MUZAFFAR HUSAIN versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR. on 6 May 2022

[2022] 7 S.C.R. 939

MUZAFFAR HUSAIN

v.

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR.

(Civil Appeal No. 3613 of 2022)

MAY 06, 2022

[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD AND

BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]

Judiciary: Subordinate judiciary – Disciplinary actionagainst judicial officer – Judicial officer-appellant took voluntaryretirement from service and joined the tribunal as member –Allegations of misconduct against him, while he was discharginghis duties as judicial officer – Charges levelled against him,departmental enquiry conducted and charges found proved – FullCourt of the High Court resolved to punish the appellant withcurtailment of 90% of his pensionary benefits with immediate effect– State sanctioned withholding of 90% from the pension of theappellant – Challenge to, by the appellant – High Court reducedthe curtailment of pensionary benefits to the extent of 70% in placeof 90% – On appeal, held: Power of judicial review conferred onthe constitutional Court is not that of appellate authority but confinedonly to the decision-making process – If the inquiry has been fairlyand properly conducted, and the findings are based on evidence,the adequacy of the evidence or reliability of evidence would notbe a ground to interfere with the findings recorded in thedepartmental enquiries – On facts, there was a regular disciplinaryproceedings conducted against the appellant after serving him thechargesheet and giving him full opportunity of hearing – Further,the appellant had not made any allegation with regard to violationof principles of natural justice or contravention of any statutoryrules or regulations having occasioned during the course of enquiryproceedings or in the decision-making process – Also, there wasenough evidence and material to show that the appellant hadmisconducted himself while discharging his duties as a judicialofficer, and had passed the judicial orders in utter disregard of thespecific provisions of law, to unduly favour certain parties, andthat such orders were actuated by corrupt motive. – Thus, thesubjective satisfaction arrived at by the High Court on the

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Aadministrative side, and the impugned order passed by the HighCourt on the judicial side did not warrant any interference – HighCourt justified in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction u/Art. 235– U.P. Govt. Servants Conduct Rules, 1956 - r. 3 – Civil ServicesRegulations – Art. 351(A) – Constitution of India – Art. 235.BDismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 The power of judicial review conferred on theconstitutional Court is not that of an appellate authority but isconfined only to the decision-making process. Interference withthe decision of departmental authorities is permissible only ifCthe proceedings were conducted in violation of the principles ofnatural justice or in contravention of statutory regulationsregulating such proceedings or if the decision on the face of it isfound to be arbitrary or capricious. The Courts would and shouldnot act as an appellate Court and reassess the evidence led inthe domestic enquiry, nor should interfere on the ground thatDanother view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiryhas been fairly and properly conducted, and the findings are basedon evidence, the adequacy of the evidence or reliability ofevidence would not be a ground to interfere with the findingsrecorded in the departmental enquiries. [Para 8][952-B-D]

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1.2 Regular disciplinary proceeding conducted against theappellant after serving him the chargesheet and giving him fullopportunity of hearing. Thereafter, pursuant to the enquiry reportsubmitted by the Enquiry Officer, Full Court of the High Courthad resolved on 02.09.2006 to accept the said enquiry reportFand punish the appellant with curtailment of 90% of pensionarybenefit with immediate effect. The order of punishment passedby the respondent-State on the basis of the said recommendationmade by the full court of the High Court, was challenged by theappellant by filing a writ petition in the High Court. The HighCourt dropped the charge nos. 1 to 3 and upheld the charge nos.G4 to 11 against the appellant, and reduced the punishment to thecurtailment of 70% in place of 90% of his pensionary benefits.[Para 11][953-F-H; 954-A]

1.3 Pertinently, the appellant had not made any allegationwith regard to violation of principles of natural justice orH

contravention of any statutory rules or regulations havingoccasioned during the course of enquiry proceedings or in thedecision-making process. Therefore, in absence of any suchallegations, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the High Courton the administrative side, and the impugned order passed bythe High Court on the judicial side did not warrant any interferenceof this court. When the Enquiry proceedings have been found tohave been conducted in proper and legal manner, and when theHigh Court on administrative side as well as on judicial side, hasaccepted the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer qua thecharge nos. 4 to 11 levelled against the appellant as “proved”,holding him guilty of having committed “misconduct”, this courtwas not expected to sit as an appellate authority and revaluatethe adequacy or reliability of the evidence adduced before theEnquiry Officer. [Para 12][954-B-D]

