CR/51/2026 on 29 July 2026

( 2026:HHC:32739) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

CR No. 51 of 2026 Decided on: 29.07.2026

Dina Nath Sharma ...Petitioner. Versus Banti Devi

...Respondent.

Coram

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner: Mr. Neel Kamal Sharma, Advocate. For the respondent: Mr. Vikrant Chandel, Advocate. Romesh Verma, Judge (oral) The instant petition arises out of the order, dated 13.03.2026, passed by learned Civil Judge, Court No.2, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. whereby application filed by defendant/petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint was dismissed.

2. The facts as emerge in the present case are that the respondent/plaintiff Banti Devi, filed a suit for declaration to the effect that she is co-owner in joint possession of the land measuring 08.15 bighas comprised in Khasra No. 281, khata/khatauni No. 97/117, situated in Village Ladhyani, Post Office Lehri Sarail, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, HP. and further, that she is having 1/2 share out of the suit land

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2 ( 2026:HHC:32739) which has been inherited by her from her husband late Sh. Ganpat, son of Sh. Sadhu in lieu of maintenance, being his legally wedded wife, and the revenue entries existing in the name of defendant may be declared as null and void.

3. As per the case as set up by the plaintiff, the plaintiff/respondent is blind by birth. Therefore, she executed a power of attorney in favour of Sh. Kamal Dev for the filing of the present suit. As per the averments as alleged in the plaint, the plaintiff Banti and defendant Dina Nath are the real brother and sister. That plaintiff is joint owner in possession over the land measuring 08.15 bighas comprised in Khasra No 281, Khata/Khatauni No. 97/117 situated in Village Ladhyani, Post Office Lehri Sarail, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, HP., i.e. the suit land along with the defendant and her three brothers, namely, Nand Lal, late Sh. Inder Raj, and Prakash Chand. That the plaintiff got married to late Sh. Ganpat. The husband of the plaintiff had given half share of the suit land in lieu of the maintenance during his lifetime and she used to reside at Village Ladhyani, i.e., in the house of her in-laws. After the death of the husband of the plaintiff, she became the sole owner of the suit land qua her share. That taking

3 ( 2026:HHC:32739) advantage of the blindness of the plaintiff, and with a mala fide intention, the defendant approached the plaintiff in the year 1980, pretending to be her well-wisher, and he requested the plaintiff to allow him to reside in her house. Taking advantage of the innocence of the plaintiff, the defendant started living in the house of the plaintiff, but subsequently he started torturing the plaintiff in all possible manners. When she was tortured, and the life of the plaintiff became miserable, she left the company of the defendant and managed to escape from the confinement of the defendant and went to the Police Station, Bharari and there she registered an FIR bearing No. 102 dated 23rd September 2022 against the defendant, his wife Kusum Lata, and his son Susheel Kumar.

4. As per the plaintiff, she raised a suspicion over the defendant that while residing with her, he might have procured some forged documents, and on the basis of the suspicion, the GPA of the plaintiff visited the office of the Patwari, and he came to know that the entire share of the plaintiff from the suit land has been relinquished in favour of defendant by virtue of the relinquishment deed dated 15th February 1995 bearing registration No.112. As a matter of fact,

4 ( 2026:HHC:32739) plaintiff never executed any such document, and in case the defendant has procured any such document, the same is shrouded by fraud, coercion, undue influence, and misrepresentation by the defendant. That on the basis of the alleged relinquishment deed, mutation No. 576 dated 27th April 1995 was attested in the absence of the plaintiff, and the defendant managed to transfer the big chunk of suit land, i.e. share of the plaintiff, in his favour in a wrongful and illegal manner.

5. On inquiry, it transpired to the plaintiff for the first time in the month of October 2022 about the entry when she inquired about her land through her GPA from the Patwari, Patwar Circle Lehri Sarail. Immediately, she obtained the revenue record and got all the copies on 18th October 2022 and later on 9th January 2023. It transpired to the plaintiff that defendant had filed various frivolous cases, in her name with respect to the suit land by appointing himself as her GPA. Immediately, plaintiff revoked the said GPA on 7th October 2022 in the office of Naib Tehsildar, Bharari. The plaintiff also withdrew the civil suits which had been filed by the defendant in her name being her GPA. Police during the investigation of

5 ( 2026:HHC:32739) the FIR bearing No. 102 dated 23rd September 2022 visited the house of the defendant and recorded the statement of the parties. The plaintiff requested the defendant on 29th December 2022 to return her articles which were in possession of the defendant, and also requested to deliver the possession of her land as well as house, but the defendant flatly refused to do so.

