M/S. SREE SURYA DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS versus N. SAILESH PRASAD AND ORS. on 9 February 2022

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 01.10.2019 passed by the High Court for the State ofBTelangana at Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No.454 of 2019 by which theHigh Court has allowed the said appeal preferred by the respondentNo.1 herein – original plaintiff and has quashed and set aside the orderpassed by the learned II Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy Districtdated 02.05.2019 in I.A. No.108 of 2019 in O.S. No.537 of 2018 bywhich the learned Trial Court rejected the plaint under Order 7 RuleC11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”),the original defendants to O.S. No.537 of 2018 have preferred the presentappeals.

2. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as under:- D2.1 That the suit schedule property was gifted to the respondentNo.1 herein – original plaintiff during his minority by his paternalgrandmother (respondent No.2 herein and original defendant in O.S.No.537 of 2018) vide registered Gift Deed dated 13.02.2003. That thesaid Gift Settlement Deed was revoked vide Revocation of Gift Deeddated 10.12.2004 by the grandmother of the respondent No.1 herein –Eoriginal plaintiff. That thereafter a registered Development Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney dated 18.01.2008 came to be executedbetween the grandmother of the plaintiff and the appellant herein – M/s.Sree Surya Developers and Promoters – original defendant No.2. Itappears that under the said Development Agreement, the grandmotherFwas entitled to 35,000 sq. ft. of fixed saleable super built-up area alongwith proportionate number of car parking spaces and undivided share inthe land.

2.2 The father of the respondent No.1 – original plaintiff (originalrespondent No.3 herein and defendant No.3 in O.S. No.537 of 2018)Gfiled a suit being O.S. No.1750 of 2015 as the next friend of then minorrespondent No.1 herein seeking for declaration that revocation ofGiftDeed dated 10.04.2004 as being illegal and not binding on the plaintifftherein and also for perpetual injunction. Subsequently, a compromisewas arrived at between the parties to O.S. No.1750 of 2015 videCompromise Deed Dated 30.12.2015. Under the Compromise, it wasH

agreed that the respondent No.1 herein – original plaintiff would be entitledto entire 35,000 sq. ft. of the constructed area, which was agreed to beallocated to the grandmother under the Development Agreement. It wasfurther agreed as per the Compromise Decree that the Developer wouldbe entitled to assign the development rightsaccrued to it under the saidDevelopment Agreement to the third parties. In furtherance of thecompromise, I.A. No.31 of 2016 under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC cameto be filed alongwith the Compromise Memo praying for passing of decreein terms thereof. The father of the respondent No.1 (respondent No.3herein – original defendant No.3) filed I.A. in the said suit under Rule172 of the Civil Rules of Practice seeking permission to act on behalf ofthe respondent No.1 herein and the Trial Court was pleased to permithim to do so.

2.3 Thereafter, the Compromise Decree came to be passed bythe VIII Additional Senior Civil Judge, RR District dated 13.01.2016 inO.S. No.1750 of 2015 in terms of the Memorandum of Compromiseentered into by the father on behalf of respondent No.1 herein, thegrandmother and the appellant herein – Developer. It appears thatthereafter the appellant – Developer assigned its development rightsunder the above-mentioned Development Agreement to respondent No.4herein under a Deed of Assignment dated 06.04.2016 and on the basisof the same, the respondent No.4 has started developing the subjectproperty in O.S. No.537 of 2018.

2.4 That on attaining the age of majority, the respondent No.1herein filed the present suit being O.S. No.537 of 2018 through his GeneralPower of Attorney praying inter alia declaration of right, title and interestover the suit schedule property and declaration of Compromise Decree.He also prayed the revocation of deed as null and void.

2.5 That having been served with a notice of the suit, the appellantfiled written statement denying all the material allegations. The appellantalso filed I.A. No.108 of 2019 under order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejectionof the plaint on various grounds and mainly on the ground that the suitfor setting aside the consent decree/Compromise Decree would be barredunder Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC. The Trial Court vide order dated02.05.2019 allowed the said I.A. and rejected the plaint on the groundthat in view of Order XIII Rule 3A CPC, no independent suit would bemaintainable against the Compromise Decree.