1.4 The submission that the disciplinary proceedings couldnot be initiated against the judicial officers merely because thejudgment or orders passed by them were wrong, is accepted,nonetheless, in the instant case the appellant was found to haveconducted the proceedings in the manner which had reflected onhis reputation and integrity. There was enough evidence andmaterial to show that the appellant had misconducted himself whiledischarging his duties as a judicial officer, and had passed thejudicial orders in utter disregard of the specific provisions of law,to unduly favour the subsequent purchasers of the acquired landswho had no right to claim compensation, and that such orderswere actuated by corrupt motive. Under the circumstances, theHigh Court was perfectly justified in exercising its supervisoryjurisdiction under Art. 235 of the Constitution. Showing unduefavour to a party under the guise of passing judicial orders is theworst kind of judicial dishonesty and misconduct. The extraneousconsideration for showing favour need not always be a monetaryconsideration. It is often said that “the public servants are likefish in the water, none can say when and how a fish drank thewater”. A judge must decide the case on the basis of the facts onrecord and the law applicable to the case. If he decides a case forextraneous reasons, then he is not performing his duties inaccordance with law. [Paras 14 and 15][955-D-H]

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942SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 7 S.C.R.

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942SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 7 S.C.R.

AAgra Development Authority, Agra Vs. State of UP andOrs. 2004 SCC Online All 269; Union of India & Ors.Vs. Iqbal Singh (1976) 1 SCC 570 : [1976] 2 SCR 988;Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant Controllerof Estate Duty (1980) 2 SCC 1 : [1980] 2 SCR 315;Food Corporation of India Vs. Kailash Chand 2014B(1) ADJ 379 (DB); Soran Singh Vs. Collector & Ors.2018 SCC Online All 5936; UP Jal Nigam, LucknowVs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow & Ors. (1996)3 SCC 124 : [1996] 1 SCR 683; Meera Sahni Vs. Lt.Governor Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177 : [2008] 10 SCRC1012; Krishna Prasad Verma (Dead) Thr Legal Vs. Stateof Bihar & Ors. (2019) 10 SCC 640 : [2019] 12 SCR861; Sadhna Chaudhary Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh(2020) 11 SCC 760; Abhay Jain Vs. High Court ofJudicature of Rajasthan & Anr. (2022) SCC Online SC319; Sarvepalli Ramaiah (D) Tr. Lrs Vs District CollectorDChittoor (2019) 4 SCC 500: [2019] 5 SCR 372; Unionof India vs. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56 : [1993] 1SCR 296; C. Ravichandran Iyer Vs. Justice A.M.Bhattacharjee & Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 457 : [1995] 3Suppl. SCR 319; High Court of Judicature At BombayEVs. Shashikant S. Patil And Anr. (2000) 1 SCC 416 :[1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 205; State Bank of Bikaner &Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 :[2011] 3 SCR 589 – referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.3613of 2022.

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From the Judgment and Order dated 17.04.2019 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Service BenchNo.496 of 2007.

Pradeep Kant, Sr. Adv., Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Simranjeet SinghRekhi, Javaid Muzaffar, Sajal Singhai, Advs. for the Appellant.

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Ms. Charu Ambwani, Pradeep Misra, Suraj Singh, Advs. for theRespondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.

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1. The challenge in the instant appeal is to the Order dated17.04.2019 passed by the High Court of judicature at Allahabad, LucknowBench, Lucknow in Writ Petition being no. 496 of 2017 filed by theappellant challenging the order of punishment issued by the respondent-State pursuant to the decision of the Full Court of the High Court takenon the report of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the disciplinaryproceedings initiated against the appellant for the alleged misconductcommitted by him as a judicial officer.