6. Plaintiff filed suit before the trial Court and prayed a decree for declaration to the effect that the plaintiff is co- owner in joint possession over the land measuring 08.15 bighas comprised in Khasra No 281, Khata/Khatauni No. 97/117, situated in Village Ladhyani, Post Office Lehri Sarail, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, HP. Further, by declaring that plaintiff is having half share of suit land which has been inherited by her from her husband late Sh. Ganpat. Decree for declaration that the relinquishment deed dated 15th February 1995 alleged to be executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant be declared null and void and the same is the result of fraud, coercion, undue influence, and misrepresentation having no binding rights over the right, title, and interest of the plaintiff. Further, the mutation No. 576 dated 27th April 1995

6 ( 2026:HHC:32739) attested by the learned Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Bharari in favour of the defendant be declared as illegal, wrong, null and void and decree for permanent injunction was sought against the defendant.

7. The suit came to be resisted by the defendant / petitioner by raising preliminary objections with respect to the maintainability, cause of action, locus standi, suppression of material facts, estoppel, etc. On merits, all the averments as made in the plaint were specifically refuted and denied. It was stated that the plaintiff had executed the relinquishment deed in favour of the defendant out of her own free will and without any pressure or coercion.

8. As per the averments as made in the written statement, it was stated that the relinquishment deed stood admitted by the plaintiff while making a statement in Civil Suit bearing No. 89/1 of 2007 which was pending in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Court No.1, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. In the said Civil Suit, the plaintiff got recorded her statement and acknowledged the execution of the relinquishment deed in favour of the defendant. It was stated that after the execution of the registered relinquishment

7 ( 2026:HHC:32739) deed dated 15th February 1995, the plaintiff ceases to have any right, title, or interest over the suit land and thereafter, it is the defendant who has become owner in possession of the same.

9. After filing the written statement, the defendant filed an application under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC for the rejection of the plaint on the ground that vide relinquishment deed dated 30th December 1994 registered on 15th February 1995 and on the basis of the mutation attested by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, dated 27th April 1995, the defendant has become owner of the suit land and the said fact was duly acknowledged by the plaintiff while making statement in Civil Suit No. 89/1 of 2007 titled as Banti Devi vs Sita Ram & others on 27th April 2011.

10. In the application, it has been stated that while appearing as PW-5, in the Civil Suit bearing No. 89/1 of 2007 in cross-examination, she has admitted that she relinquished her share in favour of the applicant/ present petitioner. The right, title, and interest of the plaintiff stood extinguished and that she has got no authority to file the instant suit through the

8 ( 2026:HHC:32739) general power of attorney. It is also the case of the applicant/ petitioner that the date of the execution of the document is 30th December 1994, which was registered on 15th February 1995, and the date of the attestation of the said document is 27th April 1995, and that the suit has been instituted in the year 2023, i.e., after elapse of more than 28 years.

11. As per defendant/petitioner the execution of the relinquishment deed was very much in the knowledge of the plaintiff; therefore, the suit is hopelessly time-barred and that the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC has to be allowed and the suit is liable to be rejected. Further, it is the case of the defendant-petitioner that the plaint has been cleverly drafted wherein it has been tried to bring the suit within the period of limitation by mentioning false and concocted date of cause of action, i.e., 29th December 2022 by alleging commission of fraud, coercion, undue influence, and misrepresentation. The defendant has prayed for allowing of the aforesaid application.

12. The said application came to be contested by the plaintiff by raising the plea of maintainability, cause of action, estoppel, locus standi, etc. On merits, it has been stated that

9 ( 2026:HHC:32739) the plaintiff is a blind lady by birth, and she was not aware about the execution of the alleged relinquishment deed.