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A2.6 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed bythe Trial Court rejecting the plaint in exercise of powers under OrderVII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground that in view of the provisions ofOrder XXIII Rule 3A CPC, no independent suit would be maintainableagainst the Compromise Decree, the original plaintiff preferred the presentappeal before the High Court.B

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2.7 By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court hasallowed the said appeal and has quashed and set aside the order passedby the Trial Court rejecting the plaint and has remanded the matter tothe Trial Court by observing that the effect of the provisions of OrderXXXII Rules 1 to 7 CPC has not been considered by the Trial court,Cwhich would have a direct bearing on the validity of the CompromiseDecree dated 13.01.2016 in O.S. No.1750 of 2015.

2.8 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High court, the original defendant Nos. 2 and 4– Developer and its Assignee have preferred the present appeals.D

3. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate appearing onbehalf of the appellant – Developer has vehemently submitted that inthe facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has committeda grave error in quashing and setting aside the order passed by the Trialcourt rejecting the plaint in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11ECPC holding that in view of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, no independentsuit would be maintainable against the Compromise Decree.

3.1 It is submitted that Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC provides forcompromise of suit. It is submitted that by way of amendment in 1976Fmade by Act No.104 of 1976, Rule 3A has been inserted, whichspecifically provides that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on theground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.It is submitted that therefore the present suit filed by the respondentNo.1 herein – original plaintiff challenging the Compromise Decree wouldbe barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC and therefore the TrialGCourt rightly rejected the plaint.

3.2 It is further submitted by Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocateappearing on behalf of the appellant – Developer and the learned counselfor the Assignee that as held by this Court in a catena of decisions, theonly remedy available to the aggrieved party would be to submit anH

appropriate application before the same Court which recorded thecompromise. Reliance is placed on decisions of this Court in the case ofBanwari Lal Vs. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC 581; Pushpa DeviBhagat Vs. Rajinder Singh &Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 566; Horil Vs.Keshav, (2012) 5 SCC 525; R. Rajanna Vs. S.R. Venkataswamy& Ors., (2014) 15 SCC 471 and recently in R. Janakiammal Vs.S.K. Kumarasamy, (2021) 9 SCC 114.

3.3 It is submitted that in the present case as such the originalplaintiff had already filed an application under Order XXIII Rule 3Abefore the same court which passed the consent Compromise Decree.It is submitted that in the present case even the original plaintiff has fileda first appeal under Order XLIII before the first Appellate courtchallenging the Compromise Decree. It is submitted that therefore assuch the plaintiff has already availed the other remedies available tohim. It is submitted that therefore the present suit is nothing but an abuseof process of law. It is submitted that in any case, the substantiveindependent suit questioning the Compromise Decree shall not bemaintainable in view of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC.

3.4 It is further submitted by Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocateappearing on behalf of the appellant that in the present case therespondent No.1 herein – original plaintiff has indulged in clever draftingseeking one relief by way of drafting multiple prayers. It is submittedthat the only relief that the plaintiff seeks is setting aside the CompromiseDecree dated 13.01.2016 which he has sought by drafting multiple prayersin order to avoid the bar to suit envisaged under Order XXIII Rule 3A ofCPC, which in other words is mere clever drafting. It is submitted thatas held by this Court in a catena of decisions by mere clever drafting ofthe plaint, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to maintain the suit, whichotherwise would not be maintainable and/or barred by any law. It isfurther observed and held by this Court that if clever drafting of theplaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it inthe bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.Reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in the case of T.Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal and Anr., (1977) 4 SCC 467;Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy Vs. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13SCC 174; Canara Bank Vs. P. Selathal and Ors., (2020) 13 SCC143; and Raghwendra Sharan Singh Vs. Ram Prasanna Singh,(2020) 16 SCC 601.