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2. Factual Matrix:

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i.The appellant had joined the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Servicesin the year 1978 and sought voluntary retirement from thesaid services in September 2003. Immediately after theretirement, appellant joined as a Judicial Member, CentralAdministrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Mumbai. On19.07.2005, the appellant was informed vide the letter dated19.07.2005 of the O.S.D (Enquiry), Allahabad High Court,addressed to the Principal Registrar, CAT, New Delhi thatthe High Court had initiated a departmental enquiry, beingno. 26 of 2005 against him. A copy of chargesheet wasenclosed therewith. There were twelve charges levelled G

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against the appellant in the said chargesheet. It was allegedagainst the petition inter alia that the appellant, while postedas the 11[th] Additional District Judge, Agra during the periodfrom 23.05.2001 to 19.05.2003, had decided a batch ofmatters under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and hadawarded enhanced compensation which was multiple timesmore than the investments made by the subsequentpurchasers of the acquired lands; that such subsequentpurchasers had no right to claim compensation for theacquired lands; that the appellant had determined thecompensation in terms of square yards and not in terms ofbighas, and had awarded such compensation in flagrantviolation of the cardinal principles of law and equity andagainst all judicial norms and propriety, with a view to undulyfavour such subsequent purchasers. It was therefore allegedthat the appellant had failed to maintain absolute integrityand complete devotion to duty, and thereby had committeda misconduct within the meaning of Rule-3 of U.P. Govt.Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. The charge no. 12 levelledagainst the appellant pertained to an undue favour shownto the son of a Counsel named Shri KC Jain, by exorbitantlyenhancing the compensation in his favour.

The appellant vide the letters dated 07.09.2005 and19.09.2005 denied all the charges levelled against him. On20.01.2006, the appellant received the written submissionssubmitted on behalf of the department in the departmentalenquiry initiated against him and the appellant also submitted his written submissions on 10.02.2006 in the said enquiry.

The Enquiry Officer vide his Enquiry report dated 05.04.2006held charges no. 1 to 11 as “Proved” and charge no. 12 as“Not Proved”. The Enquiry Officer submitted the said reportto the Chief Justice/Administrative Committee/Full Courtfor further consideration on the question of quantum ofpunishment. The appellant was called upon and he filed hisresponse on 14.06.2006 to the said Enquiry report. The HighCourt of Judicature at Allahabad in its Full Court Meetingheld that 02.09.2006 accepted the report of the EnquiryOfficer and resolved to punish the appellant with curtailmentof 90% of his pensionary benefits with immediate effect.

Pursuant to the said recommendation made by the Full CourtAof the High Court, the respondent-State passed an orderdated 22.01.2007, sanctioning withholding of 90% from thepension of the appellant in view of the provisions containedin Article 351(A) of the Civil Services Regulations.

iv.The aggrieved appellant challenged the legality of the saidorder dated 22.01.2007 by filing a writ before the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. TheDivision Bench of the High Court vide the impugned orderdated 17.04.2019 found that the punishment order inreference to the charge nos. 1 to 3 was not sustainable inthe eye of law as the respondents could not have framedthe charges for the incidences which have taken place 4years prior to the chargesheet. However, the High Courtheld that there was no ground to interfere with the findingsrecorded in reference to the charge nos. 4 to 11. The HighCourt considering the overall circumstances reduced thecurtailment of pensionary benefits to the extent of 70% inplace of 90%. The present appeal is directed against thesaid order passed by the High Court.

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3. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pradeep Kant for theappellant raised following contentions:

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i.The Enquiry against the appellant was initiated on the basisof the directions issued by the High Court in AgraDevelopment Authority, Agra Vs. State of UP and Ors.[1],though there was no complaint pending against the appellant.ii.A mere perusal of the charges levelled against the appellantin the chargesheet on the face of it revealed that the chargesdid not make out even a prima facie case of misconductand that they were neither factually nor legally substantiable.

iii.The right to seek compensation is a property right and notmere a right to sue, and the same could be legally transferredfrom one person to another as held by the Supreme Courtand High Court in catena of decisions. In this regard, hehas relied upon Union of India & Ors. Vs. Iqbal Singh[2];Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant Controller 1 2004 SCC Online All 269

2 (1976) 1 SCC 570

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Aof Estate Duty[3], Food Corporation of India Vs. KailashChand[4 ]and Soran Singh Vs. Collector & Ors.[5].

iv.The compensation was awarded by the appellant on themarket value of the land on the date of issuance ofnotification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.It had no relevance to the price offered or investments madeby the subsequent purchasers in respect of the acquiredlands. In this regard, Mr. Pradeep Kant relied upon UP JalNigam, Lucknow Vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow& Ors.[6]; Meera Sahni Vs. Lt. Governor Delhi[7 ]etc.

