KALYAN DOMBIVALI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION versus SANJAY GAJANAN GHARAT AND ANOTHER on 31 March 2022

KALYAN DOMBIVALI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

v.

SANJAY GAJANAN GHARAT AND ANOTHER

(Civil Appeal No. 2643 of 2022)

MARCH 31, 2022

[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]

Service Law – Misconduct – Suspension – Departmentalproceedings –Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 –ss. 36, 39, 39A, 45 & 56 – Suspension of Municipal Corporationemployee – Departmental enquiry – Case registered againstRespondent No.1 (AMC of KDM Corporation) under Prevention ofCorruption Act – Subsequently, he was suspended by theCommissioner of the KDM Corporation in exercise of power unders. 56(1)(b) of MMC Act r/w Rule 4(1) of Maharashtra Civil Services(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 – Notice issued againstRespondent No.1 with regard to holding of departmental enquiryagainst him – Writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 – High Courtheld that since the appointment of respondent No.1 was made bythe State Government in view of s.36 of the MMC Act, it is only theState Government, which was competent to suspend and initiatedepartmental inquiry against him – It was, therefore, held by theHigh Court that the suspension order issued by the Commissionerand ratified by the KDM Corporation, and the departmental inquiryinitiated by the Commissioner with approval of the KDM Corporationwas beyond their powers – Whether respondent No.1 though anemployee of the KDM Corporation, could neither be suspendednor any departmental proceedings could be initiated against himby KDM Corporation, since his selection and appointment was doneby the State Government – Held: High Court erred in setting asidethe suspension and departmental proceedings initiated againstrespondent No.1 – Finding of the High Court that in view of s.39Aof the MMC Act, the Commissioner or the Corporation will not havepower to suspend or initiate departmental inquiry against the AMC,is in ignorance of the provisions of s.56 and sub-section (9) of s.2of the MMC Act – Sub-section (9) of s.2, ss.39A and 56 of theMMC Act will have to be read in reference to each other and cannotbe read in isolation – Legislative intent cannot be to leave an

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Aemployee scot-free though he has indulged in serious misconduct –The legislature could not have intended a situation, wherein thoughthe post of AMC is created by the State Government and a suitableperson is appointed by it and though a person appointed on thesaid post becomes an employee of the Corporation, there would beno provision in the statute to initiate departmental proceedingsBagainst him – If such an interpretation is accepted, it would lead toabsurdity and create a vacuum – The statute has to be interpretedin such a manner that it preserves its workability – On a harmoniousconstruction of sub-section (9) of s.2, ss.39A and 56 of the MMCAct, the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation will have theCpower to suspend or initiate departmental proceedings against anAMC, who is an officer, superior in rank to the AssistantCommissioner – However, in case of suspension of such an officer,the only requirement would be to report to the Corporation, withreasons thereof, and if such a suspension is not confirmed by theCorporation within a period of six months from the date of suchDsuspension, the same shall come to an end – Any other interpretationwould lead to absurdity and anomaly, and therefore will have to beavoided –Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,1979 – Rule 4(1).

Interpretation of Statutes – “Harmonious construction” –EDiscussed.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

Conclusion

HELD: 1 The court has to avoid the interpretation whichwill result in head-on clash between two sections of the Act. WhenFone section of an Act is not in a position to bring out the legislativeintent, recourse will have to be made to other sections of thestatute for gathering the legislative intent. An attempt should bemade to see to it that the effect must be given to parts of thestatute even if they may, on first blush, appear to be conflicting.One provision of the Act has to be construed with reference toGother provisions in the Act, so as to make a consistent enactmentof the whole statute. An attempt should be made of avoiding anyinconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or betweentwo different sections. If the court has a choice between twointerpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve theH

manifest purpose of the legislation, such an interpretation willhave to be avoided. The court should avoid a construction whichwould reduce the legislation to futility. A broader interpretationwhich would bring about an effective result, will have to bepreferred. Applying this principle, it is clear that subsection (9)of Section 2, Sections 39A and 56 of the MMC Act will have to beread in reference to each other. They cannot be read in isolation.[Paras 37 and 38][471-D-G]

2 If the interpretation as placed by the High Court isaccepted, it will lead to an absurd and anomalous situation whereinon one hand, the respondent No.1, who was selected andappointed by the State Government for the KDM Corporation,though would be an employee of the KDM Corporation, the KDMCorporation would not be in a position to initiate departmentalproceedings against him, even if he is found to have indulgedinto serious misconduct. On the other hand, since the respondentNo.1 is not an employee of the State Government, the StateGovernment also would not be in a position to initiate anydepartmental proceedings against him. [Para 44][473-G-H; 474-A]

Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madras and Others(1985) 3 SCC 103 : [1985] 3 SCR 491 ; Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain (1997) 1 SCC 373 : [1996] 9 Suppl.SCR 707 ; Jagdish Singh v. Lt. Governor, Delhi andOthers (1997) 4 SCC 435 : [1997] 2 SCR 953 ;Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers(2003) 3 SCC 57 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387; MahadeoPrasad Bais (Dead) v. Income Tax Officer ‘A’ Ward,Gorakhpur and Another (1991) 4 SCC 560 : [1991] 1Suppl. SCR 9; K.P.Varghese v. Income Tax Officer,Ernakulam and Another (1981) 4 SCC 173 : [1982] 1SCR 629 ; State of Tamil Nadu v. Kodaikanal MotorUnion (P) Ltd. (1986) 3 SCC 91 : [1986] 2 SCR 927and Sanjay Ramdas Patil v. Sanjay and Others (2021)10 SCC 306 – relied on.

Ajay Kumar Choudhary v.Union of India through itsSecretary and Another (2015) 7 SCC 291 : [2015] 2

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[2022] 4 S.C.R.

ASCR 415 and State of Tamil Nadu represented bySecretary to Government (Home) v. Promod Kumar, IPSand Another (2018) 17 SCC 677 – referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2643of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.04.2021 of the High CourtEof Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (St) No.3599 of 2020.

