CRL A/1042/2024 of MARIAPPAN Vs THE STATE REP BY ITS on 16 October 2026

JUDGMENT

The Criminal Appeal challenges the Judgment passed in Spl.S.C.No.7 of 2023 by the learned Sessions Judge, Special Court for Exclusive Trial of Cases under the POCSO Act, Dharmapuri, holding the appellant guilty of the offences under Sections 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”) and 5(1) r/w 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as the POCSO Act”) and sentencing him to undergo 5 years RI and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- i/d to undergo 6 months SI for the offence under Section 366 of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo 10 years RI and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- i/d to undergo 1 year SI for the offence under Section 5(1) r/w 6 of the POCSO Act. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2 (a). It is the case of the prosecution that the victim girl was aged about 17 years at the time of the occurrence; that the appellant was her neighbour; that though the appellant was already married, he had lured the victim girl and committed penetrative sexual assault when she was alone at her house and threatened her by stating that he had her nude pictures in his mobile phone; and that he would upload them if she disclosed the occurrence to anyone.

(b) . On the complaint given by the victim/P.W.1, a case was registered for the offences under Section 354 C of the IPC and Sections 4 and 8 of the POCSO Act. On completion of the investigation, the respondent filed the Final Report for the offences under Section 5(1) r/w 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC before the learned Sessions Judge, Special Court for Exclusive Trial of Cases under the POCSO Act, Dharmapuri.

(c) . On the appearance of the accused, the provisions of Section 207 Cr.P.C. were complied with, and the case was taken on file as Spl.S.C.No.7 of 2023 by the learned Sessions Judge, Special Court for Exclusive Trial of Cases under the POCSO Act, Dharmapuri. The trial Court framed charges against the accused for the offences under Sections 366 of the IPC and 5(1) r/w 6 of the POCSO Act. During the trial, when questioned, the accused pleaded 'not guilty.'

(d) . Before the trial Court, the prosecution had examined 20 witnesses as P.W.1 to P.W.20 and marked 18 documents as Exs.P1 to

P18, besides 4 material objects as M.O.1 to M.O.4. When the accused was questioned, u/s.313 Cr.P.C., on the incriminating circumstances appearing against him, he denied the same. The accused neither examined any witnesses nor marked any document on his side.

(e) . The Trial Court believed the evidence of the victim/P.W.1 and held the appellant guilty of the offences under Sections 366 of the IPC and 5(l) r/w 6 of the POCSO Act and sentenced the accused/appellant as stated in paragraph No.1 of this Judgment. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the appellant had preferred the instant appeal.

5. Mr. E. Kannadasan, the learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that pending appeal, the victim/P.W.1 married the appellant and produced the victim and the appellant before this Court.

6. Incidently, it appears that the first wife of the appellant had also not objected to the relationship of the victim and the appellant. The victim, identified by learned counsel and by Mr. G. Murugesan, Head Constable, Thoppur Police Station, Dharmapuri District, is present in person. She has filed an affidavit, which reads as follows:

“4. I submit that after coming out bail, the appellant and his parents were convened panchayath in the presence of the Village Panchayathars and elders with my family members and the appellant expressed his willingness to get marry me and the panchayathar also advised me to settle the issue in an amicable manner and get marry the appellant. On their advise, we got marriage on 30.01.2025 at Perumal Appan Koil, Coimbatore in the presence of both sides and after the marriage both are living together as husband and wife in the appellant’s house. Throughout our wedlock one male child was born to us on 08.01.2026 and my parents also maintaining cordial relationship with the appellant and his parents. The copy of the birth certificate of our son is herewith filed land the same may be read as part and parcel of this affidavit.”

7. The appellant had also filed an affidavit stating that he would take care of the victim; that he would support the victim; that, to show his bonafides, he had already deposited Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) in the name of his wife; and that he would transfer a further sum of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five Thousand Only) in favour of the victim within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a web copy of this Judgment.

8. The victim was present in person, and she would state that she is happily living with the appellant and that if the appellant is now convicted, it would cause hardship to her and to the appellant.

9. According to the prosecution, the victim was born on 28.01.1999. She is twenty-seven years old now. In fact, a child was born on 08.01.2026 out of the marriage between her and the appellant. This Court is convinced that she has taken a conscious decision, and she had not been subjected to any coercion or threat for making this decision. In fact, this Court also questioned the first wife of the appellant, who is also present before this Court. She also has no objection, and in fact all of them are living in a joint family.

10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahesh Mukund Patel vs. State of U.P. and others in Criminal Appeal No.001005/2025 arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.492 of 2025 in similar circumstances had quashed the proceedings after the accused and the victim got married.

