CIVIL APPEAL 13946 of 2025 on 15 December 1924

1. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department ofPanchayati Raj, Government of Bihar, PatnaPanchayati Raj, Government of Bihar, Patna

2. The District Magistrate, Darbhanga.

3. Senior Deputy Collector-cum-Nodal Officer in the Janta Durbar ProgrammeOf District Magistrate, Darbhanga.Of District Magistrate, Darbhanga.

4. The District Panchayati Raj Officer, Darbhanga.

5. The Sub Divisional Officer, Biraul, District- Darbhanga.

6. The Anchal Adhikari, Biraul, District- Darbhanga.

7. The Block Development Officer, Biraul, District- Darbhanga.

... ... Respondent/s

======================================================Appearance :For the Petitioner/s: Mr. Rajni Kant Jha, Adv.For the Respondent/s: Mr. Manish Kumar, GP-4: Mr. Ajay Kumar, AC to GP-04

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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAILENDRA SINGHORAL JUDGMENT

Date : 02-09-2025

Heard Mr. Rajni Kant Jha, learned counsel appearing forthe petitioner and Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned AC to GP-4,appearing for the State-respondents.

2. This application has been filed by the petitioner underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking the followingreliefs :- “(i) That the respondents be restrained fromconstructing the building of Panchayat Bhawan on the raiyati agricultural land in cultivating possession of thepetitioner pertaining to Khata No. 48 (old)/109 (new),Khesra No. 6/135 (old)/40 (new), raqba,-1, Acre 76decimal, Mouza-Azraqbe Govindpur, Anchal-Biraul,District-Darbhanga.

(ii) That the respondents be directed torestore the possession of the land of the petitioner.

(iii) That the respondents be directed to make a just payment of compensation for the period duringwhich the petitioner was deprived from use andoccupation of his property without any legaljustification.

(iv) That any other relief/reliefs be granted tothe petitioner to which he may be found entitled in thefact and circumstances of the case.”

3. Mr. Rajni Kant Jha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner is the grandson of one,namely Bhupati Narain Choudhary, who, along with MahipatNarain Choudhary, Raj Kishore Narain Choudhary, Brij KishoreNarain Choudhary, and Nathuni Choudhary, was co-proprietor of148 Bigha 4 Kattha 6 Dhoor of land of Mahal AzraqbeGobindpur in the District of Darbhanga, which included Plot No.6/135 of Khata No. 48. The interest of one of the co-proprietors,namely Nathuni Choudhary S/o Fateh Narain Choudhary, wasacquired by purchase by Mossomat Janakbati Choudhrain, whoapplied for separation of her 3 annas 4 ganda share under Section30 of the P.A. in the partition in T. No. 342 of 1923/24. It is

further submitted that the land in question was recorded asGairmajarua Khas in the C.S. Khatiyan and the Revenue Officer,on the basis of local inspection, found that the said land fell inthe category of Bakasht land and accordingly fixed rent at Rs10/- per Bigha by his order dated 15.12.1924 passed in T. No.342 of 1923-24, i.e., in the Partition Case of Mahal AzraqbeGobindpur. In the recent Revisional Survey, new Plot No. 40under Khata No. 109 has been carved out from the land of PlotNo. 6/135, and on perusal of the R.S. Khatian of Plot No. 40under Khata No. 109, it is evident that the land in question hasbeen recorded as Anabad Bihar Sarkar, however, the nature of theland is described as Dhanhar and in the remarks column, the saidland has been shown to be in illegal possession of Phul KumarChoudhary, the father of the petitioner. The entry of Raiyat ispatently wrong as the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, whowas the ex-proprietor of the land in question, had been inpeaceful possession of the land for more than a century. It isfurther submitted that the petitioner’s father and the petitionerhave been paying rent to the State of Bihar since 16.03.1991 and25.08.2000 respectively, and the State of Bihar has issued rentreceipts. It is further submitted that the petitioner came to knowregarding the demarcation of land for construction of Panchayat Bhawan of Dumri, thereafter, he made an application on03.06.2025 at Darbhanga against making any construction on hisraiyati land, but in vain. Thereafter, on 23.06.2025, by making anonline application, the petitioner appeared in the Janta Darbar ofthe District Magistrate, Darbhanga, to save his raiyati land frombeing grabbed by the local administration. Subsequently, on24.06.2025, the Anchal Adhikari, Biraul, along with the policeforce, arrived at the aforesaid land of the petitioner, who wasdoing agricultural work on his land at that time, and threatenedhim with dire consequences if he did not vacate his possessionover the land in question. It is further submitted that it is anadmitted position that the petitioner has been in actual physicalpossession of the land in question since the time of hisgrandfather and the respondents have not taken any step forcancellation of the Jamabandi of the petitioner in respect of theland in question, nor have they initiated any land acquisitionproceeding for acquiring the raiyati land of the petitioner prior tostarting the construction of the Panchayat Bhawan on his land,which is completely in violation of Articles 21 & 300A of theConstitution of India.