WITH

Civil Appeal No. 2644 of 2022.

Tushar Mehta, SG, P. S. Patwalia, Shekhar Naphade, AnupamFLal Das, Sr. Advs., Rahul Chitnis, Sachin Patil, Aaditya A. Pande, GeoJoseph, Ms. Shwetal Shepal, Harshika Verma, Samrat Krishnarao Shinde,Kunal Cheema, Apoorv Shukla, Anirudh Singh, Krishanu Barua, Ms.Aishwarya Dash, Sabir Kachhi, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered byG

B. R. GAVAI, J.

1. Leave granted in both the Special Leave Petitions.

2. Kalyan Dombivali Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referredto as the “KDM Corporation”) and the State of Maharashtra, by way ofHthe present appeals, challenge the correctness of the judgment dated 6[th]

April 2021, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicatureat Bombay in Writ Petition (ST.) No. 3599 of 2020, thereby holding thatthe KDM Corporation was not the competent authority to suspendrespondent No.1-Sanjay Gajanan Gharat. By the impugned judgment,the High Court had also quashed the departmental inquiry initiated againstthe respondent No.1 and directed the KDM Corporation to reinstatehim forthwith to the post of Additional Municipal Commissioner(hereinafter referred to as “AMC”) of the KDM Corporation.

3. The facts are not in dispute. The respondent No.1 was initiallyappointed as an Assistant Municipal Commissioner of the KDMCorporation in the year 1995. The said appointment was approved bythe State Government on 1[st] February 1997 under Section 45 of theMaharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred toas “the MMC Act”). The KDM Corporation thereafter recommendedthe respondent No.1 to be promoted as Deputy Municipal Commissionerof the KDM Corporation on 9[th] May 2003. This was done after theDepartmental Promotion Committee of the KDM Corporation foundrespondent No.1 suitable for such promotion. The General Body of theKDM Corporation also approved the said recommendation in its meetingheld on 18[th] July 2003. The State Government, vide notification dated23[rd] July 2005, granted approval to the promotion of respondent No.1 asDeputy Municipal Commissioner with effect from 9[th] May 2003.

4. Vide Maharashtra Act No.32 of 2011, which came into effectfrom 25[th] September 2011, various amendments were effected into theMMC Act. Vide the said amendment, Section 39A was brought in thestatute, which provided for creation of one or more posts of AMCs andappointment of suitable persons on such posts.

5. In pursuance of the amendment effected in the year 2011, theState Government issued a Government Resolution (hereinafter referredto as “G.R.”) on 11[th] November 2011. Vide the said G.R., one post ofAMC was created for the KDM Corporation. Consequent to theupgradation of the KDM Corporation from Class ‘D’ to Class ‘C’, oneadditional post of AMC came to be created vide G.R. dated 6[th] January2015. The said G.R. also laid down the procedure for carrying out theselection process for the post of AMCs. Undisputedly, the SelectionCommittee, which considered the proposal of the Commissioner of theKDM Corporation, for a suitable person to be appointed as AMC, in itsmeeting held on 5[th] May 2015, found respondent No.1 most suitable for ABC

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Athe same and accordingly, his name came to be recommended by theSelection Committee to the State of Maharashtra for appointment to thepost of AMC of the KDM Corporation. The respondent No.1 came tobe appointed as AMC of the KDM Corporation by the State ofMaharashtra on 2[nd] June 2015. Pursuant to his appointment, therespondent No.1 joined his service as AMC of the KDM Corporation inBthe same month.

6. On 14[th] June 2018, an FIR No.34 of 2018 came to be registeredagainst the respondent No.1 for the offences punishable under Sections7, 8, 13(1)(d) along with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of CorruptionAct, 1988. The respondent No.1 was arrested on the same date andCcontinued to be in custody till 17[th] June 2018, on which date, he wasreleased on bail.

7. The Commissioner of the KDM Corporation purportedly, inexercise of the powers under Section 56(1)(b) of the MMC Act andRule 4(1) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal)DRules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as “MCS Rules”), on 18[th] June2018, issued an order suspending respondent No.1 from service. TheGeneral Body of the KDM Corporation, in its meeting held on 7[th] July2018, ratified the suspension of respondent No.1. On 20[th] June 2019, theGeneral Body of the KDM Corporation also accorded sanction to holdEdepartmental inquiry against respondent No.1. Accordingly, theCommissioner of the KDM Corporation issued a notice dated 7[th] August2019 to respondent No.1 with regard to holding of departmental inquiryagainst him and called upon him to appear before the Inquiry Officerappointed by the KDM Corporation. The respondent No.1, vide his letterdated 16[th] August 2019 addressed to the Commissioner, KDMFCorporation, objected to the said departmental inquiry on the ground ofjurisdiction.

8. Again, the KDM Corporation issued a notice dated 5[th] December2019, to respondent No.1 calling upon him to remain present for thepreliminary inquiry to be held on 26[th] December 2019. However, theGrespondent No.1 chose not to participate in the departmental inquiry andfiled a writ petition being Writ Petition (ST.) No.3599 of 2020 before theHigh Court of Judicature at Bombay on 21[st] February 2020. In the saidwrit petition, he sought the following reliefs:

“a) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue Writ of MandamusHor any other appropriate Writ in the nature of Mandamus or any KALYAN DOMBIVALI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v.SANJAY GAJANAN GHARAT AND ANOTHER [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

other appropriate Direction or Order thereby directing RespondentNo.1 Corporation and its Municipal Commissioner to forthwithwithdraw and/or cancel - A

I)the impugned Suspension Order dated 18th June, 2018, beingExhibit-U hereto; BII)the impugned General Body Resolution dated 7th July, 2018,being Exhibit-V hereto;

III)the Impugned General Body Resolution No.6 dated 20thJune, 2019 being Exhibit-Y hereto; and