11. In this regard, this Court also relies upon the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Ramesh Vs. State in Crl.A.(MD).No.199 of 2026, dated 15.09.2026. It would be useful to extract the relevant paragraphs in the aforesaid Judgment which is as follows: “12. Considering that the prayer is for setting aside the conviction and sentence of the accused for non-compoundable offences, we find it useful to turn to K.Dhandapani v. State [2022 (2) MWN (CR.) 481], wherein the Supreme Court has while dealing with a set of facts similar to that of the present case in which the accused had married the prosecutrix and was living happily with their two children, set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused for the offences under Section 5(j), 5(l) & 5(n) r/w. Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. The relevant extract of K.Dhandapani, Supra is as follows;

1. Leave granted.

2. The Appellant who is the maternal uncle of the prosecutrix belongs to Valayar community, which is a most backward community in the State of Tamilnadu. He works as a woodcutter on daily wages in a private factory. FIR was registered against him for committing rape under sections 5(j)(ii) read with Section 6, 5(I) read with Section 6 and 5(n) read with Section 6 of Protection of Child from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. He was convicted after trial for committing the said offences and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years by the Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Tiruppur on 31.10.2018. The High Court, by an order dated 13.02.2019, upheld the conviction and sentence. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant has filed this appeal.

3. Mr. M.P. Parthiban, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant, submitted that allegation against him was that he had physical relations with the prosecutrix on the promise of marrying her. He stated that, in fact, he married the prosecutrix and they have two children.

4. The Appellant submitted that this Court should exercise its power Under Article 142 of the Constitution and ought to do complete justice and it could not be in the interest of justice to disturb the family life of the Appellant and the prosecutrix.

5. After hearing the matter for some time on 08th March, 2022, we directed the District Judge to record the statement of the prosecutrix about her present status. The statement of the prosecutrix has been placed on record in which she has categorically stated that she

has two children and they are being taken care of by the Appellant and she is leading a happy married life.

6. Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., learned Counsel appearing for the State, opposed the grant of any relief to the Appellant on the ground that the prosecutrix was aged 14 years on the date of the offence and gave birth to the first child when she was 15 years and second child was born when she was 17 years. He argued that the marriage between the Appellant and the prosecutrix is not legal. He expressed his apprehension that the said marriage might be only for the purpose of escaping punishment and there is no guarantee that the Appellant will take care of the prosecutrix and the children after this Court grants relief to him.

7. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered view that the conviction and sentence of the Appellant who is maternal uncle of the prosecutrix deserves to be set aside in view of the subsequent events that have been brought to the notice of this Court. This Court cannot shut its eyes to the ground reality and disturb the happy family life of the Appellant and the prosecutrix. We have been informed about the custom in Tamilnadu of the marriage of a girl with the maternal uncle.

8. For the aforesaid mentioned reasons, the conviction and sentence of the Appellant is set aside in the peculiar facts of the case and shall not be treated as a precedent. The appeal is accordingly, disposed of. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

9. In case, the Appellant does not take proper care of the prosecutrix, she or the State on behalf of the prosecutrix can move this Court for modification of this

Order.

(emphasis supplied by this court)

13. In yet another similar instance, K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu [2025 INSC 1272] while dealing with a conviction and sentence under Section 366 of IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 held that ignoring the desire of the victim to live a peaceful and stable family life with the accused, would result in the continued incarceration of the accused, thereby disrupting their family unit and therewith further causing irreparable harm to the victim and their infant child. The relevant extract of the K. Kirubakaran, Supra is as follows;

1. Appellant was convicted for offences punishable Under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1872 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and 10 years, respectively, with fine. Aggrieved by such conviction and sentence, the Appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court of Judicature at Madras. It was dismissed vide the impugned judgment and order dated 13th September, 2021.

2. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, marriage between the Appellant and the victim of crime was solemnized in May 2021. By an order dated 6th February 2024, this Court had directed the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority2 to ascertain the well-being of the Appellant's wife. Pursuant thereto, the Member Secretary of the TNSLSA interacted with the Appellant's wife and has submitted a report revealing that after marriage the Appellant and his wife have been blessed with a male child, who is less than one year old, and also that they are leading a happy married life.

3. Wife of the Appellant has filed an affidavit before this Court stating that she is dependent upon the Appellant and wishes to lead a happy, normal, and peaceful life with him and the child born in their wedlock.

4. During the course of hearing, a prayer was made on behalf of the Appellant to invoke the powers of this Court Under Article 142 of the Constitution of India for quashing the conviction and sentence in order to avoid disruption of the matrimonial harmony between the parties. We considered it appropriate to first hear the complainant, being the father of the victim. He has appeared before us today through the virtual mode. Answering our query, he has stated in Tamil (conveyed to us by Mr.Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel for the State) that he has no objection to the criminal proceedings being brought to an end. ...9. Per the law made by the legislature, the Appellant having been found guilty of a heinous offence, the proceedings in the present case on the basis of a compromise between the Appellant and his wife cannot be quashed. But ignoring the cry of the Appellant's wife for compassion and empathy will not, in our opinion, serve the ends of justice. Even the most serious offenders of law do receive justice moderated by compassion from the courts, albeit in appropriate cases. Given the peculiar facts and circumstances here, a balanced approach combining practicality and empathy is necessary. The Appellant and the victim are not only legally married, they are also in their family way. While considering the offence committed by the Appellant punishable under the POCSO Act, we have discerned that the crime was not the result of lust but love. The victim of crime herself has expressed her desire to live a peaceful and stable family life with the Appellant, upon whom she is dependent, without the Appellant carrying the indelible mark on his forehead of being an offender. Continuation of the criminal proceedings and the Appellant's incarceration would only disrupt this familial unit and cause irreparable harm to the victim, the infant child, and the fabric of society itself.