13. It is case of the plaintiff that she was confined by the present petitioner for many years, and in the year 2022, somehow she managed to escape from the clutches of the defendant. Immediately thereafter, she lodged an FIR No. 102 dated 23rd September 2022 against the petitioner, his wife and his son under the various provisions of IPC. As per plaintiff, the petitioner had taken the undue advantage of being her real brother and cleverly got executed the relinquishment deed in his name. To the averment as made by the petitioner that the plaintiff had made a statement in Civil Suit bearing No. 89/1 of 2007, it was stated that she made the statement before the Court under the influence of the defendant as she was in his wrongful confinement. Further, she has stated that she has no idea about the contents of the affidavit given on her behalf in the said civil suit, being blind by birth. Therefore, the plaintiff prayed for dismissal of the application as filed by the defendant.

14. The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No.2, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. vide its impugned

10 ( 2026:HHC:32739) order dated 13th March 2026, dismissed the application as filed by the defendant.

15. Feeling dissatisfied, the defendant has approached this Court by filing the Revision Petition under Section 115 of the CPC.

16. It is contended by Mr. Neel Kamal Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order as passed by the learned trial Court is erroneous and liable to be set aside. He submits that the learned trial Court has not appreciated the point in controversy and has wrongly rejected the application, whereas the petitioner has been able to make out the case for the rejection of the plaint and suit being time- barred. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that after accepting the present revision petition, the application filed by the defendant for the rejection of the plaint deserves to be allowed.

17. On the other hand, Mr. Vikrant Chandel, learned counsel for the respondent has defended the impugned order and submitted that while exercising the power under Section 115 of the CPC, this Court will not interfere in the well- reasoned order as passed by the learned trial Court. He

11 ( 2026:HHC:32739) submits that the scope of interference by this Court while exercising the power under Section 115 of the CPC is very narrow and limited, therefore, the revision petition deserves to be rejected.

I heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the case file.

19. The precise case of the plaintiff before the learned trial Court is that she is a blind lady by birth. Admittedly, both the parties are real brother and sister, and it is case of the plaintiff that after the death of her husband late Sh. Ganpat, she inherited the suit property.

20. The plaintiff has stated that taking undue advantage of her blindness and old age, the defendant with a mala fide intention approached her and requested her to allow him to reside with her. Afterwards, the defendant started ill- treating the plaintiff, and he used to torture her.

21. It is case of the plaintiff that being aggrieved on account of the torture as committed by the defendant, she managed to escape from the wrongful confinement and went to the police station and got registered FIR No. 102 of 2022. The plaintiff has alleged that after leaving the company of the

12 ( 2026:HHC:32739) defendant, she got suspicious that probably the defendant might have obtained some documents under the thumb impression of the plaintiff. Thereafter, the revenue papers were obtained from the Patwari, Patwar Circle, Laheri Sarail, and she came to know for the first time on 18th October 2022, and later on 9th January 2023, that the suit land has been relinquished in favour of the defendant. Thereafter, she also came to know that various cases were filed by the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff by appointing himself as her general power of attorney. The general power of attorney was revoked on 7th October 2022, and thereafter, she also withdrew the civil suits which were frivolously filed by the defendant in the name of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has alleged in the civil suit that after the registration of FIR, the police visited the house of the parties in order to record the statement of both the parties, and when the plaintiff requested the defendant to return her articles which were in his possession and also requested to deliver the possession of the land and the house, the defendant flatly refused to do so and threatened her that he will not relinquish the share of the plaintiff at any cost. Immediately thereafter,

13 ( 2026:HHC:32739) plaintiff approached the civil court by filing a suit for declaration.

22. On the other hand, the defence as projected by the defendant is that the plaintiff had executed a conveyance deed/relinquishment deed on 30th December 1994, which was subsequently registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, on 15th February 1995. Thereafter, the mutation was also attested in favour of the defendant, whereby the suit land was transferred in the name of the defendant with the express consent of the plaintiff.

23. In order to substantiate his case, the defendant has relied upon the statement of the plaintiff, which she had made in the judicial proceedings on 27th April 2011, whereby in her cross-examination she had acknowledged and affirmed that the transaction/relinquishment deed was executed in favour of the defendant. Though, for the purpose of adjudicating the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the contents of the written statement as filed by the defendant have not to be taken into consideration, but the same have been reproduced only for the purpose of clarity of the facts.

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24. It is an admitted fact inter se the parties that the plaintiff is a blind lady by birth. She has levelled allegation of fraud, undue influence, misrepresentation against the defendant. It is case of the plaintiff that defendant kept her in the confinement, and she was able to escape her from the confinement of the defendant with great difficulty.

25. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the suit as filed by the plaintiff is hopelessly time-barred as the relinquishment deed is dated 1994, which was registered in the year 1995, however, the suit came to be instituted in the year 2023. Therefore, on the face of record, the suit is liable to be dismissed.

26. On the other hand, it is contended by Mr. Vikrant Chandel, learned counsel for the respondent that the limitation has to be taken from the date of the knowledge, and the cause of action in the present case accrued to the plaintiff when she came to know about the execution of the relinquishment deed and the attestation of the mutation.

27. In order to substantiate his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in Sree Surya Developers

15 ( 2026:HHC:32739) and Promoters vs. N. Sailesh Prasad & others, (2022) 5 SCC 736, decided on 09.02.2022, Forest International Limited Vs. Milan Developers and Builders Private and Limited and another, (2022) 8 SCC 633, decided on 01.04.2022 and Uma Devi & others vs. Anand Kumar & others, (2025) 5 SCC 198, decided on 02.04.2025.

28. On the other hand, Mr. Vikrant Chandel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 5622 of 2025 titled as P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan and Others, decided on 29.04.2025, wherein it has been specifically held that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs the suits seeking cancellation of an instrument and prescribes a period of limitation of 3 years from the date when the plaintiff first had the knowledge of the facts entitling him to such relief. The emphasis under Article 59 is not on the date of the transaction, but on the accrual of the cause of action, which in cases involving allegations of fraud or unauthorized execution of documents hinges upon the date on which the plaintiff acquired the knowledge of such facts. Whether the plaintiff had prior notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an early point of time, or whether the plea

16 ( 2026:HHC:32739) regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that necessarily require appreciation of evidence. At the preliminary stage, the averments as made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and assumed to be true. Once, the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily.

29. As per the Hon’ble Apex Court, when the question of limitation involves disputed facts or hinges on the date of knowledge, such issue cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

30. In case titled as Chhotanben v. Kiritibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar (2018) 6 SCC 422, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the plea regarding the date on which the plaintiff gained knowledge of the essential facts is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by the limitation or not. It becomes triable issue, and the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold.

31. The

Hon’ble

Apex

Court

in P. Kumarakurubaran’s case (supra) has held as follows: “8.3. The learned counsel further pointed out that the appellant has sought the relief of declaration of title and

17 ( 2026:HHC:32739) permanent injunction by expressly disputing the right, title, and possession claimed by the respondents. The plaint contains specific allegations regarding fraudulent alienation, subsequent encumbrance, and the absence of authority on the part of the appellant’s father to effect the transfer of the suit property. These are serious and contested issues that necessitate a detailed adjudication based on oral and documentary evidence. At the threshold stage, it is impermissible for the Court to assess the truth or falsity of these averments or to summarily reject the suit on the ground of limitation. Furthermore, the Additional District Judge, in declining the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC committed no jurisdictional error, as the plaint disclosed triable issues requiring full-fledged trial. However, the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction, has erroneously interfered with the order of the trial Court and proceeded to reject the suit at the preliminary stage.

9.3. The learned counsel also submitted that a bare perusal of the averments in the plaint reveals that the suit is barred by limitation. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali4 and Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh(Dead) by LRs 5 wherein, it was held that when the foundational facts, as pleaded, squarely attract the bar of (2020) 7 SCC 366 (2020) 16 SCC 601 limitation, no trial is warranted and the suit is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. That apart, the learned counsel referred to the decision of this Court in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another6, wherein, it was clearly held that the spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is only for the courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex- facie appears to be a clear abuse of process.

11. It is well-settled that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, governs suits seeking cancellation of an instrument and prescribes a period of limitation of three years from the date when the plaintiff first had knowledge of the facts entitling him to such relief. The emphasis under Article 59 is not on the date of the transaction per se, but on the accrual of the cause of action, which, in cases involving allegations of fraud or unauthorized execution of documents, hinges upon the date on which the plaintiff acquired knowledge of such facts.

12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to whether the appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that necessarily require appreciation of

18 ( 2026:HHC:32739) evidence. At this preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and assumed to be true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable.