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A3.5 Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate has further submittedthat even otherwise the impugned judgment and order passed by theHigh Court is unsustainable. It is submitted that in the entire judgment,there is no discussion by the High Court on the maintainability of the suitand/or any discussion on Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC on the basis ofwhich the Trial Court rejected the plaint.B

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3.6 It is submitted that on the contrary, the High Court has goneinto the validity of the Compromise Decree considering Order XXXIIRules 1 to 7 CPC and the High Court has virtually given the findingsrelying upon Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC that the Compromise Decreewas not binding to the plaintiff. It is submitted that the High Court oughtCto have addressed itself to the maintainability of the suit and at this stagethe High Court was not required to consider at all on the validity of theCompromise Decree.

3.7 Number of other submissions have been made by learnedDcounsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on the validity of theCompromise Decree. However, for the reasons stated hereinbelow, wepropose to consider the only issue with respect to maintainability of thesuit and the issue before this Court is not on the validity of the CompromiseDecree, therefore, we do not propose to deal with any of the submissionson merits on the validity of the Compromise Decree.E4. Present appeals are vehemently opposed by Shri B. AdinarayanaRao, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the originalplaintiff(s).

4.1 it is submitted that in the present case, the Compromise DecreeFis hit by Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC. It is submitted that therefore onattaining the majority immediately when respondent No.1 herein – originalplaintiff instituted a suit for various reliefs, which otherwise can be grantedin a substantive independent suit, the High Court has rightly set aside theorder passed by the Trial Court rejecting the plaint.

G4.2 It is vehemently submitted by learned Senior Advocateappearing on behalf of the original plaintiff that in the present case, thereliefs prayed in the suit are not only with respect to the CompromiseDecree, but other reliefs are sought for which an independent substantivesuit shall be maintainable. It is submitted that as such the plaintiff has notprayed to set aside the Compromise Decree. It is submitted that what isH

prayed is to declare that the Compromise Decree is not binding on him.It is submitted that therefore for the other reliefs sought, it can be saidthat an independent suit under Order XXIII Rule 3A shall not be barred.

4.3 However, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalfof the respondents – original plaintiff(s) is not disputing that the plaintiffhas already filed an application under Order XXIII Rule 3A before thesame Court, which passed the Compromise Decree. He is also not in aposition to dispute that in the said application, the plaintiff can very wellmake submission on the validity of the Compromise Decree on whatevergrounds, which may be available to him including non-compliance ofOrder XXXII Rule 7 CPC.

5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of therespective parties at length.

6. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case,the Trial Court rejected the plaint of O.S. No.537 of 2018 in exercise ofpowers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the said suitwould not be maintainable in view of specific bar under Order XXIIIRule 3A CPC. The High Court by the impugned judgment and order hasset aside the said order and has remanded the matter to the Trial Courtby observing that while passing the order rejecting the plaint, the TrialCourt had not considered the provisions of Order XXXII Rules 1 to 7CPC. However, it is required to be noted that while passing the impugnedjudgment and order, the High Court has not at all dealt with and consideredthe provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC and has not considered atall whether in fact the suit challenging the Compromise Decree and/orfor the reliefs sought in the suit would be maintainable or not. What wasrequired to be considered by the High Court was whether the independentsuit questioning the Compromise Decree would be maintainable or not.The aforesaid crucial aspect has not been dealt with by the High Courtat all and High Court has gone into the validity of the Compromise Decreein view of Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC. At the stage of deciding theapplication under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the only thing which wasrequired to be considered by the High Court was whether the suit wouldbe maintainable or not and that the suit challenging the CompromiseDecree would be maintainable or not in view of Order XXIII Rule 3ACPC and at this stage, the High Court / Court was not required to consideron merits the validity of the Compromise Decree.

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A7. Now, so far as the main issue whether the Trial Court rightlyrejected the plaint in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPCon the ground that an independent suit challenging the Compromise Decreewould be barred in view of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC is concerned, onplain reading of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, the Trial Court was justifiedin rejecting the plaint. Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, which has been insertedBby amendment in 1976 reads as under:- A

“3A. Bar to suit. — No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on theground that the compromise on which the decree is based wasnot lawful.”