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v.Many cases, in which the enhanced compensation wasCawarded by the appellant were upheld by the High Court,and in some cases by the Supreme Court and therefore itcould not be said that the appellant was actuated byextraneous consideration as alleged.

vi.There was no specific charge against the appellant that heDhad taken bribe or shown any undue favour to any personor group of persons. Hence, merely because an enhancedcompensation was awarded, no inference of extraneousconsideration could be drawn. Mere suspicion was notsufficient to prove that the appellant had acted because ofextraneous consideration. In this regard, Mr. Pradeep KantEhas relied upon the decisions in the case of Krishna Prasad Verma (Dead) Thr Legal Representatives Vs. State ofBihar & Ors.[8], in case of Sadhna Chaudhary Vs. Stateof Uttar Pradesh[9], and the latest decision of Supreme Courtin case of Abhay Jain Vs. High Court of Judicature ofFRajasthan & Anr.[10].

vii.The appellant being not held guilty of any grave misconductor having caused any loss, he could not have been awardedpunishment for ‘grave misconduct’.

G3 (1980) 2 SCC 1

4 2014 (1) ADJ 379 (DB)

5 2018 SCC Online All 5936

6 (1996) 3 SCC 124

7 (2008) 9 SCC 177

8 (2019) 10 SCC 640

9 (2020) 11 SCC 760

H10 (2022) SCC Online SC 319

4. Ms. Charu Ambwani, learned counsel appearing for respondentno. 2 raised the following contentions:

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(i) The High Court has full control over its judicial officers inthe matter of disciplinary proceedings. In the instant case,after holding a regular disciplinary inquiry and after followingthe due procedure of law, the Inquiry Officer had submittedBhis report before the High Court. The same was placedbefore the Full Court and collective consciousness of theHigh Court was shaken, considering the manner in whichthe appellant had misconducted himself while working as ajudicial officer.

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(ii) The scope of judicial review is very limited. As per thesettled legal position, the Courts cannot sit in appeal overthe decision taken by the disciplinary authority and substituteits own findings, unless any perversity or patent illegality orirrationality in the process was found. The judicial reviewis permissible not against the decision but against thedecision-making process only. In this regard, she has reliedupon the decision of this Court in Sarvepalli Ramaiah(D) Tr. Lrs Vs District Collector Chittoor[11].

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(iii) The appellant was given full and fair opportunity during theenquiry proceedings conducted against him and the decisionwas taken by the full Court of the High Court afterconsidering the entire material on record. The punishmentimposed was also proportionate to the guilt of the appellant.

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(iv) Taking the Court to the evidence recorded by the EnquiryOfficer, she submitted that the appellant had enhanced thecompensation manifolds in order to extend undue favour tothe subsequent purchasers, who had no right to receive thecompensation. She also submitted that the claimants whowere the subsequent purchasers, had made a very meagreinvestments and purchased the right to receive compensationand right to sue in place of the original owners, which wastotally prohibited under Section 6(e) of the Transfer ofProperty Act read with the provisions contained in the LandAcquisition Act.

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A(v)Lastly, she drew our attention to the observations made bythis Court in case of Union of India vs. K.K. Dhawan[12 ]inwhich it has been held that the judicial officer, if actsnegligently or recklessly or attempts to confer undue favouron a person or takes a decision which is actuated by corruptmotive, then he is not acting as a judge. Strict rules ofBevidence do not apply to the departmental inquiry.