IV)the Impugned Notice of Departmental inquiry dated 7thAugust, 2019 being Exhibit-Z to this petition; C

b) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a Writ of Certiorarior any other appropriate Writ in the nature of Certiorari or anyother appropriate Direction or Order thereby quashing and/orsetting aside –

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I)the Impugned Suspension Order dated 18th June, 2018,passed by the Municipal Commissioner of Respondent No.1being Exhibit -U hereto;

II)the Impugned General Body Resolution dated 7th July, 2018of Respondent No.1, being Exhibit-V hereto; E

III)the Impugned General Body Resolution No.6 dated 20thJune, 2019 or Respondent No.1, being Exhibit -Y hereto;and

IV)the Impugned Notice of 193 Departmental Inquiry dated7th August 2019 issued by the commissioner of RespondentNo.1 being Exhibit-Z to this petition; F

c) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to Issue Writ of Mandamusor any other appropriate Writ in the nature of Mandamus or anyother appropriate Direction or Order thereby directing RespondentNo.1 Corporation and its Municipal Commissioner to forthwithre-Instate the Petitioner in the post of Additional MunicipalCommissioner of the 1st Respondent Corporations;”

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9. By the impugned judgment dated 6[th] April 2021, the writ petitionfiled by the respondent No.1 came to be allowed in terms of the prayers(a) to (c), which are reproduced hereinabove. Being aggrieved thereby, H

Aboth, the KDM Corporation and the State of Maharashtra haveapproached this Court.

10. We have heard Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counselappearing on behalf of the KDM Corporation, Shri Rahul Chitnis, learnedcounsel appearing on behalf of the State and Shri Anupam Lal Das,Blearned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1.

11. Shri Patwalia submitted that the High Court has grossly erredin holding that the respondent No.1 was an employee of the StateGovernment and therefore, it was only the State Government, who hadpowers to suspend him. He submitted that though under Section 39A ofCthe MMC Act, the State Government was an authority competent tocreate a post and appoint a suitable person on that post, such a post wascreated specifically for the KDM Corporation and once a suitable personwas appointed by the State Government on the said post, he became anemployee of the KDM Corporation. He submitted that in view of theprovisions of Section 56 of the MMC Act, it was only the KDMDCorporation, which was competent to suspend such an employee on thegrounds as are available under the said provision, and also to initiatedepartmental proceedings. He submitted that the High Court has grosslyerred in not considering the said aspect and referring to Section 16 of theMaharashtra General Clauses Act, 1904 (hereinafter referred to as “GCEAct”). He submitted that when there is a specific provision in the MMCAct, which empowers the Commissioner to suspend an employee and toinitiate departmental proceedings against him, recourse to GC Act is notwarranted. He submitted that since the respondent No.1 was arrestedand was detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours, in view ofsub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of the MCS Rules, his suspension was a deemedFone. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the impugned judgmenthas the effect of leading to a consequence that the respondent No.1, whohas been caught red-handed in a trap case, will be left scot-free.

12. The State Government has also supported the contentions asraised by the KDM Corporation. It is submitted that though the post wasGcreated by the State Government for the KDM Corporation and thoughthe respondent No.1 was selected and appointed by the State Governmentin accordance with the procedure prescribed in the G.R. dated 6[th] January2015, the appointment was, as an AMC of the KDM Corporation and assuch, the KDM Corporation was well within its powers under SectionH56 of the MMC Act to suspend him.

13. Shri Anupam Lal Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing forthe respondent No.1, on the contrary, would submit that the respondentNo.1 was appointed by the State Government under Section 39A of theMMC Act and the post of AMC is pari materia with that of theCommissioner, who is appointed under Section 36 of the MMC Act. Hesubmitted that under Section 39A(2) of the MMC Act, an AMC is subjectto the same liabilities, restrictions and terms and conditions of service, towhich the Commissioner is subjected to as per the provisions of theMMC Act. He further submitted that the posts of the Commissioner andthe AMC find place in Chapter II of the MMC Act, whereas Section 56finds place in Chapter IV of the MMC Act. He submitted that variousother sections in Chapter IV of the MMC Act provide for appointmentof various municipal officers and servants other than AMC andCommissioner and therefore, the term “competent authority” will haveto be construed to be only such authorities, who were competent tomake appointments to the posts found in Chapter IV of the MMC Act.He submitted that in any case, in view of the judgment of this Court inthe case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India through itsSecretary and Another[1], continued suspension of respondent No.1 wasnot warranted. He submitted that even the charge-sheet was notsubmitted within 90 days and as such, there is no reason to interferewith the impugned judgment.

14. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, has held that sincethe appointment of respondent No.1 was made by the State Governmentin view of Section 36 of the MMC Act, it is only the State Government,who was competent to suspend and initiate departmental inquiry againsthim. It was, therefore, held that the suspension order issued by theCommissioner and ratified by the KDM Corporation, and thedepartmental inquiry initiated by the Commissioner with the approval ofthe KDM Corporation was beyond their powers. We will have to examinethe correctness of these findings.

15. Section 39A of the MMC Act reads thus:

“39A. Appointment of Additional Municipal Commissioners.-(1) The State Government may create one or more posts ofAdditional Municipal Commissioners in the Corporation and appointsuitable persons on such posts, who shall, subject to the control of AB

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Athe Commissioner, exercise all or any of the powers and performall or any of the duties and functions of the Commissioner.

(2) Every person so appointed as the Additional MunicipalCommissioner shall be subject to the same liabilities, restrictionsand terms and conditions of service, to which the CommissionerBis subjected to as per the provisions of this Act.

16. The perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 39A of the MMCAct would reveal that the State Government is empowered to createone or more posts of AMCs. However, such a post is created in theparticular Corporation. The State Government is also entitled to appointCsuitable persons on such posts. It is further clear that the AMCs soappointed, though shall exercise all or any of the powers and perform allor any of the duties and functions of the Commissioner, the same shallbe subject to the control of the Commissioner. Sub-section (2) of Section39A of the MMC Act provides that every person so appointed as theAMC shall be subject to the same liabilities, restrictions and terms andDconditions of service, to which the Commissioner is subjected to as perthe provisions of MMC Act.

