WRIT PETITION 9420 of 2025 on 11 February 1997

1. Heard Shri Vikrant Prakash, learned counsel appearing on behalf of thepetitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents no.1 to 3.

2. By means of the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the orderof the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Tehsil & District Sitapur, dated 15.06.2022, wherein in proceedings under Section 104/105 of the U.P. Revenue Code, it has been held that the property purchased by the petitioner, situated at Khata No.00500, Gata No.646M, area 0.020 hectareof land, for which a sale deed has been entered into by the petitioner as a recorded tenure holder, has been done in violation of the provision contained in Section 168A of the U.P.Z.A.and L.R. Act, as well as in violation of Sections 104/105 of the U.P. Revenue Code and therefore, in light of provisions contained in Section 167 of the U.P. Revenue Code, the said land would vest in the State Government.

3. A perusal of the impugned order indicates that when an application for mutation was preferred by the petitioner under Sections 34/35 of the U.P. Revenue Code and the report of the Lekhpal was sought, it was found thatthe mutation is being sought to be made on the basis of sale deed entered dated 11/02/1997 and 15/02/1997. It was further found that the said sale deed was in violation of Sections 104/105 inasmuch as, no sale deed for a fragment of check can be entered into. Apart from the above, it was foundthat the recorded tenure holder, namely Lekhraj, son of Bihari Lal belongs to a Scheduled Caste, while the petitioner belongs to General Category, and there being a clear injunction in such transfer of land, and itwas found that the same was hit the provisions of Section 168A of U.P. Revenue Code and the said sale was illegal and arbitrary and accordingly,it was declared as void sale deed, and such disputed land was vested in the State Government.

4. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, dated 15.06.2022, had preferred a revision before the Additional Commissioner (Judicial First), Lucknow, where the only ground raised was that no opportunity of hearing has been given to the petitioner. The revisional authority has also considered the case of the petitioner and found that the said transaction entered into by the petitionerby means of a sale deeds dated 11/02/1997 and 15/02/1997, was hit by theprovisions of Section 168 of the U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act and Section 104 of the U.P. Revenue Code and consequently the said land would vest in the State Government.

5. Before this Court also, the only ground urged is that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner.

6. Considering the arguments of the petitioner, we find that the only ground urged by the petitioner is that the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate has been passed in violation of the principle of natural justice and no other ground was urged by the petitioner with regard to the merits of the controversy.

7. After hearing counsel for the petitioner and perusal of the record, it is noted that the proceedings were initiated against the petitioner pursuant toan application given by him under section 34/35 of the U.P. Revenue Code. It is the case of the petitioner that he had purchased the disputed land by means of two sale deeds dated 11/02/1997 and 15/02/1997 by a registered sale deed from the recorded tenure holder, Lekhraj, son of Bihari Lal, who belongs to the scheduled caste and such land could not have been purchased by the petitioner without approval from the competent authority. It was further noticed that said sale deeds are also hitby provisions of Section 104 as a fragment of a Gata cannot be subjected

to further fragmentation. Accordingly, the sale made in favor of the petitioner was in violation of the statutory provisions and accordingly, was void and by operation of law as provided for in Section 167 (1) would vest in the State. I find that by not appearing before the prescribed authority, no prejudice was caused to the petitioner as no reason is forthcoming with regard to the infirmities in both the impugned orders. Unless and until, prejudice is caused by not being given an opportunity of hearing, an order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that the same reason in violation of principal of nature justice. Even in the writ petition, no grounds have been urged giving any reason as to why interference be shown in the impugned orders.

8. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. versus Sudhir Kumar Singh, reported in (2021) 19 SCC 706, wherein the Court comprehensively dealt with the scope andapplication of principles of natural justice. It was held that breach of audi alterum partem rule does not, by itself, vitiate an order unless prejudiced is demonstrated. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below:-

41. Under the broad rubric of the Court not passing futile orders as the case is based on “admitted” facts, being admitted by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, non-challenge or non-denial, the following judgments of this Court are all illustrations of a breach of the audi alteram partem rule being established on the facts of the case, but with no prejudice caused to the person alleging breach of natural justice, as the case was one on admitted facts:

41.1. Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sakattar Singh [Punjab& Sind Bank v. Sakattar Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 214 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 209] , paras 1, 4 and 5.

41.2. Karnataka SRTC v. S.G. Kotturappa [Karnataka SRTC v. S.G. Kotturappa, (2005) 3 SCC409 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 484] , para 24.

41.3. Viveka Nand Sethi v. J&K Bank Ltd. [Viveka Nand Sethi v. J&K Bank Ltd., (2005) 5 SCC 337 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 689] , paras 21, 22 and 26.

41.4. Mohd. Sartaj v. State of U.P. [Mohd. Sartaj v. State of U.P., (2006) 2 SCC 315 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 295] , para 18.

41.5. Punjab National Bank v. Manjeet Singh [Punjab National Bank v. Manjeet Singh, (2006) 8 SCC 647 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 16] , paras 17 and 19.

41.6. Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India [AshokKumar Sonkar v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC 54 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 19] , paras 26 to 32.

41.7. State of Manipur v. Y. Token Singh [State of Manipur v. Y. Token Singh, (2007) 5 SCC 65 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 107] , paras 21 and 22.

41.8. A.P. Social Welfare Residential Educational Institutions v. Pindiga Sridhar [A.P. Social Welfare Residential Educational Institutions v. Pindiga Sridhar, (2007) 13 SCC 352 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 656] , para 7.

41.9. Peethani Suryanarayana v. Repaka Venkata Ramana Kishore [Peethani Suryanarayana v. Repaka Venkata Ramana Kishore, (2009) 11 SCC 308 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 529] , para 18.

41.10. Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB [Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB, (2010) 13 SCC 216 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 861] , paras 31 to 36, 44 and 45.

41.11. Union of India v. Raghuwar Pal Singh [Union of India v. Raghuwar Pal Singh, (2018) 15

SCC 463 : (2018) 2 SCC (L&S) 823] , para 20.

42. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals:

42.1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands ofthe judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.

42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest.

42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him orit. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudicecan therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice.

42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion ispossible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person.

42.5. The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicionof a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice.

9. For the reasons aforesaid, I do not find any infirmity in the orders dated 15/06/2022 and 28/06/2025. The petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly, dismissed.

September 25, 2025

KR

(Alok Mathur,J.)