4. In support of his aforesaid submission, particularly tosubstantiate the petitioner’s claim as to his right having accrued in his favour on the basis of his long possession over the land inquestion, the petitioner’s counsel has placed reliance upon thefollowing judgments of this Court as well as of the Hon’bleSupreme Court: -

(i) Ramowtar Lakhotia v. State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary and Ors. Passed in CWJC No. 16494 of 2018,reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Pat 800 and the relevantparagraph No. 26 of the said judgment upon which reliance hasbeen placed, reads as under: -

“26. In the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MaharashtraIndustrial Development Corporation, (2013) 1 SCC 353, the twoJudge Bench of the Apex Court highlighting the essence of rightto property held it to be not only a constitutional or statutory rightbut also a human right. It is succinctly held that even after theright to property ceased to be a fundamental right, takingpossession of or acquiring the property of a citizen most certainlytantamounts to deprivation and such deprivation can take placeonly in accordance with the “law”, as the said word hasspecifically been used in Article 300-A of the Constitution. Inparagraph 17 of the afore-noted judgment, it was held thatdepriving the appellants of their immovable properties was aclear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.”

(ii) Rame Gowda (Dead) by Lrs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) by Lrs. and Another, reported in (2004) 1 SCC769 and the relevantparagraph No. 8 of the said judgment uponwhich reliance has been placed, reads as under: - “8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian lawis concerned, the person in peaceful possession is entitledto retain his possession and in order to protect suchpossession he may even use reasonable force to keep outa trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfullydispossessed of land may retake possession if he can doso peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force.If the trespasser is in settled possession of the propertybelonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shallhave to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law inhis own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere withhis possession. The law will come to the aid of a personin peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even arightful owner from using force or taking the law in hisown hands, and also by restoring him in possession evenfrom the rightful owner (of course subject to the law oflimitation), if the latter has dispossessed the priorpossessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of bettertitle, possession or prior peaceful settled possession isitself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to gowith the title unless rebutted. The owner of any propertymay prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasserfrom an attempted trespass, when it is in the process ofbeing committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring,intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just beencommitted, while the rightful owner did not have enoughtime to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, thepossession of the trespasser, just entered into would notbe called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.”

(iii) Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 350, paragraph no. 34 of the judgmentupon which reliance has been placed reads as under:- “34. A contract for sale does not confer title inimmovable property. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Actprovides that a contract for the sale of immovable property is acontract that a sale of such property shall take place on termssettled between the parties; it does not of itself, create anyinterest in or charge on such immovable property. Howeverstill, if a person has entered into possession over immovableproperty under a contract for sale and is in peaceful and settledpossession of the property with the consent of the person inwhom the title vests, he is entitled to protect his possession