5. At the outset, it may be noted that maintenance of high standardof conduct and character of the judicial officers has always been a matterof great concern for this court. In C. Ravichandran Iyer Vs. JusticeA.M. Bhattacharjee & Ors.[13], this court emphasizing the need toCmaintain high standard of integrity, honesty and moral vigour by the judges,observed: - “Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is,therefore, entitled to except that a Judge must be a man ofhigh integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour,Dethical firmness and impervious to corrupt or venialinfluences. He is required to keep most exacting standards ofpropriety in judicial conduct. Any conduct which tends toundermine public confidence in the integrity and impartialityof the court would be deleterious to the efficacy of judicialprocess. Society, therefore, expects higher standards ofEconduct and rectitude from a Judge. Unwritten code ofconduct is writ large for judicial officers to emulate and imbibehigh moral or ethical standards expected of a higher judicialfunctionary, as wholesome standard of conduct which wouldgenerate public confidence, accord dignity to the judicialFoffice and enhance public image, not only of the Judge butthe court itself. It is, therefore, a basic requirement that aJudge’s official and personal conduct be free fromimpropriety; the same must be in tune with the highest standardof propriety and probity. The standard of conduct is higherthan expected of a layman and also higher than expected ofGan advocate. In fact, even his private life must adhere to highstandards of probity and propriety, higher than those deemedacceptable for others. Therefore, the Judge can ill-afford toseek shelter from the fallen standard in the society.”

12 (1993) 2 SCC 56H13 (1995) 5 SCC 457

6. In Sadhna Chaudhary Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh[14], thiscourt reiterated that the judicial officers must aspire and adhere to ahigher standard of honesty, integrity and probity.

“19. It has amply been reiterated by this Court that the judicialofficers must aspire and adhere to a higher standard ofhonesty, integrity and probity. Very recently in ShrirangYadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra [ShrirangYadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC144 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 582] , a Division Bench of thisCourt very succinctly collated these principles and reiteratedthat: (SCC pp. 146-47, paras 5-10)

‘5. The first and foremost quality required in a Judge isintegrity. The need of integrity in the judiciary is much higherthan in other institutions. The judiciary is an institution whosefoundations are based on honesty and integrity. It is, therefore,necessary that judicial officers should possess the sterlingquality of integrity. This Court in Tarak Singh v. JyotiBasu [Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu, (2005) 1 SCC 201] held asfollows: (SCC p. 203)

‘Integrity is the hallmark of judicial discipline, apartfrom others. It is high time the judiciary took utmost care tosee that the temple of justice does not crack from inside, whichwill lead to a catastrophe in the justice-delivery systemresulting in the failure of public confidence in the system. Itmust be remembered that woodpeckers inside pose a largerthreat than the storm outside.’

6. The behaviour of a Judge has to be of an exactingstandard, both inside and outside the court. This Courtin Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad [DayaShankar v. High Court of Allahabad, (1987) 3 SCC 1 : 1987SCC (L&S) 132] held thus: (SCC pp. 4-5, para 11)

‘11. … Judicial officers cannot have two standards, onein the court and another outside the court. They must haveonly one standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. Theycannot act even remotely unworthy of the office they occupy.’

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7. Judges are also public servants. A Judge shouldalways remember that he is there to serve the public. A Judgeis judged not only by his quality of judgments but also by thequality and purity of his character. Impeccable integrityshould be reflected both in public and personal life of aJudge. One who stands in judgments over others should beincorruptible. That is the high standard which is expected ofJudges.

8. Judges must remember that they are not merelyemployees but hold high public office. In R.C. Chandel v. HighCourt of M.P. [R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P., (2012) 8SCC 58 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 343 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 782 :(2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 469] , this Court held that the standardof conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than that ofan ordinary person. The following observations of this Courtare relevant: (SCC p. 70, para 29)

‘29. Judicial service is not an ordinary governmentservice and the Judges are not employees as such. Judgeshold the public office; their function is one of the essentialfunctions of the State. In discharge of their functions andduties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a Judgeholds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be a person ofimpeccable integrity and unimpeachable independence. Hemust be honest to the core with high moral values. When alitigant enters the courtroom, he must feel secured that theJudge before whom his matter has come, would deliver justiceimpartially and uninfluenced by any consideration. Thestandard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher thanan ordinary man. This is no excuse that since the standardsin the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from thesociety cannot be expected to have high standards and ethicalfirmness required of a Judge. A Judge, like Caesar’s wife,must be above suspicion. The credibility of the judicial systemis dependent upon the Judges who man it. For a democracyto thrive and the rule of law to survive, justice system and thejudicial process have to be strong and every Judge mustdischarge his judicial functions with integrity, impartiality andintellectual honesty.’