12.2. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the following decisions of this Court, which have consistently held that when the question of limitation involves disputed facts or hinges on the date of knowledge, such issues cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC:

(i) Daliben Valjibhai & Others v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai & Another7 “10. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the defendants made an application for correcting the revenue records only in the year 2017 and on the said application the Deputy Collector issued notice to the plaintiffs in March 2017 and that was the time when the plaintiffs came to know about the execution of the sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the suit was instituted in the year 2017. While the High Court came to the correct conclusion that under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3 years of the knowledge, it proceeded to return a finding that in cases where the document is registered, the knowledge must be presumed from the date of registration.

11.

12. Further, in Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar where again a suit for cancellation of sale deed was opposed through an application under Order 7 Rule 11, on ground of limitation, this Court specifically held that limitation in all such cases will arise from date of knowledge. The relevant portion is as follows: “15. What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the context of the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The plaint is required to be read as a whole. The defence available to the defendants or the plea taken by them in the written statement or any application filed by them, cannot be the basis to decide the application under Order 7 Rule

19 ( 2026:HHC:32739) 11(d). Only the averments in the plaint are germane. It is common ground that the registered sale deed is dated 18-10-1996. The limitation to challenge the registered sale deed ordinarily would start running from the date on which the sale deed was 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4105 registered. However, the specific case of the appellant-plaintiffs is that until 2013 they had no knowledge whatsoever regarding execution of such sale deed by their brothers, original Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of Jaikrishnabhai Prabhudas Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They acquired that knowledge on 26-12-2012 and immediately took steps to obtain a certified copy of the registered sale deed and on receipt thereof they realised the fraud played on them by their brothers concerning the ancestral property and two days prior to the filing of the suit, had approached their brothers (original Defendants 1 and 2) calling upon them to stop interfering with their possession and to partition the property and provide exclusive possession of half (½) portion of the land so designated towards their share. However, when they realised that the original Defendants 1 and 2 would not pay any heed to their request, they had no other option but to approach the court of law and filed the subject suit within two days therefrom. According to the appellants, the suit has been filed within time after acquiring the knowledge about the execution of the registered sale deed. In this context, the trial court opined that it was a triable issue and declined to accept the application filed by Respondent 1-Defendant 5 for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That view commends to us. …..

19. In the present case, we find that the appellant- plaintiffs have asserted that the suit was filed immediately after getting knowledge about the fraudulent sale deed executed by original Defendants 1 and 2 by keeping them in the dark about such execution and within two days from the refusal by the original Defendants 1 and 2 to refrain from obstructing the peaceful enjoyment of use and possession of the ancestral property of the appellants. We affirm the view taken by the trial court that the issue regarding the suit being barred by limitation in the facts of the present case, is a triable issue and for which reason the

20 ( 2026:HHC:32739) plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold in exercise of the power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.”

13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in reversing the well- reasoned order of the trial Court warrants interference. The trial Court had rightly held that the issue of limitation necessitated adjudication upon evidence, particularly in view of the appellant’s assertion that the Power of Attorney executed by him did not confer any authority upon his father to alienate the suit property and that the impugned transaction came to his knowledge only at a much later point in time. In such circumstances, the determination of limitation involved disputed questions of fact that could not be summarily decided without the benefit of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to reject the plaint solely on a prima facie assumption that the suit was barred by limitation, without undertaking any examination as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was demonstrably false or inherently improbable in light of the record. In the opinion of this Court, such an approach amounts to an error of law and constitutes a misapplication of the well-established principles governing the exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents are inapplicable, being factually distinguishable.”

32. In the present case also, specific allegation of fraud has been levelled by the plaintiff against the defendant and the allegations which have been levelled in the plaint are bundle of facts, which are factual in nature, and those can be determined or adjudicated upon by leading independent evidence by the respective parties. The averment of the plaint shows that the plaintiff who is admittedly a blind lady of 87 years old, has approached the Court by levelling the allegation that by fraudulent means, the defendant has

21 ( 2026:HHC:32739) obtained/procured the relinquishment deed in his favour, and thereafter, the mutation has been attested in his favour.

33. It is case of the plaintiff that being a rustic villager, the defendant had duped her by obtaining her thumb impression, and that her statement was taken in the competent court of law by exerting pressure on her.