C8. Therefore, on plain reading of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, nosuit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise onwhich the decree is based was not lawful. Identical question came to beconsidered by this Court in the case of R. Janakiammal (supra). It isobserved and held by this Court that Rule 3A of Order XXIII bars thesuit to set aside the decree on the ground that the compromise on whichDdecree was passed was not lawful. It is further observed and held thatan agreement or compromise which is clearly void or voidable shall notbe deemed to be lawful and the bar under Rule 3A shall be attracted ifcompromise on the basis of which the decree was passed was void orvoidable. In this case, this Court had occasion to consider in detail OrderEXXIII Rule 3 as well as Rule 3A. The earlier decisions of this Courthave also been dealt with by this Court in paragraphs 53 to 57 as under:- “53. Order 23 Rule 3 as well as Rule 3-A came for considerationbefore this Court in large number of cases and we need to referto a few of them to find out the ratio of judgments of this Court inFcontext of Rule 3 and Rule 3-A. In Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi,(1993) 1 SCC 581, this Court considered Rule 3 as well as Rule3-A of Order 23. This Court held that the object of the AmendmentAct, 1976 is to compel the party challenging the compromise toquestion the court which has recorded the compromise. In paras6 and 7, the following was laid down: (SCC pp. 584-85)

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“6. The experience of the courts has been that on manyoccasions parties having filed petitions of compromise on basisof which decrees are prepared, later for one reason or otherchallenge the validity of such compromise. For setting asidesuch decrees suits used to be filed which dragged on for years H

including appeals to different courts. Keeping in view thepredicament of the courts and the public, several amendmentshave been introduced in Order 23 of the Code which containprovisions relating to withdrawal and adjustment of suit by theCivil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. Rule 1 Order23 of the Code prescribes that at any time after the institutionof the suit, the plaintiff may abandon his suit or abandon a partof his claim. Rule 1(3) provides that where the Court is satisfied:(a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b)that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff toinstitute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of aclaim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiffpermission to withdraw such suit with liberty to institute a freshsuit. In view of Rule 1(4) if the plaintiff abandons his suit orwithdraws such suit without permission referred to above, heshall be precluded from instituting any such suit in respect ofsuch subject-matter. Rule 3 Order 23 which contained theprocedure regarding compromise of the suit was also amendedto curtail vexatious and tiring litigation while challenging acompromise decree. Not only in Rule 3 some specialrequirements were introduced before a compromise is recordedby the court including that the lawful agreement or acompromise must be in writing and signed by the parties, aproviso with an Explanation was also added which is as follows:

‘Provided that where it is alleged by one party and deniedby the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has beenarrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but noadjournment shall be granted for the purpose of decidingthe question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded,thinks fit to grant such adjournment.

Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is voidor voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872),shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of thisRule.’

7. By adding the proviso along with an Explanation the purposeand the object of the amending Act appears to be to compelthe party challenging the compromise to question the samebefore the court which had recorded the compromise in

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question. That court was enjoined to decide the controversywhether the parties have arrived at an adjustment in a lawfulmanner. The Explanation made it clear that an agreement or acompromise which is void or voidable under the Contract Actshall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the saidRule. Having introduced the proviso along with the Explanationin Rule 3 in order to avoid multiplicity of suit and prolongedlitigation, a specific bar was prescribed by Rule 3-A in respectof institution of a separate suit for setting aside a decree on thebasis of a compromise saying:

‘3-A. Bar to suit.—No suit shall lie to set aside a decreeon the ground that the compromise on which the decree isbased was not lawful.’

54. The next judgment to be noted is Pushpa DeviBhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566, R.V. Raveendran,J. speaking for the Court noted the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3and Rule 3-A and recorded his conclusions in para 17 in thefollowing words: (SCC p. 576)

“17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions ofOrder 23 can be summed up thus:

(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree havingregard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.

(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the courtrecording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise)in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.

(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside acompromise decree on the ground that the compromise wasnot lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.

(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid andbinding unless it is set aside by the court which passed theconsent decree, by an order on an application under the provisoto Rule 3 Order 23.

Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decreeto avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court whichrecorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, andestablish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decidethe question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not.This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract betweenparties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. Thevalidity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of theagreement or compromise on which it is made. The seconddefendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree wasfully aware of this position as she filed an application for settingaside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there wasno valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, noneof the other defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasonsbest known to herself, the second defendant within a few daysthereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not topursue the application filed before the court which passed theconsent decree. Such an appeal by the second defendant was notmaintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section96(3) of the Code.”

55. The next judgment is R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkataswamy,(2014) 15 SCC 471 in which the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3and Rule 3-A were again considered. After extracting the aforesaidprovisions, the following was held by this Court in para 11: (SCCp. 474)

“11. It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that interms of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 where one party allegesand the other denies adjustment or satisfaction of any suit by alawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by theparties, the Court before whom such question is raised, shalldecide the same. What is important is that in terms ofExplanation to Order 23 Rule 3, the agreement or compromiseshall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the saidRule if the same is void or voidable under the Contract Act,1872. It follows that in every case where the question ariseswhether or not there has been a lawful agreement orcompromise in writing and signed by the parties, the questionwhether the agreement or compromise is lawful has to bedetermined by the court concerned. What is lawful will in turndepend upon whether the allegations suggest any infirmity inthe compromise and the decree that would make the same

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void or voidable under the Contract Act. More importantly,Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree onthe ground that the compromise on which the decree is basedwas not lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relatingto lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised beforethe court that passed the decree on the basis of any suchagreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alonewho can examine and determine that question. The court cannotdirect the parties to file a separate suit on the subject for nosuch suit will lie in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. That is precisely what has happened in the case athand. When the appellant filed OS No. 5326 of 2005 tochallenge the validity of the compromise decree, the courtbefore whom the suit came up rejected the plaint under Order7 Rule 11 CPC on the application made by the respondentsholding that such a suit was barred by the provisions of Order23 Rule 3-A CPC. Having thus got the plaint rejected, thedefendants (the respondents herein) could hardly be heard toargue that the plaintiff (the appellant herein) ought to pursuehis remedy against the compromise decree in pursuance ofOS No. 5326 of 2005 and if the plaint in the suit has beenrejected to pursue his remedy against such rejection before ahigher court.”

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56. The judgments of Pushpa Devi [Pushpa Devi Bhagat v.Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566] as well as BanwariLal [Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC 581] werereferred to and relied on by this Court. This Court held that nosooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement orcompromise is raised before the court that passed the decree onthe basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that courtand that court alone which can examine and determine thatquestion.

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57. In subsequent judgment, Triloki Nath Singh v. AnirudhGSingh, (2020) 6 SCC 629, this Court again referring to earlierjudgments reiterated the same proposition i.e. the only remedyavailable to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consentdecree is to approach the court which recorded the compromiseand separate suit is not maintainable. In paras 17 and 18, theHfollowing has been laid down: (SCC p. 638)

“17. By introducing the amendment to the Civil Procedure Code(Amendment) Act, 1976 w.e.f. 1-2-1977, the legislature hasbrought into force Order 23 Rule 3-A, which creates bar toinstitute the suit to set aside a decree on the ground that thecompromise on which decree is based was not lawful. Thepurpose of effecting a compromise between the parties is toput an end to the various disputes pending before the court ofcompetent jurisdiction once and for all.

18. Finality of decisions is an underlying principle of alladjudicating forums. Thus, creation of further litigation shouldnever be the basis of a compromise between the parties. Rule3-A Order 23 CPC put a specific bar that no suit shall lie to setaside a decree on the ground that the compromise on whichthe decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of Order 23Rule 3 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit partiesto amicably come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writingand a voluntary act on the part of the parties. The court can beinstrumental in having an agreed compromise effected andfinality attached to the same. The court should never be partyto imposition of a compromise upon an unwilling party, stillopen to be questioned on an application under the proviso toOrder 23 Rule 3 CPC before the court.”

That thereafter it is specifically observed and held that a party toa consent decree based on a compromise to challenge the compromisedecree on the ground that the decree was not lawful i.e., it was void orvoidable has to approach the same court, which recorded the compromiseand a separate suit challenging the consent decree has been held to benot maintainable.