MUZAFFAR HUSAIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESHAND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

MUZAFFAR HUSAIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESHAND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

9. There can be no manner of doubt that a Judge must decidethe case only on the basis of the facts on record and the lawapplicable to the case. If a Judge decides a case for anyextraneous reasons then he is not performing his duty inaccordance with law.

10. In our view the word “gratification” does not only meanmonetary gratification. Gratification can be of various types.It can be gratification of money, gratification of power,gratification of lust etc., etc.”

7. It may further be noted that when a disciplinary action can betaken against the officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers, hasalso been succinctly laid down by this court in case of Union of India Vs. K.K. Dhawan (supra): - “28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicialor quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or inorder to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as aJudge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has tobe rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the presentcase, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality ofthe decision of the respondent but the conduct of therespondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legalityof the orders with reference to the nine assessments may bequestioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we haveno doubt in our mind that the Government is not precludedfrom taking the disciplinary action for violation of the ConductRules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can betaken in the following cases:

(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflecton his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotionto duty;

(ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness ormisconduct in the discharge of his duty;

(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of agovernment servant;

(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted theprescribed conditions which are essential for theexercise of the statutory powers; A

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A(v)if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;

(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, howeversmall the bribe may be because Lord Coke said longago “though the bribe may be small, yet the fault isgreat.”

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8. It is trite to say that the power of judicial review conferred onthe constitutional Court is not that of an appellate authority but is confinedonly to the decision-making process. Interference with the decision ofdepartmental authorities is permissible only if the proceedings wereconducted in violation of the principles of natural justice or inCcontravention of statutory regulations regulating such proceedings or ifthe decision on the face of it is found to be arbitrary or capricious. TheCourts would and should not act as an appellate Court and reassess theevidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor should interfere on the groundthat another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry hasbeen fairly and properly conducted, and the findings are based onDevidence, the adequacy of the evidence or reliability of evidence wouldnot be a ground to interfere with the findings recorded in the departmentalenquiries.

9. In the High Court Of Judicature At Bombay Vs. ShashikantS. Patil And Anr.[15], this Court held :-E

“The Division Bench of the High Court seems to haveapproached the case as though it was an appeal against theorder of the administrative/ disciplinary authority of the HighCourt. Interference with the decision of departmentalauthorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdictionFunder Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority hadheld proceedings in violation of the principles of naturaljustice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing themode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority isvitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence andGmerits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority,on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious thatno reasonable person could have arrived at such aconclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But wecannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judgeof the facts, if the inquiry has been properly conducted. Thesettled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence onwhich the findings can be based, then adequacy or evenreliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing beforethe High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 ofthe Constitution.”

10. Again, in the State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. NemiChand Nalwaya[16], it was observed in para 7 as under:

“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as anappellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domesticenquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view ispossible on the material on record. If the enquiry has beenfairly and properly held and the findings are based onevidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or thereliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds forinterfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of factrecorded in departmental enquiries, except where suchfindings are based on no evidence or where they are clearlyperverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether atribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at suchconclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts willhowever interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, ifprinciples of natural justice or statutory regulations have beenviolated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious,mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.”

11. Reverting to the facts of the case, it may be noted that therewas a regular disciplinary proceedings conducted against the appellantafter serving him the chargesheet and giving him full opportunity ofhearing. Thereafter, pursuant to the enquiry report submitted by theEnquiry Officer, Full Court of the High Court had resolved on 02.09.2006to accept the said enquiry report and punish the appellant with curtailmentof 90% of pensionary benefit with immediate effect. The order ofpunishment passed by the respondent-State on the basis of the saidrecommendation made by the full court of the High Court, was challenged AB

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Aby the appellant by filing a writ petition in the High Court. The HighCourt dropped the charge nos. 1 to 3 and upheld the charge nos. 4 to 11against the appellant, and reduced the punishment to the curtailment of70% in place of 90% of his pensionary benefits.