17. It is not in dispute that vide G.R. dated 6[th] January 2015, forthe KDM Corporation, which was promoted from Class ‘D’ to Class‘C’, one new post of AMC was created. It is also not in dispute thatEthere was already one post of AMC existing in the KDM Corporation.The perusal of the said G.R. would reveal that one post of AMC, whichwas newly created, was to be filled in from the officers of the StateCadre in the KDM Corporation. It would further reveal that the secondpost of the AMC was to be filled in from the officers working in therespective Corporation by way of selection. It further clarified that inFthe event, the suitable person is not available for selection to the saidpost, the same shall be filled in from the officers of the State GovernmentCadre.

18. From the perusal of the record, it could be seen that the StateGovernment had called for the names of suitable candidates from theGCommissioner of the KDM Corporatoin. The Commissioner, vide hiscommunication dated 4[th] April 2015, proposed three names. The saidnames were considered by a Committee consisting of the followingauthorities:(i)Commissioner/Director, Directorate of MunicipalHAdministration;

(ii) Additional Commissioner, Mumbai Municipal Corporation;A

(iii) Commissioner, KDM Corporation;

(iv) Deputy Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra; and

(v) Under Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra.

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19. A perusal of the Minutes of the said Meeting would revealthat though the Commissioner of the KDM Corporation stated that noneof the candidates including the respondent No.1 were eligible for thepost of AMC, the Committee, in its meeting held on 5[th] May 2015, afterconsidering the confidential reports of the three candidates, resolved torecommend respondent No.1 for appointment to the post of AMC of theKDM Corporation. The said recommendation was approved by the StateGovernment and accordingly, respondent No.1 came to be appointed asAMC of the KDM Corporation vide G.R. dated 2[nd] June 2015. The saidG.R. would clearly reveal that respondent No.1 had been appointedspecifically as AMC of the KDM Corporation. It could thus clearly beseen from the record that though the respondent No.1 was selected andappointed by the State Government, his appointment was specificallyfor the KDM Corporation.

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20. Therefore, the question that we will have to consider is as towhether the respondent No.1 though an employee of the KDMCorporation, can neither be suspended nor any departmental proceedingscan be initiated against him by the KDM Corporation, since his selectionand appointment was done by the State Government.

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21. For considering the rival submissions, it will be relevant torefer to some of the provisions of the MMC Act. We have alreadyreproduced Section 39A of the MMC Act hereinabove. The other twoprovisions that require consideration are sub-section (9) of Section 2and Section 56 of the MMC Act, which read thus:

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(9) “the Commissioner” means the Municipal Commissioner forthe City appointed under Section 36 and includes an actingCommissioner appointed under Section 39;

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56. Imposition of penalties on municipal officers andservants.—(1) A competent authority may subject to theprovisions of this Act impose any of the penalties specified in sub-section (2) on a municipal officer or servant if such authority issatisfied that such officer or servant is guilty of a breach ofdepartmental rules or discipline or of carelessness, neglect of dutyor other misconduct or is incompetent:

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Provided that,—

(a) no municipal officer or servant holding the postequivalent to or higher in rank than the post of the AssistantCommissioner shall be dismissed by the Commissionerwithout the previous approval of the Corporation.

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[(b) any officer or servant whether appointed by theCorporation or any other competent authority, exceptTransport Manager being a Government officer ondeputation, may be suspended by the Commissioner pendingan order of the Corporation and when the officer sosuspended is the Transport Manager or an officer appointedunder Section 45, such suspension with reasons therefor,shall, forthwith be reported by the Commissioner to theCorporation, and such suspension shall come to an end ifnot confirmed by the Corporation within a period of sixmonths from the date of such suspension:

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Provided that, such suspension of an officer or servant pendinginquiry into the allegations against such officer or servant shallnot be deemed to be a penalty.]”F

22. It could thus be seen that under Section 39A of the MMC Act,though the AMC will exercise all or any of the powers and perform allor any of the duties and functions of the Commissioner, the same shallbe subject to the control of the Commissioner. No doubt, that the AMCwould be subject to the same liabilities, restrictions and terms and conditionsGof service, to which the Commissioner of the Corporation is subjected.However, the legislative intent is clear that the powers to be exercisedby AMCs would be subject to the control of the Commissioner.

23. The legislative intent would also be gathered from sub-section(9) of Section 2 of the MMC Act. It could be seen that in the definitionHof the “Commissioner”, though an acting Commissioner appointed under Section 39 of the MMC Act has been included, an AMC appointed underSection 39A of the MMC Act has not been included. We are, therefore,unable to accept the contention of respondent No.1 that the post ofAMC is pari materia with that of the Commissioner. The legislativeintent is clear that though the AMC exercises all or any of the powersand performs all or any of the duties and functions of the Commissioner,he would be subject to the control of the Commissioner, and as such,subordinate to him.

24. Under sub-section (1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act, acompetent authority, subject to the provisions of the said Act, is entitledto impose any of the penalties specified in sub-section (2) of Section 56of the MMC Act on a municipal officer or servant if such authority issatisfied that such officer or servant is guilty of breach of departmentalrules or discipline or of carelessness, neglect of duty or other misconductor is incompetent. Clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section56 of the MMC Act, however, provides that no municipal officer orservant holding the post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post ofthe Assistant Commissioner, shall be dismissed by the Commissionerwithout the previous approval of the Corporation. It can be seen that thewords used are “post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of theAssistant Commissioner”. It will also be relevant to note that Section 56of the MMC Act has also been amended by the same Amending Act i.e.Maharashtra Act No. 32 of 2011, by which Section 39A was brought inthe statute. Earlier, the words used in clause (a) of sub-section (1) ofSection 56 were “whose monthly salary, exclusive of allowances exceedsone thousand rupees”. The said words were substituted by the words“holding the post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of theAssistant Commissioner”. It can thus be seen that though the “competentauthority” is entitled to impose the penalty as specified in sub-section (2)of Section 56 of the MMC Act on a municipal officer or servant; in caseof an officer, who is equivalent to or higher in rank than the post ofAssistant Commissioner, the power of dismissal can be exercised by the“Commissioner” only with the previous approval of the Corporation.

