SCC 447Southern Petrochemicals Industries Co. , Ijtd. VsElectricals inspector and Etio and others.Head Note-K. Paragraph 92

5.2007(2) SCC 230

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs- Kimat RaiGupta and others.Head note-H.

--:::.€RE

Gangtok,

Dated 11.11.2009

For Appellant