against the whole world, excepting a person having a titlebetter than what he or his vendor possesses. If he is inpossession of the property in part-performance of contract forsale and the requirements of Section 53-A of the Transfer ofProperty Act are satisfied, he may protect his possession evenagainst the true owner. (See Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi v.Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi [(2002) 3 SCC 676] ). Section 6of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, provides for any persondispossessed without his consent of immovable propertyotherwise than in due course of law being entitled to claim andsuccessfully sue for recovery of possession thereof,notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit ifthe suit is brought before the expiry of six months from the dateof dispossession except against the Government. Article 64 ofthe Limitation Act, 1963 contemplates a suit for possession ofimmovable property based on previous possession, and not ontitle, being brought within twelve years from the date ofdispossession. Such a suit is known in law as a suit based onpossessory title as distinguished from proprietary title. The lawdiscourages people from taking the law into their own hands,howsoever good and sound their title may be. Possession isnine points in law and law respects peaceful and settledpossession. Salmond states in Jurisprudence (12th Edn.)—

“These two concepts of ownership andpossession, therefore, may be used to distinguishbetween the de facto possessor of an object and its dejure owner, between the man who actually has it andthe man who ought to have it. They serve also tocontrast the position of one whose rights are ultimate,permanent and residual with that of one whose rightsare only of a temporary nature. (p. 59)

* * *

In English law possession is a good title ofright against anyone who cannot show a better. Awrongful possessor has the rights of an owner withrespect to all persons except earlier possessors andexcept the true owner himself. Many other legalsystems, however, go much further than this, and treatpossession as a provisional or temporary title evenagainst the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer,who is deprived of his possession, can recover it fromany person whatever, simply on the ground of hispossession. Even the true owner, who takes his own,may be forced in this way to restore it to thewrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up hisown superior title to it. He must first give uppossession, and then proceed in due course of law forthe recovery of the thing on the ground of hisownership. The intention of the law is that everypossessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgmentaccording to law. Legal remedies thus appointed forthe protection of possession even against ownershipare called possessory, while those available for theprotection of ownership itself may be distinguished asproprietary. In the modern and medieval civil law thedistinction is expressed by the contrasted termspetitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (apossessory suit).” (p. 60):”

5. On the other hand, Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned AC toGP-4, submits that from the averments made by the petitioner inthe writ petition as well as from the annexures, it is clearly evidentthat the land in question is presently recorded as Anabad BiharSarkar, the nature of which has been described as Dhanhar, and inthe remarks column, the same has been shown as being in illegalpossession of the petitioner’s father. The petitioner has a specificremedy for redressal of his grievance under the Civil laws if hehas been dispossessed from the land in question, and insofar as theentries in the revenue records are concerned, they are not in favourof the petitioner.

6. Heard both sides, perused the annexures filed by thepetitioner with this writ petition, and also gone through theaverments made in the writ petition.

7. In the Indian Judicial system, there are mainly threelayers to get justice in respect of a Civil wrong. The first layer isthe District court, the second layer is the High Court, and the thirdlayer is the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Likewise, in revenue matters, there are also several layers for redressing the grievance of onerelating to revenue matters under revenue laws, such as anapplication or case before the Circle Officer, an appeal beforeDCLR, Collector and in some cases before Additional Collector,further a revision before Commissioner etc., and application/casebefore a tribunal established to deal with revenue matters underspecified revenue laws, and finally, before the High Court and theHon’ble Supreme Court. The purpose of setting up these layers isto correct or scrutiny the judicial decision of a forum/court by asuperior forum/court that is in the interest of the people who claimthemselves to be sufferers on account of a civil wrong or a wrongrelating to revenue matters. Though in several cases, particularlyin the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of TradeMarks, Mumbai and Others reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1, theHon’ble Apex Court held that one can approach the Constitutionalcourt like the High Court without exhausting the alternativeremedies in three contingencies, namely, (i) where the writpetitioner seeks an enforcement of any of the fundamental rights,(ii) where there is a violation of the principle of natural justice, or(iii) where the order or proceedings are wholly withoutjurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. However, onewho approaches the Constitutional court referring to the existence