25. It can further be seen that clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act enables the Commissioner tosuspend any officer or servant, whether appointed by the Corporation orany other competent authority, except Transport Manager being aGovernment Officer on deputation, pending an order of the Corporation.It further provides that when the officer suspended is a Transport Manager AB

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Aor an officer appointed under Section 45 of the MMC Act, suchsuspension with reasons thereof, shall, forthwith be reported by theCommissioner to the Corporation. It further provides that such asuspension shall come to an end if not confirmed by the Corporationwithin a period of six months from the date of such suspension.B26. It is thus clear that whereas, the Commissioner is empoweredto suspend any officer or servant, whether appointed by the Corporationor any other competent authority, in case of a Transport Manager beinga Government Officer on deputation or any officer appointed underSection 45 of the MMC Act, the Commissioner is required to reportsuch a suspension with reasons thereof, to the Corporation. It furtherCprovides that such suspension shall come to an end if not confirmed bythe Corporation within a period of six months from the date of suchsuspension.

27. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions of the MMCAct would reveal that though a competent authority may impose any ofDthe penalties on a municipal officer or servant, no municipal officer orservant holding the post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post ofan Assistant Commissioner, shall be dismissed by the Commissionerwithout the previous approval of the Corporation.

28. It could be seen that the legislature has created two classes ofEthe municipal officers and servants. One class is of the municipal officersand servants, other than the ones holding the post equivalent to or higherin rank than the post of an Assistant Commissioner. In this category, acompetent authority may impose the penalties as provided under theprovisions of the MMC Act. The other class of municipal officers is ofthe persons holding the post equivalent to or higher in rank than the postFof Assistant Commissioner. The officers in such a class can be dismissedonly by the Commissioner and that too with the previous approval of theCorporation.

29. As already discussed hereinabove, clause (a) of the proviso tosub-section (1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act has been amendedGsimultaneously by an amendment, which brought Section 39A into thestatute. As such, we are of the view that the term “post equivalent to orhigher in rank than the post of Assistant Commissioner” cannot beconstrued in a narrow compass. We are therefore of the view that clause(a) of sub-section (1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act would also includeHthe post of AMC. As such, the Commissioner would be a “competent authority” insofar as the post of AMC is concerned. Likewise, thoughthe powers of the Commissioner to suspend any officer or servant excepta Transport Manager being a Government Officer on deputation or theofficers appointed under Section 45 of the MMC Act are without anyrestriction, when such suspension is with regard to a Transport Manageror an officer appointed under Section 45 of the MMC Act, though theCommissioner is empowered to suspend them, such a suspension has tobe reported to the Corporation along with the reasons thereof. Such asuspension shall come to an end, if not confirmed by the Corporationwithin a period of six months from the date of such suspension.

30. For appreciation of the rival contentions, it will be apposite toseek certain guidance from some precedents of this Court.

31. In the case of Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madrasand Others[2], this Court had an occasion to decide the rate of overtimewages as mentioned in Section 31 of the Tamil Nadu Shops andEstablishments Act, 1947. This Court found that for finding the minimumrate of overtime wages as mentioned in Section 31 of the said Act, it willhave to be interpreted in the light of the provisions contained in Section14(1) read with proviso to Section 31 of the said Act. Coming to thisconclusion, this Court observed thus:

“15. No canon of statutory construction is more firmly establishedthan that the statute must be read as a whole. This is a generalrule of construction applicable to all statutes alike which is spokenof as construction ex visceribus actus. This rule of statutoryconstruction is so firmly established that it is variously styled as“elementary rule” (see Attorney General v. Bastow [(1957) 1 AllER 497] ) and as a “settled rule” (see Poppatlal Shah v. Stateof Madras [AIR 1953 SC 274 : 1953 SCR 667] ). The onlyrecognised exception to this well-laid principle is that it cannot becalled in aid to alter the meaning of what is of itself clear andexplicit. Lord Coke laid down that: “it is the most natural andgenuine exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statuteby another part of the same statute, for that best expressethmeaning of the makers” (Quoted with approval in PunjabBeverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand [(1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978SCC (L&S) 165 : (1978) 3 SCR 370] ).”

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32. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the Statutemust be read as a whole. It has been held that this rule of statutoryconstruction is so firmly established that it is variously styled as“elementary rule”. It has been held that for finding out the true meaningof one part of a statute, a reference will have to be made to another partof the statute and that will best express meaning of the makers.

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33. In the case of Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain[3], thisCourt was considering the question regarding the conflict between Section47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Order XXI Rule 2 thereof.This Court held that applying the rule of harmonious construction, theso-called conflict between the said two provisions had been dispelled.CObserving so, this Court reiterated the following well-settled principlesof interpretation of statutes:

“15. On a conspectus of the case-law indicated above, thefollowing principles are clearly discernible:

(1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clashbetween two sections of the Act and to construe theprovisions which appear to be in conflict with each other insuch a manner as to harmonise them.

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(2) The provisions of one section of a statute cannot beused to defeat the other provisions unless the court, in spiteof its efforts, finds it impossible to effect reconciliationbetween them.

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(3) It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the timethat when there are two conflicting provisions in an Act,which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should beso interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given toboth. This is the essence of the rule of “harmoniousconstruction”.

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(4) The courts have also to keep in mind that aninterpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a “deadletter” or “useless lumber” is not harmonious construction.

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(5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provisionor to render it otiose.”