34. Therefore, the learned trial Court was well within its right by coming to the conclusion that all the questions and the issues which have been raised by the plaintiff are triable issues, and those cannot be rejected or disbelieved by invoking the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.

35. The learned trial court has rightly come to the conclusion that merely on the basis of the statement which the plaintiff had made in Civil Suit No. 89/1 of 2007, it cannot be inferred or deciphered that the suit lands in the said suit and in the present suit are the same and identical. Even otherwise, the attention of this Court has been drawn to the statement which the plaintiff had made in the previous suit. It no where suggests that she was well aware about the execution of the relinquishment deed in favour of the defendant.

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36. To the similar extent, the defendant has not been able to establish that the suit land in the previous suit and in the present suit is the same. Therefore, no strength can be gathered by the defendant qua such document.

37. It is apposite to explain the nature and scope conferred to this Court under Section 115 of the CPC and analyze whether this Court is empowered to deal with the issues raised by the petitioner in the instant case. The said provision reads as under:- “Section 115. Revision- [(1)] The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears-- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or

(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: [Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.] [(2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto.] [(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court.]

23 ( 2026:HHC:32739) [Explanation.--In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding.]”

38. On bare perusal of the above provision, it is clear that the High Court can only interfere with the orders of the Subordinate Court if the court has committed illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction. It is imperative to note that under the revisional powers, this Court cannot attack the findings on the facts by the Subordinate Court and can only interfere if any infirmities are found with the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court and not when the courts erroneously decide the cases.

39. The primary object of the revision powers conferred to the High Courts is to prevent subordinate courts from acting arbitrarily, capriciously and illegally while they exercise their jurisdiction. The aspect related to the revision powers given to the High Court has been extensively dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, whereby the Hon'ble Court discussed the meaning and scope of the said provision.

40. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s D.L.F. Housing and Construction Company (P) Ltd., New Delhi

24 ( 2026:HHC:32739) vs. Sarup Singh and others, 1969(3) SCC 807, has considered the provisions of Section 115 of CPC as follows: “5. The position thus seems to be firmly established that while exercising the jurisdiction u/s 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this section on their plain reading quite clearly do not cover the present case. It was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend, that the learned Additional District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording the order that the proceedings under reference be stayed till the decision of the appeal by the High Court in the proceedings for specific performance of the agreement in question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words "illegally" and "with material irregularity" as used in this Clause do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this Clause may, in our view, relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with. The High Court does not seem to have adverted to the limitation imposed on its power u/s 115 of the Code. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined, had it dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different conclusion on the question of continuing stay of the reference proceedings pending decision of the appeal, could hardly justify interference on revision u/s 115 of the Code when there was no illegality or material irregularity committed by the learned Additional District Judge in his manner of dealing with this question. It seems to us that in this matter the High Court treated the revision virtually as if it was an appeal.

41. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5622 of 2025, titled as P. Kumarakurubaran vs, P. Narayanan & others, held as under:-

14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred in the plaint that he executed the registered power of

25 ( 2026:HHC:32739) attorney in favour of his father solely for the limited purpose of constructing a house 16 and carrying out related activities. There is no express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit property to any person without the appellant’s consent and knowledge.Yet, the appellant’s father executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope of the power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in holding that the matter ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court’s order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual disputes exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable.”

42. In Ajit Singh & others vs. Krishan Kumar, decided on 18th October, 2023, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, held as under: “11. The same view is reiterated in a later decision of this Court in the case of Managing Director (Mig) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway [(1972) 3 SCC 195] wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Hegde, J. clearly stated that the High Court under Section 115 CPC had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court based on facts or even involving any error of law. It was next observed that it was not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law; but one thing is clear, that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It was not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code."

43. In view of the observation as made hereinabove, whereby the learned trial Court has come to the conclusion

26 ( 2026:HHC:32739) that the issues as raised by the plaintiff are triable issues, which cannot be adjudicated and put to an end at the threshold, therefore, the impugned order as passed by the learned trial Court does not suffer from any infirmity.

44. Consequently, the present petition being devoid of any merit deserves to be rejected. Order accordingly.

45. However, it is made clear that observations as made in the present case will not have any bearing on the merits of the main case as these observations are strictly for the disposal of the instant petition. All the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (Romesh Verma)

Judge

July 29, 2026 (Nisha)