of any of these contingencies should consider that after getting thedecision from the High Court on merit, he will have furtherlimited remedies either before the larger bench of the High Courtas per rules or before the Hon’ble Apex Court. Although aftergetting a decision from the High Court in writ jurisdiction, one isnot restricted from availing other remedies before the otherforums or courts at District level, however, it should be kept inmind that any observation made by the High Court in writjurisdiction on the merit of an issue may have some effect on thejudicial approach of the District Court/forum, and it should also bekept in mind that at District level, the courts/forums have muchmore time to go through the issues and examine the relevantevidence. So, sometimes directly approaching the Constitutionalcourt in a hasty manner may not be more beneficial than gettingthe alleged wrong redressed from the other courts/forums step bystep, as after the decision of the Constitutional court on an issueon merit, the further remedies will remain limited. Nowadays, theHigh Court is countering a flood of writs relating to civil wrong(s)in respect of revenue matters wherein the parties approach theConstitutional court directly without exhausting severalefficacious alternative remedies available to them. Though, in thepresence of any of the aforesaid contingencies, one can directly approach the Constitutional court, but he/she must show theemergent situation which has forced him/her to approach theConstitutional court, and simply pleading the requirement ofenforcement of any of the fundamental rights by such person isnot sufficient as most of the wrongs involve the violation offundamental rights directly or indirectly. In respect of othercontingencies, the facts and circumstances of every matter shouldbe looked into, which may vary case to case and it should be leftto the discretion of the Constitutional court.

8. Now, I come to the present matter. The main reliefwhich the petitioner has sought for is to restrain the constructionof the building of Panchayat Bhawan upon his land pertaining toKhata No. 48 (old)/109 (new), Khesra No. 6/135 (old)/40 (new),Raqba 1 acre 76 decimal, Mauza - Azraqbe Govindpur, Anchal -Biraul, District - Darbhanga, and restore his possession over theland in question. In view of these prayers, it is prima facie evidentthat the petitioner has no possession over the land in question. Thepetitioner has based his claim mainly on the basis of the land inquestion being recorded as Gairmajarua Khas in C.S. Khatiyanand deeming the land in the category of Bakasht land by theRevenue Officer. However, it is a settled proposition of law thatrevenue records are not considered documents of title, and mere entries in the revenue records or issuance of rent receipts do notcreate one’s title nor divest the real title owner of a land of hisright, title, and interest in the land. It is an admitted position thatthe land in question is presently recorded as Anabad Bihar Sarkarin RS Khatiyan, which was prepared several years ago, and thenature of the said land is described as Dhanhar, and in theremarks column, the said land has been shown to be in illegalpossession of Phul Kumar Choudhary, the father of the petitioner.The petitioner has not satisfied this Court as to why he has nottaken steps to get the land in question entered in his name in therevenue records by using the legal recourse. However, suchcomplex question which requires evidences should be examinedby the concerned revenue court/civil court if the petitionerapproaches them. Accordingly, I am of the view that the petitionerhas not made out a case for invoking the writ jurisdiction of thisCourt, and the circumstances pointed out by him are notpersuading this Court to invoke the writ jurisdiction to decide themain issue raised by the petitioner by bypassing the efficaciouslegal remedies which are available to him. Accordingly, the instantwrit petition stands rejected.

9. The petitioner will have the liberty to approach theconcerned court/forum for redressing his grievance relating to the alleged civil wrong/wrong. If the petitioner avails of the liberty,then the concerned court/forum will decide his prayer withoutbeing prejudiced by this judgment according to merit. It isclarified that the aforesaid observations made by this Court inrespect of the petitioner’s issue will not affect the merit of theissue if he raises the same before any competent court/forum.

(Shailendra Singh, J)

Siddharthkr/-BKS/-Annu/-

AFR/NAFRAFRCAV DATENAUploading Date08.09.2025Transmission Date08.09.2025