12. Pertinently, the appellant had not made any allegation withBregard to violation of principles of natural justice or contravention of anystatutory rules or regulations having occasioned during the course ofenquiry proceedings or in the decision-making process. Therefore, inabsence of any such allegations, the subjective satisfaction arrived at bythe High Court on the administrative side, and the impugned order passedby the High Court on the judicial side did not warrant any interference ofCthis court. When the Enquiry proceedings have been found to have beenconducted in proper and legal manner, and when the High Court onadministrative side as well as on judicial side, has accepted the findingsrecorded by the Enquiry Officer qua the charge nos. 4 to 11 levelledagainst the appellant as “proved”, holding him guilty of having committedD“misconduct”, this court was not expected to sit as an appellate authorityand revaluate the adequacy or reliability of the evidence adduced beforethe Enquiry Officer. Nonetheless, this court just for the sake of satisfyingits conscience, had permitted the learned Senior Advocate Mr. PradeepKant to argue on the merits of the charges levelled against the appellant.

E13. The bone of contention raised by the learned Senior AdvocateMr. Kant was that the charges levelled against the appellant were notsustainable factually or legally in as much as the appellant had decidedthe land reference cases as per the law prevailing at the relevant time.According to him as held in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Iqbal Singh(supra), Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant Controller ofFEstate Duty (supra), Soran Singh Vs. Collector & Ors (supra), theright to seek compensation is a property right and the same could betransferred. In the opinion of this court, the said decisions have beenrendered considering the facts of each case, and have hardly any relevanceto the facts of the cases decided by the appellant under the LandGAcquisition Act. In case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Iqbal Singh(supra), this court was examining the right of the claimant as a legateeunder the will executed by a displaced person under the Displaced Persons(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. In case of KhorshedShapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty (supra),the question of legality and validity of the notices issued by the AssistantH

Controller of Estate Duty, Hyderabad in respect of the compensationreceived by the legal heirs and representatives of the deceased ownerof the acquired land was under consideration. So far as the chargeslevelled against the appellant were concerned, it was alleged that theappellant had awarded enhanced compensation at an exorbitantly higherrate in favour of the subsequent purchasers/investors, who had no rightto receive any compensation, more particularly when Section 6(e) of theTransfer of Property Act specifically prohibited the transfer of mereright to sue. The said cases were found to have been decided by theappellant in flagrant violation of the cardinal principles of law and equity,and against all judicial norms and propriety, with a view to unduly favoursuch subsequent purchasers who had no legal right to receive thecompensation.

14. Much reliance was placed by the learned Senior AdvocateMr. Kant for the appellant on the decision of this court in case of KrishnaPrasad Verma Vs. State of Bihar (supra), Sadhna Chaudhary Vs.State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) and Abhay Jain Vs. High Court ofJudicature of Rajasthan & Anr (supra) to buttress his submission thatmere suspicion cannot constitute misconduct, and that any probability ofmisconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary material.He also submitted that the disciplinary proceedings could not be initiatedagainst the judicial officers merely because the judgment or orders passedby them were wrong. We completely agree with the submissions madeby the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and with the ratio ofjudgments relied upon by him. Nonetheless, in the instant case theappellant was found to have conducted the proceedings in the mannerwhich had reflected on his reputation and integrity. There was enoughevidence and material to show that the appellant had misconducted himselfwhile discharging his duties as a judicial officer, and had passed thejudicial orders in utter disregard of the specific provisions of law, tounduly favour the subsequent purchasers of the acquired lands who hadno right to claim compensation, and that such orders were actuated bycorrupt motive. Under the circumstances, the High Court was perfectlyjustified in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 235 of theConstitution.

15. In our opinion, showing undue favour to a party under theguise of passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial dishonestyand misconduct. The extraneous consideration for showing favour need AB

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Anot always be a monetary consideration. It is often said that “the publicservants are like fish in the water, none can say when and how a fishdrank the water”. A judge must decide the case on the basis of the factson record and the law applicable to the case. If he decides a case forextraneous reasons, then he is not performing his duties in accordancewith law. As often quoted, a judge, like Caesar’s wife, must be aboveBsuspicion.

16. In that view of the matter, we find no merit in the presentappeal and the same is dismissed.

CNidhi Jain(Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)

Appeal dismissed.

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