WRIT PETITION 7294/20 on 13 February 1986

Conclusion

1. Learncd counsel appearing for the landlord submits that incase the tenants gets the perrnission from the [concerned]authorities to start business of dry [cleaning ][from ][the]case the tenants gets the perrnission from the [concerned]authorities to start business of dry [cleaning ][from ][the]

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premises in question in that event landlord would alsoaccord pennission to the tenants.

2. The respondents [(tenants) ]are [granted ]time to [vacate ][the]premises upto 31" December, 2014 on filing [usual]undertaking by all the legal representatives within fourweeks from today in the Registry.premises upto 31" December, 2014 on filing [usual]undertaking by all the legal representatives within fourweeks from today in the Registry.

3. In view of this order passed by this court, the [impugned]judgment is set aside and'the appeal is allowed anddisposed of accordingly. No costs."judgment is set aside and'the appeal is allowed anddisposed of accordingly. No costs."

The effect of thc order of the'supreme Court [is ][that: ][(i) ][the ][judgment]of this court dated 01.08.2006 has been set [aside; ][(ii) ][the ][petitioner ][has been]given time to hold on to the property in issue till [31 ].I2.20I4 subject [to ][the]petitioner filing usual undertakings. It is not disputed that [undertakings ][have]been filed by the petitioner; and [(iii) ]Lastly, Respondent [no. 2 (who ][was the]petitioner in the Supreme Court) would accord permission to [the ][petitioner]to comrnence the business of dry cleaning from [the ][property ][in ][issue, ][in ][the]event, the petitioner is able to obtain said permission from the [concerned]authorities.

The petitioner, pursuant to the order of the Supreme [court ][dated]08.12.2010, eventually, moved two applications before [respondent ][no. ][1.]The said applications were filed apparently on [17.11.2010 ][and22.12.2010.]Respondent no. 1, however, vide communication [dated 29.06.2011 rejected]the petitioner's request for grant of permission to carry on the business ofdry cleaning and cloth pressing/ironing in the property in issue, on [the]ground that such permission can only be granted to the 'lessee'(in this caserespondent no.2) under the "Lease Administration".

The petitioner being aggrieved by this stand of respondent no. [1]approached this court by way of the present writ petition. Learned [counsel]

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for the petitioner submits before me that the ground for refusal isunsustainable in view of the order of the Supreme Court dated 08.12.2010.Mr Hashmi, who appears for the petitioner, says that the consent of thelessee, i.e., respondent no.2 is inbuilt in the order passed by the SupremeCourt as it was against the issue of misuser that the proceedings havereached the Supreme Court and culminated in the order passed by theSupreme Court. Mr Hashrni has also referred me to the office order ofrespondent no. 1 bearing no. 7183 (in short office order) to demonstrate thatcertain businesses, which are otherwise not pennissible, as to the demisedproperty is in residential area, fall under the Category of condonablebreaches under the said office order. It is Mr l{ashmi's contention that asper item no. 69, appearing in the said office order, ironing of clothes is acondonable breach; being an activity which is perrnissible with the consentof lessce.

Mr Hashmi says that, in these circumstances, the order of respondentno. 1 dated29.06.2011 ought to be set aside and prayers as sought for in thewrit petition be granted.

Mr Khan, who appears for UOI, says that respondent no. I has noprivity of contract with the petitioner. Respondent no. 1 only recognizes thelessee, i.e., respondent no. 2 and, therefore, perrnission, if any, would begranted if, respondent no. 2 were to approach respondent no. 1. It is thussubmitted by Mr Khan, since respondent no. 2 has not approachedrespondent no. 2, there could be no other order in the instant case but theorder as passed by respondent no. I on29.06.2011.

Mr Mittal, who appears for respondent no. 2 submits that the petitioner's entire case is based on a premise that he has requisite trade

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license in his favour, to run a dry cleaning/ cloth pressing business. MrMittal has drawn my attention to page 33 of the paper book to demonsratethat the license, on which reliance is placed by the petitioner, is actually alicense for cloth pressing business, which was issued on 25.04.2003 andwhich, has expired since long, i.e., on 31 .03.2004. Mr Mittal's contentionis that the petitioner presently has no valid and subsisting license in hisfavour for running the aforementioned business.