H3 (1997) 1 SCC 373

34. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that it is the duty ofthe court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the Act andto construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each otherin such a manner so as to harmonise them. It has further been held thatthe provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat theother provisions unless the court finds the reconciliation between themimpossible. It has further been held that when two conflicting provisionsin an Act cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be sointerpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. It has furtherbeen held that an interpretation, which reduces one of the provisions asa “dead letter” or “useless lumber”, should be avoided.

35. This Court, in the case of Jagdish Singh v. Lt. Governor,Delhi and Others[4], while considering the conflict between Rules 25(2)and 28 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Rules, 1973, observed thus:

“7. … It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute or thestatutory rule that efforts should be made in construing the differentprovisions, so that, each provision will have its play and in theevent of any conflict a harmonious construction should be given.Further a statute or a rule made thereunder should be read as awhole and one provision should be construed with reference tothe other provision so as to make the rule consistent and anyconstruction which would bring any inconsistency or repugnancybetween one provision and the other should be avoided. One rulecannot be used to defeat another rule in the same rules unless it isimpossible to effect harmonisation between them. The well-knownprinciple of harmonious construction is that effect should be givento all the provisions, and therefore, this Court has held in severalcases that a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a“dead letter” is not a harmonious construction as one part is beingdestroyed and consequently court should avoid such aconstruction……..”

36. In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. HindustanBulk Carriers[5], though in Sections 245-D(4) and 245-D(6) of the IncomeTax Act, 1961, the terminus point for charging interest was not specificallyprovided, this Court, applying the principle of harmonious and contextual 4 (1997) 4 SCC 435

5 (2003) 3 SCC 57

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Aconstruction, held that they have to be charged in the spirit of Sections234-A, 234-B and 234-C of the said Act. Holding this, this Court observedthus:

“16. The courts will have to reject that construction which willdefeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there mayBbe some inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v.Duncombe [Salmon v. Duncombe, (1886) LR 11 AC 627 (PC) :55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446] , AC at. 634, Curtis v. Stovin [Curtis v.Stovin, (1889) LR 22 QBD 513 (CA) : 58 LJQB 174 : 60 LT 772]referred to in S. Teja Singh case [CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] .)

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17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower ofwhich would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation,we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislationto futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, basedon the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purposeDof bringing about an effective result. (See Nokes v. DoncasterAmalgamated Collieries Ltd. [Nokes v. Doncaster AmalgamatedCollieries Ltd., 1940 AC 1014 : (1940) 3 All ER 549 (HL) : 109LJKB 865 : 163 LT 343] referred to in Pye v. Minister for Landsfor New South Wales [Pye v. Minister for Lands for New SouthEWales, (1954) 1 WLR 1410 : (1954) 3 All ER 514 (PC)] .) Theprinciples indicated in the said cases were reiterated by this Courtin Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India [Mohan KumarSinghania v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 : 1992 SCC(L&S) 455] .

18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of theAct should be construed with reference to other provisions in thesame Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the wholestatute.

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19. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature bydirecting its attention not merely to the clauses to be construedGbut to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with otherparts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpretedoccurs. (See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [R.S.Raghunath v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 1 SCC 335 : 1992 SCC(L&S) 286] .) Such a construction has the merit of avoiding anyHinconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is theduty of the court to avoid a head-on clash between two sectionsof the same Act. (See Sultana Begum v. Prem ChandJain [Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 373].)

20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done to construethe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. Itshould not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with onehand what it took away with the other.

21. The provisions of one section of the statute cannot be used todefeat those of another unless it is impossible to effectreconciliation between them. Thus a construction that reducesone of the provisions to a “useless lumber” or “dead letter” is nota harmonised construction. To harmonise is not to destroy.”

37. It could thus be seen that it is more than well-settled that thecourt has to avoid the interpretation which will result in head-on clashbetween two sections of the Act. When one section of an Act is not in aposition to bring out the legislative intent, recourse will have to be madeto other sections of the statute for gathering the legislative intent. Anattempt should be made to see to it that the effect must be given to partsof the statute even if they may, on first blush, appear to be conflicting.One provision of the Act has to be construed with reference to otherprovisions in the Act, so as to make a consistent enactment of the wholestatute. An attempt should be made of avoiding any inconsistency orrepugnancy either within a section or between two different sections.

38. It has further been held that if the court has a choice betweentwo interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve themanifest purpose of the legislation, such an interpretation will have to beavoided. The court should avoid a construction which would reduce thelegislation to futility. A broader interpretation which would bring aboutan effective result, will have to be preferred. Applying this principle, weare of the considered view that sub-section (9) of Section 2, Sections39A and 56 of the MMC Act will have to be read in reference to eachother. They cannot be read in isolation.

39. Therefore, we are of the view that the finding of the HighCourt that in view of Section 39A of the MMC Act, the Commissioneror the Corporation will not have power to suspend or initiate departmentalinquiry against the AMC, is in ignorance of the provisions of Section 56and sub-section (9) of Section 2 of the MMC Act.

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A40. We find that the view taken by the High Court is also notacceptable in view of another principle of statutory interpretation. In thecase of Mahadeo Prasad Bais (Dead) v. Income-Tax Officer ‘A’Ward, Gorakhpur and Another[6], this Court held that an interpretation,which will result in anomaly or absurdity, should be avoided. It has beenheld that at times, the circumstances justify a slight straining of theBlanguage of the clause so as to avoid a meaningless anomaly.

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41. It will further be relevant to refer to the following observationsof this Court in the case of K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer,Ernakulam and Another[7]:

C“6. …….We must therefore eschew literalness in the interpretationof Section 52 sub-section (2) and try to arrive at an interpretationwhich avoids this absurdity and mischief and makes the provisionrational and sensible, unless of course, our hands are tied and wecannot find any escape from the tyranny of the literalinterpretation. It is now a well-settled rule of construction thatDwhere the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision producesa manifestly absurd and unjust result which could never have beenintended by the legislature, the court may modify the languageused by the legislature or even “do some violence” to it, so as toachieve the obvious intention of the legislature and produce aErational construction (vide Luke v. Inland RevenueCommissioner [(1963) AC 557] ). The Court may also in such acase read into the statutory provision a condition which, thoughnot expressed, is implicit as constituting the basic assumptionunderlying the statutory provision …..”