10. We are, thus, persuaded to hold that this is a case where the law must yield to the cause of justice.

11. Accordingly, resting on the foregoing considerations, the developments subsequent to the trial, and in the interest of rendering complete justice, we deem it appropriate to invoke our powers Under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings against the Appellant including the conviction and sentence. Ordered accordingly.

12. Also, bearing in mind the interests of the Appellant's wife and child, we deem it appropriate to subject the Appellant to the specific condition of not deserting his wife and child and also to maintain them for the rest of their life with dignity. If, in future, there be any default on the Appellant's part and the same is brought to the notice of this Court by his wife or their child or the complainant, the consequences may not be too palatable for the Appellant. (emphasis supplied by this court)

14. Although, K. Dhandapani, Supra and K. Kirubakaran, Supra were rendered in exercise of the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, it is notable that Suraj Singh Gujar v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2024 SCC OnLine SC 2414] has while setting aside a conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 323, 324 (i.e. non compoundable offence) and 325 of IPC placed reliance on Ramgopal v. State of M.P [(2022) 14 SCC 531] to hold that both the High Court under Section 482 and the Supreme Court under Article 142 are vested with the powers to consider a compromise between the parties to grant permission to compound non-compoundable cases. The relevant extract of Suraj Singh Gujar, Supra is as follows;

5. As far as Sections 323 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code are concerned, offences under these provisions are compoundable but the offence Under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code is a non-compoundable offence.

6. Courts cannot grant permission to compound

the non-compoundable offences, on the basis of any sort of compromise between the parties, as it would be contrary to what has been provided by legislation, except the High Court Under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure and the Apex Court in exercise of its powers Under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The compromise between the parties in non-compoundable cases has been taken into consideration by this Court in various occasions to reduce the sentence of the convicts. (See: Murali v. State (2021) 1 SCC 726; Manjit Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2020) 18 SCC 777) Also, in a series of other cases, considering that the incident occurred between relatives and the incident is of such a nature which did not have much impact on society, this Court had set aside the conviction by invoking its power Under Article 142 of the Constitution in matters involving non-compoundable offences. (See: Kailash Chand v. State of Rajasthan (2021) 18 SCC 534; Srinivasan Iyenger and Anr. v. Bimla Devi Agarwal and Ors. (2019) 4 SCC 456; Ramawatar v. State of M.P. 2022) 13 SCC 635) However, this is to be done only in exceptional cases after considering various factors including the nature of injuries, relation between parties and the impact of crime on society, etc. While discussing the powers of Article 142 of the Constitution and Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure (in relation to High Courts) in quashing criminal proceedings in non-compoundable offences, this Court in Ramgopal and Anr. v. State of

M.P. (2022) 14 SCC 531 observed as follows: “19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences "compoundable" within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure or vested in this Court Under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind:

19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of the society; 19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any; 19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the Accused and the victim; 19.4 Conduct of the Accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.” Considering the aforesaid factors, we have no doubt that the present case, which we are dealing with, is a fit case to invoke our powers Under Article 142 of the Constitution.

7. In our case, the incident occurred on 20.05.2011 relating to a minor issue where Respondent No. 2 was trying to tie bullocks to which the Appellants objected by saying that it was their land. As is clear from the compromise, the Appellants and complainant side are close relatives and after settling their disputes, both sides have agreed to maintain peace and harmony in the society. Taking all of this into account, we invoke our powers Under Article 142 of the Constitution and hereby, set aside the conviction of Appellants in the present case. Appellants, who are already outside jail, need not surrender. (emphasis supplied by this court)

12. Considering all the above facts, this Court is of the view that if the appellant is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, it would cause undue hardship to the appellant, the victim and the child born to the victim. Therefore, in exercise of the inherent powers, this Court accepts the compromise and sets aside the Judgement of conviction. The appellant is therefore acquitted of the charges levelled against him.

13. Accordingly, this criminal appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment passed by the Trial Court is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted of all the charges. Bail bond, if any, executed by the appellant shall stand discharged. Fine amount, if any paid, shall be refunded to the appellant. 16-10-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No dk

To

1. The Sessions Judge, Special Court for Exclusive Trial of Cases under POCSO Act, Dharmapuri.

2. The Inspector of Police, Thoppur Police Station, Dharmapuri, District.

3. The Public Prosecutor, High Court of Madras, Chennai – 600 104.

SUNDER MOHAN, J. dk CRL A No. 1042 of 2024 16-10-2026