Right to Information Act, 2005 (in short RTI Act) evinced a response fromthe Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) dated 15.07.2003. A perusal ofthe said reply, to which, my attention was drawn, would show that the drycleaning business is not permitted, and that the only business which ispennissible is a cloth pressing business. The petitioner apparently wasissued, a cloth pressing license under the ad hoc registration policy dated27.09.2000, on the basis of an affidavit and rent receipt submitted by him.

In other words, Mr Mittal says that MCD, will not issue a license forrunning a dry cleaning business and that in any case the license for clothpressing has expired as per the petitioner's own showing on 31.03.2004.

Apart from the above, Mr Mittal has also drawn my attention to itemno. 99, in the very same office order, on which Mr Hashmi placed reliance.Mr Mittal submits that item no. 99, applies to a rehabilitation colony inDelhi. Under the said provision lessee and/or tenant residing in thepremises are allowed to run dry cleaning business provided condonable areadoes not exceed 300 sq. ft. It is not disputed by Mr Mittal that the propertyin issue falls within the rehabilitation colony. Mr Mittal, however, submitsthat since the petitioner is not residing in the said premises, he cannot take

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advantage of thc said provision.

Mr Mittal concluded his submission by drawing my attention [to]respondent no. 2's affidavit wherein it is averred that the [petitioner ][has]closed his business in the property in issue and is [presently ]operating [from]premises situated at WZ 508 A/1, Basai Darapur, New Delhi. It is Mr.Mittal's contention that in these circumstances the relief [prayed ]for by [the]petitioner ought not to be granted. The petitioner is a businessman and not adhobi and, therefore, provisions to which reference has been made are [put ][in]place to benefit those persons, who do not have the necessary wherewithal.

Having heard the learned counsels for the [parties ]and on [perusal ]of [the]record, I am of the view that the following emerges:

(i) Undoubtedly, pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court dated08.I2.20I0, the orders of the courts below (which include this courtand the authorities constituted under the DRC Act) have merged inthe said order of the Supreme Court. The petitioner can continue [as]a tenant in the property in issue, till 31 .I2.2014.

(iD Respondent no. 2 cannot object to the petitioner seeking permission to commence the business of dry cleaning from theproperty in issue. As a matter of fact, respondent no. 2 took a standbefore the Supreme Coutt that if any suoh permission is sought, [he]will accord permission to the tenant, i.e., the petitioner herein.

(iii) In view of the aforesaid, the stand taken by respondent no. 1 inits communication dated 29.06.2011, is completely unsustainable,since respondent no. 2's consent is already on record, as is reflectedin the order of the Supreme Court dated 08.12.2010.

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The question, however, still remains which is that, it [could not ][be ][the]intent of the order of the Supreme [court that ]if [any ][permissions ][are ][required]under law, the petitioner could claim exemption [qua ]those.

1\ [Ihe ][petitioner ][has ][not ][been able ][to ][show anything ][to ][the court which]would persuade the court at this [juncture ]to [come ]to [a ][conclusion that ][he ][has]a requisite license to run either the dry cleaning business or the [cloth]pressing business from the property in issue.

Therefore, the net effect of the discussion [above ]will [be that ][the]petitioner would be free to once again apply to respondent no. 1 for seekingpermission to run the dry cleaning business/ cloth [pressing ]business [from ][the]property in issue. The petitioner will, however, have to do the [necessary]work, including obtain a license from the MCD, if that is necessary to obtainthe perrnission from respondent no. 1. Respondent no. 1, however, shall notreject, as.it did vide order dated 29.06.2011, the [petitioner's ][application ][on]the ground that it is respondent no. 2, who should approach the [petitioner.]

I had put a specific quely to Mr Mittal as to whether Respondent no.2would oppose the application of the petitioner, if made. Mr Mittal [quite]curiously, contrary to the stand taken before the Supreme Court, answered inthe affinnative. This stand of respondent no. 2 borders on contempt. Asindicated above, respondent no. 1 can not process the application [of ][the]petitioner on this ground.

At this stage, Mr Mittal says that respondent no. 2 will support thecause of the petitioner, if otherwise the petitioner is entitled to a [permission,]in accordance with the law, and that, there was no intention to take a standcontrary to what was taken in the Supreme court.

The petition is thus disposed of with liberfy to the petitioner to I

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approach respondent no. 1 with the requisite material [and permissions ][so]that the application for grant of permission can be processed. [Respondent]no. 1 thereafter is frec to take a decision in the matter, in [accordance ][with]thE-,law.t The petition stands disposed of.

RAJIV SHAKDHER, J

OCTOBER OT,2OI2kk wP(c) 7294/2Qtl