42. It will be apposite to refer to the following paragraphs fromFthe judgment of this Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v.Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd.[8]:

“16. Lord Denning, in Seaford Court Estates v. Asher [(1949)2 All ER 155, 164] said thus:

“... when a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold hishands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work onthe constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament…

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7 (1981) 4 SCC 173H8 (1986) 3 SCC 91

and then he must supplement the written word so as to give‘force and life’ to the intention of the legislature.... A Judgeshould ask himself the question how, if the makers of theAct had themselves come across this ruck in the texture ofit, they would have straightened it out? He must then do asthey would have done. A Judge must not alter the materialof which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron outthe creases.”

17. The courts must always seek to find out the intention of thelegislature. Though the courts must find out the intention of thestatute from the language used, but language more often than notis an imperfect instrument of expression of human thought. AsLord Denning said it would be idle to expect every statutoryprovision to be drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity.As Judge Learned Hand said, we must not make a fortress out ofdictionary but remember that statutes must have some purpose orobject, whose imaginative discovery is judicial craftsmanship. Weneed not always cling to literalness and should seek to endeavourto avoid an unjust or absurd result. We should not make a mockeryof legislation. To make sense out of an unhappily worded provision,where the purpose is apparent to the judicial eve “some” violenceto language is permissible. (See K.P. Varghese v. ITO [(1981) 4SCC 173, 180-82 : 1981 SCC (Tax) 293, 300-302 : (1981) 131ITR 597, 604-606] and Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioner[(1964) 54 ITR 692 (HL)] .)”

43. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the courtshould not always cling to literal interpretation and should endeavor toavoid an unjust or absurd result. The court should not permit a mockeryof legislation. It has been held that to make sense out of an unhappilyworded provision, where the purpose is apparent to the judicial eye,‘some’ violence to language is also permissible.

44. If the interpretation as placed by the High Court is accepted,it will lead to an absurd and anomalous situation wherein on one hand,the respondent No.1, who was selected and appointed by the StateGovernment for the KDM Corporation, though would be an employeeof the KDM Corporation, the KDM Corporation would not be in a positionto initiate departmental proceedings against him, even if he is found tohave indulged into serious misconduct. On the other hand, since the AB

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Arespondent No.1 is not an employee of the State Government, the StateGovernment also would not be in a position to initiate any departmentalproceedings against him.

45. We have no hesitation in holding that the intention of thelegislature would not have been to lead to such an absurd and anomalousBsituation. A legislative intent cannot be to leave an employee scot-freethough he has indulged into serious misconduct. We are therefore of theconsidered view that on a harmonious construction of sub-section (9) ofSection 2, Sections 39A and 56 of the MMC Act, the Commissioner ofthe Municipal Corporation will have the power to suspend or initiatedepartmental proceedings against an AMC, who is an officer, superiorCin rank to the Assistant Commissioner. However, in case of suspensionof such an officer, the only requirement would be to report to theCorporation, with reasons thereof, and if such a suspension is notconfirmed by the Corporation within a period of six months from thedate of such suspension, the same shall come to an end. In our considered Dview, any other interpretation would lead to absurdity and anomaly, andtherefore will have to be avoided.

46. We find that the appeals deserve to be allowed on anotherrule of interpretation, that the statute has to be interpreted in such amanner that it preserves its workability. Recently, this Court, in the caseEof Sanjay Ramdas Patil v. Sanjay and Others[9], has referred to theearlier judgments of this Court and observed thus:

“36. …..It will be relevant to refer to the observations of thisCourt in State of T.N. v. M.K. Kandaswami [State of T.N. v. M.K.Kandaswami, (1975) 4 SCC 745 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 402] : (SCCFp. 751, para 26)

“26. … If more than one construction is possible, that whichpreserves its workability, and efficacy is to be preferred to theone which would render it otiose or sterile.”

37. This Court in CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers [CIT v.GHindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57] has observed thus :(SCC p. 73, para 15)

“15. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretationthereof by a court should be to secure that object unless crucial H9 (2021) 10 SCC 306

omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.(See Whitney v. IRC [Whitney v. IRC, 1926 AC 37 : 10 TaxCas 88 (HL) : 95 LJKB 165 : 134 LT 98], AC at p. 52 referredto in CIT v. S. Teja Singh [CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] and Gursahai Saigal v. CIT[Gursahai Saigal v. CIT, AIR 1963 SC 1062 : (1963) 48 ITR1] .)”

38. In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India [Balram Kumawat v.Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 628], this Court observed thus :(SCC pp. 636-37, paras 25-26)

“25. A statute must be construed as a workable instrument. Utres magis valeat quam pereat is a well-known principle oflaw. In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam[Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (1989)3 SCC 709] this Court stated the law thus : (SCC p. 754, paras118-20)

‘118. The courts strongly lean against any constructionwhich tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision ofa statute must be so construed as to make it effective andoperative, on the principle “ut res magis valeat quampereat”. It is, no doubt, true that if a statute is absolutelyvague and its language wholly intractable and absolutelymeaningless, the statute could be declared void forvagueness. This is not in judicial review by testing the lawfor arbitrariness or unreasonableness under Article 14; butwhat a court of construction, dealing with the language of astatute, does in order to ascertain from, and accord to, thestatute the meaning and purpose which the legislatureintended for it. In Manchester Ship Canal Co. v.Manchester Racecourse Co. [Manchester Ship CanalCo. v. Manchester Racecourse Co., (1900) 2 Ch 352 : 69LJCh 850 : 83 LT 274] Farwell, J. said: (Ch pp. 360-61)

“Unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I coulddo nothing at all with them, I should be bound to find somemeaning, and not to declare them void for uncertainty.”