9. In view of the above decisions of this Court, the Trial Courtwas absolutely justified in rejecting the plaint on the ground that the suitfor the reliefs sought challenging the Compromise Decree would not bemaintainable.

10. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the plaintiff that inthe suit the plaintiff has not specifically prayed for setting aside theCompromise Decree and what is prayed is to declare that theCompromise Decree is not binding on him and that for the other reliefssought, the suit would not be barred and still the suit would be maintainableis concerned, the aforesaid cannot be accepted.

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A10.1 As held by this Court in a catena of decisions right from 1977that a mere clever drafting would not permit the plaintiff to make the suitmaintainable which otherwise would not be maintainable and/or barredby law. It has been consistently held by this Court that if clever draftingof the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court willnip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at theBearlier stage.10.2 In the case of T. Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977)4 SCC 467, it is observed and held as under;- “5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitionerCfor the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly andunrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts foundin the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suitnow pending before the First Munsif’s Court, Bangalore, is aflagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. Thelearned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — notDformal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, andmeritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, heshould exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC takingcare to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, ifclever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip itEin the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchinglyunder Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer toirresponsible law suits.”

10.3 In the case of Ram Singh v. Gram Panchayat MehalKalan, (1986) 4 SCC 364, this Court has observed and held that whenFthe suit is barred by any law, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to circumventthat provision by means of clever drafting so as to avoid mention ofthose circumstances, by which the suit is barred by law of limitation.

11. If we consider the reliefs of declaration of title, recovery ofpossession, cancellation of revocation of Gift Deed, declaration for DGPAGand Deed of Assignment-cum-DGPA, the said reliefs can be grantedonly if the Compromise Decree dated 13.01.2016 passed in O.S. No.1750of 2015 is set aside. Therefore, by asking such multiple reliefs, the plaintiffby clever drafting wants to get his suit maintainable, which otherwisewould not be maintainable questioning the Compromise Decree. All theaforesaid reliefs were subject matter of earlier suits and thereafter alsoH

PRASAD AND ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

PRASAD AND ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

subject matter of O.S. No.1750 of 2015 in which the Compromise Decreehas been passed. Therefore, it is rightly held by the Trial Court that thesuit in the present form and for the reliefs sought would be barred underOrder XXIII Rule 3A CPC and therefore the Trial Court rightly rejectedthe plaint in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC.The High Court has erred in setting aside the said order by entering intothe merits of the validity of the Compromise Decree on the ground thatthe same was hit by Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC, which was not permissibleat this stage of deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPCand the only issue which was required to be considered by the HighCourt was whether the suit challenging the Compromise Decree wouldbe maintainable or not.

12. As observed hereinabove and it is not in dispute that as suchthe respondent No.1 – original plaintiff has already moved an appropriateapplication before the concerned Court, which passed the decree settingaside the compromise Decree by submitting an application under OrderXXIII Rule 3A CPC therefore the said application will have to be decidedand disposed of in accordance with law in which all the defences /contentions which may have been available to the respective parties onthe validity of the Compromise Decree would have to be gone into bythe concerned court in accordance with law and on its own merits.

13. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, thepresent appeals succeed. The impugned judgment and order passed bythe High Court allowing the appeal and quashing and setting aside theorder passed by the II Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy Districtpassed on 02.05.2019 in I.A. No. 108 of 2019 in O.S. No.537 of 2018 ishereby quashed and set aside. The order passed by the Trial Court dated02.05.2019 in I.A. No.108 of 2019 in O.S. No. 537 of 2018 rejecting theplaint is hereby restored. However, it is observed that we have notexpressed anything on merits on validity of the Compromise Decree andthe same shall have to be decided and considered by the Court whichpassed the decree in an application under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC,which as observed hereinabove has been filed by the original plaintiffand the said application be decided and disposed of by the concernedCourt in accordance with law and on its own merits and the contentions/defences which may be available to the respective parties on the validityof the Compromise Decree are kept open to be considered by theconcerned Court in accordance with law and on its own merits.

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1098SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 3 S.C.R.

APresent appeals are allowed accordingly. However, in the factsand circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

Devika GujralB(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

Appeals allowed.

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