119. In Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham CountyCouncil [Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County AB

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Council, (1960) 3 WLR 831 : (1960) 3 All ER 503 (HL)]Lord Denning approving the dictum of Farwell, J., said:(WLR p. 849 : All ER p. 516)

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“But when a statute has some meaning, even though it isobscure, or several meanings, even though there is little tochoose between them, the courts have to say what meaningthe statute is to bear, rather than reject it as a nullity.”

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120. It is, therefore, the court’s duty to make what it can ofthe statute, knowing that the statutes are meant to beoperative and not inept and that nothing short of impossibilityshould allow a court to declare a statute unworkable. InWhitney v. IRC [Whitney v. IRC, 1926 AC 37 : 10 Tax Cas88 (HL) : 95 LJKB 165 : 134 LT 98] Lord Dunedin said :(AC p. 52)

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“A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretationthereof by a court should be to secure that object, unlesscrucial omission or clear direction makes that endunattainable.” ’

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26. The courts will therefore reject that construction whichwill defeat the plain intention of the legislature even thoughthere may be some inexactitude in the language used. [SeeSalmon v. Duncombe [Salmon v. Duncombe, (1886) LR 11AC 627 (PC) : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446] (AC at p. 634).]Reducing the legislation futility shall be avoided and in a casewhere the intention of the legislature cannot be given effect to,the courts would accept the bolder construction for the purposeof bringing about an effective result.”

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39. It could thus be seen that the Court will have to prefer aninterpretation which makes the statute workable. The interpretationwhich gives effect to the intention of the legislature, will have tobe preferred. The interpretation which brings about the effect ofresult, will have to be preferred than the one which defeats thepurpose of the enactment……”

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47. We are of the considered view that the legislature could nothave intended a situation, wherein though the post of AMC is created bythe State Government and a suitable person is appointed by it and thoughHa person appointed on the said post becomes an employee of the Corporation, there would be no provision in the statute to initiatedepartmental proceedings against him. If such an interpretation isaccepted, it would lead to absurdity and create a vacuum. In our opinion,in order to avoid such a situation, the interpretation as placed by us onthe aforesaid provisions of the MMC Act will have to be preferred.

48. Insofar as the contention raised on behalf of respondent No.1that the term “competent authority” as used in sub-section (1) of Section56 of the MMC Act will have to be read as a “competent authority” inrespect of appointments to be made for the posts in Chapter IV isconcerned, we are unable to accept the said contention. Such a restrictivemeaning would render the legislation otiose. In any event, it is to benoted that though a Transport Manager is appointed under Section 40 ofthe MMC Act, which is a part of Chapter II, a Transport Manager isspecifically referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 56 ofthe MMC Act which is a part of Chapter IV and empowers theCommissioner to suspend his services, however, with a requirement ofreporting the same with reasons to the Corporation. It is thus clear thatif the legislative intent was to give a narrower meaning to the term“competent authority”, only to mean such authorities who were found inChapter IV, then there would have been no reference in sub-section (1)of Section 56 of the MMC Act to Transport Manager, who is appointedunder Chapter II of the MMC Act. We therefore find that the contentionin that regard needs to be rejected.

49. We are therefore of the considered view that the High Courthas totally erred in setting aside the suspension and the departmentalproceedings initiated against respondent No.1. The effect of the impugnedjudgment is that the respondent No. 1, who has been, prima facie, foundto be involved in a serious misconduct, has been left scot-free withoutrequiring to face any departmental proceedings and directed to bereinstated in services.

50. Insofar as the prolonged suspension of the respondent No.1 isconcerned, the respondent No.1 has relied on the judgments of this Courtin the cases of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) and State of TamilNadu represented by Secretary to Government (Home) v. PromodKumar, IPS and Another[10]. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in thecase of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) is concerned, though this Court A

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Ahas deprecated the protracted period of suspension and repeated renewalthereof, in the facts of the said case, this Court found that since theappellant therein was served with a charge-sheet, the direction issued inthe said case may not be relevant to him any longer.

51. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in the case of PromodBKumar, IPS (supra) is concerned, this Court observed thus:

“24. ….There cannot be any dispute regarding the power orjurisdiction of the State Government for continuing the firstrespondent under suspension pending criminal trial. There is nodoubt that the allegations made against the first respondent areCserious in nature. However, the point is whether the continuedsuspension of the first respondent for a prolonged period isjustified.”

52. In the said case, the respondent No.1 therein was suspendedfor more than six years. This Court found that no useful purpose wouldDbe served by continuing the respondent No.1 therein under suspensionany longer.

53. We find that in the present case, it is the respondent No.1who, though called upon to participate in the departmental proceedings,has on his own, chosen not to participate therein. It is the respondentENo.1, who had objected to the initiation of the departmental proceedingsby the Commissioner on the ground of jurisdiction and refused toparticipate in the departmental proceedings. We therefore find that therespondent No.1 cannot be permitted to take benefit of his own wrong.In any case, we find that the issue of prolonged suspension would beFtaken care of by directing the departmental proceedings to be completedwithin a stipulated period but the suspension of respondent No.1 wouldcontinue till then.

54. We find that the impugned judgment passed by the High Courtis not sustainable in law.G

55. In the result, the appeals are allowed in the following terms:

(i) The impugned judgment dated 6[th] April 2021, passed by theHigh Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (ST.)No. 3599 of 2020 is quashed and set aside; H

KALYAN DOMBIVALI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v.SANJAY GAJANAN GHARAT AND ANOTHER [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

(ii) The Writ Petition (ST.) No. 3599 of 2020 filed by theArespondent No.1 before the High Court of Judicature atBombay is dismissed;

(iii) The departmental proceedings initiated against respondentNo.1 are directed to be completed as expeditiously aspossible and in any case, within a period of four monthsBfrom the date of this judgment. The respondent No.1 wouldcontinue to be under suspension till the conclusion of thesaid departmental proceedings; and

(iv) Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in theabove terms. No order as to costs.

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Bibhuti Bhushan Bose(Assisted by : Preetam Bharti, LCRA)

Appeals allowed.

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